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As events in Europe in 1938 and 1939 followed their inexorable path
toward war, relations between Mexico and the United States were passing
through one of their frequent periods of turmoil following the expro-
priation by President Lazaro Cardenas of valuable American oil properties
in March, 1938. There was little reason to believe that these often
uncooperative neighbors could solve their many problems and assist each
other should the war spread to the Western Hemisphere. Almost miraculously,
by the end of 1941 the United States and Mexico had resolved their major
differences and were adopting programs and policies which resulted in
unprecedented mutual collaboration during the long years of World War II.
Although many volumes have been written covering the relations
between these two countries during the periods of the Mexican Revolution
and the petroleum seizure, historians have tended to ignore the era of
tremendous cooperation from 1941 to 1945. The topic has been mentioned
in general histories of American foreign policy and general accounts of
American relations with Mexico, but it has not received extensive
monographic attention. This study attempts to provide the student of
history with a detailed description of the economic and political
collaboration that took place between Mexico and the United States during
the global struggle.
No attempt has been made to make this paper all-encompassing. In
two specific areas the student of United States-Mexican relations may
wish to consult additional sources. The military relationship between
the United States and Mexico is discussed in Chapter III; however, a more
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CHAPTER I
SETTING THE STAGE: UNITED STATES MEXICAN RELATIONS, 1910-1940
A huge celebration took place in Mexico City on September 16, 1910,
to commemorate the one-hundredth anniversary of Mexico's independence and
the eightieth birthday of Porfirio Diaz who, except for a brief interrup-
tion, had ruled Mexico with an iron hand for thirty-four years. Thousands
of foreigners flocked to the Mexican capital to take part in the
festivities. Their genial host spent millions of pesos from the nation's
treasury for fireworks, music, food and champagne. To the casual observer
Mexico appeared quite happy and contented under the reign of Don Porfirio.
This was particularly true since the Indian population and the poor had
been barred from the central district of the capital and were prohibited
from joining in the celebration. However, a revolutionary spirit was
spreading throughout the country, particularly among the peasant classes,
and soon would manifest itself in the overthrow of the aging dictator.
Throughout his lengthy rule Diaz did everything in his power to
attract foreign capital, primarily from the United States. When potential
investors reached Mexico they usually found the Government more than
eager to grant whatever concessions were requested, favorable tax
legislation, leniency in interpretation and enforcement of local laws,
and considerate treatment in the courts. One writer has stated: "What
Dfaz refused to grant by open and formal proclamation from the housetop
1Lewis Hanke, Mexico and the Caribbean (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand




he gradually yielded in the secret places of the palace.'
By 1910 under the Di'az regime some seventy-two million hectares of
Mexican soil, about one- third of the national domain, had been alienated,
causing one Mexican to remark bitterly: "Mexico has been called the
o
mother of foreigners and the stepmother of the Mexican. 1 At the same time
only ten percent of the Indian population owned any land whatever, and the
Indians themselves were treated as social outcasts by other Mexicans.
D^az argued that the introduction of foreigners and their capital
in Mexico was progressive and necessary for development while the Mexicans
denounced their presence as imperialistic and oppressive. This increased
foreign investment had coincided with a sharp drop in the economic wel-
fare of the peasants, and it was only natural that a cause and effect
relationship be seen between these two occurrences. It was just as
natural to carry the analysis one step further and argue that only through
a drastic reduction in foreign control of the economy could the position
of the lower classes be improved.
Strong feelings of nationalism were in evidence throughout the
country as many Mexicans called for expulsion of foreign investors and
the removal from office of the man who bade them welcome. Scores of
charges were levied against D^az, a typical one being the granting of
"scandalous concessions in rubber lands... to the American multimillion-
aires John Rockefeller and Nelson Aldrich, which caused the ruin of a
2James Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1926), p. 311.
^Quoted in, Wendell C. Gordon, The Expropriation of Foreign-Owned
Property in Mexico (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs,
1941), p. 4.





great number of poor towns in the state of Durango."^ President Diaz
was forced to make a choice; he could not serve two masters. He elected
to back foreign capital because he believed economic development should
precede social reform, but the reform movement grew and in the end proved
too strong for the aged ruler.
In the midst of this agitation for change during the 1910 Mexican
General Election, Francisco Madero emerged as the hero of the peasant
class and the President's principal opposition. Madero publicly denounced
Diaz and was imprisoned by him a few days before the election on charges
of inciting armed rebellion. Two months later Djfaz announced the results
of the election in which, according to official figures, he had received
millions of votes while his opponent gathered only 196. Following his
"defeat" Madero was permitted to "escape" from his cell in San Luis Potosf
and seek asylum in Texas.
On reaching the United States Madero issued his "Plan of San Luis
Potosi" which he had prepared in prison. He demanded that the recent
election be nullified, claiming it was dishonest and not representative
of the will of the people. He called on the Mexican nation to rise up in
revolt against the corrupt regime of Diaz, and set November 20, 1910, as
the initial day of action. Madero named himself Provisional President
and promised elections as well as broad political, social and economic
reforms. Although no major revolt took place on that date, November 20,
1910, began a new era which divided "old" Mexico from "new" Mexico and
signalled the start of revolutionary change that has not yet ended.
^Quoted in, Rippy, The United States and Mexico
, p. 330.
6Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1953), p. 120.
Cline, The United States and Mexico, p. 121.
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Djfaz who had over the years completely alienated the peasant and
Indian populations soon realized that in order to avert a dreadful blood-
bath he must step down. Resigning the presidency on May 25, 1911, he
journied to Veracruz where the German vessel, Ypiranga
,
was waiting to
carry him into exile. He died four years later in Paris still believing
that he had valiantly served his patria querida .8
As had been promised in the "Plan of San Luis Potosi," elections were
held immediately following the ouster of Diaz, and to the surprise of no
one Francisco Madero emerged as the victor. Madero was honest, but had
little experience in government. He moved cautiously in carrying out his
plans and alienated those of his followers who were in favor of immediate
and far-reaching economic and political change. Several counterrevolutions
followed.
President William Howard Taft whose foreign policy was influenced by
his Secretary of State, Philander C. Knox, and who favored any orderly
Government in Mexico, promptly recognized the new Mexican regime in
November, 1911. When an armed uprising led by General Pascual Orozco
almost immediately threatened the infant Mexican administration, Taft
put American railroad facilities at Madero' s disposal to transport his
troops across Texas. As the fighting intensified Taft requested and
received Congressional authorization in March, 1912, to embargo arms
shipments to both sides in the civil struggle. Two weeks later, however,
the embargo was lifted on shipments to Madero' s forces.
No sooner had the Orozco rebellion been put down than Felix Dxaz, a
nephew of the ex-dictator, led a number of army units in a new revolt in
8John Edwin Fagg, Latin America : A General History (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 702.
Q
Cline, The United States and Mexico , p. 121.
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Mexico City on February 9, 1913. Madero's forces scattered the rebelling
troops and forced them to take refuge in the military prison which bore
the name, Ciudadela . When the President called in additional government
troops under the command of General Victoriano Huerta it appeared that
the Diaz revolt would be quickly smashed.
Huerta, however, had ambitions of his own, and instead of defeating
Diaz concluded a secret agreement with him on February 17, 1913, known
as the "Facto de la Ciudadela ". The combined strength of Diaz and Huerta
was too much for Madero. On the following day the latter was deposed and
Huerta, after having himself appointed Provisional President, sent the
following cable to President Taft: "I have the honor to inform you that
I have overthrown this Government. The forces are with me, and from now
on peace and prosperity will reign."
Huerta promised that the ousted President would be granted safe
passage to the Mexican border, but a few days later Madero was killed.
Huerta claimed that several Maderistas had attempted to free their leader
from the presidential palace where he was being held and in the ensuing
fracas he had been shot. Historians have found scant evidence to back
up this story.
During Madero's presidency, Henry Lane Wilson was the United States
Ambassador in Mexico. He was appointed to the post by President Taft in
1910 when it became apparent that Mexico would experience internal dissen-
sion as a result of the presidential election. The Ambassador was the
brother of the leader of the Republican Party in the state of Washington,
and as United States Minister to Chile had been a staunch supporter of
Taft's Dollar Diplomacy.
1QForeip,n Relations of the United States , 1913 , General Huerta to
President Taft, February 18, 1913, p. 721.
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Because Madero was inexperienced in government and because he did not
respond to the American diplomat's suggestions and ideas, which invariably
favored United States business interests, Ambassador Wilson developed a
resentment for the Mexican President. This resentment soon grew to a
passionate dislike, and the Ambassador became convinced and determined
that Madero had to be removed from office. This bias so colored his
reports to Washington that President Taft and Secretary Knox began to
doubt their reliability.
Throughout the period of the successful uprising against Madero,
Ambassador Wilson was "suspiciously active. "** He had dealings with both
General Diaz and Huerta and was, if not active in its preparation, at
least aware of the signing of the "Pacto de la Ciudadela ." Following the
removal of Madero, Huerta met with Felix Diaz at the American Embassy where
it was decided that Huerta should assume the provisional presidency until
elections could be held. Ambassador Wilson proudly presented General
Huerta to the diplomatic corps and sent glowing messages to Taft who had
little idea of the role played by his Ambassador in Mexican internal
affairs. 12
Soon afterwards Britain, France, Germany, Japan and many other
countries with envoys in Mexico City recognized the Huerta regime as the
13legal Government of Mexico. Ambassador Wilson pleaded for American
de jure recognition of the Provisional Government, which Secretary Knox
was willing to grant, provided Huerta would agree to certain concessions,
among them the establishment of a commission to consider American claims





^Arthur S. Link, Wilson : The New Freedom (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1960), p. 349.
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for losses suffered during the revolution. When Huerta refused, Taft
decided to leave the problem of recognition to Woodrow Wilson who became
President in March, 1913.
Despite the strong pro-Huerta stand taken by Ambassador Wilson, by
the State Department Counselor, John Basset t Moore, and by many members
of the large American colony residing in Mexico, President Wilson decided
to withhold formal recognition until he could familiarize himself with the
Mexican situation. When he learned the details of the overthrow and
subsequent death of Madero, and the manner in which the American Ambassador
had presided over the change in government, the new President was so
repulsed that he recalled Ambassador Wilson "in something bordering on
disgrace. 1 In addition, he sent a special fact-finding mission to
Mexico in order to determine the conditions as they then existed, and he
decided to continue withholding recognition from a regime that had come
into power through the methods used by Huerta. In one respect this policy
represented the Jeffersonian principle of recognition which held that a
government must be representative of the people. In another respect it
seemed to be a new policy because more recently the United States had
recognized de_ facto governments regardless of how they had ascended to
power provided there was no serious internal opposition to the new govern-
ment, and the new regime promised to carry out its international obliga-
tions. In addition to these two conditions Taft had made recognition
dependent on guaranteed protection of United States nationals and property
in the country in question. Now Wilson introduced the element of
constitutionality; he intended to examine the manner by which a government
had assumed power.
Fagg, Latin America : A General History , p. 709.
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Any regime which seized the seat of authority by overthrowing a
duly-elected government would, under Wilson's new principle, not be recog-
nized unless subsequently sanctified by the will of the people. Wilson
held: "that just government rests always upon the consent of the governed,
and that there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon
public conscience and approval..." and "we can have no sympathy with
those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own
16personal interests or ambitions."
As events unfolded south of the border Wilson became even more deter-
mined to deny recognition to the Huerta Government. Immediately following
the coup , the Maderistas leaders in many northern Mexican states rose up
in open rebellion against the Provisional Government. On March 26, 1913,
the anti-Huertistas , or Constitutionalists, as they preferred to be called,
assembled at Guadalupe, demanded the return of constitutional government,
and installed Venustiano Carranza, Governor of the State of Coahuila, as
"First Chief" or head of the revolutionary movement. Four days later
Carranza appointed himself Provisional President of Mexico.
Wishing to know more about Mexico, a country which would occupy a
great deal of his time from his inauguration until United States entrance
into World War I, President Wilson commissioned his good friend, William
Hale, to visit the country and report on the conditions as he found them.
Hale knew very little about Mexico, but he was an excellent reporter, and
Wilson trusted him implicitly.
Hale became convinced that Huerta would not survive and that if the
Quoted in, Rippy, The United States and Mexico , p. 333.
Quoted in, Link, Wilson : The New Freedom , p. 360.




civil war continued for any length of time the United States would be
required to intervene. He boldly recommended that Wilson demand the
elimination of Huerta and the immediate holding of free elections in order
to form a new government which the United States could recognize. °
In July, 1913, Wilson and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan
reviewed their Mexican policy in light of the report received from William
Hale and decided to offer their good offices to mediate the internal
conflict. Along with the offer of good offices they articulated what they
considered to be satisfactory proposals for a settlement. One of these
proposals called for Huerta to renounce his candidacy in the forthcoming
election. The General refused, thus retiring the American proposals to
the scrap heap of good intentions
.
Wilson went before a joint session of the Congress in late August,
1913, to explain his Mexican policy. He emphasized that his concern was
only for the welfare of the Mexican people who, due to irresponsible
government, were going to suffer even more than they had in the past.
He gave details of the initiatives he had undertaken and of their ultimate
failure. The President stated: "It was our duty at least to volunteer our
good offices— to offer to assist, if we might, in effecting some arrange-
ment which would bring relief and peace and set up a universally acknowledged
political authority there." 1
"
Now the United States could only watch and wait while the bloody civil
war took its course. Wilson announced that the Government would recommend
that its citizens leave Mexico and would strictly embargo all arms
shipments to any part of the republic. Both the American public and Huerta
seemed pleased with Wilson's policy of strict neutrality and "watchful
18Link, Wilson : The New Freedom
, pp. 354-355,
19Quoted in, Link, Wilson : The New Freedom , p. 360.

-10-
waiting." In fact, there were even indications from Mexico City that the
General might voluntarily withdraw from the presidential election. This,
however, was not to be the case.
The Chamber of Deputies, a pro-Maderista body and a thorn in the side
of the provisional regime since the coup , threatened to dissolve the
Government in mid-October, 1913, and move behind Constitutionalist lines.
Huerta quickly moved to unseat the Congress until a new body could be
selected by the October 26 ballot. He publicly declared to the diplomatic
corps that he would neither seek nor accept the presidency of the Republic
in the upcoming election.
The results of the Mexican election discouraged President Wilson
and led him to abandon his policy of "watchful waiting." Huerta succeeded
in having a subservient Congress elected which in turn declared the
presidential election void on the grounds that too few people had cast
ballots. The Congress appointed Huerta President ad_ interim and set the
new election for July, 1914. Wilson decided that Huerta should be removed
from power in Mexico, but preferred to reach his goal without the use of
force. He addressed a confidential memorandum to the Mexican Minister of
Foreign Affairs which stated in part:
that, unless General Huerta now voluntarily, and as if of
his own motion retires from authority and from all attempts
to control the organization of the government and the course
of affairs, it will be necessary for the President of the
United States to insist upon the terms of an ultimatum,
the rejection of which would render it necessary for him to
propose very serious practical measures to the Congress of
the United States. 20
The message was to intimate that the United States would actively
assist Carranza if Huerta did not retire.
20Quoted in, Link, Wilson : The New Frontier , p. 380.
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By January, 1914, the Mexican situation required another decision of
Wilson. The Constitutionalist offensive had bogged down and Carranza's
forces were actually being pushed back. The "First Chief" needed arms to
continue his struggle, and the United States was the best source. Wilson
preferred to supply the Constitutionalists with arras and munitions rather
than commit American troops to the civil war. The arms embargo on shipments
to the anti-Huertistas was lifted on February 3, 1914, when Carranza
promised that he would respect foreign investment, including "just and
equitable concessions. "^l
This initiative by Wilson, however, did not have the desired effect;
Huerta continued to win impressive victories. His success can be attri-
buted to two factors. First, a fierce rivalry was beginning to corrode
the formerly solid Constitutionalist ranks. Pancho Villa, one of
Carranza's generals, became disenchanted with the "First Chief" and decided
to seize power himself. The constant jockeying for position between the
two rivals tended to blunt the heretofore sharp fighting edge of the
Constitutionalists. Second, the Church and propertied classes who
considered Carranza both anti-clerical and the champion of land reform
threw their support to Huerta in an effort to retain their favored
22positions.
Meanwhile, on April 9, 1914, an incident occurred which President
Wilson used to discredit the Government of Huerta. On that date, one
officer and seven enlisted personnel in a whaleboat from the USS Dolphin ,
one of several American ships stationed off the port-city of Tampico,
then under attack by Carranza's forces, were arrested by a group of
21Cline, The United States and Mexico , p. 154.
22Link, Wilson : The New Freedom , p. 392.

-12-
Mexican soldiers as they landed without permission to purchase gasoline.
Admiral Henry T. Mayo, the Commander of the United States squadron,
immediately sent Lieutenant Commander Ralph K. Earle, Commanding Officer
of Dolphin
,
to the local Huertista military governor to demand the release
of the prisoners.
General Ignacio Morelos Zaragoza, "dumbfounded" when informed of the
arrest, promptly freed the Americans and apologized, explaining that the
Mexicans involved were not regular soldiers, but members of the State
Guard who were "evidently ignorant of the first laws of war. 3 To this
point the whole incident had lasted less than one hour; normally it would
have lasted no longer. The American seamen had been neither harassed nor
insulted by their captors, and the general population of Tampico was
unaware of the incident. However, Admiral Mayo decided that the Mexican
response did not adequately atone for the disrespect shown to the United
States Navy. His Chief of Staff was sent to General Zaragosa with an
ultimatum: by six o'clock the following evening to "hoist the American
flag in a prominent position on shore and salute it with twenty-one guns,
which salute will be duly returned" by the American flagship. In
addition, the officer responsible for the arrest was to be court-martialed,
and a formal written apology was to be sent to Admiral Mayo.
The matter was quickly referred to the highest levels of both Govern-
ments. Huerta agreed to court-martial the responsible officer and to
apologize in writing, but he refused to fire the demanded salute. Mayo
was backed up by President Wilson who sought a joint resolution from
23Quotcd in, Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor : Woodrow Wilson
and the Occupation of Veracruz (Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press,
1962), p. 23.
Quoted in, Cline, The United States and Mexico , p. 156.
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Congress declaring that he was "justified in the employment of armed
25forces of the United States to enforce demands made on Victoriano Huerta.
Before this resolution was passed and while Admiral Mayo was planning
to seize Tampico, it was learned that the German steamer, Ypiranga , was
expected within the next few days to arrive in Veracruz with arms for
Huerta. The action anticipated by the United States was shifted to
Veracruz where the American forces were told to seize the customs house
and prevent the war supplies carried by the German vessel from being
delivered to the Huerta Government or to any other party. 26
Early on the morning of April 21, 1914, after a brief naval bombard-
ment, about one thousand sailors and marines landed unopposed at Veracruz,
ostensibly to prevent arms shipments from reaching the Federalists. Within
the hour Huerta' s forces, joined by cadets from the Mexican Naval Academy,
began to resist the American occupation. By the following afternoon the
Mexican defenders had been scattered. Casualties were: Mexican 126 dead
and 195 wounded; American 19 dead and 71 wounded. '
In ordering the occupation Wilson had thought there would be no
Mexican resistance and possibly no casualties. He was visibly shaken when
he learned of the bloodshed on both sides and even more upset when both
Huerta and Carranza bitterly protested the American intervention and
demanded an immediate withdrawal of the occupation forces. For the next
few days war against the combined armies of the Federalists and the
Constitutionalists seemed a very real possibility to the American President.
Only the most fortuitous circumstances prevented the outbreak of
Quoted in, Link: Wilson: The New Freedom , p. 395.





hostilities between United States forces in Veracruz and the Constitutional-
ists who had been attacking the city at the time of the occupation. In
order to lessen this undesired possibility, Wilson reimposed the embargo
on the shipment of arms and munitions to Carranza while assuring the
"First Chief" that the United States had no quarrel with the Mexican
people and would "respect in every possible way the sovereignty and
JO
independence of the people of Mexico."
The American intervention was vociferously denounced throughout
Latin America. Particularly vehement was one of Buenos Aires 1 dailies,
La Nacio'n , which stated: "The memory of this conflict will live in the
99
history of the relations between the United States and Latin America." -
However, it was three Latin American nations, Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile, which offered on April 25 to mediate the conflict, thus removing
the United States from a very difficult position.
The Mediation Conference opened on May 18 at Niagara Falls, Ontario
and dragged on until late June. The United States was not in any partic-
ular hurry to adjourn since as long as American forces were in control
of the customs house at Veracruz, Huerta was denied a vital source of
revenue necessary to purchase arms, thus causing a continual deterioration
in his position vis-a-vis the Constitutionalists. Throughout the confer-
ence Wilson and Bryan were most uncompromising in their position that a
settlement could only be reached if Huerta were removed from power and a
Government were established under Constitutionalist control.
Finally, on June 24 an agreement was reached at the Niagara Conference.
Making no reference to the occupation of Veracruz it stated simply that







the United States would recognize the Provisional Government resulting
from the civil war (it was obvious by this time that Carranza would triumph),
that the United States would not demand reparation for the Tampico affair,
and that the new Provisional Government would grant general amnesty to all
sides in the internal struggle and compensate foreigners for damages
resulting from the war.™
Huerta realized even better than Wilson that without the revenue
from the customs house he could not remain in power. His paper money was
worthless, and he had no foreign exchange with which to buy food and
armament for his troops. On July 14, after appointing the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court to negotiate with Carranza for the surrender of
Mexico City, he resigned the presidency and left the country on the
/ 31Ypiranga
,
the same ship that carried Porfirio Diaz into exile. Mexico
City was formally surrendered on August 20, 1914, the day that the "First
Chief," surrounded by his generals, triumphantly entered the capital and
took up residence in the presidential palace.
Long and difficult negotiations with Carranza for the withdrawal of
American troops from Veracruz finally proved fruitful. They were
evacuated on November 23, 1914, after the Provisional President promised
general amnesty for those Mexicans who had served the occupation force
in Veracruz. 32 it is rather ironic to note that the ship carrying the
arms shipment to Veracruz, which precipitated the invasion there, was
allowed to proceed to Puerto Mexico with her cargo for delivery to Huerta.
By the end of August, 1914, most Americans were optimistic with the
3D
Link, Wilson: The New Freedom
,
p. 412.
31Cline, The United States and Mexico
,
p. 162.
^ 2J. Lloyd Mecham, A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 358.
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events as they had transpired in Mexico; Huerta had been deposed, his
army scattered, and the revolution begun by Madero was apparently success-
ful. However, Wilson and Bryan realized that the situation was not as
rosy as it appeared. They saw the volcano just beneath the surface
ready to erupt.
South of Mexico City Emiliano Zapata, an agrarian revolutionary,
continued his armed land reform independent of the President just as he
had done while Madero and Huerta had been in power. Discontent throughout
the country was mounting as the effects of the revolution were being felt
by an increasing number of Mexicans. The biggest threat to the Government
was in the North where Pancho Villa and his powerful Division of the
North, now in open revolt against Carranza, sought to gain control of the
revolution.
Villa openly solicited the support of Washington. Whatever Don
Pancho thought Wilson would like to hear, he said. During the United
States occupation of Veracruz, while both Huerta and Carranza were pro-
testing the intervention, Villa assured Wilson that the troops could
remain there as long as they wished provided they did not cross Constitu-
tionalist lines.
It appears that sometime during the month of August, for reasons not
totally clear, Wilson decided to support Villa in his drive to control
the Mexican revolution. The President was probably influenced in his
decision by the following factors: 1) a belief that Villa represented
the best hope for a solution to the serious agrarian problem; 2) the fact
that a great many Americans favored Villa whom they considered to be a
modern day Robin Hood; and 3) probably most important, the assumption
which seemed quite accurate that Carranza, who had no armies of his own,
and only the dubious loyalty of his generals to rely on, was bound to lose
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an armed struggle against Villa and his powerful Division of the North. ^^
Events in Mexico followed their disturbing sequence as fighting
broke out between Villistas and government forces on September 25. Four
days later Villa and Zapata agreed to commit their armies to the task of
overthrowing Carranza. Wilson who had little faith in Carranza believed
that Villa would easily triumph and that his victory would contribute to
lasting peace in Mexico. The United States was determined not to inter-
vene again in the bloody struggle.
In October, 1914, a revolutionary convention was held in Aguascalientes
to select a Provisional President. Carranza had originally been in favor
of such a convention, but he insisted that the convention should select a
civilian government to carry out the work of the revolution. Villa and
Zapata disagreed insisting that a military government must be maintained.
Due to this basic difference Carranza refused to attend the convention
which on November 2 elected a former Carrancista , General Eulalio
Gutierrez, as its President and appointed Villa as Secretary of War.
The State Department observer at the scene was optimistic and happily
wired the Department: "Truly the Republic of Mexico was born again last
night by the selection of a man upon whom all factions and elements
35
could center without discord."
During the month of November President Wilson's estimate of the
situation seemed correct. The Villistas , aided by Zapata, drove Carranza
out of Mexico City and captured the capital which they triumphantly
entered on December 6. Gutierrez was installed as Provisional President,
Arthur S. Link, Wilson : The Struggle for Neutrality (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 240-241.
Cline, The United States and Mexico , p. 164.
35Quoted in, Link, Wilson : The Struggle for Neutrality , p. 253.
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but when he observed the cruelity of Villa in executing political prisoner
he defected to the Carrancistas .
Following his defeat at Mexico City, Carranza had retreated to
Veracruz, still claiming to be the rightful ruler of Mexico. Now that
Gutierrez had fled their camp, Villa and Zapata were unable to agree on a
mutually acceptable plan of government. Superimposed on this new factional
struggle was perhaps the most important decision of the entire revolution,
that of General Alvaro Obregon to remain loyal to Carranza. With Villa
and Zapata now divided among themselves, Obregon began to win important
victories. On January 27, 1915, he drove the Villistas from the capital,
and Carranza returned to the city the following day.
The United States had, in fact, broken de facto relations with
Carranza when the latter was forced to retreat to Veracruz. It was done
in a manner that must have been quite humiliating to the "First Chief."
When he left Mexico City the State Department simply stopped talking to
him, and during December and January maintained de_ facto relations with
Villa. Now that the situation had reversed itself again, the United
States resumed de facto relations with Carranza in February. This,
however, did not heal the deep wounds existing between the two countries.
Wilson still had no confidence in Carranza' s ability to govern, and the
Mexican leader did not trust the United States.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1915 Obregon, continuing to
score impressive triumphs, completely shattered Villa's armies and pushed
him and his followers far to the north. Secretary of State Robert A.
Lansing, who had replaced the retired Bryan, began to feel that perhaps
Carranza would be able to unite the divided Mexican people. "The
Link, Wilson ; The Stru^le for Neutrality , pp. 456-A57.
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Carranzistas ( sic ) , " he wrote to Wilson on September 12, "are undoubtedly
stronger and more cohesive than they have ever been. In fact I have
about reached the conclusion that they are so dominant that they are
entitled to recognition. " Wilson had reached this same conclusion and
proposed to several Latin American nations that a conference be held to
decide on the advisability of granting de_ facto recognition to Carranza.
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala and Uruguay met with the United
States in early August to discuss the recognition issue. After a great
deal of discussion it was decided that Lansing should exact from Carranza
a promise that his Government would protect foreign lives and property,
and fulfill its obligations under international law. When the Mexican
ruler agreed to this the American Secretary of State was able to convince
38his Latin American colleagues to grant recognition. "The Conferences,"
a statement declared, "after careful consideration of the facts, have
found that the Carranza party is the only party possessing the essentials
39
for recognition as the de facto government in Mexico...." In addition
to the above mentioned countries Bolivia, Colombia, and Nicaragua supported
the declaration.
On October 19, 1915, the Latin American countries and the United
States formally recognized Carranza as the d_e facto ruler of Mexico. By
proclamation Wilson embargoed arms shipments to all factions in Mexico
other than the duly recognized Government. These actions produced
screams of protest from some American religious leaders who opposed
Carranza because of his anti-clericism, and from those with financial
interests in Mexico who considered Carranza a danger to their properties.
Quoted in, Link, Wilson ; The Strup.ftle for Neutrality, p. 636.
38Cline, The United States and Mexico , p. 174.
39Quoted in, Link, Wilson : The Struggle for Neutrality , p. 639.
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Following the de facto recognition of Carranza's Government, an era
of cooperation and good feeling was initiated by the two neighbors. The
Mexican President promised to take action on several outstanding problems
that had previously clouded relations, and Mexican troops were given
permission to transit Texas and Arizona in order to do battle against the
remnants of Villa's army in Sonora. Determined to restore full diplomatic
intercourse, which had been broken when Henry Lane Wilson was recalled,
the State Department proposed the name of Henry P. Fletcher as Ambassador
to Mexico. His departure was delayed as serious difficulties again arose
between the two countries.
On January 10, 1916, a band of Villa's so-called irregulars led by
one of his most trustworthy officers stopped a train at Santa Ysabel,
about fifty miles west of Chihuahua City, and murdered seventeen American
passengers in cold blood. Many prominent Americans, Senators Albert B.
Fall (R. , N. Mex.) and Lawrence Y. Sherman (R., 111.) among them, called
for United States military action if Carranza were unable to protect
foreigners within his borders. The Hurst press was even more vocal, and
quite irresponsible. "It is true at last," it stated. "We see we ARE too
proud to fight.... Why even a little, despicable, contemptible bandit
nation like Mexico murders our citizens, drags our flag in the dirt and
spits at and defies this Nation of ours with truculent insolence."
President Wilson made it quite clear that he did not intend to
intervene militarily in Mexico. He, of course, deplored the loss of
American life, but he was not moved to action as were some members of
Congress who visited him the day following the incident. He had recognized
Cline, The United States and Mexico, p. 174.
^Quoted in, Arthur S. Link, Wilson ; Confusion and Crisis (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 201-202.
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the Carranza Government, and he looked to that Government for redress.
Besides, Wilson reasoned, the Americans had been warned not to travel in
that section of the country in which they had been killed. A considerable
sector of public opinion, not wishing war with Mexico, backed the Presi-
dent.
Villa struck again on March 9, 1916, this time on United States
soil. Firing indiscriminately he attacked Columbus, New Mexico, where
buildings were burned and looted and nineteen Americans killed. This
second attack on American lives further aroused the anti-Mexican sentiment
in the country and caused many people who had previously supported Wilson's
policy to demand instant retaliation.
The President realized the possibility that Villa had carried out his
raids to force United States intervention, a move which Wilson was still
determined to avoid. A considerable sector of the American public, how-
ever, called for the immediate capture and punishment of Villa, something
Wilson thought might be accomplished by a small United States force
entering Mexico with Carranza 's blessing. The latter immediately ordered
General Luis Gutierrez, the off icer-in-charge at Chihuahua, to track down
and capture Villa, but he did not favor granting formal permission for
any foreign troops to operate on Mexican soil. In fact, he ordered
Government troops at Sonora and Veracruz to resist any American invasion
by land or sea.
Wilson could not understand why Carranza elected to take such a stand.
He thought he had made it quite clear that the operations would only be
against Villa, and under no circumstances would "they be suffered to
trench in any degree upon the sovereignty of Mexico or develop into




Although some of Wilson's advisers favored war-like preparations,
the President still maintained his position that war must be avoided. He
told his secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty: "There won't be any war with
Mexico if I can prevent it no matter how hard the gentlemen on the hill
yell for it and demand it.... I will not resort to war against Mexico
until I have exhausted every means to keep out of this mess.' In view
of the course of events in Europe and the possibility of war with Germany,
Wilson was determined not to commit a large amount of military resources
in Mexico.
Unexpectedly word was received from General John. J. Pershing, who
was to command the expeditionary force, if one were ordered into Mexico,
that the Mexican military commanders along the border had said not only
could the American force enter their country, but that General Obregon,
the Minister of War and Navy, had instructed them to assist the Americans
in every way possible. Pershing, with his force of 4,000 men, entered
Mexico on March 15. Two days later Congress passed a joint resolution
approving the use of the military to capture Villa.
Carranza was persuaded by his advisers to acquiesce to the entrance
of Pershing's troops into his country. However, he was not sufficiently
convinced of the wisdom of this policy to refrain from sending a mild
protest note to Washington on March 18, 1916.
By the beginning of April Villa had not been apprehended. As it
became more and more obvious that his capture would involve a lengthy
42Quoted in, Link, Wilson : Confusion and Crisis , p. 211.
^ 3Quoted in, Ibid
. ,
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^^Foreign Relations of the United States , 1916 , E. Arredondo to
Secretary" of State, March 18, 1916, p. 493.
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operation, tension in Mexico began to mount. Carranza had not protested
too loudly because he was advised by Obregon to allow the expedition to
enter Mexico and because he had become convinced by Wilson that the troops
would be withdrawn as soon as Villa was captured or killed. As time
dragged on Mexicans became more insulted at what they considered to be an
affront to their sovereignty. They called for an immediate evacuation of
the American troops, an action Wilson refused to take. Both Presidents
hoped for an early capture of the bandit chieftain which would remove them
from their present dilemma.
As the Preventive Expedition moved deeper into Mexican territory the
danger of an unfortunate incident increased, and it occurred on April 12
when about one hundred of Pershing's men entered the small town of Parral
to buy supplies. A mob, later joined by some three hundred federal troops,
threw stones and then fired on the American column which at first
retreated, but then returned the Mexican volleys. When the action was
over two Americans and more than forty Mexicans had been killed.
Domestic pressures now influenced the action of the two Presidents.
Carranza requested the removal of the expeditionary force; Wilson refused.
The "First Chief" gave strict orders that the movement of American troops
in Mexico in any but a northwardly direction was to be resisted. The
American President called out the national guards of Texas, New Mexico
and Arizona so as to free the regular troops stationed at the border for
a possible invasion. Wilson embargoed arms shipments to Mexico; Carranza
took his munitions business to Japan. War clouds were rapidly gathering.
Another serious exchange occurred on June 20, 1916, making it appear
that war could not be avoided. As an American patrol of about seventy-five
^ 5Cline, The United States and Mexico , p. 180.
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men attempted to pass through the town of Carrizal, the local commander,
enforcing Carranza's order to resist all but northern movements by the
expeditionary force, refused to allow the patrol to enter the town. Con-
trary to his orders, the American of f icer-in-charge decided to force his
way through Carrizal. In the ensuing battle thirty Mexicans and fourteen
Americans were killed and twenty- three members of the patrol were captured,
Both sides began full-scale preparations for war. Lansing said that
armed conflict could be averted only if the prisoners captured at Carrizal
were immediately released and harassment of the Punitive Expedition
ceased.
Carranza apparently felt that the situation, so pregnant with danger
for both sides, had gone far enough. On June 28 the American prisoners
were freed, and word filtered into Washington that the order to engage
Pershing's men under certain conditions had been modified. ' Tensions
were relaxed and peace, which Wilson and the majority of the American
people still desired, was at least a possibility.
In a particularly courteous letter on July 4, 1916, the Mexican
President inquired whether the United States would prefer to settle the
existing problems through Latin American mediation or direct negotiations.
Wilson preferred the latter. It was agreed that a mixed American-Mexican
Commission consisting of three representatives of each Government would
meet to arrange the withdrawal of the Punitive Expedition and to "consider
such other matters the friendly arrangement of which would tend to improve
48
the relations of the two countries."







Arthur S. Link, Wilson : Campaign for Progress ivism and Peace
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Hardly had the commission's first meeting been called to order when
an impass was reached which threatened to doom the effort to failure.
The United States wanted to discuss the reasons for Mexican social and
economic unrest and ascertain the Mexican position on protection of
foreign investment before formulating a plan for withdrawal of the
expeditionary force. The Mexican delegation had received strict instruc-
tions not to inquire into any issue before an agreement on the evacuation
of American troops had been reached. After several meetings in which
neither side was willing to adjust its original position the commission
adjourned.
By mid-January, 1917, Wilson apparently had decided to pull the
American troops out of Mexico. No one knows precisely how he arrived at
his decision, but factors probably influencing him were: 1) the election
of 1916 was over giving him a freer hand than he previously had; 2) although
Villa had not been captured his ability to launch attacks across the
border had greatly diminished; and 3) the desire to avoid the possibility
49
of war in the face of the deteriorating European situation.
The mixed commission reconvened for its final meeting on January 15,
1917. Several days later Pershing received orders to prepare for the
evacuation of his forces. The last member of the Punitive Expedition
left Mexico on February 5.
Scarcely had Wilson reached this decision when he was faced with
another, just as complicated and as perplexing: that of full de_ facto
recognition of the Constitutional Government then being formed in Mexico.
A Constitutional Convention had adjourned on January 31 after having pro-
claimed a new Constitution with many bold reform provisions.
Link, Wilson : Campaign for Proftrcssivism and Peace, p. 335.
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The Constitution of 1917 stipulated that in the final analysis land
was the property of the state and could be expropriated from the individual,
with compensation, if demanded by the national welfare. It further
specified that communal ejidos should be enlarged, and that immense
individual holdings should be partitioned.
Perhaps the greatest amount of controversy arose over Article 27 which
stated:
In the nation is vested direct ownership (dominio directo )
of all minerals or substances which in veins, layers,
masses, or beds constitute deposits whose nature is
different from the component of the land, such as...
petroleum and all hydrocarbons. .. .51
Most of the American-owned oil holdings had been obtained between
1876 and 1917. The vital question was whether this key article would be
applied retroactively.
Many Americans felt that Wilson should not formally recognize
Carranza until a pledge had been obtained guaranteeing United States
private property in Mexico. The President, however, had no intention of
subordinating United States-Mexican relations to individual financial
interests. Ambassador Henry P. Fletcher presented his credentials to the
head of the de facto Government on March 3. Carranza was elected President
of the Republic on March 11, and Ygnacio Bonillas was received as
52Ambassador in Washington on April 21, 1917.
By this time war had spread throughout a great part of Europe, and
Fagg, Latin America : A General History
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on April 6, 1917, the United States finally became a participant in the
titantic struggle. During the war Wilson devoted very little of his ener-
gies to Mexico, which along with several other Latin American countries
had proclaimed its neutrality. Those entrusted with the conduct of
relations south of the border knew the President's attitude quite well
—
no use of force in Mexico under any circumstances. When Carranza assured
Ambassador Fletcher that his administration would protect United States
property, especially oil holdings, he was granted full de jure recognition.
Throughout the great European conflict Carranza proved to be most
uncooperative and even obstructionist. He proposed several pro-German
actions, the most infamous suggested that all neutral countries, partic-
ularly those of the Americas, try to end the war by mediation. If this
proved unsuccessful an economic boycott should be imposed on all
belligerents. While this appeared to be a neutral action it would have
had little effect on Germany which was prevented by the British blockade
from sending her ships abroad for trade purposes. The United States and
Britain would have suffered the full impact of the boycott which received
very little support from the other American Republics and was not adopted.
Carranza' s sympathies seemed to be with Imperial Germany throughout
the war. He failed to prevent Germany's use of Mexican soil as a base
for espionage and sabotage against the United States. In fact, Germany
felt Carranza' s attitude was so cordial that the Zimmerman Note was sent,
prior to the entrance of the United States into the war against Germany,
promising the return of territory lost to the United States in 1848 and
1853 in exchange for Mexican cooperation during the war. The Mexican
President rejected the offer; however, the publication of the note proved




very embarrassing to both Mexico and Germany.
No sooner had Uorld War I ended than the advocates of a more aggres-
sive Mexican policy began to be heard in the United States. Many of the
more prominent American journals called for the punishment of Carranza
for his pro-German attitude, the establishment of a regime in Mexico more
friendly to foreign capital and the rendering of the same services for
Mexico "which had been performed for Cuba." In September, 1919, a
Senate Subcommittee, under the chairmanship of Senator Albert Fall, issued
its report on a study of United States-Mexican relations which it had
just completed. The report, which has been called "the last word in
imperialistic propaganda" advocated a less cordial and more unyielding
policy toward Mexico.
As this debate was taking place within the United States, an event
occurred which added fuel to the fire of those favoring an interventionist
policy toward Mexico. William 0. Jenkins, the American Consul at Puebla,
was kidnapped by a revolutionary band of Mexicans and held for ransom.
Carranza did nothing to effect his release.
For Senator Fall this was the last straw. In November he introduced
in the Senate a resolution calling for the rupture of relations with
Mexico preparatory to a declaration of war, While Fall was discussing
the resolution with President Wilson, who was then seriously ill and
confined to bed, Secretary Lansing sent word that Jenkins had been released.
Mecham, A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations , p. 361.
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The immediate crisis was over.
With the national election in the United States less than a year off,
the Mexican question, although not nearly as important as the League of
Nations, was a campaign issue. The Republican Party pledged to support
a much more drastic Mexican policy.
The presidential election was also approaching in Mexico where, under
the new Constitution, incumbents were not eligible for reelection.
Laboring under the false impression that he was sufficiently strong to
pick his replacement, Carranza chose Ignacio Bonillas, a former Ambassador
in Washington, as his successor. Opposition sprang from all sides, the
most strenuous coming from Alvaro Obregon, commander of the most elite
state troops. Realizing that he was greatly outnumbered, Carranza, with
his pockets bulging, attempted to flee the country. His train was stopped
enroute to Veracruz and the "First Chief" was killed.
Following Carranza 1 s death in 1920 General Obregon was elected
President of the Republic. The new jefe immediately assumed a friendly
position toward the United States where anti-Mexican agitation soon ceased,
Woodrow Wilson relinquished the presidency to Warren G. Harding in
March, 1921. Throughout his eight years in office Wilson was more con-
cerned with Mexico than he was with any other country with the possible
exception of Germany. He was convinced that a war with Mexico could be
averted, and he staunchly maintained that position in the face of great
opposition. He tried to show the Mexican people the way to democratic
government, and in so doing he unfortunately intervened significantly in
their internal affairs. He has been criticized on many accounts, partic-
ularly the invasion at Veracruz, an action for which criticism seems
deserved. However, his successes, particularly that of averting a war
should not be disregarded. It seems quite true, as one writer states:

-30-
"But no one has ever done great things without making mistakes, and
Wilson's mistakes were not to be compared to his accomplishments in
CO
Mexican policy. °
As Wilson had been left with the decision on recognition of Huerta,
Harding took office with a similar issue confronting him. In order to
gain United States recognition Obregon was willing to make several verbal
concessions concerning the protection of property of foreigners and non-
retroactive application of Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917, but
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, remembering similar promises
from Carranza, wanted a formal, written treaty. ^9 in addition Hughes
wanted a commission set up to award damages for losses suffered by Americans
during the revolution. For obvious political reasons the Mexican
President was unwilling to sign such a document. Immediate United States
recognition was therefore withheld from his regime.
In order to ease mounting tensions and ultimately gain recognition,
Obregon, in 1921, pressured the Mexican Supreme Court, which had several
oil cases before it, to adopt the doctrine of "positive act." The court
decided that property acquired before the Constitution of 1917 had been
adopted, on which the owner had erected drilling equipment, or had taken
some other "positive act," would be exempt from retroactive application
of Article 27. In other words, the oil on the property, under the court's
decision, belonged not to the state, but to the owner of the property.
For land on which no "positive act" had taken place or land acquired after
the Constitution of 1917 had come into force, Article 27 would apply.
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The State Department was not satisfied with the court decision since
under Mexican law five such decisions without an intervening dissent were
needed in order to establish a precedent which could be applied in sub-
sequent cases. Harding and Hughes still demanded a written document which
would bind not only Obregon, but also future administrations. The
President could not comply without seriously compromising Mexican
revolutionary spirit and economic policies. By 1922 the "positive act"
doctrine had been applied in the five Supreme Court decisions required to
establish a firm precedent. The United States, however, would not com-
promise its demand for a written commitment.
The impasse continued until 1923 when both countries agreed to hold
a conference aimed at settling all existing problems. The Bucareli
Conference, held at No. 85 Bucareli, in Mexico City, met from May 15 to
August 15 and resulted in an "Extra-Official Pact," or gentlemen's
agreement between the two Presidents, and two formal conventions. The
former dealt with the two outstanding issues between the two countries:
confiscation of agricultural land for use as ej idos , and ownership of oil
deposits, while the latter were concerned with claims for damages suffered
by United States citizens in Mexico.
The United States position had always been that payment for expro-
priated lands in the form of rapidly depreciating and non-convertible
bonds was equivalent to confiscation without compensation. In the
"Extra-Official Pact" it was agreed that due to the "worthy objectives of
the agrarian reform in Mexico" bonds would be accepted provided that each
expropriation \*as not greater than A, 335 acres. The Supreme Court doctrine
£>1
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of "positive act" was accepted by both sides in determining ownership of
subsoil petroleum deposits. J
Two claims conventions were signed: a General Claims Convention for
damages dating back to 1868 when the last convention had been held by the
two countries and a Special Claims Convention for claims resulting from
the revolutionary period, 1910-1920.
As a result of the agreement reached at the Bucareli Conference formal
recognition was granted to Obregon on August 31, 1923. Almost immediately
the benefits of United States recognition began to flow to the Mexican
President.
Adolf o de la Huerta, who had served as Provisional President for a
short period between the death of Carranza and the formal assumption of
power by Obregon, launched an armed revolt on the grounds that Obregon
in the "Extra Official Pact" had compromised the aims of the revolution.
The de la Huerta uprising would probably have succeeded had Obregon not
received prompt military aid from the United States. In addition to
arms and ammunition, American aircraft were transferred to Mexico and used
by government forces to bomb rebel positions in Jalisco, thereby assist-
n. / , . . 64mg Obregon to remain in power.
With de la Huerta' s defeat Plutarco Calles, Obregon' s hand-picked
successor, had little difficulty winning the presidential election of
1924. He was recognized by the United States after repeatedly promising
to abide by the agreements reached at the Bucareli Conference. Relations
6"}
Mecham, A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations , p. 364.
Cline, The United States and Mexico
, p. 208.




between the two countries proceeded smoothly until the first month of
1926.
In December, 1925, the Mexican legislature reacting to initiatives
supplied by President Calles, enacted a land law and a petroleum law to
supplement the Constitution of 1917. The former demanded that all
foreigners owning large tracts of agricultural land surrender majority
shares, while the latter required the owners of all oil property to
exchange their title for a concession which would run for fifty years. In
addition, all foreigners owning property in Mexico had to agree to be
bound by the Calvo Clause, that is agree not to request the diplomatic
protection of their government under penalty of forfeiture of their
, 66property.
The provision that caused the greatest controversy was the require-
ment to surrender title to oil property in exchange for a fifty year
concession. December 31, 1926, was the deadline, ignored by the majority
of American owners, for applying for the concession. The oil companies
felt that by surrendering their titles, confiscation of their properties
by the Mexican Government would be made easier.
The United States immediately protested these laws as contrary to
the agreements reached at the Bucareli Conference. Calles retorted that
the "exchange of views" in 1923 was in no way binding on his Administration
despite his promise made prior to receiving American recognition. The
Hurst press, several prominent legislators, and some sectors of public
opinion, as in the previous decade, called for armed intervention in
Mexico.
66




By 1927 the situation had deteriorated to such a degree that Presi-
dent Calvin Coolidge felt compelled to report to Congress on its serious-
ness. Unconfirmed Mexican sources claimed that Calles somehow received
copies of secret letters between Coolidge and Ambassador James R.
Sheffield in Mexico City indicating that the two American officials were
trying to manufacture an incident which could be used as a basis for
United States intervention. Calles allegedly threatened Coolidge with
publication of the letters if the latter did not assume a more friendly
68position toward Mexico.
By the fall of 1927 both Governments had become somewhat conciliatory,
On September 22 Ambassador Sheffield was recalled and a few weeks later
Dwight D. Morrow, a former college classmate of President Coolidge,
assumed the vacant post in Mexico City. Many felt that the appointment
of Morrow, a Wall Street financier, was the worst possible choice for this
key position in such a crucial time, but their fears were soon dispelled.
He treated the Mexicans as equals, cultivating cordial social and diplo-
matic ties. Soon Mexicans one and all considered him very simpatico .
Calles, at the same time, decided to back down from the hostile
position he had taken toward foreign oil interests. It is very likely
that Ambassador Morrow, who in a short time had become a very good friend
of the Mexican President, influenced this decision. He also persuaded
Calles to cease his anti-clerical campaign which had aroused intense
anti-Mexican feelings among American Catholics.
The new attitude toward the oil companies was first evidenced in
November, 1927, by a Mexican Supreme Court decision which held that it
would be unconstitutional for the Mexican Government to confiscate
68Cline, The United States and Mexico, p. 210.
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property fron an American company which failed to exchange its title for
a concession by the December, 1926 deadline.
^
9 Four more such decisions
were needed under Mexican law to form a precedent.
Calles , who had been largely responsible for the court decision,
decided not to wait until the courts could act in the required number of
cases. He recommended to the Congress that a new petroleum law be
adopted which would eliminate those articles most offensive to the
American Government and the oil companies. The requested legislation,
approved in March, 1928, followed exactly the wording of the "Extra-
Official Pact" agreed to at the Bucareli Conference.
The United States considered the new Mexican law to be fair and
impartial. The State Department in a press release declared: "These
steps, voluntarily taken by the Mexican Government, would appear to bring
a practical conclusion to the discussions which began ten years ago with
reference to the effect of the Mexican Constitution and laws upon foreign
oil companies." That a settlement was reached acceptable to both sides
attests to the success of the "Morrow Mission."
Between 1923 and 1934 no controversies existed in United States-
Mexican relations which could not be settled through normal diplomatic
channels. The Good Neighbor Policy, initiated during the Hoover Adminis-
tration and formally adopted by President Roosevelt, was in full bloom,
and nothing was permitted to cause a deterioration in relations with the
United States nearest Latin American neighbor. Uhen Ambassador Morrow
left Mexico City in September, 1930, there were no outstanding issues
69Gordon, The Expropriation of Foreign-Owned Property in Mexico ,
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between the two countries with the exception of natters under consideration
by the claims commissions set up in 1923.
As mentioned earlier, the General Claims Commission was to consider
all outstanding claims since 1868 except those arising from the revolu-
tionary period, 1910-1920, which were to be handled by the Special Claims
Commission. Following seven years of existence the General Claims Commission,
in August, 1931, listed the following very limited accomplishments: Ameri-
can claims: filed, 2,781, amounting to $513,694,267.17; claims disallowed
or dismissed, 50; awards made, 89, amounting to $4,607,926.59; Mexican
claims: filed, 835, amounting to $246,158,395.32; claims disallowed or
dismissed, 4; awards made, 5, amounting to $39,000. No overall settle-
ment of the general claims problem was possible until it was resolved by
the comprehensive agreement of November 19, 1941.
The Special Claims Commission did not even enjoy the limited success
of the General Claims Commission. The first special claim considered,
amounting to $1,225,000, was for the murder of American citizens by
Villa's men at Santa Ysabel. The Mexican representative, supported by the
Brazilian umpire, argued that his Government was not responsible for the
massacre. The American representative violently objected, refusing to
discuss any other claims until the Santa Ysabel incident was decided.
It was not until 1934 that a lump sum settlement for all special
claims, to be paid in annual installments, was agreed to by both sides. It
was decided that Mexico would pay 2.64 percent of the total amount of these
claims. The 2.64 figure \>/as the actual percentage that mixed European-










Mexican commissions had awarded considering each individual claira. Using
this approach a sura of $5,448,020.14 was awarded to the United States.
Mexico, paying annual installments of $500,000, made her final payment
for special claims in 1945.
Calles influenced the 1928 election so as to have ex-President
Obregon succeed him in the presidential palace. However, before the
inauguration could take place Obregon was assassinated, and Calles
appointed Emilio Portes Gil Provisional President until another election
could be held to select the new Chief Executive to complete the term,
recently extended to six years, that Obregon was to have filled.
It soon became obvious that although Calles was no longer President
he was by far the most dominant figure on the Mexican political scene.
Under his initiative and leadership Mexico officially became a one-party
state. He succeeded in having himself named jef e maximo of the Partido
Nacional Revolucionario , a position from which he was able to control the
election of 1929 that carried Pascual Ortiz Rubio to the Presidency.
Ortiz Rubio consulted with Calles on every decision but one. In
1933 he neglected to secure the permission of his jefe prior to making a
minor appointment. A short time later under pressure from Calles he
resigned his office and left the country. Abelardo Rodriquez, submitting
to the will of Calles, served as the President until the regular election
in 1934.
Prior to 1933 a great deal of the widespread anti-American feeling
throughout Latin America was due to the United States policy on protection
of its nationals and their property abroad. Nearly all of the American
75Mecham, A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations , p. 367.
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Presidents since the turn of the century had felt they were free to use
whatever pressures they desired, including armed intervention, to secure
proper respect for United States lives and property. When Franklin
Delano Roosevelt took up residence in the White House, he, his Secretary
of State, Cordell Hull, and his Assistant Secretary of State for Latin
American Affairs, Sumner Welles, carefully reviewed and modified this
traditional attitude.
This reversal in United States policy became known at the Seventh
International Conference of American States held in Montevideo in 1933 and
the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace which was con-
vened in Buenos Aires in 1936. In declarations at these two conferences the
United States agreed not only to cease acts of armed intervention, but
also to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of the Latin
American states. American businessmen with financial interests south of
the border, were now required to exhaust all local remedies before
appealing to the State Department for diplomatic protection in cases
where they felt mistreated.
The relative calm in United States-Mexican relations lasted until
the inauguration of President L/zaro Cardenas in November, 1934. Under
his leadership the revolutionary spirit which had laid dormant since 1928
was rekindled, leading to a period of greater tensions than had been
experienced since the "Morrow Mission."
Agrarian reform x-7as reinstituted as one of the major aims of the
Government causing the expropriation of large amounts of American-owned
land. Indications that the President's program also included the
nationalization of industries and natural resources were given by the
enactment of the Expropriation Law of 1936 which gave the Executive





Cardenas cited the expropriation law as his source of authority in
taking over the National Railways of Mexico in June of 1937. Although
significant amounts of United States private capital were invested in the
railways this action caused hardly a ripple through the State Department.
In March of the following year the Mexican President, under the same law,
expropriated various British and American oil properties, promising even-
78
tual compensation.
By 1938 Mexican petroleum production was only a fraction of what
it had been nearly twenty years earlier. In 1920 Mexico had been, next
to the United States, the world's second largest producer of oil, account-
ing for just under 200 million barrels out of the world total of 766
79
million barrels. Significant American investments in Mexican oil
property prior to the Mexican Constitution of 1917 were primarily re-
sponsible for the large output. Although a sort of modus vivendi was
established after 1917 between the Mexican Government and the oil com-
panies, and no oil was expropriated prior to 1938, the handwriting was
on the wall. American capital flow to the Mexican oil industry dropped
off sharply, and exploration for new wells decreased, so that by 1938 total
80
Mexican production was only 38.5 million barrels.
When analyzing the oil expropriation, it should be kept in mind
that the controversy centered not on the legal status of petroleum
property, but on a labor dispute concerning a demanded pay increase. In
Mecham, A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations , p. 368.
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1935 President Cardenas had urged the many small Mexican petroleum unions
to organize into a strong National Petroleum Workers Syndicate. This
centralization resulted in an increasing number of strikes being called
to protest allegedly unjust worker treatment by the oil companies.
The National Syndicate in November, 1936, demanded that wages be
significantly increased and that many fringe benefits be granted to the
workers. When its demands were ignored the union called a general strike
which was prevented only through the intercession of Cardenas who ordered
a six month "cooling off" period. During this time the oil companies
and the syndicate representatives carried on long negotiations which
were completely unsuccessful in averting the strike after the six months
had elapsed.
The Federal Board of Arbitration and Conciliation after reviewing
the report submitted by its investigating commission, directed the com-
panies to raise wages by twenty-seven percent which would have increased
their payrolls by over 26 million pesos. The companies appealed to the
Mexican Supreme Court to overrule the Federal Board, but the Court
sustained the Board's order.
The petroleum companies resorted to bargaining with the laborers and
the unions. They offered to raise salaries by 24 million pesos which
was acceptable to Cardenas and the workers, but when the companies demanded
the President agree that this would be the final wage increase requested
by the unions the bargaining broke down. Cardenas was willing to agree
verbally that this would be the final wage demand, but the American
companies, remembering promises received under past Presidents, wanted
the agreement in writing. Feeling that his honor had been questioned, the
81







After deliberating for several weeks the oil companies announced
that they could not and would not meet the demanded wage increase. On
March 15, 1938, Cardenas declared his intention to nationalize the
foreign dominated oil industry, an action carried out three days later
despite statements from the nervous companies that they would now pay the
required 26 million peso wage increase. Mexicans were jubilant over
their "economic independence" which they compared to their political
independence of 1810.
The Mexican Ambassador in Washington, Francisco Castillo Najera, in
explaining the reason for the nationalization noted: "the obstinacy of
the companies in disobeying the law, and the threat implied by their
declaration 'that they would not be responsible for the consequences' of
the dispute, which amounted to their considering themselves as powerful
as the government was decisive in bringing about the action on the night
of March 18, 1938.
"
8A
It has been speculated in some sectors that Mexico had decided to
seize the oil properties prior to the Buenos Aires Conference of 1936
where, it will be recalled, the United States renounced the use of inter-
vention and interference in the domestic affairs of Latin American States.
This was probably not the case although it can not be denied that Mexico,
along with Argentina, took the lead in pressing for the adoption of the
non-intervention protocol, which the head of its delegation, Castillo
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Najera, stated was "the principal objective of Mexico." 8 ^ When questioned
following the expropriation regarding the possibility of United States
intervention he postulated: "Roosevelt would not commit such an attack,
both because of his personal sentiments, and because of the international
pledge of the Non-intervention Protocol." Castillo Najera could very
easily have added a third reason: Roosevelt had already decided, with
respect to the expropriation controversy, that it was in the United States
best interest to appease Mexico.
Great Britain, which needed Mexican petroleum so urgently, particularly
as events in Europe began to unfold in 1938, and which lost more property
than the United States as a result of the expropriation decree, protested
furiously the actions of the Mexican Government. So violent was the
diplomatic protest that Cardenas severed relations with Britain, remind-
ing her that by defaulting on her x^av debt to the United States after
World War I, she had not carried out her international financial obliga-
tions. 87
The State Department was shocked by the Mexican expropriation, but
Secretary Hull was quick to declare that the Roosevelt Administration
did not question Mexico's right to seize the property as long as prompt
Op
and adequate compensation was paid to the owners. Never was there even
the slightest indication that armed intervention was being considered as
8 5Quoted in, Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy , p. 121.
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a policy option by the American President. The United States attitude
was praised by Ca'rdenas as further indication of "a policy which is
winning," for the United States, "the affection of many people of the
world. "89
Two economic measures designed to put pressure on the Mexican
Government were taken, but they proved to be rather ineffective. On
March 27, the State Department announced the suspension of the 1936 silver
purchase agreement under which the United States was required to buy
five million ounces of Mexican silver per month at a rate slightly higher
90than the world price. However, since Americans owned about 70 percent
of the Mexican silver mines, the loss of revenue due to the suspension
was felt at home causing strong lobbies in Washington to demand its
removal. "1 In addition, it was evident that if this measure achieved its
designed goal of putting great pressure on the Mexican Government,
Cardenas would simply nationalize the silver mines. For these reasons,
although the suspension was not formally lifted, after only three weeks
of its operation the United States resumed silver purchases on a day-to-
day basis.
Shortly after the expropriation all United States Government lending
agencies decided against making any further loans to Mexico, a policy
which they continued until November, 1941, when the petroleum issue was
ultimately resolved. In 1939 the State Department replied to an inquiry
from Ambassador Josephus Daniels in Mexico City concerning a loan to
Mexico for purchasing fishing vessels that it knew of no agency where
890uoted in, Mecham, A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations ,
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such a loan might be available. This "no loan policy" had been employed
with success previously in influencing the President of Bolivia to change
his policy toward the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, but it had
QO
little effect on the determined Cardenas.
The initial Mexican reply following the seizure was quite encouraging
to the proponents of the Good Neighbor Policy. President Cardenas, in a
note to Ambassador Daniels on March 31 wrote: "You may be sure... that
Mexico will know how to honor its obligations of today and its obligations
of tomorrow. 3
By mid-summer, when no settlement had been reached, Secretary Hull
set out, in a note to the Mexican Ambassador in Washington, the differences
between expropriation and confiscation, explaining that the Mexican action
in respect of the petroleum property was no less confiscatory simply
because Mexico had promised to pay a still to be agreed upon figure on an
undetermined date. Eduardo Hay, the Mexican Foreign Minister, in answer-
ing Hull's note stated that the Cardenas plan to put Mexico's land in the
"hands of the people who work it... cannot be halted by the impossibility
of paying immediately the value of the properties belonging to a small
number of foreigners who seek only a lucrative end."
Throughout the remainder of 1938 the position of the two Governments
did not change. The United States, not wishing to damage its new image
in Latin America, frequently acknowledged the right of the Mexican Govern-
ment to expropriate the property, but insisted that prompt and adequate
compensation had to be paid. Cardenas agreed that compensation would
92Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy , p. 233.
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eventually be paid, but he pointed out that a great deal of Mexican-owned
property had been seized on which no compensation had as yet been paid,
and therefore, the United States was demanding for its nationals better
treatment than Mexican nationals were receiving, something which he could
not grant.
Since Hull was meeting with little success in attempting to placate
the loud voices of the oil companies which were demanding greater
governmental support on their behalf, he decided to turn his efforts
toward assisting the modest investors who had lost property in Mexico
since 1927. It will be remembered that the Bucareli Convention had
concerned itself with claims up to 1923, and very little land had been
seized between 1923 and 1927. In November, 1938, the CaVdenas Adminis-
tration agreed to submit to a mixed commission claims for land expropriated
since 1927. To show its good intentions Mexico agreed to pay $1,000,000
annually until the commission reached its decision on the total amount
95
owed. A final settlement was not reached until November, 1941.
Coincident with the very moderate efforts of the United States
Government to reach a solution to the petroleum issue, the oil companies,
encouraged by the State Department, were attempting to solve the problem
directly with the Mexican Government. The companies demanded either the
immediate return of their land or prompt payment of compensation for the
96
entire value of their property which they placed at $260 million. In
reaching this figure the Americans included the value of underground
petroleum deposits, which position was strenuously objected to by the
Mexicans. The companies contention was completely undermined by President
95Mecham, A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations , p. 369.




Roosevclt who sided with Cardenas in declaring that despite the Bucareli
Agreement of 1923 and the new petroleum law signed by Calles in 1928, the
value of the oil deposits should not be included in the settlement i.e.,
97
could be taken without compensation. Even without this unexpected
backing by the American President, the Mexican Government had no intention
of paying such a high price for the oil properties and, of course, no
thought was given to returning them.
No progress whatsoever was made toward a settlement in 1939. Secre-
tary Hull proposed arbitration to the Mexicans as a possible method for
reaching an equitable solution, but the Cardenas Administration flatly
rejected this idea on the grounds that arbitration should be used only
98
in cases of "irreducible differences" which did not exist in this case.
In late 1939 the petroleum companies appealed to the Mexican Supreme
Court a lower court decision of the previous year which held that Cardenas
had not violated the Constitution of 1917 in seizing the oil property.
On December 2, the Mexican Supreme Court in upholding the lower court
decision ordered the Mexican Government to return the "accounting books,
accounts and documents" which had been taken on March 18, 1938, but
sustained the President's action as being a "public benefit in favor of
the Nation. "99 in addition, the Court held that Mexico could take as
long as ten years to pay compensation, that no compensation need be paid
for the subsoil deposits since under the Constitution of 1917 the owner-
ships of such deposits resided with the state, and that compensation need
be paid only for legitimately invested capital and on the tax value of
97Mecham, A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations
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the land. The companies bitterly protested the decision, but to no
avail.
In an attempt to force the Mexican Government to reach what they
considered to be a just settlement the oil companies began to bring suit
in United States and European courts by attaching Mexican oil shipments
as they entered the ports of those countries, alleging that the Mexican
Government had illegally taken the oil from them. After a few successes
for the companies, the decisions began to favor the Mexican Government
since many courts, especially after the 1939 Mexican Supreme Court decision,
declared that the seizure was not illegal.
The expropriated American companies also attempted to retaliate against
the Mexican Government by urging that all foreign petroleum enterprises
cease purchasing Mexican oil. Two of the companies, Standard Oil of New
Jersey and Dutch Shell, were of such enormous importance in world petroleum
markets that their "fiat was law." Due to the tremendous success of
their efforts, Mexico was obliged either to make a settlement satisfactory
to the American oil companies or direct her oil to the Axis countries:
Germany, Italy and Japan. She chose the latter course. During the
1 no
1939-1940 period Mexico supplied 68 percent of Germany's oil imports.
Since Mexico was not earning dollars with her oil exports, she was not
able to purchase as many American products as she previously had. Thus,
both the State Department and United States exporters viewed the deterio-
rating situation with alarm; the former because Mexico, America's closest
southern neighbor, was being drawn ever so close to the Axis web, and the
Guerrant, Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy
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latter because of decreasing revenues from Mexican trade.
Throughout the remainder of Lazaro Cardenas' term of office, very
little progress was made in reaching a solution to the oil problem. In
1940 one of the small expropriated companies reached an independent
settlement in which Mexico agreed to pay $8.5 million as compensation for
property seized, but the remainder of the companies and the Mexican Govern-
ment refused to budge from their original positions, thus prolonging the
103
stalemate.
On December 1, 1940, Manuel Avila Camacho succeeded Cardenas as
President of Mexico. Camacho and his Foreign Minister, Ezequiel Padilla,
were both dedicated to the principles of the revolution, but they were
both considered more friendly toward the United States than Cardenas.
With German victories in Norway, Denmark, the Low Countries and
France, events in Europe were becoming more chaotic and dangerous each
day; the United States was already waging the "phony war" and had firmly
committed itself to the side of the Allies in the rapidly approaching
world war. The vicissitudes in United States-Mexican relations had been
many since the overthrow of Diaz, but never in those thirty years did
the world situation so clearly point out that a solution to the pressing
problems was so fundamentally in the interest of both countries. The
deadlocked General Claims Commission set up by the Bucareli Conference
of 1923, the inability of the claims commission set up in 1938 to reach
a decision, and the petroleum controversy were all obstacles to effective
cooperation in the titanic struggle that loomed over the horizon.
The United States x^as vitally interested in the defense of the
Hemisphere against an invasion by the Axis powers. Roosevelt thus took





the lead at the Eighth International Conference of American States at
Lima in 1938 in persuading the Latin Americans to agree to consult in the
event of threats to the hemisphere from abroad; at the First Meeting of
Consultation of Foreign Ministers at Panama in 1939 where it was agreed to
set up the neutrality patrol; and at the Second Meeting of Consultation
of Foreign Ministers at Havana in 1940 where the Inter-American Peace
Committee was formed and where it was agreed that any nation (i.e., United
States) could intervene to prevent the Axis from acquiring European
territory in this Hemisphere. Without the active cooperation, or at the
very least, the strict neutrality of the United States closest Latin
American neighbor, the effectiveness of these measures would be jeopardized,
As has been noted, Mexico, under Cardenas, and primarily due to the
boycott set up by the American oil companies, was trading quite substan-
tially with the totalitarian powers in 1939 and 1940. Avila Camacho,
concerned that his country was supplying strategic materials to the Axis,
wanted Mexico to revert to doing bvisiness almost exclusively with her
more traditional commercial partner. Both Roosevelt and Camacho were
determined to resolve the troublesome issues pending between their
countries and adopt programs and policies leading to ever-increasing




1941-THE YEAR OF RECONCILIATION
Although President Cardenas was unable to satisfactorily settle the
petroleum dispute with the United States before turning over the reins
of government to his successor, he decided no later than early June,
1940, that the position of Mexico during the rapidly approaching global
struggle should be beside her northern neighbor. He was probably influenced
in his decision by the conviction that all Democratic Governments should
form a solid front in the face of the very real danger presented by the
Axis Powers, and by his ever-increasing faith in the good intentions of
President Roosevelt and his Good Neighbor Policy. The economics of the
situation also pointed in the same direction, since by mid-1940 the
British blockade of the Western European Coast made trade with Germany
and Italy impossible, and Mexico again began to depend on the United
States as a market for her expropriated oil and other strategic materials.
In addition Mexico relied on exports of silver to America which had
continued on a day-to-day basis since March, 1938, when the Mexican
silver purchase agreement had been suspended due to the oil expropriation.
As the Battle of France hastened to its inexorable conclusion,
Mexico and the United States agreed to hold military staff discussions in
an effort to derive the formula for effective collaboration in the
gigantic task of hemispheric defense. On June 11, 1940, prior to the
opening of technical military consultations, United States Army and Navy
Arthur P. Whitaker, ed., Inter-American Affairs, 1941 (New York




staff personnel were advised of Mexico's position by Ambassador Castillo
Najera. Mexico was aware of the serious threat to hemispheric security,
the Ambassador declared, and "was prepared unreservedly to collaborate
with the United States in the development of plans for the common defense."
As part of its contribution, his Government, he suggested, was ready to
develop military bases "at places to be chosen strategically, not only
from the purely national point of view but from the broader point of view
of hemispheric defense." He concluded his remarks by indicating that
this military cooperation must have as its basis the settlement of the
outstanding political and economic problems plaguing the relations between
the two countries. ^ A great deal of valuable discussion took place at
the staff meetings, but no final agreements were reached because of the
inability to solve the petroleum controversy and because Mexico did not
wish to assume new obligations before President-Elect Avila Camacho took
office on December 1, 1940. The technical conversations were thus sus-
pended in late July, 1940.
Less than three weeks after his inauguration President Camacho
indicated his intention to actively cooperate with the United States in
the defense of the Hemisphere as well as in other areas where joint
collaboration was possible. Military staff discussions between the United
States and Mexico were begun on February 17, 1941, for the specific
purpose of reaching agreement on the formation of a Joint Mexican-United
States Defense Board. Throughout 1941 cooperation between the two countries
intensified as President Camacho adopted a more anti-Nazi posture. In
explaining Mexico's actions one Government spokesman stated: "the place
2 Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, United States Army in World V.Tar II
The Framework qf_ Hemispheric Defense (Washington: United States Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1960), p. 334.
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of the United States and Mexico is shoulder to shoulder against any Nazi-
Fascist threat and we ought to make it clear to the world as soon as
3possible."
In his first major move against the Axis, President Camacho, on
April 2, 1941, ordered the seizure of twelve German and Italian ships
moored in the Mexican ports of Tampico and Veracruz. The action was
described as demonstrating Mexican collaboration with the United States
in continental defense and hemispheric solidarity. On one of the ships,
the 9,600-ton liner, Orinoco , the German crew resisted the Mexican boarding
party while an unsuccessful attempt was made to scuttle the ship. Demands
made by the German and Italian Governments calling for immediate release
of the seized ships were promptly rejected by President Camacho.
Six days following the seizure the Mexican President announced that
the twelve ships were being expropriated and that his Government would
not honor any requests for compensation until after the war in Europe had
ended. He ordered the ships placed in service immediately, explaining
that Mexico desperately needed a merchant marine since the war had swept
away the shipping facilities on which his country's commerce normally
depended. According to Camacho, Mexico, which relied quite heavily on
maritime facilities to move its goods, was being seriously crippled by
the European conflict.
The Axis Powers were disturbed by the seizure of their ships and
became quite concerned that the Mexican action might serve as an example
to other Latin American countries. Italy however had a ready means of
reprisal at her disposal. During 1939 and 1940 Mexico had supplied large
quantities of petroleum to Germany and Italy in exchange for industrial
3the New York Times , January 19, 1941.
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products. The latter promised to deliver two new tank ships in exchange
for the oil. The tank ships were nearing completion in late April, 19 41,
when they were seized by the Italian Government as a reprisal for the
confiscation of its merchant ships by Mexico.
The Mexican seizure of Axis ships and the resulting Italian reprisal
severely strained the already cool relations between the countries concerned
At the time of the Mexican expropriation it was generally believed in
Mexico that the rupture of diplomatic relations was imminent, and although
the final break did not occur until December, 1941, relations were
conducted in an atmosphere of increasing hostility. In May 1941, it was
announced by the Mexican Government that its Minister in Germany, General
Juan F. Ascarate, who had traveled to his country ostensibly for a brief
visit, would not return to Germany, leaving Mexican representation there
in the hands of a charge d'affaires . During the month of August Presi-
dent Camacho closed all German consulates in Mexico and ordered home all
Mexican consuls in Germany in retaliation for the closure of Mexican
consulates in the German-occupied countries in Europe. These actions of
course aligned Mexico even more closely with the United States, leaving
only the petroleum and land compensation problems standing in the way of
total political, economic and military cooperation.
Throughout 1940 several proposals were exchanged between the two
countries in an effort to solve the complex claims issues, but a solution
satisfactory to both sides remained unattainable. Within the United
States Government there was a difference of opinion as to the desirability
of rapidly reaching an accommodation. Ambassador Daniels argued that in
the event of war Mexican oil and other raw materials would be vital for
*The New York Times, May 4, 1941.
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both national and hemispheric defense, and, therefore, the outstanding
problems should be quickly settled, even if this meant sacrificing the
rights of the expropriated American oil companies. Herbert Feis, the State
Department Economic Adviser, felt that the United States could reach a
much more advantageous settlement if no action were taken until Mexico
was in such need of foreign capital that she would be forced to acquiesce
to the oil companies' claims. Feis along with Max W. Thornburg, the
Department's Petroleum Adviser, expressed the view that any agreement
considered favorable to Mexico would set a dangerous precedent with
respect to other nations.
Perhaps the most naive proposal for reaching the evasive solution
was offered by Senator William Gibbs McAdoo (D. , Cal.). He suggested
that the United States give Mexico $150,000,000, which the latter would
use to compensate for the expropriated oil properties, provided that
Mexico cede to the United States Lower California. This totally unrealistic
idea was completely rejected by Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles
who felt that its proposal by Washington would create deep resentment in
Mexico and possibly place an obstacle in the path of reaching an acceptable
accommodation.
The rudiments of what were to be the basis for the final settlement
were first set out on February 17, 1941, in a memorandum from Ambassador
Najera to Secretary Hull. In addition to proposing a solution to the
petroleum controversy, the Mexican note covered several issues, among
them general and agrarian claims, the dividing of water from the Rio Grande
and Colorado Rivers, and the principles of banking, commercial, and
Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (New York:






financial cooperation which would favor the development of the Mexican
economy.
The Mexican Ambassador again stressed that his country did not
"cherish the slightest desire of failure to pay the expropriated petroleum
o
companies an acceptable and just compensation." He proposed that if the
Mexican Embassy in Washington and the State Department should reach a
solution which the oil companies refused to accept, then the American
Government would agree to desist from any future representations on behalf
of the companies, leaving them to settle directly with the Mexican
Government. Castillo Najera insisted that Mexico was as anxious as the
United States to settle the claims problem, since without full economic
collaboration between the two countries the Mexican economy became
sluggish, rendering it impossible to construct the necessary military
facilities and procure the armament required for national and hemispheric
defense. "In view of the European tragedy and the abuse of power by the
totalitarian countries," the Ambassador concluded, "the Mexican people...
not only perceives with genuine sympathy the continental objectives which
will be imposed upon its efforts in the future, but it also feels, in an
extraordinarily positive way, the advisability of a joint action in
defense of Democracy with the other American republics and in particular
with the United States of America." 9
Basically, the proposals outlined in the Mexican Ambassador's
memorandum were acceptable to the Roosevelt Administration; however, two
Foreign Rela tions of the United States , 1941 , Mexican Ambassador









obstacles stood in the path of a final agreement. The first and by far
the more serious concerned the exact formula for fixing the amount of
compensation due the expropriated companies. The second problem area
dealt with a demand by Mexico that the United States give assurances that
in the event of subsequent expropriation it would not extend its protec-
tion to American investors who in the future acquire farm land in Mexico.
The United States did agree to the amount of compensation proposed by
Najera to be paid by Mexico for agrarian claims and those arising out of
the General Claims Convention of 1923. The Roosevelt Administration was
also willing to open discussions on providing credit for the purpose of
stabilizing the Mexican peso and constructing highways in Mexico, and to
renegotiate the Silver Purchase Agreement which had been suspended
following the oil expropriation. The United States felt that negotiations
on the waters of the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers and a reciprocal trade
agreement should wait until the oil controversy was settled.
Following a lengthy conversation on July 14, 1941, between the
Mexican Ambassador in Washington and officials of the State Department's
Division of American Republics Affairs, the Mexican Embassy, on July 22,
addressed a memorandum to the Department of State which contained pro-
posals on which both Governments were finally able to agree in settling
the petroleum controversy. Mexico was in favor of setting up a Mexican-
American Commission consisting of one expert from each country to fix the
amount of compensation to be paid to the expropriated companies, but was
unalterably opposed to designating a third party to act as umpire in the
event that the experts could not agree. She preferred to iron out any
differences by direct diplomatic means. Mexico also insisted that the
Foreign Relations of the United States , 1941 , Secretary of State to
American Ambassador in Mexico, April 27, 1941, Vol. 7, pp. 383-384.
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agreement laying to rest the oil problem be signed simultaneously with
the arrangements settling the agrarian claims and those providing credits
for monetary stabilization and highway construction.
H
By August the two Governments had reached a tentative agreement on a
solution to the petroleum issue. Secretary Hull then embarked on the
task of gaining the assent of the oil companies to the proposed accommo-
dations, something he hoped would be possible prior to the official settle-
ment. On September 27, he met in his office with the representatives of
the American oil companies and laid the tentative agreement before them.
The Secretary reviewed events in Europe and Axis activities in Mexico,
and stressed the cooperation already received from President Camacho in
restricting supplies of strategic materials to Japan. In reviewing the
world crisis and the inherent dangers it presented to the United States,
Hull indicated those areas where Mexican assistance would be most benefi-
12
cial and urged the oil companies to accept the proposed settlement.
The petroleum representatives completely rejected the planned agreement
since they felt that by accepting it they would recognize the legality.
of the Mexican expropriation. They asserted that the solution in effect
denied the principle of property rights, and they preferred to see the
issues unsettled, even if it meant losing everything rather than agree to
sacrifice the property rights principle. ^
Following the tentative accommodation to the oil problem there
remained only one other area where agreement between the two Governments
1 1Foreign Relations of the United States , 1941 , Mexican Embassy in
Washington to Department of State, July 22, 1941, Vol. 7, pp. 334-387.
12
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proved difficult. In a memorandum to the State Department dated October 6,
1941, the Mexican Government expressed its concern that in the near future
"lands which now belong to Mexican owners or to foreigners of nationality
other than American, may pass, by real or fictitious sales, into the
possession of United States nationals, in an attempt thus to seek the
protection of the Washington Government and bring up a problem similar to
the one we are now trying to settle.' Mexico, therefore, wished the
United States Government to renounce its right of diplomatic protection
in the event of expropriation of farm land acquired by American nationals
subsequent to the date of the final claims agreement. Mexico, at first,
insisted that this renunciation be part of the claims convention, but
later agreed that it could be carried out by an exchange of notes.
Herbert S. Bursley of the Division of American Republics Affairs,
in a conversation with Dr. Roberto Cordova, the Legal Counselor of the
Mexican Embassy, explained on the same day that the Mexican memorandum
was presented to the State Department that it was impossible for the
United States to give such assurances unless Mexico found it practical
to meet a similar request from the United States that there be no further
expropriation of American property without the payment of prompt
compensation. Bursley reported that Dr. Cordova tried to appear very
surprised by the American reply, but both he and a representative of the
State Department Legal Adviser, who also took part in the conversation,
felt that the Mexican was not at all surprised. Dr. Cordova stated that
the renunciation was considered verv important by his Government which viewed
it as a sine qua non to the signing of the claims convention. Bursley
14
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felt that Dr. Cordova's statement was not to be taken at face value and
that the desired financial arrangements contemplated in the overall
package agreement, so badly needed by Mexico, would require President
Camacho to relinquish this demand. The latter evaluation proved correct,
and when the convention was finally signed there was no mention of the
renunciation.
Secretary Hull again met with the oil company representatives in
October in an effort to win their approval of the tentative petroleum
settlement, but his efforts were in vain. During the previous month
President Camacho had publicly announced that the final accommodation with
the United States would take place in the very near future, and as Hull
postponed the signing of the agreement while he attempted to negotiate
with the oil companies the Mexican Government was experiencing increasing
domestic pressure. The Mexican economy was in a state of stagnation and
desperately needed foreign capital which would be forthcoming from the
only available source, the United States, only after the claims contro-
versies had been settled.
In late October Ambassador Josephus Daniels informed President
Roosevelt that his Good Neighbor Policy was at stake in Mexico and urged
immediate action in laying to rest the outstanding issues. "If the matter
drags on," he counselled Roosevelt, "Mexico will think that pressure is
being put on them that is akin to intervention. Unless the oil matter is
settled now (and if we wait for the oil companies to agree to confer, it
will hang on indefinitely) Mexico and Pan America will lose faith in the
^"Foreign Relations of the United States , 1941 , Memorandum of
Conversation, October 6, 1941, Vol. 7, p. 387.
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Good Neighbor Policy." 17
The President and Secretary of State had just about decided that
Daniels' view was correct. Hull, however, made one last attempt to secure
the concurrence of the oil companies. He met for the third time with their
representatives on November 13, 1941, and when they absolutely refused
to accept the Administration's viewpoint, Roosevelt and Hull decided to
sign the final agreement in spite of the oil companies' opposition. °
If the companies were unwilling to accept the Administration's settle-
ment, they would be forced to bargain directly with the Mexican Government
where an even less favorable solution was a certainty. The worsening
world situation made further delay unwise. The negotiations with Japan
were proving unfruitful, and in Washington's eyes the United States
interest in hemispheric solidarity far outweighed the financial interests
of the expropriated companies.
The comprehensive agreement between the United States and Mexico
was signed in Washington on November 19, 1941, thus solving the serious
problems that heretofore had impeded the total cooperation which was
.
considered essential in the. approaching global conflict. The accommoda-
tion covered six principal areas: 1) agrarian claims, 2) compensation
for the oil expropriations, 3) a reciprocal-trade agreement, 4) credit for
stabilization of the Mexican peso, 5) a silver purchase agreement, and
19
6) credit for Mexican highway construction.
In settling the agrarian claims issue, Mexico agreed to pay
Josephus Daniels, Shirt-Sleeve Diplomat (Chapel Hill: The Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press, 1947), p. 267.
iyWilliam L. Lnnger and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War
1940-1941 (New York: Harper and Brothers Publisher, 1953), p. 609.
19
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$40 million in United States currency for all those claims pending from
the General Claims Convention of 1923, all agrarian claims based on
expropriation or damage suffered between August 30, 1927, and October 7,
1940, including those covered by the claims convention of November, 1938,
and "all other claims of nationals of either country, which arose subse-
quent to January 1, 1927, and prior to October 7, 1940, and involving
international responsibility of either Government toward the other Govern-
ment as a consequence of damages to, or loss or destruction of, or wrongful
20interference with the property of the nationals of either country."
Under the terms of the claims convention Mexico was credited with
$3 million she had paid under the November, 1938 agreement. An additional
$3 million was deposited on ratification of the convention and Mexico
21paid $2.5 million annually until the debt was liquidated. By an exchange
of notes on the day the agreement was signed, it was understood by both
Governments that any claims arising in connection with oil property
22
rights were in no way affected by the claims convention.
The perplexing oil controversy which had defied solution since
March, 1938, was settled by an exchange of notes between Secretary Hull
and Ambassador Najera. Each Government agreed within thirty days to
appoint an expert to closely examine all aspects of the problem. The
two experts would work in close consultation and at the end of five months
would file a joint report, indicating the amount of compensation to be
20
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paid. It was agreed that this joint report would be unappealable by
either party. If the experts could not agree at the expiration of the
specified five month period, the two Governments would fix the exact
amount through "diplomatic negotiation." On the date of the exchange of
notes Mexico deposited with the United States Government $9 million in
partial payment for the expropriation. In the event the experts did not
agree and after an additional five months of diplomatic negotiations the
Governments could not agree on the amount of compensation to be paid, the
Mexican deposit was to be returned, and the petroleum agreement would be
without effect.
The United States designated as its expert Morris Llewellyn Cooke,
who was described as "an able, distinguished, and just economist and
24
expert known as Uncle Sam s Number One Trouble Shooter. The Mexican
expert, Manuel J. Zevada, was considered equally qualified. After
intensive study of the entire issue the two submitted their report on
April 17, 1942, which fixed the total amount of compensation at
$29,137,700.84. ($23,995,991.00 plus interest at three percent per annum).
The following year Mexico agreed to make annual payments of slightly over
$4 million until the obligation was liquidated in 1947. This amount was
far short of what the oil companies claimed as adequate and just compen-
sation, but they had no alternative because the United States Government
had already decided that Mexican cooperation during the war was more
important than just compensation.
U. S., Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No. 234
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The November, 1941 settlement also contained an agreement to begin
negotiations on a reciprocal- trade pact. Prior action in this area had
been postponed pending the solution of the oil expropriation problem.
The Mexican economy badly needed an agreement with the United States to
check its adverse trade balance which amounted to about $37 million in
1941.
Coupled with the agrarian claims and petroleum settlements were two
agreements signed by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morganthau and
Mexican Finance Secretary Eduardo Suarez. The Treasury promised to pro-
vide $40 million to support the Mexican peso at a level of 4.85 pesos per
dollar and agreed to purchase monthly six million ounces of Mexican silver
under the Silver Purchase Agreement, which had been suspended in 1938
following the oil seizures. The silver would be bought at a rate of
thirty-five cents per ounce, a price slightly higher than the world
level. 26
In the final agreement of the comprehensive settlement the Export-
Import Bank granted a $30 million credit spread over a three-year period
for Mexican road building. Part of the money was used to finance con-
27
struction of the Pan American Highway from Mexico City to Guatemala.
In addition the Export- Import Bank indicated its willingness "to consider
sympathetically other requests for credit for development in Mexico,"
whether they were "to be executed by the Mexican Government or any
private enterprise guaranteed by that Government or one of its official
agencies."
26
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As expected, reaction to the settlement within Government circles
in both countries was extremely laudatory. Secretary Hull stated that
the agreements "mark a new milestone of great importance in the cause of
increasingly closer collaboration and solidarity between the countries of
the New World. "^ President Roosevelt added that the accord between the
two countries established "for future generations an anniversary to be
30proudly celebrated." In a telegram to his American counterpart Presi-
dent Camacho said he had "an intimate conviction" that the agreement
signed would be "of real benefit to the two countries," and that it would
"mark a point of departure, within the work of continental solidarity
which our Governments are pursuing, for a fuller understanding between
31
Mexico and the United States." Foreign Minister Padilla was overflow-
ing in his praise of the accommodation as he addressed the Mexican Senate.
The agreements, according to Padilla, indicated a definite change in
United States foreign policy and were "a clean sweep of the irritation
and barriers that had lasted for several decades" and "one of the most
32
eloquent demonstrations of the spirit of the new decades."
The Mexican press reacted most enthusiastically to the signing of
the Washington agreements. The newspapers in Mexico City generally
regarded the settlement as a diplomatic victory for the Camacho Adminis-
tration since the American Government had accepted terms that the oil
29
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companies had repeatedly rejected.
The oil companies considered the settlement to be very unjust and
were outspoken in their criticism of the American Government. The
president of Standard Oil Company of Mew Jersey, W. S. Farish, whose
company was the largest American enterprise affected by the Mexican action,
rejected the agreement on the grounds that it validated the confiscation
and bound the companies to "accept a speculative promise in exchange for
their tangible properties.' Another oil executive noted that by giving
large sums of money to Mexico, the American Government was underwriting
the cost of the expropriations and thereby rewarding the Mexican Govern-
ment for an action that the State Department had previously condemned.
The companies also considered the settlement unjust since it was not
linked with a settlement for the British and Dutch companies which were
expropriated at the same time as the American companies. The Americans
feared the possibility that at a later date, after they had already lost
title to their properties, the British and Dutch might get their property
back, perhaps even at the invitation of the Mexican Government. The idea
that the accord was unjust was rejected by Ambassador Daniels who remarked:
"Certainly the United States would not sponsor anything but a just
35
settlement," but he did not provide facts to sustain his judgment.
Following the settlement Secretary Hull communicated to Mr. Farish
his regrets that the American companies saw fit not to agree with the
Department in pressing for an immediate solution to the petroleum dispute.
He stressed that the agreement provided for an examination by the experts
"^Foreign Relations of the United States , 19 41 , United States
Charge in Mexico to Secretary of State, November 21, 1941, Vol. 7, p. 397.
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of records and data held by the companies and requested their cooperation
in this natter. Farish, realizing that in reality he had very little
choice, indicated that the requested cooperation would be forthcoming
and added that he was hopeful the United States expert would be instructed
to "adhere to the established principles of international law so clearly
37
set forth by your Department as applicable to this controversy."
The American press examined the agreement in a far more critical
manner than did its counterpart in Mexico. The general feeling seemed to
be that the United States, considering itself in need of hemispheric
solidarity far more than Mexico, paid an unreasonably high price. One
editorial pointed out that Mexico by cleverly utilizing the oil compensa-
tion problem had extracted concessions from a country that was her
creditor. The writer advised that friendship "purchased at a high price
is scarcely the most secure foundation for international relations."
It was also emphasized that the stabilization loans, although not specif-
ically intended to be used for payment to the oil companies, would in
effect have the same result since they would release other funds for
39
compensation purposes.
President Roosevelt was also attacked from many sides for allowing
Mexico to completely ignore the Bucareli Agreement of 1923 which stated
that subsoil petroleum deposits were legally owned by the oil companies.
Although the experts were to determine the amount of compensation to be
36
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paid to United States nationals "whose properties, rights, or interests
in the petroleum industry" in Mexico had been adversely affected by the
expropriations of 1938, the settlement agreed to by the experts clearly
40
rejected underground petroleum rights. These rights, according to one
distinguished writer, "had been placed on the sacrificial altar of the
41Good Neighbor Policy. The American Ambassador in Mexico at the time
of the agreement gave some credence to this viewpoint when he later
remarked, "I think I can surely say that the only yardstick by which I
measured every problem which arose in the nearly nine years I was Ambassador
/
to Mexico was, 'Will it promote the Good Neighbor Goal?'"
Scarcely had the ink dried on the historic agreement than Japanese
aircraft carried out their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Secretary
Hull had said on November 19, that the accommodation was a great milestone
in the quest for hemispheric solidarity. Undoubtedly this was true but
of even greater importance was its effect on bilateral relations between
the two countries. All major differences that had previously existed
were wiped away, setting the stage for the cooperation that took place
during the titanic world war.
Feelings of surprise and outrage filtered through the Mexican capital
on December 7, 1941, when news was received of the attack on Hawaii. On
that very day the Mexican Government in asserting its total support of
the United States issued the following statement:
Our past is the best guarantee of our future. Associated
^U. S. , Department of State, Executive Agreement Series Mo. 234
(Washington, 1941), p. 4.
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with the United States in the common defense of democracy
and of the destiny of America, we will omit of no
effort, by all possible means, to establish our spirit
of solidarity and of close friendship. In this hour, of
the greatest importance, the Government is convinced that
the opinion which it expresses is that of all Mexicans
and it has the absolute certainty that, irrespective of
the results, the nation will carry out unanimously a deci-
sion which is in full accord with the continuity of its
tradition and with the dignity of our future. 3
Mexico City's major newspapers completely endorsed the action of





and La_ Prensa all denounced Japan's treacherous
and unprovoked attack and urged unified hemispheric action. La_ Prensa
stated that the war against Japan
is precisely Mexico's war, as it is the whole continent's
war. Our stand is unquestionable, clearly commanded by
conscience and unqualified. Our place, in history as in
geography, is with the neighbor who was at our side during
our War of Independence and during our war with the French
invader. 44
The day following the bombing of Pearl Harbor Mexican Foreign
Minister Padilla, citing the Declaration of Havana in which all the Ameri-
can Republics agreed to consider an attack against one of them by a non-
American state to be an attack against all, declared that the maintenance
of diplomatic relations with Japan would be incompatible with the intent
45
and spirit of the 19A0 Havana Convention. The formal break in relations
between Mexico and Japan occurred on December 9.
Former President Lazaro Cardenas also warmly endorsed the stand
U. S., Department of State Bulletin Vol. 5, No. 129, (Washington,
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taken by his successor and without delay placed himself at the disposition
of President Camacho who quickly accepted the offer, naming General
Cardenas Commander-in-Chief of all Mexican Pacific Coast forces. Mexican
gunboats were ordered moved from the Gulf of Mexico via the Panama Canal
to the Pacific area to guard against possible landings of Japanese forces.
The State Department announced on December 9 that Mexico was moving "a
considerable body of troops" to Lower California to provide for the defense
of that crucial area. Part of the transit would take place over United
States territory as the troops passed from Nogales, Arizona, to Tijuana
via San Diego. The American Government viewed the Mexican action as a
striking example of hemispheric cooperation and welcomed "this opportunity
of facilitating the journey of the troops of the sister republic and of
extending to them every courtesy and assistance."
In severing relations with both Germany and Italy on December 11,
Mexico again made reference to her obligation under the Declaration of
Havana. The action of the Axis Powers in declaring war on the United
States obligated Mexico to act. On receiving word of the break between
Mexico and the Axis, Secretary Hull wired Foreign Minister Padilla "to
express the pride of my countrymen in their good friend and neighbor,
Mexico, whose prompt and decisive steps in the face of wanton aggression
are of transcendental importance to the future of our hemisphere." In
late December, following their declaration of war against the United
States, Mexico closed her legations in Bulgaria and Hungary. Rumania
joined with the latter two countries in their declaration of war, but
Mexico could take no action against Rumania since she had no diplomatic
Department of State Bulletin , December 13, 1941, p. 484.
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relations with her. In explaining why it merely severed relations
rather than declaring war against these countries, the Mexican Government
pointed out that the latter course would have increased the danger of an
attack on Mexico's Pacific Coast which the United States would have had
to prevent by diverting large numbers of forces from other strategically
important areas. The Mexican Government indicated that the Roosevelt
Administration fully supported its action.
On December 24, the Mexican Senate unanimously passed a bill sub-
mitted by President Camacho which opened Mexican ports and airfields to
the forces of the United States and any other American Republic at war
with a non-American country. Thus, as the year 1941 drew to a close
and the two-year old European war spread to the Americas and the Pacific,
the United States and her southern neighbor were initiating an era of
significant wartime cooperation. At the time of the petroleum settlement
and the other financial agreements, many people in the United States felt
that President Roosevelt had paid too high a price for Mexican friendship.
They argued that the Mexican economy was in a woeful situation, and that
if the United States would just hold out for a while longer Mexico would
agree to a solution, but on American terms.
Quite naturally the oil companies were very upset by the November 19
agreement. They felt that one of their basic rights had been abrogated,
and indeed it had been. To add insult to injury their own Government
had provided the funds to the expropriators with which to pay the compen-
sation.
Fev; people realized when the agreements were signed that World War II
48
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was less than three weeks away. Nor did they realize the tremendous
potential for cooperation in the great task of hemispheric defense that
existed between the two neighbors once their mutual problems were solved.
Almost immediately after the solution was reached, the United States
began to reap unexpected benefits as Mexico opened its defense facilities
for American use. From the viewpoint of the oil companies and their
supporters the agreements were a catastrophe, but from the viewpoint of




It was the most appalling situation America had
faced since the preservation of the Union had been
assured. .. .Anything might happen. Even strikes on
Puget Sound, San Francisco or the Panama Canal were
not beyond the range of possibility.
1
Thus wrote the official historian of the United States Navy regarding
the situation following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Grave
concern was immediately felt throughout the United States as civilian
and military officials across the land prepared for the defense of Fortress
America. A major part of the Pacific Fleet lay in ruin in Hawaii, and
many people in the United States, although not aware of the full extent
of the damages suffered by American naval forces, feared that the Imperial
Japanese Navy would next strike at the mainland.
Several years later it would be pointed out by numerous historians
that the threat of an attack on the American continent was far less than
anticipated during the year following Pearl Harbor. This may be true,
but the important thing is that those in authority in the United States
at the time believed an assault was imminent. As C. V. Wedgwood has
postulated, in writing history "we know the end before we consider the
beginning, and we can never wholly recapture what it was to know the
beginning only." 2
Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in
World War II : The. Rising Sun in the Pacific (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1955), pp. 209, 219.
2Quoted in, Dean Ache son, Present at the Creation (New York: W. W.




As noted earlier, military staff discussions between the United
States and Mexico had begun in February, 1941, for the announced purpose
of reaching agreement on the formation of a Joint Mexican-United States
Defense Board. The establishment of the Defense Board proved to be an
unreachable goal due, in part, to lack of support for the project from
the State Department which believed that the petroleum controversy should
be settled before final arrangements were made for the Defense Commission.
This being the case, the staff discussions, which lasted until December 3,
1941, covered two principal topics: United States acquisition of naval
bases in Mexico, and the right of United States aircraft enroute to the
3Panama Canal to use Mexican airfields.
Throughout the negotiations concerning acquisition of naval bases in
Mexico, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, with strong support from
President Roosevelt, insisted on a long-term lease and extensive United
States jurisdiction in the base areas as had been granted in the British-
United States agreement of September, 1940. The Navy was particularly
interested in acquiring bases at Magdalena Bay and Acapulco. The Mexi-
can Government and the Mexican people were adament against the United
States acquiring sovereignty over any bases constructed in their country.
During the initial discussions there was a public outcry, particularly
from the Mexican Left, against the leasing of bases to the American Navy.
President Camacho assured his people that Mexico "has not ceded and shall
never cede to any foreign power, transitory possession of any part of its
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The Mexican Government was willing to consult with interested
American Governments concerning the sites of future naval bases which
were to be constructed by Mexican engineers and laborers, and financed by
those Governments planning to use them in proportion to their ability to
pay. There would be absolutely no question of the slightest diminution of
Mexican sovereignty over the bases.
Secretary Knox advised Secretary of State Hull in May, 1941, that
due to the critical situation developing in Europe, which could ultimately
threaten the United States, the Navy Department was willing to have the
Department of State arrange for Mexican-United States joint use of bases
in Mexico, leaving the question of long-term leases for future settlement.
Toward the end of July the Mexican Ambassador in Washington informed the
State Department that Mexico would agree to construct the naval facilities
desired by the United States if the American Government would provide the
capital and if Mexico would retain complete sovereignty over the bases.
United States naval vessels could use the bases for no more than one week
at a time. This offer was described by Ambassador Castillo Najera as
"the utmost concession possible within the framework of Mexican sover-
eignty and national dignity." Secretary Knox considered the proposal
as offering port facilities and not bases, and strongly backed the State
Department in rejecting the Mexican plan.
No further progress was made on the use of Mexican ports until after
Pearl Harbor, when, on December 24, 1941, the Mexican Senate unanimously
passed a bill submitted by President Camacho authorizing the use of
William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared Wnr ,
1940-1941 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 153.




Mexican ports by all naval vessels of any American country at war with
a non-American power.
The most important result of the military discussions was the signing
of a reciprocal air- transit agreement on April 1, 1941. The subject was
first raised by American representatives at a staff meeting on March 11,
and less than three weeks later Mexico and the United States agreed to
"grant free transit through their respective territories and territorial
waters of military airplanes and seaplanes of the other country, without
restriction as to type, number, frequency of flights, personnel or
material carried."'
This agreement which facilitated the rapid movement of military men
and supplies, as dictated by the requirements for hemispheric defense, was
to remain in effect "only for the duration of the present state of possi-
Q
ble threat of armed aggression." The pact provided that a twenty-four
hour notification be given to the transited country and that only pre-
viously designated airfields could be used by the transitting aircraft.
The entire period of transit was not to exceed twenty-four hours, and it
was expressly stated that either contracting party could at any time
unilaterally terminate the agreement.
As Hitler's war aims became more clear and Axis influence in Latin
America grew in an alarming manner, an increased concern for the defense
of the Panama Canal was evidenced in the United States. Prior to the
flight agreement only two planes per week were permitted the use of
U. S. Treaties, Treaty Ser ies 971 , "Transit of Military Aircraft








Mexican airfields and these planes were limited to five passengers
each. Other aircraft with limited fuel capacities wishing to reach the
Canal from the United States had to take a much longer sea route via
Guantanamo, Cuba, or Jamaica. Now military aircraft could more quickly
reinforce the Canal defense by transitting Mexico in unlimited numbers
utilizing her airfields for repairs and refueling.
In a letter to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Secretary Hull
stressed the great importance attached to the agreement by the State
Department as a step forward in the development of friendship between
the two countries and as an important contribution to hemispheric defense.
He reminded the War Department of the serious internal problem that would
confront the Camacho regime if any of the rights conferred by the agree-
ment were abused, and further recommended "most strongly" that the
Department of Defense should take care to prevent any untoward incidents
arising from the use of the facilities granted by the Mexican Government.
Hull also suggested that it might be advisable to arrange for a Mexican
aircraft to make the first flight under the agreement into the United
States in order to demonstrate to the Mexican public the reciprocal nature
of the pact.
The primary transit route for American planes enroute to the Canal
was via Tampico, Veracruz and Tapachula. The original requirement for a
twenty-four hour notification was very indirect and cumbersome as the
message traveled through prescribed channels from the United States Army
Adjutant General's Office to the Mexican Embassy in Washington, thence
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mexico City and finally to the
10
The New York Tines , April 2, 1541.
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appropriate Mexican military commander. It was not until 1944 that this
procedure was simplified by requiring only that the pilot of the aircraft
notify the nearest Mexican airfield by radio after his take-off from the
United States. Despite the rather burdensome requirements of the original
pact, the knowledge that American planes could freely and safely transit
to the Panama Canal was a source of satisfaction to United States mili-
tary commanders in those crucial and perilous days following Pearl Harbor
12
when enemy action against the Canal was a real possibility.
Once the overall accommodation of November 19, 1941, had laid to
rest the outstanding problems between Mexico and the United States, and
the Japanese had provided their great impetus for cooperation on December 7,
1941, the formation of the Joint Mexican-United States Defense Board
was an easy task. On December 18, officers from the War and Navy
Departments recommended to the State Department Political Adviser,
Laurence Duggan, that the subject of a Joint Defense Board again be
raised with the Mexican Government. The officers felt that discussions
with the Mexican Military Attaches had proven to be unsatisfactory since
the Mexicans had to refer even minor matters to Mexico City for resolution,
and the Americans hoped that if a Joint Board could be formed the Mexican
representation x^ould be empowered to make all but the most critical
1 o
decisions. By the end of the month the War and Navy Departments had
been informed by the State Department that Under Secretary Sumner Welles
and Mexican Ambassador Castillo Najera had agreed the Defense Commission
12Conn and Fairchild, United States Army in World War II: The
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should be formed immediately and that the Ambassador was consulting with
his Government before proceeding further.
President Camacho, anxious to increase the collaboration of his
country with the United States, indicated his approval of the Defense
Board. On January 12, 1942, the State Department announced that the two
Governments had found it expedient to establish a Joint Defense Commission
whose purpose, as stated in Executive Order 90S0, was:
to study problems relating to the common defense of the
United States and Mexico, to consider broad plans for
the defense of Mexico and adjacent areas of the United
States, and to propose to the respective Governments the
cooperative measures which, in its opinion, should be
adopted. 14
The original Mexican members of the Board were Brigadier General
Miguel S. Gonzalez Cadena and Brigadier General Tomas Sanchez Hernandez. ^
General Gonzalez Cadena served only until June 1, 1942, when he was
replaced as senior Mexican representative by Ambassador Castillo Najera
I c
who held the military rank of Major General. The United States was
represented by Lieutenant General Stanley D. Embick, a delegate on the
Inter-American Defense Board and a member of the Joint Canadian-United
States Defense Commission, and Vice Admiral Alfred W. Johnson, also a
delegate on the Inter-American Defense Board, who in 1939 had planned the
neutrality patrol—the United States first effort at hemispheric defense.
14
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Admiral Johnson remained with the Commission throughout the war while the
Army representative changed on several occasions. The Joint Defense
Board, which survived the war and still meets regularly, held its first
meeting on March 18, 1942.
This decision on the part of President Camacho to form a Defense
Commission with the United States, was not universally approved throughout
Mexico. Many Mexicans protested against strengthening military ties with
this neighbor who in the past had been considered so unfriendly toward
their country, while others criticized the Defense Board as an attempt by
the North American Government to draw Mexico into the war. In normal
times the vociferous extreme Left element would have joined in the con-
demnation of closer ties with the United States and made President Camacho 's
stand even more difficult, but since June, 1941, when Hitler had turned
on his former ally and attacked Russia, the Left had generally supported
any measures which could be considered anti-Axis. This attitude pre-
vailed throughout the entire war.
The Mexican President and his Foreign Minister, Ezequiel Padilla,
had decided that their country's best interests would be served by close
collaboration with the United States during the war, but they also
realized that at first they must move slowly and attempt to convince the
public that this was the best course to follow. The United States also
was axi/are of the delicacy of Mexico's internal political situation.
Shortly after the Defense Board was formed United States Army Chief of
Staff General George C. Marshall, in a memorandum given wide circulation
within the Uar Department, explained that complete military cooperation
between Mexico and United States was "fraught with serious implications
for the Government of that country." He cautioned that the approach of
the United States in military matters should be patient and well-considered
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with proper regard for the internal situation in Mexico, and ordered that
1 8
all operational military matters be handled by the Joint Commission.
The Defense Board, which held its first meeting nine days before
the two countries signed a formal lend-lease agreement, spent the greatest
part of its time as the board of first review for Mexican lend-lease
requests. However, of more immediate importance was the defense of
Mexico's long Pacific Coast and the construction of an air base at
19Tehuantepec, and it was to these tasks that the Commission first turned.
United States military experts considered Mexico's Atlantic Coast
to be relatively safe from enemy attack due to American bases in the
Antilles and constant aerial patrols of the Gulf of Mexico. The threat
was to the western coast where Japanese "fishermen" had come for years and
had familiarized themselves with every mile of coastline. In addition,
living in Mexico along the coast were large colonies of Japanese nationals
whose loyalties were thought to still lie with their native country. A
particular danger was felt to exist along the almost uninhabited western
shore of Lower California, especially near Magdalena, where several
excellent harbors could hide a sizable naval element and where a landing
force could roam for days without detection. Should a large Japanese
force succeed in getting ashore undetected in Lower California the naval
facilities in San Diego would be endangered. The Panama Canal, which
permitted the most rapid transfer of naval forces from one ocean to the
1
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other, was considered to be a prime Japanese target, and American aircraft,
using Mexican airfields for fueling stops as provided for in the transit
agreement of April, 1941, were rushed immediately after Pearl Harbor to
reinforce the defense of that strategic water route.
Joint efforts to defend Mexican shores and the adjacent United States
coastal areas resulted in close cooperation in four areas: 1) placing of
radar detection stations in Lower California, 2) joint planning by General
John L. DeWitt, Commander United States Western Defense Command, and
General Lazaro Cardenas, Mexico's ex-President who had been given the
task of defending Lower California, 3) construction of airfields in
Mexico, and 4) anti-submarine warfare when German submarines threatened
21the Gulf of Mexico shipping lanes.
The necessity of establishing radar stations in Mexico became
apparent after an Army Air Force study in early 1941 showed that the
radar coverage provided by existing equipment was unsatisfactory in that
several gaps existed in the southwestern United States near the Mexican
border which could only be closed by placing detectors on Mexican soil.
This matter was considered far too important to await the formal convening
of the Joint Defense Board and was raised with the Mexican Government on
December 3, 1941. Pearl Harbor proved to be an effective catalyst which
prompted President Camacho to give his full support the day following the
attack to the installation of the radar stations in Lower California.
Sites were selected for the detectors at Punta Salispuedes, 20
miles northwest of Ensenada, Punta San Jacinto, 125 miles south of
22
Ensenada, and Punta Diggs on the northeast coast of Lower California.
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All of the stations were functioning by July, 1942. A United States
military detachment consisting of one officer and twenty-five enlisted
personnel was assigned to each site both to operate the equipment and to
instruct the Mexican military in its use. Within two months Mexican
soldiers were operating the radar sets.
These additional stations did not close all of the gaps in the San
Diego-Los Angeles area radar coverage, but they did plug the majority of
"holes" around this vital military and civilian center. After mid-1942,
since the threat of an attack on the west coast was not considered nearly
as great as it had been a few months previously, no additional radar
stations were constructed. The following summer all United States mili-
tary personnel assigned to the radar sites in Mexico were withdrawn with
the exception of one officer and three enlisted men left in Ensenada for
liaison purposes. 3
As stated previously, immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor
former President Cardenas placed himself at the disposal of his successor,
Avila Camacho. Both men, having attained the rank of General in the
Mexican Army, realized the particular vulnerability of Lower California
to a Japanese attack. General Cardenas was placed in command of a large
military force whose mission was to defend the strategic peninsula.
Cardenas, after establishing his headquarters at Ensenada, personally
traveled throughout his area of responsibility, inspecting every site
where a potential invasion force could land and stationing his troops
where they could report immediately any signs of enemy activity. Although
it was never thought that Mexico could repulse a large Japanese invasion,
United States military leaders rested easier knowing that any enemy
23Conn and Fairchild, United States Army in World War II : The




activity in Lower California would be detected, and immediately reported.
In the area of joint planning not a great deal was accomplished
during the entire war, in fact, only one joint plan was adopted, the
DcUitt-Cardenas Plan of March, 1942. It provided that each country would
patrol its own western coast, that information would be exchanged between
the two military forces, that troops of one of the powers could transit
the territory of the other and that, when required, forces of one of the
countries could operate under arms in the territory of the other. This
last provision caused a great deal of discussion since General Cardenas
insisted, that if troops of one country were required to operate in the
territory of the other, they be under the control of the host government's
military command. Of course this was not acceptable to General DeUitt.
The two generals, not being able to resolve the impasse, declared
that the plan was militarily sound and forwarded it to the Joint Defense
Board for a solution of the nationalistic issue. The Defense Commission
was likewise incapable of reaching a satisfactory solution, but the
Mexican officials made it quite clear in private conversations that should
an attack occur they would immediately call for United States assistance.
Following its devastating losses at Pearl Harbor the United States
Navy was in no position to patrol Mexico's west coast with surface
vessels. As a substitute, long-range air patrols were extended into the
Pacific, and the question of air bases in Mexico was raised at the Joint
United States-Mexican Defense Board meetings. Since the Mexican Govern-
ment had made it quite clear in the past that she would not entertain a
request for a long-term lease of bases on Mexican soil, or any other
arrangement that might infringe her sovereignty or national dignity, the
9 /
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United States confined its requests to construction of bases for the joint
use of both countries, such bases to be under Mexican command. It was
hoped that dive bombers could operate from these Mexican bases to repulse
any attack from sea.
The United States Fourth Air Force strongly recommended the con-
struction of three landing fields in Lover California and two staging
fields, one at La Paz, near the southern end of the peninsula, and the
second near Rosario on the mainland. On April 10, 1942, this proposal
was approved by the Defense Commission and the sites were chosen for the
fields. Mexico previously had refused to allow the use of her airfields
as operating bases, but now that she had broken relations with the Axis
Powers, and as the war seemed to be moving closer to her shores, she
decided to take a further step along the path of total collaboration.
Similarly, on April 30, 1942, the Joint Board approved a United States
request for the construction of a heavy bomber base at Tehuantepec to be
used by aircraft protecting the western approaches to the Panama Canal.
The airdrome would be constructed with American funds and would be under
Mexican command. In granting permission to use her air bases Mexico
insisted in each instance that any American mechanics stationed at the
installations be employees of Pan American Airways and not Army personnel
in uniform. Mexican public opinion was not yet ready for such complete
cooperation.
President Camacho's collaboration with the United States served to
further exacerbate the already bitter feelings between Mexico and Germany,
making it only a matter of time before one of them would decide to declare
5Conn and Fairchild, United States Army in World War II : The





war on the other. Following the Japanese attack on Hawaii the United
States needed increasing quantities of petroleum to enable her industries
to produce enormous amounts of war materials. Although her oil produc-
tion had not increased appreciably following the 1933 expropriation,
Mexico was able to meet some of the American demand for petroleum, and
even supplied several tankers for transporting it. As early as March, 1942,
German submarines had intercepted some of the Mexican tankers and threat-
ened them with destruction if they continued to carry petroleum to the
United States. In spite of this warning the Mexican ships continued to
arrive in American ports loaded with petroleum.
The inevitable occurred on May 14, 1942, when a Mexican tanker, the
Potrero de Llano was torpedoed by a German submarine off the coast of
Florida. Five members of her crew were lost. Despite a strong protest
from the Mexican Government, which Germany chose to ignore, a second
ship, the Faja de Pro , was sunk the following week with the loss of
seven Mexicans. The Mexican public was shocked and indignant, and on
May 30 the Mexican Senate by a vote of 53-0 passed a resolution presented
by President Camacho declaring that Mexico had been at war with Germany,
Italy and Japan since May 22, the day of the sinking of the Faja de Pro . 2"
With this declaration of war, Mexico even more firmly aligned
herself with the United States, and it appeared that public opinion backed
the President's position. In a poll taken in Mexico City prior to the
sinking of the Mexican tankers 59 percent of those questioned felt that
Mexico should not enter the war. After the declaration of war 82 percent
considered the President's action patriotic." On being informed of the
26
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Mexican proclamation the State Department sent a telegram to the Foreign
Office which stated in part: "The United States will never forget the
friendly policies adopted hy Mexico as a participant in the defense of
the Western Hemisphere. Still less will the United States forget the
moral and material support resulting from Mexico's declaration of war."
Since German submarine activity in and around the Caribbean Sea and
the Gulf of Mexico had become a definite danger to both countries, the
Mexican airfield at Cozumel, a small island off the northeastern coast of
Yucatan, took on added importance. Until then it had been one of the
secondary bases used by American aircraft enroute to the Panama Canal in
accordance with the transit agreement of 1941, but following the loss of
the two Mexican tankers, the United States requested and received per-
2°
mission to use Cozumel as a base for anti-submarine warfare operations. J
On October 2, 1942, a reciprocal defense agreement was signed between Cuba
and Mexico which coordinated anti-submarine surface patrols in the waters
between the two countries. In addition the United States, under the
terms of the lend-lease agreement, supplied the Mexican Navy with numer-
ous PT boats and other patrol craft to combat the submarine threat. While
not completely clearing the area of German submarines the efforts of the
three countries were instrumental in keeping their operations to a minimum.
By the end of 1942 the strategic situation had drastically changed.
The defeat of the Japanese at the Battle of Midway in June, 1942, while
not completely shattering the Imperial Navy, rendered it infinitely less
capable of attacking the west coast of the American continent. The
28Department of State Press Release No. 269, June 2, 1942, Hull
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Allied assault in North Africa caused the German Navy to recall its sub-
marines from the waters of the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, and
position then across the enemy invasion routes. The establishment of
United States island bases in the Caribbean correspondingly reduced the
requirement for operating bases in Mexico. As a result of this improved
strategic picture the Joint Defense Commission agreed to reduce construc-
tion plans at Cozumel and Tehuantcpec and maintain these fields as emer-
gency bases only. So confident was the War Department by early 1943 of
Japan's inability to attack North America, that it decided the construc-
tion of the airfields in Lower California was no longer important, and the
building materials were directed to more pressing projects.
It might be argued that all the discussions and negotiations over
acquiring airbases in Mexico represented time wasted, since only a few
of the fields were ever constructed, and the majority of those were never
used. However, it must be borne in mind that United States military
leaders in early 1942 considered an attack possible, and even probable,
and thought that the bases would be necessary to repulse the enemy. On
May 17, 1942, the Army's Intelligence Division estimated that the Japanese
would attack somewhere along the Pacific Coast before the end of the
month and that the assault would be in the form of "hit and run raids on
West Coast cities of the continental United States supported by heavy
31
naval forces." The Army considered that an operation of this magnitude
was within the capability of the Imperial Navy and recommended the
stationing of all available aircraft on the West Coast to repel the attack.
30
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The predicted attack, of course, never occurred, and following the Battle
of Midway it ceased to be a real possibility.
Although the Mexican flag was not carried into battle until 1945,
many Mexican nationals were engaged throughout the war as members of the
United States Army and Navy. On January 22, 1943, through an exchange of
notes effective the same day, the Governments of Mexico and the United
States agreed: "The nationals of either country resident within the
territory of the other may be registered and inducted into the armed
forces of the country of their residence on the same conditions as the
nationals thereof unless otherwise provided herein.' Those exempted
from the terms of the agreement, which would be in effect for the duration
of the war and six months thereafter, were students who planned to return
to their country upon completion of their studies and officials of either
33Government residing in the territory of the other. This understanding
contrasted sharply with one signed by Mexico and Great Britain on July 8,
1943, which provided for reciprocal exemption from compulsory military
service of each country's citizens living in the territory of the
other. 34
There was a sharp diversity of opinion in Mexico regarding this
agreement. One Mexican newspaper levied harsh criticism on the accord and
on Foreign Minister Padilla who, it charged, was motivated not by the
well-being of his fellow citizens, but by a desire to please the United
States. Padilla was accused of having "abandoned to their fate those
•JO
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Mexican residents of the United States who neither wish to lose their
Mexican nationality nor serve in the United States armed forces. 1 ^ Thus
the Government of President Camacho made still another decision, which
while not universally popular, was believed by the President to be in the
best interest of his country.
As a result of the agreement about 250,000 Mexican nationals served
in the armed forces of the United States, with approximately 14,000 of
this number seeing combat action. They suffered almost 1,000 fatalities
and received about 1,400 Purple Hearts. Several of the Mexicans distin-
guished themselves in combat; one, Sergeant Jose Mendoza Lopez, received
the Congressional Medal of Honor, America's highest military decoration.
In addition to the many Mexicans actively fighting the war in Europe
and the Pacific as members of the United States armed forces, many
Mexican generals were in favor of their country actually sending a combat
unit abroad. It seems that President Camacho also entertained the thought
of seeing Mexican troops on the front lines, but he was determined to
move slowly in reaching a decision, launching several apparent trial
balloons in an attempt to ascertain public support for such a plan.
This was necessary because General Cardenas was opposed to sending troops
outside the national territory, and if the public shared his view, he
could easily organize a protest movement against Camacho causing serious
internal problems for the President should he decide to send a Mexican
unit overseas.
George S. Messersmith, who in February, 1942, had replaced the
retiring Josephus Daniels as American Ambassador in Mexico City, as
35
Asi', February 6, 1943.





early as July 10, 19A2, reported that Camacho was being pressured by his
37generals to send troops to the front. Foreign Minister Padiila privately
informed Messersmith two months later that his country was "waiting for
her opportunity" to take part in combat operations.
In his first apparent attempt to "sound out" the Mexican public on
this idea, the President said in October that Mexico was now in a position
to send a fighting unit abroad and would assist militarily any country in
39
this Hemisphere requesting such aid. Any country in this Hemisphere
obviously meant the United States, and Camacho probably had in mind the
supplying of at least one military unit which would be trained, equipped
and supported by the United States. A much more direct statement was made
by Padiila on November 17, 1942. After explaining that until then the
exigencies of the war had not called for direct Mexican combat partici-
pation, the Foreign Minister said that should the necessity of sending
troops outside the national territory arise, the Government would imme-
diately present the facts to the people for their decision, and he was
sure the Mexican people, "loyal to their traditions of honor and a clear
knowledge of the cause which they defend will respond affirmatively
without the least vacillation." The newspaper, Hoy , in an article
printed shortly after Padiila' s speech entitled, "Ourselves First,"
advocated staunch defense of Mexican territory, but rejected the idea of
37
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sending troops abroad. Messersmith reported two weeks after Padilla's
remarks that although many criticized the Foreign Minister for his stand
in the days immediately following the speech, the attack was abating and
it was his (Messersmith 's) opinion that the people would soon come around
to Padilla's viewpoint. *
By July, 1943, the Mexican Government was so confident the public
would support the sending of a military unit abroad that Foreign Minister
Padilla raised the subject in a conversation with Ambassador Messersmith,
Padilla said it was not in accord with Mexico's dignity to sit idly by
and watch the other United Nations carry on the war against the Axis.
His country wanted to take its rightful place and share in the sacrifice
of those fighting for democracy. He was sure that the President was in
complete agreement with what he was saying. Messersmith replied that he
thought it would be entirely too difficult to train, equip and integrate
an army ground unit into the American command structure, but he felt that
since many Mexican pilots had already received some training in the United
States it would be feasible to send an Air Force squadron to the front.
In informing the Department of his talk with Padilla the Ambassador
cautioned that absolute secrecy must be maintained since Avila Camacho
had not informed other members of his Government of the initiative the
Foreign Minister had taken, and because under the Mexican Constitution
the President needed Congressional authority to send troops outside the
continent.^
No further steps were taken by the Mexican Government in this matter
^George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, December 1, 1942, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
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until mid-September when General Marshall traveled to Mexico for that
country's Independence Day celebration. The General reported to Presi-
dent Roosevelt that during his visit President Camacho had raised the
question of sending a military unit of his countrymen overseas. The
Mexican President realized that the United States apparently had suffi-
cient troops to bring the war to a successful conclusion, but he wanted
the American Government to know that should additional forces be needed,
his country would make them available. On hearing this President Roosevelt
replied that he hoped the United States "could think up some method of
using even a token force of Mexicans at some point outside of Mexico...*
The War Department opposed the idea of Mexico sending an infantry divi-
sion since it would take about two years to train such a unit, but was
willing to accept an offer to send a fighter squadron should such a pro-
posal be made by Mexico.
President Caraacho in addressing a gathering of Mexican generals on
November 23, 1943, said that the Mexican Army "removed up to the present
time from the battles which the soldiers of the United States are heroically
f ighting. . . is ready to take part if the war demands it." Messersmith
reported that without exception the press was favorable in its critique of
the President's message. One year earlier similar remarks by Ezequiel
Padilla aroused waves of opposition, but suddenly it appeared that the
public was ready for Mexico to assume a more active military role.
In late January, 1944, when he was in Washington, Ambassador
Messersmith spoke to President Roosevelt, with General Henry H. Arnold,
^Memorandum, General George C. Marshall to Franklin D. Roosevelt,
September 18, 1943, Secretary's File 40, Roosevelt Library.
^George S. Messersmith to Chief, Division of American Republics
(Bonsai), November 23, 1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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Army Chief of Air Staff, also present, of the desire of President Camacho
and Foreign Minister Padilla to send at least one air squadron and
possibly two or three to the combat front. Roosevelt favored the idea
which Arnold considered perfectly feasible. Messersmith was instructed
on his return to Mexico to inform the Mexican leaders that President
Roosevelt had expressed interest in the participation of one or more
Mexican fighter squadrons in the war effort. -> This would place the
burden on the Mexican Government to make a firm offer.
At this meeting with General Arnold and Ambassador Messersmith,
Roosevelt agreed to a request made by President Camacho that initial
discussion on Mexican combat participation be carried on via diplomatic
channels and not be introduced into the Joint Defense Commission, at
least until preliminary matters were settled. This precaution was neces-
sary since General Cardenas, who now held the post of Defense Minister,
was opposed to any Mexican military participation in the war, which he
considered would be too small to have any effect. Because the Mexican
representatives on the Defense Board reported to the President through
Cardenas, Camacho much preferred to receive information directly from
Messersmith rather than from Cardenas who might tend to be somewhat
selective in his reporting. In addition, the subject was still con-
sidered quite sensitive by both Governments which were eager to restrict
the number of people who knew it was being discussed.
On his return to Mexico in mid-February Ambassador Messersmith
informed President Camacho and Padilla of President Roosevelt's interest
in the Mexican squadron. Both men were quite pleased at the American
^ 5George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, February 18, 1944, State





response and the Mexican President indicated that he would consult with
his Government and inform the Ambassador of his decision. Messersmith
understood this to mean that the President would make another attempt to
convince Cardenas, whose opposition would almost certainly be overridden,
that the sending of the squadron would be in the national interest.
At an Air Force luncheon on March 8, 1944, the Mexican Chief Executive
in addressing the officers present said that he felt the time had come
for Mexico to take an active military role in the war, and he considered
the Air Force eminently qualified to carry the national colors into
battle. His statement was received vociferously, and in the days following
the luncheon the President received thousands of telegrams from men
volunteering to become part of a combat air unit should one be sent. On
March 14, Foreign Minister Padilla informed Messersmith that his country
was now formally offering to send a combat air squadron abroad, but that
no publicity should be given the offer since the President still did not
have Congressional authority to dispatch troops outside the continent.
The American Government immediately accepted the offer, and the Army
began making detailed plans for training the squadron in Texas prior to
its departure for the combat zone. In Mexico the selection of personnel
for the unit was personally supervised by President Camacho who wanted
only the very best to represent his country. Of the aviators making up
the squadron about two-thirds had been trained in the United States.
The 201 Mexican Fighter Squadron, consisting of 42 officers and
249 enlisted personnel under the command of Colonel Antonio Cardenas
Rodriguez, arrived at Randolph Field on July 25, 1944, for about six
Fore ign Reflations of the United States , 1944 , American Ambassador




months of comprehensive training. Still no mention was made of its
ultimate destination since the Mexican Congress would not be in session
until September to give its permission for overseas service, and President
Camacho felt it unwise to call a special legislative session for that
purpose. United States officials said only that the squadron was coming
to Texas for training and that its ultimate destination was for the
Mexican Government to decide. Ambassador Messersmith reported after the
departure of the unit that most Mexicans felt its ultimate destination
was the combat zone. No adverse press reports appeared, and the people
seemed both happy and proud that their country would be represented in
49battle. J
Formal costs of training the squadron were charged to Mexico's lend-
lease account as were expenditures for housing and feeding of enlisted
personnel. The Mexican Government provided insurance, uniforms, and pay
and allowances for its enlisted men. Mexican officers were housed, uni-
formed and fed at their own expense. Use of United States Army equipment
was authorized as needed throughout the training cycle.
During a visit to Washington in December, 1944, Ambassador Messersmith
again had an opportunity to discuss the Mexican air squadron with President
Roosevelt. The training which was to end about mid-March was progressing
satisfactorily and Avila Camacho was becoming concerned over the final
destination of the unit. The Mexican President had learned unofficially
that the squadron was destined to serve in the European Theater, and he
48
Memorandum of Conversation by Division of American Republics Affairs
(McGurk) July 22, 1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
49George S. Messersmith to Dep
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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Records, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland.
artment of State (McGurk) July 29, 1944,
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had asked Messersmith to personally relay his strong desire to President
Roosevelt that it be sent instead to the Pacific. President Camacho
recounted to the Ambassador how about two years earlier on a radio broad-
cast, both he and President Roosevelt had promised President Manuel L.
Quezon of the Philippine Commonwealth that they would do everything
possible to liberate his country from the Japanese. Camacho realized
that one squadron would not really make a great difference in the final
results of the war, but he said the Mexican people would be pleased to
see their aviators fighting in the Pacific.
President Roosevelt thought this to be a natural request, and one
that should be granted. He promised to refer the matter to General
Marshall and General Douglas MacArthur, Commander, United States Forces,
Philippines, for their decision. MacArthur replied that he would be
52happy to have the Mexican squadron join his command.
On December 29, 1944, the Mexican Senate unanimously authorized the
President to send the squadron abroad, and on January 9, 1945, an agree-
ment was signed by the two Governments providing for the integration of
the unit into the United States Army Air Force. According to the under-
standing, the squadron was to be treated as an integral part of the
American Army, and all official communications between the unit and the
Mexican Government would be sent via the War Department. In the interest
of safety all planes flown by the 201 Squadron would bear standard United
States markings although, in addition, a Mexican insignia could be
displayed. All items of initial issue as well as replacement and
51Forei£n Relations of the United States , 1944 , Memorandum of Con-
versation by George S. Messersmith, December 19, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1196-1197
Foreign Relations of the United States , 1045 , George S. Messersmith
to Cordell Hull, January 4, 1945, Vol. 9, p. 1109.
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maintenance equipment were to be charged to Mexico's lend-lease account.
The following day the squadron officially received its new title, the
Mexican Expeditionary Air Force.
The Mexican public was now sure that the squadron would be sent to
the war zone. They accepted the news with apparent approval, and as
Ambassador Messersmith reported, "if there are any left who do not
thoroughly approve of this participation, it is a few ultra radical or
ultra conservative groups in Mexico which have no controlling voice in
the country."-5 An editorial in one of the country's leading newspapers
probably represented the feelings of many Mexicans:
For the first time in the history of Mexico our flag
will be carried on foreign soil. It goes not as a sign
of conquest or as a promise of booty, but as the emblem
of a people whose fundamental rights were transgressed
and who are fighting on the side of justice and liberty.
The Mexican Expeditionary Air Force completed its training on March 14,
and departed the United States for the western Pacific on April 6, 1945.
On arrival in the Philippines on May 2, the Mexicans were greeted by
General George Kenney, Commander of the United States Fifth Air Force.
While assigned to the Pacific Theater the squadron was part of the Fifth
Air Force, Fifty-Eighth Fighter Group.
Between June 4 and August 6 the Mexican unit flew 59 missions and
293 sorties against enemy targets in the Philippines and Formosa, for
53
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a total of 907 combat hours. The squadron dropped 181 tons of bombs and
expended 104,000 rounds of .50 calibre ammunition during its missions,
the results of which were evaluated by United States air controllers as
varying between good and excellent. Mexican casualties were listed as
four killed and one missing.
On returning to their native land in mid-November the aviators were
accorded a tumultuous reception. To the average Mexican these were the
conquering heroes returning home from a victorious battle against the
enemies of liberty. President Harry S. Truman sent a telegram to Presi-
dent Camacho expressing his "sincere congratulations and appreciation...
for the splendid conduct of these men in the Pacific Theater where they
upheld the fine tradition of Mexican arms and of Mexico's historic stand
CO
with the principles of democracy." The Mexican President replied that
his country was grateful to have been able to cooperate with the armed
59forces of the United States in so great a task.
The real measure of military cooperation that took place between
the United States and Mexico during World War II cannot be calculated by
considering the success of the joint planning between General Cardenas
and General DeWitt, or by the permission granted by Mexico for joint use
of her bases and airfields, or even by the formation of the Mexican-United
States Joint Defense Commission and the signing of the air-transit
"History of the 201 Mexican Fighter Squadron," Washington National
Records Center.
Acting Adjutant General (Gilbert) to Department of State, November
21, 1945, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
5 8Foreign Relations of the United States , 1945 , President Truman
to President of Mexico, November 14, 1945, Vol. 9, p. 1129.
59
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agreement. These were the initial successes, but possibly more important
was the increasing collaboration which prompted Mexico to participate
actively in the war. In addition to the 201, Mexico had a second air
squadron in training when the war ended. With the exception of Brazil
which sent a ground force to Europe, she was the only Latin American
nation to provide a military unit for combat action. This military
collaboration had some effect in stimulating mutual cooperation in other
areas.
During the First World War, Mexico was looked upon in the United
States as, at best, a neutral with pro-German sympathies, and prudence
dictated that several thousand American troops be stationed along the
Mexican border to meet any eventuality. The situation had changed
drastically in twenty-five years, and as the United States was drawn into
World War II, it was possible for the two neighbors to be allies rather
than potential enemies.
60
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CHAPTER IV
LEND-LEASE ASSISTANCE TO MEXICO
Shortly after the United States held its 1940 presidential election
in which Franklin Delano Roosevelt was chosen for an unprecedented third
tern, Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain sent a long
letter to the American President listing the implements of war that his
country would need in its battle for survival. Roosevelt responded
publicly in his now famous "arsenal of democracy" address to Congress on
January 6, 1941, in which he called for "all-out aid" to the democracies.
The President's remarks produced a sharp debate in the legislature between
the isolationists and the internationalists which the latter won on
March 11, 1941, with the passage of the Lend-Lease Act, HR 1776.
This bill, also known as "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United
States," granted extraordinary powers to the Chief Executive. It
provided that the President could authorize any of the departments or
agencies of the Government "to manufacture in arsenals, factories, and
shipyards under their jurisdiction. . .any defense article for the govern-
ment of any country whose defense" the President deemed vital to the
defense of the United States.
Long before receiving this broad authorization, Roosevelt had
instructed the War and Navy Departments to determine those countries
whose defense was essential to the well-being of the United States. Of
the Latin American countries the War Department considered the defense
of Brazil and Mexico as most important to the strategic interests of
Ruhl J. Bartlett, ed., The Record of American Diplomacy (New York:





In the spring of 1940 the War Department prepared a "combat estimate"
of Mexico's armed forces. This report indicated that although Mexico's
military establishment was sufficiently strong to combat domestic up-
risings and provide for internal security, lack of training and equipment
would preclude it from turning back a strong military invader. The Army
lacked aircraft, artillery and ammunition of all classes, while the Navy,
existing as an independent service only since the beginning of 1940,
commanded little more than a few coastal patrol craft. The level of
training in all branches of the military was low. If Mexico were to make
any contribution to the defense of the Hemisphere, it was obvious, the
report concluded, that the United States would be required to equip the
2Mexican military and train its personnel. An army plan approved by the
President on August 1, 1940, recommended supplying arms to Mexico "to
insure her ability to defend herself against any probable attack from
overseas..." until United States forces could arrive in sufficient strength
to insure success.
In order to implement this plan, the United States requested Mexico,
along with the other Latin American countries, to supply the War Depart-
ment with a list of its defense needs. Mexico, however, was not willing,
prior to the passage of the Lend-Lease Act, to accept a large quantity
of military equipment from the United States since she did not have the
money to purchase it and did not wish to negotiate a loan for that
purpose. By the beginning of 1941 only Mexico and three of the Central
2Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, Uni_ted ^tates Armv in World War II:
The Framevork of Hemispheric Defense (Washington: United States Govern-






American countries had failed to provide the Array with the requested
list. Similarly, following the enactment of lend-lease, no progress was
made in supplying Mexico with defense equipment because, although she
did submit a list of her military needs, the State Department objected
to the signing of a lend-lease agreement with Mexico before an under-
standing was reached on United States use of Mexican naval facilities.
On December 24, 1941, when the Mexican Senate approved legislation opening
ports and airfields of that country to American forces, the path was
cleared for the concluding of a military supply agreement.
Originally the United States proposed that the lend-lease arrange-
ment with Mexico be negotiated for a sum of $29 million but the latter,
not yet officially at war with the Axis , favored a much smaller amount.
A figure of $10 million was finally agreed to by both sides, and under the
authority of the Lend-Lease Act and in conformity with the principles of
the Declaration of Havana, an agreement was signed on March 27, 1942,
making Mexico the seventeenth country, including fourteen Latin American
nations, to conclude such a pact with the United States. The Havana
Declaration of July, 1940, provided that in the event of aggression
against an American state by a non-hemispheric nation the signatory
powers would "proceed to negotiate the necessary complementary agreements
so as to organize cooperation for defense and the assistance that they
shall lend each other...."
4
Memorandum, Adviser on Political Relations (Duggan) , August 1, 1941,
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In reaching the March, 1942 agreement the Presidents of the United
States and Mexico declared that the defense of each of the American
Republics was vital to the security of all of them, and for this reason
Mexico and the United States were mutually desirous of militarily assist-
ing each other. Under the terms of the pact the United States proposed
to transfer to Mexico ,!armaments and munitions of war" to a value not in
excess of $10 million, which delivery could be halted at any time by the
President of the United States or acceptance stopped by the President of
Mexico. A reduction of 52 percent in the scheduled cost of the material
transferred was granted to Mexico, and the repayment schedule called for
yearly installments with the final sum of $4.8 million due no later than
July 1, 1943. Mexico promised to supply to the United States any defense
articles or defense information in her possession which the latter re-
quested, and also agreed not to transfer to another power any of the
materials received from the United States under this arrangement. The
pact was to continue in force until a date mutually agreeable to both
Governments
.
Ambassador Messersmith reported favorable editorial comment on
the lend-lease agreement in all of Mexico City's newspapers. Most
Mexicans were proud, Messersmith stated, that their country had been found
a worthy ally to share in America's military might. Six United States
patrol aircraft transferred to Mexico arrived in that country almost
simultaneously with the announcement of the military aid pact. In the
Ambassador's opinion the arrival of war equipment was the most effective
instrument in inducing the Mexican public to assume a more pro-American
^Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, "Lend-Lease Agreement






When the defense needs of the United States were considered, the
materials requested by the Mexican military were the very items that
could least be spared. Mexico asked for mortars, anti-aircraft cannons,
machine guns, armored vehicles, aircraft and parachutes, all of which
were in very short supply in the United States. Nevertheless, as soon as
the agreement entered into effect, military equipment, at first in small
quantities, but later in an ever-increasing volume, began to flow south
of the border. One of the first lend-lease shipments arrived in Mexico
on July 15, 1942, and included various anti-aircraft equipment, anti-tank
guns and motorized vehicles. In December of the same year tx^o squadrons
of American aircraft were delivered to the Mexican Air Force. I
Under the terms of the lend-lease agreement the transfer of non-
military equipment was not precluded provided it was "necessary to the
war effort," a phrase strictly interpreted by the War and Navy Depart-
ments. 2 Four Mexican requests for non-military material provoked some
disagreements among the members of the Joint United States-Mexican Defense
Board, but they were quickly resolved to the satisfaction of both sides.
In the first of these requests President Camacho's Government asked
for lend-lease assistance to complete a highway construction program.
The United States quickly pointed out that Mexico had not yet used the
George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, March 31, 1942, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
9Conn and Fairchild, United States Army in World War II: The
Framework of Hemispheric Defense
, pp. 353-354.
10The New York Times , July 17, 1942.
11The New York Times
,
December 12, 1942.
12Cordell Hull to George S. Messersmith, June 18, 1942, State
Department Records, MA, RG59.
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$30 million highway building credit provided for in the comprehensive
agreement of 1941. Obviously, Mexico would have preferred to use lend-
lease material for this particular project because only A3 percent of the
total value would have to be repaid, but she was finally persuaded to
use part of the $30 million credit to carry out her highway construction
plans.
As Mexico began to deliver to the United States large quantities of
strategic materials, so vital in the manufacture of many implements of
war, the woeful condition of her national railways became apparent.
(See Chapter VII for a description of the strategic materials supplied by
Mexico, and Chapter IX for a discussion of the National Railways of
Mexico.) Her representatives on the Joint Defense Board raised the
question of lend-lease support for railroad maintenance and repair, but
the United States preferred that the assistance come from another source.
When the magnitude of the railroad rehabilitation task became apparent,
the Roosevelt Administration felt it only fair that the United States
share in the cost of this program since America was asking the Mexican
railroads to carry a burden far greater than normal. An agreement was
signed late in 1942 under which the United States agreed to finance a
substantial part of the rehabilitation of the national railways.
In 1942 the Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense, Harold L.
Ickes, reported that a shortage, would soon exist in the supply of high
octane gasoline used by high performance military aircraft and recommended
that a 100-octane gasoline plant be constructed in Mexico. Since the
United States considered this a self-liquidating project which would pay
for itself, a Mexican request for lend-lease assistance was turned down





The final request of the four mentioned above was for a dry dock.
This project was felt to be sufficiently "necessary to the war effort" to
justify the use of lend-lease funds.
Less than six weeks after his country had declared war on the Axis,
Ambassador Castillo Najera called at the State Department to say that
his Government was interested in increasing the amount of its lend-lease
agreement and renegotiating the terms of payment. ^ The United States
was willing to accede to this request, and after careful consideration
proposed the ceiling be raised to $70 million with repayment of 35 percent
of that amount. The Mexican Government replied that since it had
already been determined that the railroad rehabilitation project, the
highway construction program, and the high octane gasoline plant would not
be financed with lend-lease funds it was thinking more in terms of $40
million rather than $70 million. The United States accepted the smaller
figure and even agreed to lower the repayment percentage to 33 percent.
In early March, 1943, Mexico recommended that the revised draft
agreement be further modified to provide that Mexican lend-lease requests
be approved by a resolution of the Joint Defense Board. Although this
body was the board of first review for Mexican requests, final approval
rested with the Lend-Lease Administration which was not willing, in effect,
13
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to give prior consent to any project which passed the Defense Board.
Castillo Najera v;as so informed and the Mexican proposal did not appear in
the final draft.
The "Agreement Between the United States and Mexico Regarding Princi-
ples Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War" which cancelled
the original lend-lease pact was signed in Washington on March 18, 1943.
Similar to the first agreement in many ways it provided for the transfer
of about $40 million worth of "armaments and munitions of war" with a
reduction of 67 percent in the scheduled cost of such equipment. Follow-
ing the war Mexico could return any material not utilized and her account
would be credited with the full amount she had been charged for the
I Q
returned items. The repayment schedule called for the final installment
to be paid by January 1, 1949.
The delivery of American aircraft comprised a large portion of
United States lend-lease aid to Mexico. Of the 305 planes transferred
to the Mexican armed forces, 25 were P-47 Mustangs, one of the most modern
fighter-bombers in the United States air inventory at the time. These
modern aircraft were used by the Mexican 201 Fighter Squadron in action
against Japanese forces in the Philippines and Formosa. Most of the other
Special Assistant to Under Secretary of State (Collado) to Mexi-
can Embassy, March 3, 1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
18
Foreign Relations of the United States , 1943 , "Agreement Between
the United States and Mexico Regarding Principles Applying to Mutual
Aid in the Prosecution of the War," March 18, 1943, Vol. 6, pp. 397-402.
The agreement actually provided: "The Government of the United
Mexican States shall not be required to pay more than a total of $2,200,000
before January 1, 1944, more than a total of $4,400,000 before Januarv 1,
1945, more than a total of $6,600,000 before January 1, 1946, more than
a total of $8,800,000 before January 1, 1947, more than a total of
$11,000,000 before January 1, 1948, or more than a total of $13,200,000
before January 1, 1949." This repayment plan presupposed that Mexico
would utilize her entire lend-lease quota.
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planes delivered to Mexico were trainers and patrol craft, although in
1943 the War Department did transfer 30 Douglas light bombers to the
Mexican Air Force for anti-submarine escort duties. The real value of
all aircraft assigned to Mexico under the lend-lease agreement amounted
20
to $14,619,440. As was the case with all lend-lease equipment supplied
to her military forces, Mexico elected to retain all of these planes
after the war.
The cost of all training programs in which members of Mexico's armed
forces participated was charged to her lend-lease account. These train-
ing courses, begun in 1942, reached a peak enrollment during fiscal
year 1944 when about 165 Mexican officers and enlisted men were in
attendance at any one time. The most popular programs were at the
Subchaser Training Center at Miami and the Air Training Center at Corpus
Christi, while smaller numbers attended aviation mechanics, logistics and
supply schools. When the air squadron began its training in July, 1944,
which was also financed by lend-lease aid, other aviation training
21programs involving Mexican personnel were reduced
.
Another portion of Mexican military assistance was "spent" on the
construction of an ordnance plant for the production of 75-mm projectiles.
The Lend-Lease Administration approved this project in December, 1943.
It had been the plan of the Mexican Government to develop a munitions
industry near Mexico City consisting of the above plant and factories for
the manufacture of smokeless powder and small arms. Despite the strong
recommendation of the Defense Commission the Lend-Lease Administration
refused to sanction the latter two projects. The ordnance plant was
20Conn and Fairchild, linited States Army in World War II : The








about 80 percent completed when lend-lease deliveries were suspended in
September, 1945. The machinery, valued at over $1 million, which had
been delivered to Mexico for use in the plant was retained by that Govern-
22
ment and installed in publicly-owned factories.
Numerous other implements of war including machine guns, rifles,
hand guns, anti-aircraft cannons, various kinds of ammunitions, naval
patrol craft, tanks, armored vehicles, etc. were delivered to Mexico
during the war. Total United States lend-lease assistance to all nations
during the Second World War amounted to about $42 billion, of which Latin
America received 1.1 percent or $459,422,000. Next to Brazil which
received almost 75 percent of the latter figure to equip her expeditionary
force, Mexico's share of lend-lease was greater than that of any other
23Latin American nation.
It is probable that Mexico received such a large amount of the lend-
lease funds allotted to the American Republics for the following reasons:
1) although on a modest scale, Mexico was one of the two active bellig-
erents among the Latin American countries; 2) the United States hoped
.
that it could induce even more cooperation from Mexico in political and
economic areas by supplying the Mexican military with large amounts of
equipment; and 3) the United States had learned from its experience during
World War I that it would be very beneficial to have Mexico friendly,
collaborative, and at least adequately equipped from a military viewpoint.
The program of lend-lease assistance to Latin America in general,
and Mexico in particular, was not immune from criticism by various
Conn and Fairchild, United State s Army in World War II: The
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members of both Houses of Congress. In late 1943 Senator Hugh A. Butler
(R.
,
Neb.) leveled an attack, described by Secretary Hull as being of the
"narrowest partisan character," against the use being made of lend-lease
aid in several American Republics. In a lengthy report Butler charged
that funds were being spent on completely unnecessary projects which had
little or no connection with the war program and which were causing
intense rivalries among the nations in the southern part of the Hemis-
25
phere. Hull charged that Butler's "unfortunate allegations" contained
"inaccuracies," "fallacies," "misstatements," and "gross misrepresenta-
..26
tions.
In April of the following year two members of the House of Repre-
sentatives spoke out against alleged misuse of lend-lease funds.
Representative Harold Knutson (R. , Minn.) in a House speech charged that
the United States Government was spending $200 million to rehabilitate
the railroad between Mexico City and Veracruz. This allegation was
utterly false as the railway in question was British-owned, and the United
States spent absolutely no money on its repair. On hearing of Knutson'
s
remarks Ambassador Messersmith said that in his opinion, with the possible
exception of Brazil, no country in this Hemisphere had made such good
27
use militarily of lend-lease funds as had Mexico.
Representative Fred Bradley (R. , Mich.) claimed that lend-lease
funds were being expended "on a multitude of so-called Good Neighbor
/
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projects large and small." He said that lend-lease aid was being used to
rehabilitate Mexican railroads which had no strategic value and for the
construction of air raid shelters when there was little danger of an air
attack. The Congressman concluded: "now all this would not be too bad
if our Good Neighbor Policy were actually bearing fruit but our extreme
lend-lease generosity under our Good Neighbor Policy is wholly unappre-
28
ciated by the average Mexican." In response to Representative Bradley's
charges, Leo T. Crowley, head of the Foreign Economic Administration, in
a letter published in the Mexican press said that no lend-lease money had
been expended on civil or commercial projects. Crowley stated that up
to that time 65 percent of the military aid extended to Mexico had been
used for aircraft and aviation parts with the remainder allocated for
tanks, ammunition, and military vehicles. Not one cent of lend-lease
29
money had been spent on Mexican railroads.
Secretary of State Hull informed Ambassador Najera in December of
1942 that the Lend-Lease Administration was in the process of preparing
repayment schedules for individual countries and asked that no install-
ment be paid until statements were received. The renegotiation of the
Mexican agreement complicated the task, and it was not until June 27, 1944,
that the Mexican Embassy in Washington was presented with a statement
which requested the payment of $2.2 million due as of the previous
30
January first. Having received no response to this communication by
late November, the State Department again requested the overdue payment
28
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from the Embassy and instructed Ambassador Messersmith to discreetly
bring up the subject in his conversations with officials of the Foreign
Office. Again the Mexican Government made no reply to the American
request, and the State Department elected not to apply further pressure
until the completion of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War
and Peace held at Chapultepec Castle in Mexico from February 21 to March 8,
1945.
In late March, for the third time, Mexico was asked to meet her
lend-lease repayment obligations; however, by that time the amount in
arrears, in accordance with the mutually agreed payment schedule, had
increased to $4.4 million. (See footnote #19, p. 107.) Mexico was not
the only Latin American country that had seemingly ignored its financial
obligations. Of the eighteen Republics which had signed lend-lease
agreements, only eight, by the beginning of 1945, had begun to reimburse
31
the United States for the defense material received.
One week after the State Department's third request for repayment
had been sent to the Mexican Embassy, Ambassador Messersmith in a long
dispatch to Secretary Hull stated that the burden of lend-lease repayment
was too great for the weak financial structure of the Latin American
countries to bear. Messersmith cautioned that if the United States wished
to maintain the close wartime military and economic collaboration with
the Republics of the Western Hepiisphere, which he considered indispensable,
the defense materials must be supplied to these countries at a very low
cost. Finally the Ambassador recommended that the nations of this
Division of Mexican Affairs (Carrigan) to George S. Messersmith,




Hemisphere be relieved of their lend-lease repayment obligations.
The follov;ing month Brigadier General A. R. Harris, United States
Military Attache in Mexico City, recommended to the War Department that
Mexico's lend-lease debt be cancelled. He reasoned that during World War I
it had cost the United States $30 million per month to station 100,000
troops along the Mexican border. During the current struggle due to
Mexico's unequivocally friendly posture, it had not been necessary to
guard the border, and America had supplied Mexico with about $25 million
worth of military goods and training. By her policy of complete colla-
boration, the General argued, Mexico had actually saved the United States
millions of dollars, and thus she deserved to be liberated from her
33debt.
Apparently these arguments fell on unsympathetic ears in the State
Department and the Lend-Lease Administration because on August 30, 1945,
payment was again requested from Mexico. On this same day President
Truman announced to Congress : "The great task of lend-lease has now
ended. The programs of lend-lease to our allies are being terminated in
an expeditious and orderly manner, subject to military needs for the
movement of troops or for occupation purposes."' As of the following
day Mexico had received from the United States military goods and services
valued at $26,275,731.75; however, by December, 1946, the figure had
35
risen to its final total of almost $39 million.
32 Foreign Relations of the United States , 1945 , George S. Messer-
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33Military Attache in Mexico (Harris) to War Department, May 4, 1945,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
3
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In mid-September Ambassador Najera, who would soon take up the
Foreign Minister's post recently vacated by Ezequiel Padilla, informed
officials of the State Department's Division of Mexican Affairs that the
late President Roosevelt had given him the impression that Mexico would
not be expected to meet her lend-lease obligations. Castillo Najera
indicated that in giving this impression Roosevelt had told his famous
story of the man, who on seeing his neighbor's house burning, lent his
neighbor a hose to put out the fire. The assumption was that it would
have been foolish for the man to charge his neighbor for using the hose
since the fire probably would have spread to his house had his neighbor
not been able to extinguish it. The Ambassador said that former Under
Secretary of State Sumner Welles also had imparted the idea that Mexico
would not be required to pay her lend-lease debt.
Although President Roosevelt had died five months earlier and Sumner
Welles no longer occupied a position with the State Department, an
investigation was conducted in an effort to either substantiate or dis-
prove Castillo Kaj era's allegation. A careful check of Department files
plus an interview with Welles failed to produce any evidence to support
Najera's statement. A memorandum explaining the Mexican Ambassador's
contention that his country was not expected to meet its lend-lease
obligation was prepared by the Director of the Office of American Republic
Affairs and circulated throughout the State Department for the appro-
priate comment of those officials who had been active in the negotiation
of the Mexican agreement. The memorandum was returned to its author
with the following comments written in the margin: Assistant Secretary
of State William L. Clayton, "I never heard of it before;" Emilio G.
36Memorandum of Conversation by Division of Mexican Affairs (Carrigan)
September 14, 1945, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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Collado, Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy, "I
never heard of this and was handling it at the tine;" Acting Secretary
of State Dean Acheson, "I was familiar with this at the tine & never heard
of such a suggestion. If you have not I think we ought to put it to
37
rest." The only support for the Mexican position cane from Ambassador
Messersmith who recalled that in a conversation he had had with the late
President Roosevelt, the latter indicated the American Republics would
o o
not be required to pay for defense materials received during the war.
In October, after he had become Foreign Minister, Castillo Najera
raised the question of lend-lease payments with Ambassador Messersmith.
He told Messersmith that the revenues of the Mexican Government had
decreased recently while the cost of mandatory social programs had
increased, and that Mexico was not in a position to pay her lend-lease
debt without defaulting on other obligations under the Petroleum and
Agrarian Claims Settlements which he considered more important. More-
over, the Mexican diplomat, elaborating on his earlier conversation with
State Department officials the previous month, asserted that during the
time he had held the position of Ambassador in Washington he had advised
President Roosevelt that Mexico might not be able to repay the United
States for the defense material received, and according to Najera, the
President said that his country would not request the Latin American
Republics to pay anymore than it would require the European and Far
Eastern countries to do so. Furthermore, the newly appointed Foreign
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945 , Memorandum by
Director of Office of American Republics Affairs (Warren) , September 14,
1945, Vol. 9, p. 1119.
Foreign Relations of the Uni ted States , 1946 , George S. Messer-
smith to James F. Byrnes, May 2, 1946, Vol. 11, pp. 978-985.
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Minister said that when the revised lend-lease agreement was being
negotiated in 1943, Sumner VJelles told him that it did not matter if the
ceiling was set at $70 million or $40 million since Mexico would not be
expected to pay for any of the goods delivered. Finally, Castillo
Najera stated that if the United States demanded repayment his Government
39
would eventually satisfy its obligation.
In reporting this conversation to the State Department, Messersmith,
pressing his views upon his superiors, said that in his opinion most of
the Latin American countries which had made lend-lease payments believed
that they would be refunded. The Ambassador pointed out that with regard
to lend-lease, as well as in other areas, the American Republics felt
that the United States had treated her European allies far better than
she had treated them and, he cautioned, this feeling was not conducive to
the successful negotiation of the Inter-American defense treaty which the
United States considered so essential. Messersmith again recommended
that serious consideration be given in the highest levels of government
to the complete cancellation of Latin American lend-lease debts.
In May, 1946, prior to departing Mexico to assume the post of
Ambassador to Argentina, Messersmith for the third time strongly urged
the State Department to reconsider its policy of insisting on lend-lease
repayment by the Latin Americans. The countries of the Americas, the
Ambassador argued, should at least be treated with equity and released
41
from their obligations as the Europeans and others had been.
39Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945 , George S. Messersmith
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It was not until he had been replaced in Mexico by Walter Thurston
that the State Department replied to Messersmith's request for re-
examination of its lend-lease policy. "It is the established policy of
the United States Government," the Department stated, "to continue to
require payment in full of sums due on account under the lend-lease
agreement with the American republics. This is a definite policy which has
been specifically reaffirmed and is not being considered for revision.
It applies and will continue to apply in the case of Mexico."' The
Department said it knew of no reason why Mexico should not pay for the
material she had received. Finally on December 14, 1946, the American
Embassy in -Mexico was notified that the Government of that country was
disposed to negotiate a lend-lease settlement in accordance with the
revised agreement of March 18, 1943.
During the immediate post-war years the United States concluded
lend-lease settlement agreements with the majority of those countries
which had received military assistance during the war. With the exception
of the Latin American Republics most of the allies were not asked to make
payment for the equipment delivered to them by the United States prior
to the cessation of hostilities. The lend-lease settlement with Norway
stated: "Following the pattern of most previous settlements, the United
States asks no payment for lend-lease supplies used up before V-J Day
or held by the Norwegian armed forces" as of the defeat of Japan.
In his annual lend-lease report to Congress dated October 3, 1951,
which covered the period from April 1, 1950, to March 31, 1951, President
/ 9
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to Ambassador in Mexico (Thurston), November 26, 1 1J46, Vol. 11, pp. 986-987,
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Trunan revealed that a final settlement had been signed with Mexico.
Although the agreements with most countries, including Brazil, were
printed in the State Department Bulletin the terms of the Mexican settle-
ment were not released. An 1970 inquiry to the State Department's Office
of Mexican Affairs revealed that the terms of the agreement still have
not been made public even though the issue has been settled for some time.
This would seem to indicate that the final arrangement was for less than
the amount called for under the 1943 agreement. The only information that
the American Government has released is that payments from Mexico were




Although the controversy over Mexico's lend-lease payments caused
concern to both Governments, it never became a divisive factor during the
war, nor was it permitted to tarnish the picture of two friends joined
together in a common cause. Civilian and military officials in Washington
noted with pleasure that Mexican lend-lease requisitions were modest, and
the materials requested were necessities rather than ornaments or prestige
items. The United States supplied Mexico with as much military equip-
ment as was possible under the circumstances, and as Ambassador Messer-
smith testified, "the material which was furnished was used in the most
46
effective way and was carefully maintained in excellent condition. °
U. S., Department of State Bulletin Vol. 25, No. 642 (Washington,
October 15, 1951), p. 631.
*5U. S., Department of State Bulletin Vol. 25, No. 633 (Washington,
August 13, 1951), p. 260.
^Unpublished Memoirs of George S. Messersmith, Vol. 3, No. 18,
University of Delaware, p. 12.

CHAPTER V
THE MIGRATION OF MEXICAN WORKERS TO THE UNITED STATES
Following the sudden and unexpected Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
the task of adjusting to a wartime economy was thrust upon the people of
the United States. Immediately the nations largest industries began
converting the output of their plants and factories to meet the needs not
only of America's armed forces but also of its allies all over the world.
The urgent demand for increased production and the entrance of hundreds
of thousands of young men into the military service caused an acute labor
shortage in many industrial centers which was partially alleviated by
the migration of workers from agricultural areas to the cities. 'Jhile
helping to solve one problem, this movement contributed to another, as
many of the country's farmers found themselves without adequate labor to
harvest their crops.
The sugar beet growers in California and Montana who were the first
to experience a scarcity of agricultural workers quickly petitioned their
representatives in Washington to raise with the State Department the idea
of importing Mexican labor to salvage their harvests. It was not at all
surprising that California should be plagued with this problem since, in
addition to losing farm workers to the military and to industry, she
lost thousands more when security precautions dictated the relocation of
Japanese nationals farther away from the Pacific Coast.
Senator Sheridan Downey (D. , Cal.) with the consent of Under Secre-
tary of State Sumner Welles wrote an informal note to Ambassador
Castillo Najera in April, 1942, requesting him to explore the possibility




The Senator said that such assistance would greatly aid the American
people in their program of national defense, and he pledged every protec-
tion to the Mexican workers should they be permitted to come. The
following month, Senator James E. Murray (D. , Mont.), in requesting
immediate efforts be made to secure Mexican labor, advised Secretary of
State Cordell Hull that farmers in his state would have to begin plowing
up land already planted to sugar beets if additional harvesters were not
2
available within ten days.
The idea of acquiring farm workers in Mexico was not new. For years
thousands of Mexicans had illegally entered the United States both as
permanent and seasonal agricultural laborers. The Immigration Law of
1924 exempted the nationals of Latin American countries from quota
restrictions, but most Mexican workers were unable to obtain visas
because they did not meet the self-support or employment specifications
3
of the law. Since high levels of unemployment existed in their own
country and opportunity awaited them in the "paradise" to the north, a
great many Mexicans clandestinely entered the United States looking for
work. The majority crossed the border by wading the Rio Grande River,
thus receiving the name "wetbacks."
When it became known that several legislators were pressuring the
State Department to negotiate an agreement permitting the immediate
entrance of Mexican laborers into the United States, the Secretary General
Senator Sheridan Downey to Ambassador Castillo Najcra, April 13,
1942, Department of State Records, National Archives, Record Group 59.
Hereafter referred to as State Department Records, NA, RG59.
2Senator James E. Murray to Cordell Hull, May 21, 1942, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
J. Lloyd Mecham, A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 374.
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of the Confederation of Mexican Workers announced that his organization
would not oppose such a plan provided satisfactory arrangements could
be made governing wage scales, duration of work, and return of the laborers
to Mexico upon completion of their contracts. The Confederation felt
the migration of workers to the United States was at least a partial
solution to Mexico's unemployment problem.
Not everyone in the afflicted western states was in favor of import-
ing labor from south of the border. The Federation of Spanish American
Voters of California in a letter to President Roosevelt announced it
was unequivocally opposed to legislation which would allow Mexican workers
to enter the United States. The Federation claimed there were already
sufficient farm laborers in California and that cheap imported labor was
always treated badly. The United States Employment Service did not
agree with the Spanish American Voters, and after a careful survey of
the beet growing areas certified that a shortage of 6,000 workers existed.
Secretary of Agriculture Claude R. Wickard strongly urged Secretary
of State Hull in late May, 1942, to do all in his power to arrange for
the importation of Mexican labor. He cautioned that immediate action
was necessary if the twenty-five percent increase in agricultural pro-
duction called for by the Federal Government was to be realized. By the
middle of the following month the labor situation in the Southwest had
further deteriorated. Culbert T. Olsen, Governor of California, notified
Secretary Hull that his state was suffering from a shortage of 20,000
Novedadcs
, April 16, 1942.
^Federation of Spanish American Voters of California to President
Roosevelt, April 23, 1942, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
Secretary of Agriculture to Secretary of State, May 29, 1942, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
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farm workers, and the prospects of a successful harvest were becoming
bleaker every day. Governor Olsen, in urging Faul V. McNutt, Director
of the War Manpower Commission, to support the importation of Mexican
laborers, stated: "Without a substantial number of Mexicans the situation
is certain to be disastrous to the entire victory program, despite our
united efforts in the mobilization of youth and city dwellers for emergency
farm work." One study conducted by the University of California indi-
cated that California alone would need 159,000 additional workers by
October, 1942.
Ambassador Messersmith was instructed on June 8, 1942, to raise with
Foreign Minister Padilla the question of the temporary immigration to
this country of Mexican agricultural workers. The Ambassador was to
stress how reluctant his Government was to make such a request, but was
doing so because war measures dictated that food production not only be
maintained, but also increased in spite of the fact that large numbers of
laborers were being lost to the military. Although in the past Mexican
workers had encountered unsatisfactory working conditions and had been
discriminated against in this country, Messersmith was to guarantee that
the United States Government would make every effort to see this situation
did not recur if laborers were made available to help meet the existing
emergency.
Since Foreign Minister Padilla was not in Mexico City at the time,
Ambassador Messersmith discussed the issue with the Deputy Foreign Minis-
ter, Jaime Torres Bodet. The latter said that this question raised
several serious problems which his Government would need a certain amount
7The New York Times , June 16, 1942.
8Foreign Halations of the United States , 1942 , Secretary of State
to George S. Messersmith, June 3, 1942, Vol. 6, pp. 537-538.
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of time to consider, lie stressed the many instances of racial discrimi-
nation suffered by Mexicans in the United States which he felt the American
Government could not prevent since they were the result of strong local
feelings. The Mexican Government feared that a recurrence of these
unfortunate episodes could impede the close collaboration existing between
the two countries. In addition the Foreign Office was apprehensive of
the internal effects that a temporary emigration of laborers would create.
Many Mexicans would volunteer to work in the United States where
they would receive a much higher wage than that paid in their own country.
This would produce a certain amount of dislocation within the Mexican
economy, since those applying to go to America would be not only the
unemployed, but those already working who were enticed by the thought of
getting rich in a land "flowing with milk and honey." Uhen their
temporary employment hod ended, the workers would return to Mexico, many
penniless after either wasting their earnings or losing them to swindlers,
and they would be dissatisfied with the inferior working conditions and
lower salaries which awaited them. In some cases the conditions of these
workers on returning to Mexico would be worse than before they left,
causing serious social and political problems for the Government.
Mexico, Torres Bodet stressed, was sincerely interested in cooperating
with the United States in alleviating her labor shortage and was seriously
studying the problem from every angle in order to arrive at a mutually
agreeable solution, which would neither interfere with the collaboration
between the two Governments nor contribute to internal instability in
either country.
9
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Secretary of Agriculture Wickard, while attending the Inter-American
Agricultural Conference in Mexico in early July, 1942, spoke with Presi-
dent Camacho of the serious farm labor problem faced by the United States.
At first, the Mexican Chief Executive expressed doubt as to whether it
would be wise for him to send workers abroad, in view of his own country's
increased production program, but he finally agreed that as a measure of
wartime cooperation his Government would be prepared to allow laborers
to temporarily emigrate to the United States. In reporting the Presi-
dent's decision to the State Department, Ambassador Messersmith warned
that in accordance with the wishes of the Mexican Foreign Office nego-
tiations would have to take place strictly on a government-to-government
basis. Mexico did not want to deal with any local or state agencies.
Messersmith recommended that calculations on the number of workers needed
be kept small at first since high estimates could endanger the program
for subsequent years when United States requirements would be even larger.
Two officials from the Department of Agriculture, David Meeker,
Assistant Director of the Office of Agriculture War Relations and John
0. Walker, Assistant Administrator of the Farm Security Administration,
were immediately sent to Mexico to begin negotiations with their counter-
parts, E. Hidalgo of the Foreign Office and Abraham J. Navas from the
Department of Labor and Social Provisions. The American delegation was
augmented by the addition of Joseph F. McGurk, Counselor of the United
States Embassy in Mexico City. Discussions were carried out in a cordial
and statesmanlike manner with the final arrangement being approved in a
surprisingly short time.
In the Executive Agreement signed on August 4, 1942, the Mexican
10George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, July 15, 1942, State Depart-
ment Records, KA, RG59.
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Government declared that no obstacles would be placed in the path of any
of its nationals who desired to temporarily emigrate to the United States
to alleviate that country's agricultural labor shortage provided an
individual contract was signed with each worker affording him certain
guarantees. Under the terms of the agricultural arrangement, it was
specifically agreed Mexican workers coming to the United States would not
be liable for compulsory military service nor would they be made to
suffer discrimination of any kind. The American Government would provide
the laborers with transportation both to and from the United States and
guaranteed each worker would be repatriated when his individual contract
expired. It was stated in the agreement that the Mexicans would not be
used to displace American workers nor for the purpose of lowering pre-
viously established wage scales. Each laborer would sign a contract of
six months duration with the Farm Security Administration of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture under whose auspices the labor immigration program
was to be carried out, and the latter would in turn sign a subcontract
with the farm owners wishing to employ Mexican workers.
The agreement provided that the Mexicans would be employed exclusively
as agricultural laborers and would be paid the same wages as other
laborers were paid for the same type of work, but in no case would the
wage paid the Mexicans be less than thirty cents per hour. To insure
they did not arrive home empty-handed, ten percent of their salary was
withheld each week, to be paid when they returned to their own country.
Housing conditions and sanitary and medical services provided for the
workers entering the United States under this program were to be identical
to those received by other laborers in the localities where the Mexicans
-^U. S., Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No_^ jT^
(Washington, 1943), pp. 4-13.
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were employed. The agreement strictly prohibited the contracting of
children under fourteen years of age. Each Government retained the right
to unilaterally renounce the understanding by notifying the other Govern-
12
ment ninety days in advance of the effective date of its renunciation.
Since it was impossible to determine at the time the agreement was
signed the exact number of Mexican workers the United States would need,
it was stated the United States would periodically notify the Mexican
Government of its needs, and the latter would determine in each instance
how many agricultural laborers could leave the country without adversely
affecting the national economy. Ambassador Messersmith informed the
Mexican Foreign Office that his Government was attempting to contract a
maximum of f^OOO workers before the end of 1942 to be employed only in
California and Arizona for the harvesting of sugar beets and cotton.
In order to secure workers under this agreement, American farmers
in a region where a manpower shortage existed would report their needs
for laborers to the local office of the United States Employment Service.
If this agency, after appropriate investigation, discovered that the
domestic supply of workers could not meet local demands, it informed the
Farm Security Administration of the shortage and certified the number of
Mexican workers needed. The Farm Security Administration then proceeded
to negotiate contracts with the farmers in the area, thus firmly
establishing the demand for an exact number of laborers. The recruiting
of workers was controlled by the Mexican Government, and until 1943 was
U. S. , Department of State, Executive Agreement Serie s No. 278
(Washington, 1943), pp. 4-13.
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done exclusively in Mexico City where labor was more plentiful than in
other parts of the country. At the recruiting stations personnel from the
United States Immigration Service, the Public Health Service and the Farm
Security Administration worked in cooperation with a similar team of
Mexican officials. The Public Health Service examined all Mexicans
recruited for service in the United States to insure their physical fit-
ness and cared for them while they were in America.
The recruitment of agricultural workers began in early September,
1942, and progressed satisfactorily throughout the remainder of the year.
Secretary of Agriculture Wickard suggested that the manpower shortage
could be further alleviated if the Mexican Government would permit farm
workers to cross the border and return each day without coming under the
provisions of the agricultural labor agreement. This possibility was
explored with the Foreign Office and rejected by the latter which strongly
opposed any worker migration outside of the formal understanding.
Ambassador Messersmith was informed by the State Department in early
1943 that it was estimated the United States would require 50,000 Mexi-
can farm workers before the year ended, and the Ambassador was directed
to seek the approval of the Mexican Government to the recruiting of that
number of laborers. While the Camacho Administration was considering
this new request for additional workers, it was announced in early
February that due to disorganization within the Mexican Ministry of Labor
further recruitment would be suspended until the departmental problem
15Cordell Hull to American Consul General in Mexico (Blocker)
,
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16Secretary of Agriculture Wickard to George S. Messersmith, November 2,
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could be solved. This stoppage in recruiting caused a great deal of
concern in the agricultural areas of the southwestern United States where
the large landowners pleaded with their elected representatives in
Washington to do everything possible to facilitate the uninterrupted
movement of workers from Mexico. In March President Camacho appointed a
new Minister of Labor who immediately supervised a complete turnover of
personnel within his Department. At the same time the Mexican President
directed that members of his Government must collaborate fully in supply-
ing the United States with the greatest number of workers possible under
the August fourth accord. On March 15 the Foreign Office announced
recruiting of Mexican workers could be resumed the following day.
Both the Mexican Government and the Mexican press reported quite
favorably on the initial results of the migratory labor program as the
first contingent of workers returned home following six months of service
in the United States. One member of a Mexican presidential commission
sent to California to examine the working and living conditions of the
immigrant laborers stated that while they were not in a paradise, the
conditions under which the Mexicans were working were at least as good and
in many cases better than those they had left in their own country.
When problems did arise the member reported, they were quickly solved
with the help of officials of the Farm Security Administration. 19 Luis
Padilla Nervo, Mexican Under Secretary of Labor, said on March 31, 1943,
that he had not received a single complaint from any of the returning
workers. "It is made clear," Padilla Nervo stated, "that the Mexican
I Q
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laborers who are now in the United States are being treated most justly
and they are receiving every attention.... In this as in all other
matters that the two countries, Mexico and the United States, attend,
20
there is a sentiment of cordial cooperation."" The Mexican press
reported that the great majority of laborers who had fulfilled their
contracts in the United States were highly satisfied since the American
Government had strictly adhered to the migratory worker agreement. The
returning farm laborers presented a petition to the Ministry of Labor
asking that consideration be given to their previous service when future
contigents of workers were sent to the United States.
No sooner had the. recruiting of farm workers begun again in Mexico
City than the continuation of the agreement itself was seriously jeopardized,
A joint resolution was being considered by the United States Congress
which, if adopted, would take the administration of the labor pact from
the Farm Security Administration and place it in the hands of individual
state agencies. This possibility seriously concerned the Mexicans who
had the utmost confidence the agreement would be fairly administered by
the Federal Government, but questioned the. ability and the will of
California, Arizona, Mew Mexico and Texas authorities to grant equitable
treatment to Mexican workers. While neither the Foreign Office nor the
Mexican Embassy in Washington flatly stated the arrangement would be




Foreign Relations of the United States , 1943 , Memorandum by Divi-
sion of American Republics, April 20, 1943, Vol. 6, pp. 545-546.
21George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, March 8, 1943, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
22
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between State Department and
Mexican Embassy, March 15, 1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.

-130-
The State Department relayed the fears expressed by the Mexican
Government to Congressional leaders who immediately began the task, of
revising the bill. On April 8, 1943, Senator Carl Hayden (0., Ariz.),
representing one of the states which would suffer most should the Mexican
Government prohibit its workers from coming to the United States, declared:
"No legislation is contemplated which would make any provision with
respect to the Mexican Agreement, except to allow it to operate. ^
That same day Congress passed its substitute resolution on supply and
distribution of farm labor which allowed the administration of the Mexi-
can agreement to remain with the Federal Government.
One x-zeek after Congressional action on the farm labor bill, Ambassador
Messersmith informed the State Department that President Camacho had
given his approval to the recruiting of up to 50,000 workers during 1943.
However, the Mexican Government made it quite clear this was the maximum
number that could be authorized since the contracting of more than 50,000
might adversely affect the Mexican domestic economy and could also produce
political repercussions.
The War Food Administration (WFA) was established by President
Roosevelt in Executive Order 9334 of April 19, 1943, and was charged,
among other things, with the responsibility for carrying out the farm
labor program. This same order stipulated that the Farm Security
Administration was to be transferred from the Department of Agriculture to
25the War Food Administration.
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By an exchange of notes between Mexico and the United States dated
April 26, 1943, the migratory labor agreement was modified. The modifi-
cation did not basically change the provisions of the accord, but served
to put in writing clearer statements on procedures than were found in the
original pact. ° At the time of the exchange of notes approximately
15,000 Mexican workers were employed under the terms of the agreement
largely in the states of California, Arizona and Washington. Recruiting
was being expedited in Mexico City so as to contract the maximum number
permitted prior to the peak fall harvest.
Paul V. Mclv'utt, Chairman of the War Manpower Commission (WMC} had
recommended to the State Department as early as December 26, 1942, that
an arrangement similar to the agricultural pact be made with Mexico which
would permit the entrance into the United States of large numbers of
workers for the western railroads. The Department, wishing to insure
that the agricultural recruiting began the new year on a solid footing,
advised McNutt that it would be unwise to bring up the matter at that
time, but did not discount the possibility of future negotiations at a
27later date.
As was the case with the farm labor agreement certain groups within
the United States opposed the immigration of Mexican railroad workers.
Representatives of the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees stated
that adequate domestic labor was available for railway maintenance jobs
provided reasonable wages were offered. They charged the railroads were
only concerned with procuring cheap labor when they sought workers
26
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from Ilexico. Railroad officials on the other hand said local manpower
was insufficient and warned service could not be maintained if Mexican
workers were not contracted.
During a visit to Washington in late January, 1943, Ambassador
Messersmith spoke with the Chairman of the WMC who informed Messersmith
that he was under great pressure to obtain a large number of railroad
workers, possibly as many as 100,000. The Ambassador informed McNutt
that since a maximum of 50,000 agricultural workers might be recruited
during the year, it was doubtful the Mexican Government would agree to
29
supply more than 10,000 maintenance of way workers. The two men agreed
that the time had come to raise with President Camacho's Administration
the possibility of the United States acquiring railroad workers in Mexico,
and after further discussions within the State Department, the American
Embassy in Mexico City was directed on January 28, 1943, to approach the
Foreign Office with a proposal for securing labor for use on railroads
30in the Southwest and possibly in copper mines in the same area. The
Embassy was informed that the WMC certified an immediate shortage of
3,000 laborers existed and estimated that an additional 6,000 would be
needed in the near future.
Shortly thereafter Joseph B. Eastman, Director of the Office of
Defense Transportation, notified Secretary Hull he had held extensive
90
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talks with railway labor and management which failed to produce a satis-
factory solution to the manpower shortage affecting the nation's railroads
In Eastman's opinion the problem could only be met by the temporary
immigration of Mexican workers to this country, and he recommended nego-
31tiations with the Mexican Government for that purpose be expedited.
It was precisely at this time that the recruiting of agricultural
labor had been suspended by the Mexican Government due to internal
problems within the Ministry of Labor, and Ambassador Messersmith con-
sidered it unwise to put too much pressure on the Foreign Office for a
railway workers agreement until the contracting of farm laborers had
recommenced. Foreign Minister Padilla also shared this view. As soon
as recruiting of agricultural workers began again in Mexico City, the
Foreign Office informed the American Embassy that it was prepared to
discuss a possible arrangement for recruiting unskilled, non-agricultural
workers. The W11C immediately sent Arthur W. Motley, Chief of its Employ-
ment Office Service Division, to Mexico as its representative in the up-
coming negotiations.
By the end of April it was announced by both Governments that an
understanding on the recruiting of non-agricultural labor had been
reached. In an exchange of notes on April 29, 1943, it was agreed with
respect to the departure from Mexico of non-farm workers: "There shall
govern in understandings reached by agencies of the respective Governments
the same fundamental principles which have been applied here to the
32departure of farm labor.' Under this agreement the workers received
31 Director of Office of Defense Transportation (Eastman) to Secre-
tary of State, February 27, 1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
3 U. S., Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No. 376
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the same guarantees with regard to wages, housing and sanitation, food,
transportation, exemption from military service, and repatriation as
did the agricultural laborers.
The original authorization given by the. Mexican Government under
the non-agricultural agreement was for the contracting of 6,000 unskilled
railway workers. Ambassador Messersmith reported it was possible addi-
tional recruiting would be permitted once the initial 6,000 had been
contracted. As was the case with the farm laborers, the Foreign Office
insisted that all recruiting of railway workers take place in Mexico City.
The Camacho Administration was very reluctant to allow recruiting outside
the capital where it would be difficult to control and where unscrupulous
persons might attempt to exploit the workers for their own personal gain.
In addition, the Mexican Government lacked a sufficient number of trained
oo
personnel to supervise the recruiting process at several locations.
The signing of the non-agricultural agreement with Mexico revived
hope in the United States that the Mexican Government would permit mine
workers to immigrate temporarily to this country for employment in the
mines of the western states. Along with the agriculture and transportation
industries, the copper mining industry in the United States experienced
labor shortages due to military induction and large-scale movements of
workers to defense manufacturing plants. Since copper was one of the
most important strategic minerals during the war years, the V.Tar Department
decided to release experienced copper miners already inducted into the
Army to allow them to return to their previous occupations. As early as
November 2, 1942, Chairman McNutt of the WMC advised the State Department
that strenuous efforts should be made to secure permission from the
33Forcign Relations of the United States , 1943 , George S. Messer-
smith to Cordell Hull, April 30, 1943, Vol. 6, pp. 548-550.

-135-
Mexican Government for the recruiting of about 10,000 mine workers in
Mexico for use in Arizona and New Mexico.
The American Embassy was directed by the State Department to discuss
with the Foreign Office the possibility of acquiring mine workers in
Mexico. Ambassador Messersmith replied that due to the programs of in-
creased mineral production in Mexico, which the United States had readily
supported, there were no unemployed mine workers in the country. The
Ambassador expressed surprise that the State Department would even
consider recruiting mine workers in Mexico when Mexican production of
strategic materials was so important to the United States war effort.
Messersmith reported the operation of mines in Mexico was handicapped by
manpower shortages, and any emigration of workers would make it impossible
for Mexico to maintain, let alone increase, the mineral production desired




The State Department did not again seriously consider approaching
the Mexican Government in this regard until after the non-agricultural
agreement of April 29, 1943. However, two months earlier the War
Department stated quite clearly its interest in getting unskilled mine
workers from Mexico. In a letter to the State Department, Under Secretary
of War Robert P. Patterson wrote: "If we are going to fight a United
Chairman War Manpower Commission to Secretary of State, November 21,
1942, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
35George S. Messersmith to Cordell hull, November 23, 1942, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, December 7, 1942, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
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Nations war, there must be some way of utilizing United Nations manpower.'
Following the non-agricultural understanding, James F. Byrnes,
Director of the Office of War Mobilization, requested that the Mexican
Government again be urged to permit mine workers to enter the United
States under the April agreement. Ambassador Messersmith was instructed
to raise the issue with the Camacho Administration, and after discussing
it thoroughly with officials of the Foreign Office he informed the State
Department that the Mexican Government considered it unwise to permit the
contracting of labor for employment in copper mines in the United
38
States. On July 22, 1943, Secretary Hull informed Messersmith that the
shortage of non-ferrous miners in the United States had reached such a
critical stage that a personal appeal for mine workers from President
Roosevelt to President Camacho was being considered, and the Ambassador's
view on such an appeal was requested. Messersmith replied that in his
opinion it would be utterly impossible for the Mexican President to
deviate from the course he had already taken on this issue, and that it
would cause Camacho a great deal of embarrassment to respond negatively
to President Roosevelt's request. The Mexican Chief Executive, Messer-
smith cautioned, had been following the labor situation in his own
country quite closely and was convinced that any movement of mine workers
to the United States would have a most upsetting effect on the Mexican
labor market and would be detrimental to his country's strategic material
production program. " The Ambassador strongly urged such an appeal not
"17
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be made and the idea of securing nine workers in Mexico was never again
seriously contemplated.
Employers throughout the United States seemed to feel that the
unskilled non-agricultural agreement with Mexico presented them with
unlimited opportunities for obtaining workers, and they besieged the
State Department with requests for acquiring, among other things, tailors,
lumbermen, unloaders of freight cars, dental technicians, chauffeurs,
caulkers, cow hands, lambers, sheep herders and camp tenders. With the
exception of about 100 cow hands for Arizona and about 1,100 lambers,
sheep herders and camp tenders for Wyoming, Montana and Colorado, which
were all charged against the agricultural quota, the Mexican Government
permitted only farm and railroad workers to migrate to the United States.
No sooner had recruiting begun under the non-agricultural agreement
when a situation arose which threatened the very existence of both labor
migration programs. On May 14, 1943, Ambassador Messersmith informed the
State Department that the recently appointed Under Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, Manuel Tello, had called at the Embassy to protest
against what he termed the "indiscriminate recruiting" of Mexican nationals
outside of the existing agreement by United States Immigration Officials
in the Juarez-El Paso area. The immigration office in El Paso reported
it was documenting Mexican workers for a one year stay in the United
States under authority contained in Public Law 45 of April 29, 1943, which
appropriated $26.1 million for recruiting and transporting of additional
Li
labor in those areas experiencing manpower shortages.
Cordell Hull to George S. Messersmith, August 4, 1943, State
Department Records, MA, RG59.
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Tello said in his opinion the Mexican Government was prepared to
authorize even further increases in labor recruiting under the existing
agreements, but if further contracting outside of the understandings
continued, the agreements would come to an end because they would lose
their significance and it would be foolish for his Government to continue
expending money in the examination and recruiting of laborers if the
United States chose to contract workers along the border.
Messersmith reported the concern of the Mexican Government was much
deeper than Tello had allowed himself to indicate, and he was sure that
if the United States persisted in undermining the international agreements
with domestic legislation, Mexico would become justifiably annoyed and
renounce the migratory labor program. Avila Camacho remembered vividly
how, during the First World War, thousands of his countrymen without any
guarantees had migrated to the United States to alleviate the American
employment problem only to become destitute and impoverished when the war
had ended and work was no longer plentiful. For several years after the
war the Mexican Government spent large sums of money repatriating its
citizens. President Camacho was determined this situation would not be
repeated, and he insisted that Mexican laborers proceed to the United
States only when protected by the agreements.
Continued recruiting under Public Lav; 45 compelled the Mexican Govern-
ment to instruct Ambassador Castillo i'lajera in Washington to inform
Under Secretary Welles that the entrance of Mexican laborers into the
United States, outside of the agreements, and sanctioned by American
42
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immigration officials, had reached such proportions that consideration
was being given in the Ministry of Gobernacion to closing the border.
The Ambassador was further directed to say his Government considered the
recruiting of workers by immigration officials contrary to the spirit of
the understandings effected by the exchange of notes between Mexico and
the United States, and should such recruiting continue the Mexican Govern-
ment would unhappily be forced to renounce the agreements and close the
border. * President Camacho considered the excellent relations existing
between Mexico and the United States were too important to jeopardize
by subjecting unprotected Mexican x.'orkers to inevitable exploitation
which would force him to take unfortunate counter actions.
The prospect of having the Mexican border closed with the attendant
loss of thousands of workers caused great concern in VJashington and
prompted State Department officials to meet with representatives of the
Immigration Service and the War Food Administration to see what steps
could be taken to satisfy Mexican demands. One of the officials of the
WFA at the conference held on May 22, 1943, became quite indignant at the
idea of Mexico refusing to allow workers to be recruited outside of the
labor agreements. He stated that Mexico was in a position to furnish as
many laborers as were needed, and without further nonsense the United
States should inform the Foreign Office how many workers were required
and demand they be supplied. Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge
Long quickly discarded that suggestion by explaining the basic inter-
national facts of life, stressing that United States jurisdiction ended
precisely at the border. It was finally decided by those in attendance
to cease recruiting outside of the formal understandings and to petition
44
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the Mexican Government to open recruiting stations along the border so
that contracting could take place there under the terms of the two
agreements
.
For the reason already discussed President Camacho was unwilling to
accede to this request, but was disposed to compromise by opening stations
in Guadalajara for the recruiting of all railroad workers, thereby leav-
ing all the facilities in Mexico City for the contracting of farm labor.
This plan would permit the documenting of as many as 3,000 agricultural
workers per week. The United States agreed to accept this offer and also
decided to discuss with the Mexican Government an increase in the 1943
farm laborer quota which at that time stood at 50,000. On May 28, the
Attorney General notified immigration officials: "Effective immediately,
nationals of Mexico are not to be admitted as agricultural workers under
the provisions of Public Lav/ 45... unless they present written consent of
the Federal Government of Mexico to emigration for that purpose.'
As of the beginning of June, 1943, Texas had not received any
Mexican workers under the terms of the international agreements, but 2,044
laborers had been documented for work in Texas under Public Law 45. Now
that the Justice Department had taken steps to insure that no additional
Mexican labor would be made available from the latter source, Texas
suddenly became dependent on the understandings with Mexico to supply
badly needed manpower, and Foreign Minister Padilla decided the time was
right to bring pressure to bear on Texas to abandon its arbitrary and
' Memorandum by Division of American Republics, May 28, 1943, State
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dlscriminatory treatment of Mexican nationals. Realizing that power-
ful labor forces in Texas were urging state officials to secure additional
workers, and that if a definite stand were not taken the situation would
only become worse, Padilla decided to make the sending of his countrymen
to Texas contingent upon their receiving equal treatment in that state.
One American news source reported on the Texas treatment of Mexicans in
this way:
There are about a million people of Mexican extraction in
Texas. In much of the state they are forced to ride in
Jim Crow cars, use Jim Crow toilets, go to separate ' SPIK'
schools and restaurants. Even Mexican Consuls have been
treated as if they were unfit to associate with any white
Texan. .. .Many leading Mexicans will never forget or forgive
the insulting treatment they have received in Texas. ^^
In mid-June the Mexican Government issued orders to its Consuls that
none of its nationals should be sent into Texas under the labor agreements
due to persistent cases of racial discrimination. Foreign Minister
Padilla in a public statement outlined several instances of pre-
judicial treatment of Mexicans in Texas, and called on state officials
to spare no effort in rectifying the situation. Padilla promised if the
attitude of the people in Texas toward his people improved his Government
would reexamine its policy of prohibiting Mexicans from entering the
state. At least some Texans realized that Padilla was speaking the
truth and resolved to bring about a change in the treatment of their
Mexican neighbors. The citizens of Laredo, Texas in an open letter to
the press commented on the Foreign Minister's speech:
^ 8Time Magazine , February 10, 1944.
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A statement like that years ago would have caused a great
deal of resentment here in Texas but strange as it seems
from our Governor on down our own six million people in
Texas realize that you are merely telling the truth and
the high esteem in which you and your great President are
held in Texas as throughout our nation, we merely started
putting our own house in order which we know was long past
due as you have publicly stated. ^
As the shortage of labor in Texas became more acute, state officials
began to take steps to curb instances of racial discrimination, with the
hope that the Mexican Government, on seeing the situation improving,
would permit its laborers to enter the state. Governor Coke R. Stevenson
issued a proclamation on June 25, based on a concurrent resolution of the
Texas Legislature, declaring the Good Neighbor Policy had been adopted as
an official policy of Texas. "The policy of this state," said Stevenson,
"consists in giving equal and complete comfort, advantages and privileges
in all public places of business and entertainment to the Mexicans and
other Latin American residents or visitors in this state." In addition
a fund was established by concerned Texas land owners to combat, in the
courts if necessary, instances of discrimination.
Ambassador Messersmith reported on July 20, after discussing the
Texas problem with Padilla, that the Foreign Minister was giving serious
thought to allowing Mexican workers to enter Texas although he realized
this reversal of position would not be universally popular in his country.
All of the major newspapers in Mexico City, including the usually pro-
American Excelsior , El Universal and El Popular , had bitterly condemned
the treatment of Mexicans in Texas and applauded the action of the
Government in prohibiting its citizens from entering that state. Padilla,
5QThe Laredo Times , August 19, 1943.
La Prensa, June 27, 1943.
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the Ambassador explained, was concerned that if Texas really needed
laborers and if Mexico refused to allow workers to go to Texas, while
permitting them to enter other states, thus in effect discriminating
against Texas, the Texans might blame Mexico for any crop losses they
experienced, and the treatment of Mexicans in Texas could become even
52
worse. Since it appeared state officials were honestly attempting to
improve the situation, Padilla was disposed to recommend to President
Camacho that the ban against Mexicans entering Texas be lifted provided
certain demands were met.
In late July an understanding was finally reached which paved the
way for the entrance of Mexican laborers into Texas. Governor Stevenson
agreed to send a letter, approved by the Mexican Foreign Office, to all
Texas law enforcement agencies directing them "to be vigilant in repress-
ing cases of discrimination" against Mexicans, and the Governor further
consented to the establishment of a Good Neighbor Commission to study and
act on any complaints of discrimination. As soon as Stevenson appointed
the Commission, which he did on August 10, Padilla agreed to certify
5,000 Mexican workers for Texas provided they enter Texas from another
53American state and not directly from Mexico.
In reporting to the Mexican press the steps taken by the Mexican
Government and Governor Stevenson to alleviate the problem of racial
discrimination in Texas, Foreign Minister Padilla stated: "Realistically
speaking, we need a combined effort in order that this flagrant contradiction
52
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to the ideological principles of the United Nations does not open a
breach of mistrust and discredit in our continental life. Fortunately,
never has the situation been as propitious as it is now for an effort of
this kind." * Padilla's remarks were given wide and favorable coverage
by the press which seemed to have been won over to the Foreign Minister's
point of view.
Throughout the remainder of 1943 Mexico continued to permit increasing
numbers of its citizens to enter the United States on a temporary basis
in an effort to ease the critical labor shortage. In August permission
was given to recruit 9,360 additional laborers under the non-agricultural
pact bringing the allowable maximum to 15,360 under that agreement. On
October 1, Ambassador Messersmith in a note to Ezequiel Padilla requested
that permission be given for the recruiting of an additional 25,000 farm
workers, which would raise the total under the agricultural understanding
to 75,000. In making this request Messersmith stated that his Government
considered the sending of workers to the United States to be "a signifi-
cant expression of Mexico's collaboration in the war effort of the United
Nations." Three days later in answering the Ambassador's note Padilla
replied that, "notwithstanding the sacrifice on the part of its national
economy which the exodus of agricultural workers" signified, the Mexican
Government as a measure of wartime cooperation was willing to increase
the farm labor quota by 25,000 workers.
At the beginning of November Chairman McNutt of the WMC requested
George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, August 12, 1943, State
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that the State Department explore the possibility of relocating about
10,000 agricultural workers into war essential industries during the
winter months in those northern states where farming was impossible in the
cold climate. Some of those industries suggested by McNutt were mining,
smelting, logging, aircraft manufacturing, shipbuilding, etc. Ambassador
Messersmith replied that the Foreign Office was very reluctant to discuss
the transfer of farm workers to other industries where housing and
sanitary facilities were not available as they were on the farms, and
that it would much prefer that the laborers in the north be moved to
southern states where they were needed on the farms and where agriculture
was possible during the winter. In the Ambassador's opinion the indus-
trial relocation would be unwise because some of the industries suggested
by McNutt paid wages higher than the agricultural workers were receiving,
and if they were transferred to better paying positions it would be very
difficult in the spring to move them back to farming where the greater
57
need for labor existed.
The State Department then suggested that perhaps the Mexican Govern-
ment would not object during the winter months to transferring the
Mexican agricultural workers from the northern states to the railroads
where they would receive all the guarantees of the international agreement
and where the living and working conditions were well known. Neither the
Foreign Office nor Ambassador Messersmith considered this a satisfactory
alternative. Messersmith recommended that the United States conform
strictly to the exchange of notes with the Mexican Government. He
reported that the Governors of manv Mexican states were complaining
bitterly to their Federal Government that the United States was taking
57Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, George S. Messer-
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all of the best farm workers from the country and leaving only the poorer
ones for employment in their own nation. Any attempt by the Americans to
use these laborers in any but agricultural endeavors would only cause
more internal problems for President Camacho. 58 After receiving this
report from its representative in Mexico, the State Department applied no
further pressure to switch the workers.
Figures compiled by the State Department at the end of 1943 showed
that 54,514 farm laborers and 15,376 railroad workers came to the United
States from Mexico. A further breakdown of the latter figure as of the
end of the year indicated 13,091 were actually employed, 541 were missing,
23 had died in the United States and 1,721 had terminated their contracts
and returned to Mexico.
In the vast majority of cases American employers were highly satis-
fied with the work performed by the Mexican laborers. The turnover of
Mexican workers in the railway industry during 1943 was 12 percent while
the normal figure for domestic labor was greater than 100 percent, and
59had on occasion reached 200 percent. A typical reaction to the work.
performed by the Mexicans was the resolution adopted by the farmers of
the San Joaquin Valley in California who credited imported Mexican manpower
with salvaging 15 percent of that state's 1943 harvest, thus avoiding a
crisis which would have had a detrimental effect on the war food program.
The California farmers expressed their "deep and heartfelt appreciation
to the Republic of Mexico and its loyal people for this contribution to
George S. Messersmith to Division of American Republics, December 4,
1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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the cause of freedom."
In August, 1943, the United States received the first serious com-
plaint from the Mexican Government alleging unequal treatment of its
workers under the migratory labor agreements. The Foreipn Office informed
Ambassador Messersmith that the Santa Fe Railroad had, through the inter-
mediation of contractors, employed many workers at wages varying between
$.65 and $.875 per hour while Mexicans working right alongside these
men and performing the same tasks received an hourly rate of $.4825. The
Ministry considered this wage differential a blatant violation of the
labor agreements which guaranteed the Mexicans eaual pay for equal work
and warned that many Mexican railway workers were on the verge of can-
celling their contracts. In replying to the Mexican charge the State
Department acknowledged the existence of the situation, but declared
itself powerless to increase the salary paid to the Mexicans because of
wage controls applied by President Roosevelt in Executive Order 9250 of
October 3, 1942.
61
In addition to the wage dispute, Manuel Tello notified Ambassador
Messersmith that the Mexican Government had received numerous adverse
reports from railroad workers alleging poor food and housing, unsatis-
factory sanitary conditions and lack of consideration for the welfare
of the workers by those administering the program. Tello stated the
position of the track workers was made even more intolerable by the fact
that the agricultural workers were being treated so favorably in every
regard. He said that he had prepared (but not sent) a directive which
Resolution of Associated Farmers of the San Joaquin Valley, Cali-
fornia, November 10, 1943, Transmitted From War Food Administration to
Secretary of State, January 5, 1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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instructed the Mexican Embassy in Washington to demand a transfer of all
track workers either to agricultural positions or to other industries
where all the guarantees of the agreements would be applied. Although
Messersmith reported that the Mexican Government was seriously concerned
over the treatment of the railway workers , he was sure an overall solu-
tion could be easily reached once the wage problem was settled.
In September the State Department was informed that President Camacho
had tentatively agreed to increase the railway quota to 20,000, but as
the salary dispute dragged on, the Mexican Government announced further
recruiting of maintenance of way workers had been suspended. Although
the Foreign Office simply stated contracting had stopped because the
formally recognized quota of 15,360 had been reached, it was quite clear
this was not the principal reason for the abrupt halt in recruiting.
The Office of Defense Transportation was particularly concerned that
the interruption in contracting of Mexican railway workers would seriously
hinder the efforts of the western railroads to increase their service at
a time when war production traffic was increasing in a westwardly direc-
tion.
The situation had become very serious by the end of October, 1943,
and the Mexican Government remained adamant against the further documen-
tation of railroad workers until the salary controversy was settled.
Since the suspension had been placed in effect, six weeks had passed
during which neither new laborers were recruited nor expiring contracts
renewed. If the status quo were allowed to exist until the middle of
November, the United States would lose half of the Mexican maintenance of
62George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, August 20, 1943, State
Denartment Records, NA, RG59.
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way workers in the country due to contract expirations. In Mexico City
great pressure was being put on the Ministries of Foreign Relations,
Labor, and Gobernacion to renounce the agreements due to publicized
reports of worker maltreatment. At this juncture the American Embassy
suggested to the Foreign Office that a commission consisting of two
Mexicans and two Americans be established to examine the Santa Fe Rail-
road salary dispute and formulate a solution. The Mexican Government
agreed to this proposal, declaring that when the commission was set up and
the Santa Fe promised to abide by its decision, recruiting of railway
workers could resume with the quota increased to 20,000. Ambassador
Messersmith strongly urged the WMC to accept the settlement plan.
A few days after receiving Messersmith
1
s proposal the WMC replied
that it was unequivocally opposed to any solution which recommended the
studying of a particular incident of alleged unfair treatment of workers,
and suggested instead the commission confine its work to: 1) considering
discrepancies in interpretation of the agreements, 2) recommending
changes to the agreements, and 3) recommending procedures to minimize
individual complaints. In addition, the WMC requested the Mexican Govern-
ment agree to a thirty day extension for all railway worker contracts in
order to avoid a slowdown on railroads in the western United States.
Mexico emphatically rejected the WMC plan and reiterated its support
of the original proposal made by Ambassador Messersmith.
The State Department was informed in November that the Mexican
Government would definitely not accept the proposed commission exercising
63George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, October 29, 1943, State
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any functions other than determining: 1) how many Mexican workers were
discriminated against by the Santa Fe Railroad, 2) how long a time the
discrimination existed and 3) the amount of compensation due each worker.
The Foreign Office stated it was not necessary to make settlement
immediately, that no further claims would be made provided other workers
receiving higher wages were not placed alongside the Mexicans and that
present wage rates were not being disputed.
Apparently in the belief that the Foreign Office would not alter its
position, the WMC after five days of deliberation decided to accept the
Mexican proposal on November 11, 1943. The following day the Camacho
Administration announced that recruiting of railway workers, up to a
maximum of 20,000, and renewing of contracts could be resumed.
The Claims Commission, consisting of Luis Padilla Nervo and Manuel
Aguilar from the Mexican Consulate General's Office in Los Angeles, and
Robert L. Clark of the WMC and William G. MacLean from the State Depart-
ment, met for the first time in El Paso, Texas on January 17, 1944, and
labored almost two months before arriving at a solution acceptable to
both sides. During their discussions the Commissioners spoke with
representatives of the Santa Fe Railroad, the Southern Pacific Railroad,
the American Association of Railroads and the WMC.
In presenting his country's claims, Padilla Nervo cited the wage
differential which the Mexican Government considered a clear violation
of the labor agreement. He stressed that Avila Camacho 's policy of send-
ing workers to the United States was not accepted by all segments of
Mexican society, but the President continued the program as a measure of
Foreign Relations of the Unite d States, 1943 , Memorandum, Chief of




wartime collaboration. His Government however had to insure that the
project was equitably carried out so as to limit the grounds for criticism
by those opposed to the emigration of labor. In order to blunt the attacks
of his critics, Padilla Nervo continued, President Camacho had to insist
on compensation for the railroad wage discrepancy which had been given
wide publicity in Mexico City.
When the United States agreed to the Commission, based on Mexico's
proposal, the State Department and other Government agencies realized
compensation would have to be paid, and they were willing to do so in
order to insure a continuing supply of workers. The real function of the
Commission then was simply to determine the amount of compensation. After
the first few weeks of discussion the American representatives felt
agreement could be reached for less than $250,000. They were authorized
to mention $150,000 as the basis of a possible settlement, but this
was turned down when a railroad official indicated a willingness to pay
as much as $200,000. 67
The work of the Commission almost ended in failure when Chairman Paul
McNutt of the WMC, in a manner which Mexico considered insulting and the
State Department thought quite improper, offered directly to the Mexicans
about $225,000 (one million pesos) to settle the dispute. The Mexican
representatives immediately rejected McNutt' s overture and threatened to
breakoff the negotiations, but they were persuaded by the American
^Foreign Relations of the United S tates , 1944 , Memorandum of Con-
versation by Division of Mexican Affairs (MacLean) , February 25, 1944,
Vol. 7, pp. 1296-1298.
67rorei^n Relations of the United States, 1944, Memorandum by Office
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Commissioners to continue with their work when McNutt witlidrew his offer.
^
8
The Mexican delegation was pressured to suggest a sura which it
considered equitable to both sides, but when it proposed $487,000 as a
basis for settlement, the Americans replied that they could not
recommend to their Government the payment of such a large amount of money,
and in turn countered with an offer of $250,000. The latter figure was
unacceptable to the Mexican Commissioners who considered it to be too
close to the sum proposed by the WMC Chairman. However, after further
discussions the Mexicans lowered their original demand and agreed to
recommend to their Government the acceptance of $300,000 as compensation
for damages suffered.
The members of the mixed Commission submitted a report to their
respective Governments which called for payment by the United States of
$300,000 to the Government of Mexico "as a complete and final settlement
of all claims against the Government of the United States under... the
agreement of April 29, 1943, up to and including the date on which this
agreement is made effective by an exchange of notes between the two
Governments." The recommendations of the Commission proved acceptable
to both countries and notes to that effect were exchanged on April 8, 1944,
thus laying to rest the most serious problem experienced under the non-
agricultural labor agreement.
By the beginning of 1944 the WMC had received from the nation's
Foreign Relations of the United States , 1944 , Memorandum by Office
of American Republics (Uuggan) to Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)
,
March 6, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1301-1302.
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railroads requests for 32,810 workers which could not be filled from
domestic sources or under the present recruiting quota of 20,000 set by
the Mexican Government. In informing the State Department of this fact
Chairman McNutt stressed that the railroads could not carry the increased
loads demanded by the exigencies of war unless additional manpower were
made available, and he requested that the Mexican Foreign Office be
urged to raise the ceiling on contracting to 40,000. Hull forwarded
McNutt 's petition to Ambassador Messersmith who replied that there was
considerable political pressure being exerted on President Camacho to
limit the number of railway workers sent outside the country, and in view
of the domestic problems which could result from an increase in recruit-
ing, the Ambassador felt he would have to discuss the matter directly
with the Mexican President. •*
Messersmith met with the President on February 17 and informed him
that accidents on United States railroads had increased significantly
during the previous few months due to increased traffic loads and lack of
railway maintenance. He stressed that American railroad management was
highly pleased with the Mexican workers already in the United States, and
inquired whether President Camacho would consider sending another "divi-
sion to the front." The Mexican Chief Executive replied that he fully
understood the importance of additional laborers to the war effort and he
wished to continue this program of collaboration. lie said immediate
instructions would be issued raising the recruiting quota to 40,000.
Messersmith stressed to the State Department that in view of the oppo-
sition to the program by several Mexican States which were themselves
7foreign Relations of the United States , 1944, Memorandum by Divi-
sion of" Mexican Affairs (McGurk), January 27, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1291-1293.
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experiencing labor shortages, this was not an easy decision for President
Camacho to reach and should be interpreted as another proof of his desire
72
to cooperate fully with the United States.
Throughout his entire tour in the Embassy at Mexico City, Messer-
smith reminded United States Government officials that the Mexican press
was never generally sympathetic to the labor agreements. The leading
newspapers continually printed accounts of alleged discriminations against
Mexican workers or carried stories of poor workers moving to Mexico City
and living there for months in abject poverty without being recruited.
Claims made by the officials of some Mexican States that they were
experiencing manpower shortages due to the emigration of so many workers
73
were given front page headlines. Typical of the attacks against the
Mexican Administration's policy was one levelled by Senator llamiro Tames
of Nuevo Leon who charged that racial discrimination against Mexicans
existed in the United States, and that Mexican labor and governmental
officials had done little to look into complaints of mistreatment or
improve the lot of their countrymen laboring in America. To accusa-
tions such as these the Camacho Administration replied through its semi-
official organ that conditions for the migration of workers to the United
States had never been as favorable as they then were. "We view with a
little skepticism," the Government stated, "and as referring to sporadic
and isolated cases perhaps, those denunciations which have been made... of
bad treatment, discriminations and abuses which have been committed
72
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against Mexican laborers and of the alleged abandonment of them on the
75
part of Mexican consuls."
Less than three months after the railway recruiting quota had been
raised to 40,000 workers, the WMC again requested the Mexican Government
be approached with a view toward increasing the ceiling under the 1943
agreement to 50,000. The WMC argued that under the present authorization
there were never 40,000 laborers actually working at any one time due to
men missing from their places of employment and the unavoidable delay in
replacing workers as their six months contract expired and they elected
to return to Mexico. If the quota were raised to 50,000, it would be
possible at all times to insure a minimum of 40,000 were employed.
The State Department instructed the embassy in Mexico City to discuss the
increase with the Foreign Office, if and when it appeared such a request
would be considered favorably. The matter was raised with the Mexican
Government in June, and the augmentation approved by Avila Camacho on
July 1, 1944.
On learning the WMC was interested in obtaining unskilled lumber,
forge and foundery Xvorkers in Mexico, Ambassador Messersmith reported
there was little or no hope of securing more than the 75,000 agriculture
and 50,000 track laborers already authorized. A United States request
for an additional 5,500 workers for the food processing industries of
California, Oregon and Washington State was turned down by President
Camacho who felt it was not possible at that time to drain more personnel
from the agricultural or food processing industries of his country.
El_ Nacional , editorial, May 18, 1944.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944 , War Manpower Commission
to Division of Mexican Affairs, May 9, 1944, Vol. 7, p. 1312.
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In early August, James F. Byrnes, the War Mobilization Director,
informed the State. Department that a critical shortage of forge, foundcry
and tire workers had developed in the United States and requested imme-
diate efforts be made to secure 25,000 unskilled laborers from Mexico to
fill the vacancies in these areas. In directing Ambassador Messersmith
to discuss the need for these additional workers with the Foreign Office,
Acting Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius stipulated that the
guarantees of the April 1943 agreement would be applied to any of its
countrymen made available by the Mexican Government under this new
appeal. When the subject was raised with President Camacho, he replied
that in view of the recent protests against further recruiting he had
received from his State Governors and Mexican industry, he would need
several days to reach a decision on this highly controversial matter.
The President felt it would be almost impossible to authorize the contract-
ing of the entire 25,000, but he promised the request would receive his
sympathetic consideration. Messersmith reported that the combined quotas
of 125,000 workers would be reached in October and recommended the United
States be content with the existing authorization and refrain from apply-
ing pressure on the Mexican Government for additional laborers.
Less than two weeks later, the Mexican Chief Executive announced
he had decided to permit the recruiting of 25,000 unskilled forge,
foundery and tire workers which could begin as soon as all previously
sanctioned quotas were filled. The United States still had 17,000
laborers which it could contract under prior authorization, a process it
'7Foreign Relations of the United States , 1944 , Acting Secretary




was calculated would take until mid-September or early October to
complete. 78 Ambassador Messersmith asked if the documenting of these
additional workers could not begin immediately, to which Avila Camacho
replied that it could begin as soon as the necessary machinery for
4+4 - 79recruiting was set up.
Not one laborer was ever contracted under this new authorization.
On November 17 the State Department informed the American Embassy in
Mexico that it was doubtful a strong demand for forge, foundery and tire
workers would develop due to the guarantees which were required under the
00labor agreements. The housing and sanitary facilities guaranteed by
the international understandings were not available, and the industries
in question were unwilling to provide them, which seems to indicate their
labor needs were not as acute as originally indicated. Why the WI1C would
request the 25,000 workers without first reaching an accord with industry
on the guarantees provided by the 1943 agreement remains a mystery, but
the indisputable fact is that President Camacho, despite intense local
opposition, authorized the sending of 25,000 additional workers to the
United States in yet another example of his desire to collaborate in the
war effort.
In 1944 the agricultural program reached its peak in terms of number
of laborers employed as the Mexicans were introduced into many new states.
During the previous year they had worked in California, Nevada, Arizona,
Colorado, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming,
78George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, August 15, 1944, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
79Foreign Relations of the United States , 1944 , George S. Messer-
smith to Cordell Hull, August 25, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1322-1323.
80Secretary of State to United States Embassy in Mexico, November 17,




Idaho, Oregon and Washington. x In answering a United States inquiry,
the Mexican Government said it had no objection to its workers entering
any state as long as the agreement was followed and the laborers remained
82
under the jurisdiction of the War Food Administration. In response to
this broad authorization Mexican farm labor was employed throughout 1944,
in addition to those states previously mentioned, in Iowa, Michigan, New
Mexico, Minnesota, Utah, Wisconsin, Indiana, Texas, Illinois, Mississippi,
Missouri, Ohio and Arkansas. According to the WFA as of August 31, 1944,
there were 67,860 Mexican farm workers in the United States which was the
maximum number reached at any one time. Of this figure 58,927 were
o o
actually employed while 8,933 were either in transit or missing.
The Mexican-United States agricultural agreement served as an example
for similar arrangements which provided for the entry during 1944 of
84
about 15,000 farm workers from Newfoundland, Jamaica and the Bahamas.
In addition during the same year more than 75,000 prisoners of war were
Q C
used in agricultural positions.
An increased number of Mexican railway workers was also dispersed
throughout the United States in 1944. Although the quota of 50,000
laborers was never exceeded at any time, a total of 55,354 maintenance
Q "I
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of way workers came to America from Mexico. The largest contingent
of laborers, more than 12,000, was assigned to the Southern Pacific
Railroad. Some of the other lines receiving large quotas of Mexican
workers were: Santa Fe— 7,900, Pennsylvania— 6,800, and New York Central—
3,865. The Colorado and Southern Line received 100 workers which was the
smallest group of Mexicans employed by any railroad while the Boston and
Maine was allotted 150. During 1944 the Mexican Government granted a
major concession by authorizing the contracting of railway labor at San
Luis Potosi provided the United States bear the expense of transporting
o o
the workers to the recruiting stations. Previously the Camacho Admin-
istration had resolutely refused to permit documenting of laborers
other than in Mexico City for farm labor and Guadalajara for railway
workers.
A long-standing problem which the Mexican Government always considered
annoying was the illegal entrance into the United States of thousands of
its countrymen in search of relatively high- salaried employment. In late
1943 Mexico decided to intensify its campaign against the "wetback"
emigration and requested that the United States Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service cooperate in this effort. A similar petition was again
made by Ambassador Castillo Najera to Secretary of State Hull in February,
1944, when the illegal exodus reached alarming proportions and threatened
Mexican agriculture in the areas adjacent to the border with severe labor
shortages.
Arthur P. Uhitaker, ed., Inter-American Affairs, 1944 (New York:




Department Records, NA, RG59.
, "A New Pattern in International Wartime Collaboration,"
op
tment of State to War Manpower Commission, May 2, 1944, State

-160-
On March 27, 1944, Foreign Minister Padilla met with Ambassador
Messersmith to discuss what the former considered to be a very serious
problem along the Texas-Mexican border. Padilla stated that recently
several individuals from Texas had crossed the border for the purpose of
inducing Mexican farm workers to illegally enter the United States for
employment in Texas. Many promises were made to the laborers, the Foreign
Minister continued, but when they arrived in Texas their expectations
were not met and they were treated badly. Manuel Tello suggested a
conference of United States and Mexican immigration officials be held to
89investigate the situation and propose corrective action. Messersmith
thought this to be an excellent idea and forwarded it to the State
Department with a strong recommendation for its acceptance. United States
officials in Washington also considered the conference a logical approach
to the problem, and in mid-April approved a formal request from Padilla
that a meeting of immigration officials be held to examine the border
difficulties. The Mexican Government also proposed the conference study
a request made the previous month by the WFA that the 2,044 Mexican
workers who entered the United States in May, 1943, for one year under
Public Law 45, and whose authorization was about to expire, be recruited
under the labor agreement so they could continue working in the regions
where they were then assigned.
The informal conference to discuss border immigration problems was
held in the Mexican Foreign Office daily from May 29 to June 2, 1944.
On the final day of the meetings a protocol was adopted by the participants
which provided: 1) the Mexican representatives would request that their
Government impose stricter conditions on the issuance of passports for
89
United States Embassy in Mexico to Division of Mexican Affairs,
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entrance into the United States and reinforce patrols on the Mexican
side of the border to halt illegal emigration from their country, 2)
American delegates would recommend United States immigration officials
complement the Mexican effort by increasing border surveillance, 3) Mexi-
can farm workers who had entered the United States the previous year
under Public Lav; 45 would be returned to Mexico for documentation under
the agricultural labor agreements, and 4) American immigration officials
would attempt to return to their own country all Mexican males who had
90
clandestinely entered the United States.
During 1943 the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service
had deported a total of 2,905 illegal Mexican immigrants while in 1943
the figure rose to 9,818. At the border conference the representatives
of the two Governments set as a goal the returning of 20,000 "wetbacks"
in the six month period following the meetings. This quota was more
than doubled by the Immigration Service which returned to their own
country, pursuant to the June 2 convention, 45,461 Mexicans between
92
June 1 and December 1, 1944.'
American officials embraced the protocol and worked hard to carry
out its provisions while the Mexican Government refused to sign it even
though it had been adopted by the Mexican delegation at the conference.
After discussions with the Ministry of Gobernacion, the United States
Embassy in Mexico gained the impression that at the time of the meetings
90Fareign Relations of the Tlnited States,, 1944 , George S. Messer-
smith to Cordell Hull, June 6, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1314-1316.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944 , Division of Mexican
Affairs (McGurk) to George S. Messersmith, July 18, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1319-
1320.
9?Toreign Relations of the United States, 194 5, Department of Justice
to Secretary of State, January 11, 1945, Vol. 9, pp. 1139-1140.
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the unlawful exodus of workers was causing a political problem for the
Mexican Government, but since American authorities had taken steps to
halt the illicit movement and were returning thousands of illegal immi-
93
grants, Mexico saw no need for further action.
The most serious problem faced by the United States in its effort to
return illegal entrants to Mexico was the acute shortage of transportation
facilities which rendered it impossible to deliver the workers to the
locations from which they had come. American officials much preferred
to return to Tijuana and Mexicali the thousands of Mexicans who had
crossed the border into Texas and were finally apprehended in California
where they had migrated in search of work. This presented great diffi-
culties to Mexican authorities in Baja California who had neither jobs
for their returning nationals nor a means of transporting them back to
the Mexican states of which they were residents. Initially Tijuana and
Mexicali accepted the deported workers , but finally on December 6, 1944,
Mexican immigration officials in these two localities, at the request of
the Governors of Sonora and Baja California, announced they would not
accept additional illegal immigrants because of the inability of these
94
two states to handle large numbers of non-resident nationals. The
following day a note was delivered by the Mexican Embassy in Washington
to the State Department requesting that its citizens apprehended in the
United States be returned via El Paso and Laredo, Texas.
The Secretary of State replied to the Mexican Charge, Rafael de la
Colina, that it would be very difficult to comply with the terms of his
93United States Embassy Memorandum, September 29, 1944, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
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note due to transportation limitations in the United States caused by the
war. The State Department suggested the problem would disappear if the
men being returned could be coiitractcd under the agricultural agreement
as soon as they reached Mexican territory. If several recruiting stations
were established at various points along the border, the illegal entrants
could be delivered to the nearest one, where they would be documented
under the agreement and returned to their place of employment in a short
period of time. The United States guaranteed that if this proposal were
accepted the workers would be repatriated through El Paso. The Mexican
Government stated that although it appreciated the offer of the State
Department it was impossible to accept it because the contracting of
workers along the border would induce thousands of Mexican laborers to
move to that area hoping to be recruited. Those not selected would in
many cases enter the United States clandestinely which would only serve
95
to further exacerbate the original problem.
The Foreign Office asked, in light of the inability of the United
States to transport the detained workers to Texas, if it would be
possible to deliver to Nogales on the Arizona border those unlawful
Mexican immigrants apprehended in the far western states who were not
residents of Baja California. Under this plan former inhabitants of
Baja California would continue to be returned via Tijuana and Mexicali.
On December 11 the United States accepted this proposal with the provision
that Mexico would agree to receive in Baja California all of her nationals
deported from the western states until arrangements could be made for
handling them at Nogales. Despite the assurances given by Mexican
95
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officials, the immigration office at Tijuana was instructed to continue
its practice of refusing to accept non-residents of Baja California from
the United States Immigration Service.
A satisfactory solution which proved to be workable was finally
agreed to on January 9, 1945, by Padilla Nervo and Ugo Carusi, Commissioner
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Under the terms of a joint
memorandum approved by the two officials, the United States would return
Mexicans illegally in this country to Mexicali if residents of Baja
California, and to Nogales if residents of Sonora, Sinaloa or Jalisco.
All others would be delivered to Juarez. The Mexican Government promised
to immediately transport its nationals returned via Nogales and Juarez
to their homes or other areas removed from the border, thereby making it
96
more difficult for them to clandestinely re-enter the United States.
Although this arrangement did not solve all of the problems associated
with the illegal entrance of Mexican nationals into the United States,
it provided an effective mechanism for their return once they were
apprehended and insured that the two Governments were again cooperating
on this sometimes divisive issue.
In January, 1945, the WMC advised the State Department that American
railroads were continuing to experience a shortage of maintenance of way
workers and requested the Mexican Government be asked to permit the
recruiting of 75,000 laborers, an increase of 25,000 over previous
authorizations. Before formally addressing the Camacho Administration on
this subject, it was discussed with Padilla Nervo, temporarily in Washing-
ton negotiating the solution to the illegal immigration problem, who
Foreign Relations of the United States , 1945 , Department of Justice
to Secretary of State, January 11, 1945, Vol. 9, pp. 1139-1140.
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said he would have no objection to such a quota expansion. 97 On January 29
an appeal for permission to contract the additional 25,000 railroad
workers was made by Ambassador Messersmith to Foreign Minister Padilla
who announced on February 17 that President Camacho had authorized the
expanded recruiting.
Original United States estimates for 1945 indicated that only about
60,000 Mexican farm workers would be needed during the year, but a
decision by the Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconver-
sion, to induct into the armed forces all domestic farm workers between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-six who had previously been exempted,
caused the WFA to increase its initial assessment.'" Mexico agreed to
maintain the agricultural quota for 1945 at 75,000 workers.
One of the principal concerns expressed by the Mexican Government
during the migratory labor program was that all its nationals employed
in the United States under the agreements would be returned within a few
weeks after the cessation of hostilities, causing a severe strain on its
economy which would already be depressed due to cutbacks in the wartime
strategic materials production. This fear seemed a reality when the
United States Attorney General in late 1944 interpreted Public Law 229 as
requiring foreign laborers to leave the United States within thirty days
after the end of the war.
The WMC made a strong appeal to the Justice Department that a new
ruling be. made allowing the railway workers to remain in this country
until their contracts expired. War Manpower Commission studies indicated
97Forcign Relations of the United States, 1945 , Secretary of State
to George S. Messersmith, January 22, 1945, Vol. 9, pp. 1141-1142.
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the Mexican workers would be needed since the termination of fighting
would produce a great demand for both passenger and freight service and
because returning American armed forces personnel would not search for
railway maintenance work which was considered by many to be undesirable
99
employment. The State Department made a similar plea for a revised
ruling, stressing that the contemplated action was a violation of the
workers' contracts and the two international agreements with Mexico.
In March 1945 the Attorney Ceneral, in reversing his original
decision, ruled that Mexican workers employed by the WMC and the UFA could
remain in the United States after the war until their individual contracts
expired. This meant that when recruiting was terminated the laborers
would be returned to Mexico over a six month period at the same rate at
which they were contracted. Even had the Attorney General refused to
change his original decision, it would have been impossible for the
United States to return all the Mexican workers within thirty days of the
cessation of hostilities. The limited transportation facilities avail-
able at the end of the war did not even permit the laborers to be
repatriated as quickly as their contracts ran out.
By mid-1945 approximately 70,000 farm laborers and 70,000 railroad
workers had migrated from Mexico to the United States under the terms of
the international agreements. Since the WFA and the WHC still required
additional manpower, consideration was being given to requesting from the
99
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Mexican Government further increases in recruiting quotas. The most
ardent support for the migratory labor program, Ambassador Hessersmith
advised the State Department, had come from President Camacho and Foreign
Minister Padilla who had recently resigned his post, some thought, to
enter the presidential election for which campaigning had already begun.
At that time the only announced candidate was Miguel Al email, the former
Minister of Gobernacion, who had continually opposed the sending of
Mexican workers to the United States. The Ambassador reported that in
these circumstances it would be most difficult for Avila Camacho to
enlarge the contracting quotas, and he recommended that domestic workers,
who had lost their jobs as defense production was cut back, be used on the
farms and railroads.
The WFA instructed its local representatives in Mexico towards the
end of July to suspend further recruiting of farm workers since the
quota of 75,000 had practically been reached. Budgetary difficulties
were also heavily considered in reaching this decision. Pablo Campos
Ortiz, who had succeeded Manuel Tello as Under Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, was quite upset when he learned contracting of agricultural labor
had been terminated, but his anger subsided when he was assured by the
WMC that it would recruit all workers brought, at great expense to the
Mexican Government, from outlying areas to Mexico City at the request of
the UFA. 103
On August 20, 1945, the American Embassy in Mexico was instructed
to inform the Foreign Office that V-J Day (which in reality had already
102
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passed) would probably signify the end of all railway worker recruiting
and contract renewing. Agricultural labor would be needed at least
through the 1946 harvest. Assurances were to be given that every worker
would be able to fulfill his present contract. Three days later the
WMC ceased all recruiting in Mexico.
The Mexican Government notified Ambassador Messersmith of its grave
concern over this sudden action which violated the provisions of the
formal agreements requiring a ninety day notice prior to a suspension of
recruiting. Campos Ortiz stated that at the direct request of the WMC and
the UFA about 11,000 laborers had been transported to the contracting
centers at an expense to his Government and to send them home without
being recruited would embarrass the Government and could provoke riots
among the disappointed workers. He said the ninety day notification
requirement was designed to prevent the situation now faced by the Camacho
Administration. Hessersmith pointed out to the State Department that the
sudden suspension violated the spirit of the agreements and recommended
that the 11,000 workers be contracted. 1Q5 The Department replied that the
contracting had taken place under war-time legislation and since all
hostilities had ceased as of August 14 further recruiting would be
impossible. This restriction, however, was conveniently overlooked when
the United States found it necessary to recruit Mexican farm workers under
the farm labor agreement in 1946.
In late August railroad officials and the Department of Agriculture
both notified the State Department that they would need many of their
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Mexican workers until at least the end of the year, and possibly longer,
and that available transportation did not permit the repatriation of the
laborers as their contracts expired. On November 6 an agreement was made
between the Foreign Office and the State Department whereby Mexican workers
could volunteer to extend their contracts until December 31, 1945. Those
not desiring to do so were to be returned to Mexico as their individual
covenants elapsed. During the fall of 1945 repatriations lagged behind
contract expirations, but as more transportation was made available toward
the end of the year the situation improved to such an extent that on
January 7, 1946, the State Department informed the Mexican Embassy that
in a few days repatriations, would be current with contract expirations and
would remain so until all workers were returned to Mexico.
In 1946 Mexico again cooperated in alleviating the United States
agricultural labor shortage by permitting 54,000 of her nationals to be
contracted for farm work under the international agreement. No
further recruiting was carried out under the non-agricultural pact, and
the two Governments terminated the 1943 agreement with an exchange of
notes on November 15, 1946. 08 The following April legislation was
passed by Congress which liquidated the temporary migratory labor program.
Although future bracero understandings were consumated , in none of them
did the United States Government guarantee wages, housing, subsistence
and sanitary facilities as it did in the wartime labor agreements with
1Q 6Foreign Relations of the United States, 194 5, Secretary of State
to Mexican Ambassador Antonio Fspinosa de los Monteros, January 7, 1946,
Vol. 9, p. 1158.
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Several of the problems encountered by the two countries in imple-
menting the labor agreements have been described in this account, but when
the program as a whole is carefully examined it must be considered an
unqualified success. Mexico made available thousands of her nationals
to aid in the United Nations war effort, thus freeing more Americans for
military service, while the United States made every effort to see that
the immigrating laborers were cheerfully received and well cared for in
this country. The collaboration of Mexico was not given without some
sacrifice on her part since the recruiting process was rigorous with only
the healthy and well-qualified applicants chosen to go abroad, which
meant that the less qualified workers remaining in Mexico had to fill the
positions vacated by those selected for service in the United States.
It is not intended to impart the impression that the terms of the
individual contracts and the overall agreements were scrupulously adherred
to by all concerned. Certainly this was not the case, and there were
incidents when nationals of both countries acted in bad faith. Several
Mexican workers used their contracts only as vehicles of transport to
this country and abandoned their place of employment at the first oppor-
tunity, while cases of harsh and discriminatory treatment of workers by
railroad foremen and farm owners are known to have existed. Despite the
efforts of Texas officials, it became necessary for Mexico, in the summer
of 1945, to request that its nationals working on the railroads be removed
from that state due to poor treatment.
This, however, was the exception rather than the rule as each
nationality generally treated the other with mutual respect and kindness.
Francisco Trujillo Gurria, Mexican Secretary of Labor, after visiting
several groups of his countrymen employed on United States railroads,

-171-
remarked that he was highly satisfied with the working and living condi-
tions enjoyed by the workers. One farm laborer returning to Mexico
remarked: "The North American working people in general consider us as
their comrades consequently, they conduct themselves well and as good
109friends." That the Mexicans were well treated was shown by a high
percentage of contract renewals and the large numbers of laborers apply-
ing to come to America. United States satisfaction with the performance
of the imported Mexican workers was illustrated by the manager of the
Glendora California Lemon Growers Association who stated: "...their
behavior is excellent. Their attitude is inspiring. Their cleanliness,
their housekeeping, their self-discipline are amazing. We are most
impressed by their production records. These nationals have saved the
. c ,,110day for us.
The accomplishments of the Mexican workers were substantial. A great
part of the maintenance of way work in the Southwest was performed by the
Mexicans who were also found on railroads in the mid-West, New England
and Florida. On some of the major western roads their labor made the
difference between safe, efficient operation and a complete breakdown of
vital trunk lines. Many of these trunk lines were able to increase their
traffic loads during the critical war years due to the invaluable service
provided by the Mexican workers.
California credited the Mexican farm laborers with salvaging between
15-20 percent of its harvest in 1943 and 1944 while several other states
109
The Inter-American , Vol. 3 (February, 1944), p. 37.
110Carey McWilliam, "They Saved the Crops," The Inter-American ,
Vol. 2 (August, 1943), pp. 10-14.




acknowledged similar debts of gratitude. The sugar beet harvesting in
numerous states during the war was performed almost exclusively by the
Mexicans. One author describes the contribution of the imported farm
workers in this way:
At any one time there were seldom more than 75,000
braceros (representing a shade over 2% of the total agri-
cultural force) at work in the United States during the
war. Their services were more valuable than their numbers
would indicate. The braceros formed a sort of tactical
and strategic reserve which was shifted from harvest to
harvest when labor shortages would have been disastrous
to perishable commodities. They worked as far north as
Wisconsin, and in ceneral were found to be quite able and
competent. ±J"L
As President Roosevelt observed, the collaboration of President
Camacho in sending laborers to this country was an "eloquent demonstration
of the important role our Mexican allies can and are taking in the war
effort of the United Nations." 113
112Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1953), p. 275.





THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION
As early as April 3, 1942, Ambassador Messersmith recommended to the
State Department the formation of a joint Mexican-United States economic
commission consisting of three representatives from each country to
examine economic conditions in Mexico. Messersraith's initiative sprang
mainly from his concern over the deteriorating Mexican railway system
which he considered inadequate to transport the increasing quantities of
strategic materials needed by the United Nations in their war against the
Axis. The Ambassador felt it to be in the United States interest to
develop Mexico's railroads so that vitally needed minerals could reach
America's markets. Messersmith's anxiety over Mexico's delapidated
transportation system was somewhat eased in the fall of 1942 when the
United States agreed to send a railroad mission to Mexico to determine
the principal needs of that country's national lines and also to provide
a large share of the money required for rehabilitating her railroads.
Economic cooperation began in other areas also as Under Secretary
Welles and Foreign Minister Padilla agreed on April 11, 1942, that the
two Governments would cooperate in establishing a series of basic indus-
tries in Mexico to meet domestic consumption needs and to supply goods
required by the war effort. With this understanding in mind the Export-
Import Bank extended a $6 million credit to Mexico for construction of
•'George S. Messersmith to Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles,
April 3, 1942, Department of State Records, National Archives, Record
Group 59. Hereafter referred to as State Department Records, NA, RC59.





the Altos llornos steel plant in the State of Coahuila. 3 Ultimately this
plant took military orders from the United States and fabricated ship
plates for the Maritime Commission. The idea of a formally constituted
joint economic commission seemed to die, however, as the economic unit
in the American Embassy was heavily augmented following Mexico's declaration
of war, giving it, in the Ambassador's opinion, the capacity to handle
any problem that arose.
As the war progressed, the Mexican economy became seriously inflated,
threatening the nation with a severe crisis. Eduardo VillasefTor, Director
of the Bank of Mexico, noted in April, 1943, that due to a favorable
trade balance and a war-induced inflow of foreign capital, Mexico had
acquired a $110 million surplus of gold and foreign exchange. Since
her supply of European imports had been interrupted by the war and the
United States was not supplying her with enough material to dissipate
the unwanted excess, capital circulation was on the increase, and prices
had sharply risen. Villasenor argued that if Mexico had not aligned
herself with the United States and permitted foreign governmental agencies
to dictate terms of trade she could have made delivery of strategic
minerals contingent on the receipt of industrial goods. He called on
the United States to increase its exports of machinery, spare parts and
industrial equipment to his country.
The historic meeting between Presidents Roosevelt and Camacho in
April 1943, the first face to face encounter between the Chief Executives
of the two nations since Porfirio Diaz and William Howard Taft met in
3U. S., Department of State Bulletin , Vol. 7, No. 164, August 15,
1942, p. 704.
George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, April 8, 1943, State Depart-
ment Records, NA, RG59.
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1909 for the dedication of the international bridge linking El Paso and
Ciudad Juarez, provided the impetus for the formation of the joint
economic commission which would prove an effective catalyst in helping
Mexico acquire capital goods during the war years. The prospect of
Roosevelt visiting with Camacho had been rumored in both countries since
the latter' s inauguration in December, 1940, but the exigencies of the
war had heretofore precluded such a meeting. On learning a tour of
United States military installations would bring President Roosevelt to
Corpus Christi, Texas, in the spring of 1943, Ambassador Messersmith
suggested the President seize the opportunity to confer with his Mexican
counterpart on a variety of issues affecting their countries. Roosevelt
accepted Messersmith' s proposal provided as the President put it, "the
big boy would go to see the smaller boy first."
Arrangements were subsequently made for the American President to
travel by train on April 20 to Monterrey, Mexico's iron and steel center,
often referred to as that nation's Pittsburgh, for consultations with
Camacho. Roosevelt remained in Monterrey until the following morning
when the Mexican President joined him on his train for further discussions
enroute to the Naval Air Station at Corpus Christi. Following an
inspection of the military facility in Texas, Camacho returned to Mexico
while Roosevelt continued on his tour of American defense establishments.
No one seemed to care that President Camacho came to Texas on April 21,
San Jacinto Day, the 107th anniversary of the state's declaration of
5The New York Times, news article by W. H. Lawrence, April 21,
1943.
Unpublished Memoirs of George S. Messersmith, Vol. 2, No. IS,




The talks between the two Executives centered on the desirability
of industrial modernization and expansion in Mexico and the close colla-
boration between their countries such an undertaking would necessarily
produce. Camacho said that plans submitted to him by economic experts
indicated development in Mexico should take place first in the industrial
economy followed by agricultural development, modernization of communi-
cation facilities and improvements in the fields of health, sanitation
and education. The Mexican President expressed his intention to main-
tain close cooperation with the United States both during the war and
in the post-war period and to coordinate as closely as possible Mexican
agriculture and industry with that of her northern neighbor. In the
opinion of the two leaders economic problems arising from Mexico's
attempt to industrialize which would affect both countries could better
o
be solved by an on-going commission rather than ad_ hoc committees.
Mexicans were exuberant over Roosevelt's visit, nlacing particular
importance on his coming to Monterrey befor e Camacho travelled to Corpus
Christi. Minister of Gobernacion, Miguel Aleman, and Foreign Minister
Padilla were of the opinion that the American President's visit to Mexico
had done more to ameliorate relations between the two countries than any
action taken by the United States in the 20th century. Padilla remarked:
"All problems existing between Mexico and the United States have been
thoroughly discussed and agreements reached on all points. You will see
"U. S. -Mexican Ties Smoothed by the Meeting at Monterrey," Newsweek,
May 3, 1943, Vol. 21, pp. 26-27.
c
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, Memorandum of Con-




the results of the meeting shortly.'
Ambassador Messersmith reported that the visit had a profound effect
on the Mexican people who genuinely appreciated the President's visit at
a time when he was so occupied with the conduct of the war. According
to Messersmith, not a "single discordant note" was sounded in Mexico
City about the Monterrey conferencc.
As Padilla predicted, the results of the presidential discussions
were soon made public. On April 29 the State Department announced the
two Presidents had agreed: 1) it would be beneficial to have expert
economists examine the balance of payment difficulties and related
economic forces at work in Mexico as a result of the war, with a view
to submitting corrective recommendations, 2) measures of regulation and
adjustment advocated by the economists would in no way cause a reduction
in Mexico's production of strategic materials, and 3) an economic committee
consisting of representatives of both countries would be created to study
the Mexican economy and formulate a program of economic cooperation.
The Mexican-American Commission for Economic Cooperation, estab-
lished under this agreement and given thirty days to complete its work,
held its first meeting in Washington on May 21, 1943. The Mexican dele-
gation consisted of Evaristo Araiza, General Manager of the Monterrey
Steel Works and Valentin R. Garfias, a well-known Mexican mining engineer.
The American representatives were Wayne C. Taylor, the Under Secretary of
The New York Times , news article by Camille M. Cianfarra, April 22,
1943.
l0George S. Messersmith to Sumner Welles, April 30, 1943, Secretary's
File, Box 14, Roosevelt Library.
^Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Department of State
Press Release, April 29, 1943, Vol. 6, p. 417.
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Commerce, and Dr. Karry White, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury. 1
Conferences were held in Washington until June 3 at which time the
Commission traveled to Mexico City where it held deliberations for three
weeks. The representatives then returned to Washington on June 28 to
conclude their discussions and prepare a final report.
Throughout the long series of conferences held by the economic
experts it seemed to American officials that the Mexican delegation was
more interested in using the Commission as a vehicle for obtaining pref-
erential treatment for Mexican import requests rather than as a forum for
inquiring into its country's economic ills. This appears to be an
accurate evaluation of Mexico's intention since her representatives on
the Commission had been instructed by Foreign Minister Padilla to:
1) present factual proof of present inequalities in
balance of payments and to seek correction of this
situation by arranging for increased exports to
Mexico of machinery, tocls, equipment and manu-
factured products.
2) determine what industries can be established in
Mexico using facilities existing in Mexico as well
as peace time machinery lying idle in the United
States which might be put to work in Mexico. 13
In carrying out its mandate and in reaching its conclusions the
Commission placed great emphasis on the efforts of both countries to
cooperate in the production of strategic goods, the maintenance of Mexico's
civilian economy during the war years and recommending programs in which
both governmental and private agencies of the two nations could
12
U. S., Department of State Bulletin , Vol. 8, No. 204, May 22, 1943,
p. 457.
13
Instructions Issued to Mexican Members of Joint Economic Commission
by Ezequiel Padilla, May 13, 1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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collaborate in the long-range development of Mexico's national economy. 1 ^
During its stay in Mexico the Commission created several subcommittees
consisting of Mexican Government, industrial and banking officials and
representatives of various American Government agencies to study dis-
turbances in the Mexican balance of payments and to examine proposals
for increased production of strategic materials and economic development
in Mexico. In addition to considering strategic minerals, individual
subcommittees worked in the areas of agricultural production, industrial
development, public works and sanitation, tourism, transportation,
communications, and merchant marine and fisheries.
The economic experts in their final report to Presidents Roosevelt
and Camacho cited the loss of Mexico's European and Far Eastern markets,
the emphasis on war production in the United States, a large capital
influx and increased exports to the United States as the factors producing
the imbalance in the Mexican economy, but offered no solution other than
an increase in American exports to Mexico. The Commission strongly
recommended that Mexico continue its expanded program of strategic
material production and urged the United States to export more industrial
equipment to Mexico. During the war it was the practice of the United
States to ration goods in scarce supply and to allocate to the Latin
American countries, as the exigencies of war permitted, only such goods
as were necessary for the maintenance of the economies of those nations.
This quota of materials would not permit further economic development,
but only maintenance of the status quo ; therefore, the Commission
recommended that Mexico's share of American exports be substantially






increased to permit the economic expansion the experts considered
. . ., 16desirable.
Each of the subcommittees compiled a report in the area of its
expertise, suggesting possible methods for solving developmental problems.
With few exceptions the recommended programs called for acquisition of
materials from the United States.
The industrial experts considered projects designed to promote the
orderly expansion of Mexico's electrical, steel, rubber, cement, chemical,
textile, sugar and alcohol, and pulp and paper industries. In the
Commission's view industrialization aimed at serving Mexico's domestic
needs, which would combine her technology, capital and materials with
those of the United States, offered the best prospect for sound economic
cooperation. In many instances, the economists report stated, equipment
was not presently available, but in other cases, a careful combination of
idle machinery and tools with the limited new material that could be
procured, would be sufficient to establish new industries or expand
existing facilities. The experts suggested the formation of a commission
17
to oversee the detailed planning for Mexican industrial development.
Finally, the Joint Commission noted that the propinquity and economic
interdependence of the two countries offered opportunities for "con-
structive economic cooperation" which were "unequaled" and urged proce-
dures be devised for promptly carrying out the recommendations contained
18
in the report.
The Commission's report was made public on July 17, 1943, the same










day a joint statement of the Mexican and United States Governments was
released declaring that Mexico was cooperating "to the maximum of its
present possibilities" with the United Nations war effort by sending to
the United States large quantities of strategic minerals. If this con-
tribution was to continue and even increase, the two Governments agreed,
the United States must export to its neighbor in larger quantities the
capital goods it is capable of providing to permit Mexican industry to
develop on a sound basis and to compensate for the recent large surplus
In Mexico's trade balance. This forei<^n trade disequilibrium, the
statement continued, could result in a sharp decrease in Mexican produc-
tion and a corresponding reduction in her war-time contributions. In
publishing the Commission's report, Mexico and the United States agreed
they were manifesting "their determination to take without delay the
necessary steps to carry into effect the conclusions which are expressed
therein. . .'.'
Secretary of State Hull on receiving the economists' report informed
President Roosevelt that the Commission had faithfully carried out its
task and had produced a final document which would "form the basis for
mutually beneficial further cooperation between the two nations" in the
task of Mexican industrialization. 20 Ambassador Messersmith notified
the State Department that the report received universally favorable
comments in the Mexican press. La Prensa declared that America was
willing to allow Mexico to achieve its high destiny of becoming an in-
9 1
dustrial nation, no longer existing on her natural resources alone.
19U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 9, Mo. 212, July 17,
1943, p. 40.
20
Cordell Hull to President Roosevelt, July 8, 1943, State Department
Records, NA, IIC59.




If President Cair.acho entertained any doubts as to President Roose-
velt's firm commitment to assist in Mexican industrialization they were
dissipated shortly after the experts' final report was made public. "I
assure you," Roosevelt said in a telegram to the Mexican President, "that
every effort will be made by the United States to implement the recommen-
22dations of the Commission."
As soon as they had read the report State Department officials
braced themselves for a strong protest they envisaged would come from the
War Production Board (WPB) and the Foreign Economic Administration (PEA)
which they felt would oppose the exportation to Mexico of any industrial
material in excess of the minimum requirement previously established
for Mexico as well as the other Latin American countries. The Department
realized presidential intervention would in all probability be necessary
to procure the increase in equipment for Mexico. Ambassador Messersmith
also foresaw opposition from some governmental agencies, and cautioned
Secretary Hull that it would be disastrous if the United States reneged
on its assurance to carry out the Commission recommendations since the
Mexican people considered the arrangement as one between the Presidents.
VJithin a month after the Commission report had been released,
Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson received a communication from
J. A. Krug, Vicc-Chairman of the WPB, advising the Department of the need
to examine specific projects which might be recommended for Mexican
industrial development from a "domestic supply-requirements standpoint"
before firm commitments were undertaken. Some programs, Krug predicted,
may be very difficult to carry out without interfering with previously
established priority domestic and export allocations. The Vice-Chairman
22
President Roosevelt to President Avila Camacho, July 29, 1943,
State Department Records, 1IA, RG59.
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said the UPB was sympathetic to any project which would assist Mexico
in her industrialization program, but the Board wanted to insure material
commitments were not made which could not ultimately be fulfilled. The
WPB had a responsibility to prevent scarce equipment produced for defense
purposes or other urgent uses from being consigned to a lower priority
23program.
Mr. Acheson replied that some of the development projects would
be capable of early completion while others would have to be delayed
until the supply situation in the United States had improved. He reiter-
ated, however, that it was the policy of the Roosevelt Administration to
cooperate with Mexico in this task to the degree that military and other
priority programs would permit.
The anticipated opposition from the FEA never materialized. Its
Director, Leo T. Crowley, advised Secretary Hull that his office would
cooperate by pushing forward, as permitted by the exigencies of the war,
25
all requests for material to be used for Mexico's industrial program.
In perhaps its most important recommendation the Economic Commission
proposed the creation of a Joint Industrial Commission to consider
specific projects designed to promote Mexican development. By the end
of July, 1943, the two Governments had agreed each would appoint three
members to the Industrial Committee, and Mexico had submitted to the
State Department a list of her representatives. The Mexican delegation
consisted of Primo Villa Michel, former Chief of the Office of Coordination
Vice-Chairman, War Production Board (Krug) to Assistant Secretary
of State Acheson, August 12, 1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
Assistant Secretary of State Acheson to Vice-Chairman War Produc-
tion Board (Krug), August 17, 1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
Leo T. Crowley to Cordell Hull, September 15, 1943, State Depart-
ment Records, NA, RG59.
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of Exports and Imports, Evaristo Araiza, a holdover from the original
Commission, and Salvador Ugarte, a well-known Mexican banker. American
representatives included Under Secretary of Commerce Wayne C. Taylor, who
had also been a member of the previous Commission, Nelson A. Rockefeller,
the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and Thomas H. Lockett, the
Economic Counselor of the United States Embassy in Mexico.
At its first meeting in Mexico City on September 20 the recently
formed Industrial Commission unanimously adopted a Mexican proposal
requesting the sponsoring Governments to consider it as a continuation
of the original Commission "with facilities as broad as those of the
latter and with a field of action as large as may be necessary for the
study of the general problems of economic cooperation between the two
countries and the concrete problems which will arise from the realization
of the plan for the industrialization of Mexico... 1." Presidents Camacho
and Roosevelt approved the resolution, and the Foreign Office and Embassy
in Mexico City exchanged notes to that effect on October 26. Thereafter
the Industrial Committee was known by its predecessor's name, the Mexican-
American Commission for Economic Cooperation. At its initial meeting the
Commission named Primo Villa Michel its Chairman and iNelson Rockefeller
Vice-Chairman.
The Mexican Government had felt compelled to suggest a broadening
in the competence of the Commission since it considered a sound plan for
industrialization must be based on a study of the entire Mexican economy,
not only its industries. Any attempt to industrialize would be unsatis-
factory, the Mexicans reasoned, unless all the forces at work within the
26Resolution of Mexican-American Industrial Commission, September 21,
1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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economy were examined. '
Due to the nature of its tasl; the Commission decided most of its
work would have to be done in Mexico where it established its headquarters.
Since both Rockefeller and Taylor had important functions to perform in
Washington, they opened an office of the Commission there with an American
staff and some Mexican advisers. Plans for particular projects were drawn
up by Mexican governmental or private agencies, often after consulting
United States technicians, and submitted to the Mexican Section of the
Commission for its consideration. Assuming approval at each stage of its
examination, a project would go from the Mexican Section to Lockett,
the United States resident Commissioner in Mexico City, then to the
Washington Commissioners, and finally back to Mexico for formal Committee
passage. The plan would then be forwarded via the American Embassy to
the State Department for distribution to the licensing agencies of the
United States Government. In order to limit the number of requests
for immediate delivery of new materials for Mexican industrialization,
the American Commissioners carefully studied each project to determine
if it could be delayed until after the war, and in those cases where it
could not, to sec if used machinery or machinery already available in
Mexico could be substituted for recently produced United States goods.
To facilitate its work the American Section formed sub-committees
composed of one or more experts in the fields of agriculture, trans-
portation, communications, public works and sanitation, fisheries, tourism,
power industry, iron and steel, chemicals, cement, pulp and paper, textiles
27George S. Messersmith to Cordcll Hull, September 24, 1943, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
28Thomas Lockett to Kelson Rockefeller and Wayne Taylor, January 15,
1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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and miscellaneous. These subcommittees were staffed by members of the
United States Embassy in Mexico City, the Office of the Coordinator of
Inter-American Affairs, the Foreign Economic Administration and the Fish
and Wildlife Service of the Department of Interior. Similar divisions
were made by the Mexican Commissioners in the areas of transportation
and communications, agriculture, highway transportation, civil aviation,
public works and sanitation, and tourism. When discussing other subjects
29
the Mexican representatives called in experts as needed.
After its initial meetings on September 20 and 21 when the resolution
expanding its competence was drafted and approved, the Commission met
on October 18, 1943, to consider a number of particular proposals, many
of which had been recommended for completion by the original Committee
in its final report. During this meeting eight projects including the
Tequixquiac Tunnel, four cement factories, El Palmito Dam, and two iron
and steel mills were approved. ° These were the only proposals examined
by the Committee in 1943 since a serious disagreement between United
States governmental agencies over the method to be used in supplying -
materials for these projects caused a suspension in the formal activities
of the Commission until early 1944.
The WPB took the position that the equipment furnished by the United
States for projects approved by the Joint Economic Committee should be
deducted from the minimum quota established for the maintenance of
Mexico's wartime economy, while the State Department, strongly backed by
Ambassador Messersmith, argued this material should be supplied over and
above the minimum allocation. Until the issue was settled, the Mexican
29
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Commiss loners, as a matter of principle, refused to make any proposals
for the industrial development of their country.
In Messersmith's opinion the importance of the Economic Commission
was far greater than that normally attributed to similar bodies because
it was created as a result of "very fundamental conversations" between
Presidents Camacho and Roosevelt and their "very fundamental desire" for
collaboration, which they realized was in the interest of both countries.
To insist material for Commission-approved projects should be charged
against Mexico's minimum allocation was "quite out of line" with the ideas
31
of the two Presidents. Moreover, the Ambassador pointed out, it would
have been superfluous for the two leaders to talk of industrialization
if they did not have in mind the delivery of goods outside the estab-
lished quota, since such allocation was the bare minimum for maintenance
of the Mexican economy and would permit no new development. He declared
it was mandatory that all agencies of the Government agree as "a basic
principle" to send to Mexico, in addition to the minimum quota, addi-
tional equipment for the completion of Commission-approved projects.
As the bureaucratic struggle in Washington continued into the new
year, President Camacho stressed to Ambassador Messersmith the serious-
ness of the suspension in the work of the Economic Commission and urged
him to redouble his efforts to resolve the impasse. The Mexican President
reaffirmed the understanding he had reached with President Roosevelt
that the necessary material for Commission proposals would be supplied
over and above the minimum allocation, and he warned that if the WPB
^George S. Messersmith to Under Secretary of State Stettinius,
December 12, 1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
32Foreign Relations of the United States , 1°44 , Memorandum of Con-
versation by George S. Messersmith, January 27, 1944, Vol. 7, p. 1199.
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decision was allowed to take precedence over the Presidents' agreement
at Monterrey, the entire program of economic cooperation between the two
countries would be jeopardized. J
In an attempt to prevent the collapse of all he had worked for since
his arrival in Mexico City, Messersmith traveled to Washington in mid-
January, 1944, to discuss with President Roosevelt the nature of his
understanding with President Camacho. Roosevelt told the Ambassador
that he and his Mexican counterpart had definitely agreed during their
April meeting that the material delivered to Mexico for specific indus-
trial projects approved by both Governments would be outside of that
country's regular allotment for her minimum needs.
Immediately following this meeting, Messersmith notified Donald
Nelson, Chairman of the WPB, and FEA Director Leo Crowley of his conver-
sation with the President. Melson and Crowley both agreed, the former
somewhat reluctantly, that it was impossible for Mexico to carry out a
program of industrialization within her minimum allocation, and since
it was President Roosevelt's desire to collaborate in this task, the WPB
and the FEA, as the exigencies of the war permitted, decided to grant
priority ratings to orders for materials destined for Commission-sanctioned
projects and to deliver this equipment to Mexico outside her normal
allocation.
With the supply issue finally resolved, the Joint Economic Commission
resumed its work, which it interpreted as reviewing plans for specific
proposals with a view to facilitating the shipment from the United States
JlPL ^™ Relations of the United S tate s , 1944 , Memorandum of Con-






to Mexico of critical material for those projects it approved. The
first meeting of the Committee following the temporary suspension of its
activities was held on February 11, 1944, at which time it was reported
that equipment for all but one of the eight previously approved projects
had been made available by the United States. The representatives adopted
a resolution requesting that the United States governmental agencies
involved "accord special treatment to projects approved by this Commission,
to the end that the materials required may be furnished to Mexico as soon
as practicable without interference to the common war effort and without
encroaching UDon the supply of materials to Mexico for its normal needs. 10
In effect this was what the UPB and the FEA had agreed to do the previous
month.
It was also at this session that the Mexican Section of the Commission
presented its Minimum 1944 Program, a list of twenty projects, six (El
Palmito Dam, Altos Homos iron and steel mill and four cement factories)
already having been approved, for which the Mexican Government requested
Committee approval and material support during the current year. The
cost of the entire program was estimated to be $23,940,000. The value
of the material requested from the United States for this undertaking
was placed at $12,553,000 of which $9,695,000 was for new equipment and
$2,863,000 for used machinery. 37 The Commission approved in principle
the minimum program, but, at the insistance of the American Section,
formal acceptance of the plan was withheld until each project could be
individually studied.
Primo Villa Michel to Presidents Avila Camacho and Roosevelt,
February 15, 1944, State Department Records, MA, RG59.
37
George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, March 14, 1944, State
Department Records, MA, RG59.
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In the order of priority established by the Mexican Government, the
projects making up the Minimum 1944 Program together v/ith their estimated
annual capacity were: 1) one iron and steel mill—45,000 metric tons;
2) three textile mills—2,721 metric tons of rayon yarn and 1,819 metric
tons of cotton yarn; 3) seven cement factories—386,400 metric tons; 4)
one pulp and paper mill—10,500 metric tons of pulp and 9,500 metric
tons of paper; 5) three steam and two hydro-electric power plants
—
72,500 kilowatts; 6) one irrigation dam—250,000 acres; 7) one fertilizer




In similar letters of March 31, 1944, to Donald Nelson and Leo
Crowley, Secretary of State Hull announced State Department approval of
the 1944 plan and recommended that the UPB and FEA authorize production
and delivery of the materials needed to complete the various projects
listed above. Hull remarked that the Department was influenced in its
decision by the fear that failure to make substantial progress towards
completion of this program could cause serious internal problems for
President Camacho which might adversely affect United States-Mexican
39
relations. The FPB replied it had committed itself to supporting the
1944 minimum plan for Mexican development.
While the American Section of the Commission was still investi-
gating the individual projects prior to formal Commission action on the
entire package, President Roosevelt, without the knowledge of the State
"Bulletin of the Pan American Union, Vol. 77, No. 4 (April, 1^45),
pp. 211-216.
39Foreign Pvelations of the United States , 1944, Secretary of State




Department, sent a letter to President Camacho praising the 1944 program
as "a carefully planned and realistic step tov;ard strengthening the
Mexican economy" and "a concrete expression of the hroad economic strategy
on which you and I agreed during our meeting at Monterrey." It gave him
great satisfaction, Roosevelt continued, as lie was sure it gave Camacho,
"to see this tangible proof of the esteem and close economic ties that
underlie the military alliance of our two countries." Finally the
President flatly stated the entire program had been approved by the United
States, and he encouraged Mexico, in view of America's acceptance of her
short-term projects, to begin preparation of long-range development
, 40plans.
The State Department viewed the President's letter as having created
a firm commitment which the Mexican Government was entitled to interpret
as signifying total support for the Minimum 1944 Program in its entirety.
The Department warned that the good faith of the United States would be
questioned if the program was delayed on the grounds the Commission had
not yet formally approved the projects. Since it is a certainty the
Economic Committee would have ultimately approved the entire program,
the President's letter had little effect other than perhaps speeding
up Commission acceptance of the proposal.
Between its March meeting when the 1944 program of twenty short-term
projects was first submitted and early November, 1944, the Commission
held four meetings during which about thirty long-term proposals were
studied and approved. By that time, it had been unofficially learned that
President Roosevelt to President Avila Camacho, May 11, 1944,
Secretary's File, Box 14, Roosevelt Library.
f
Memorandum, Division of Mexican Affairs (Carrigan) , September 6,
1944, State Department Records, HA, RG59.
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the UPB was about to announce a new policy whereby only material requisi-
tions for Commission-approved projects having a direct connection with
the war effort would be given priority ratings by that agency. The
Mexican Commissioners felt if this policy was adopted the Economic
Committee could serve no useful purpose since they viewed its main func-
tion as one of securing export licenses and UPB priority ratings for
/ 9
Mexican projects. when public notification was made of the UPB
decision, the Mexican representatives recommended to their Government
that the work of the Commission be terminated.
Ambassador Messersmith reluctantly notified the State Department of
his concurrence with the recommendation that the Economic Commission
should cease to operate. Since the Mexicans judged the Committee's
success by its ability to gain priority ratings for its projects, and
since the UPB indicated there was no possibility it would reverse its
decision, Messersmith reasoned it would be better to dissolve the
Commission then, rather than wait until it had become ineffective and bad
feelings existed.
The Ambassador reported that the Mexicans considered the adoption
of the Minimum 1944 Program in its entirety was the major accomplishment
of the joint body. He said that all of the twenty projects making up the
program had been given preferential treatment by United States agencies
with the exception of two planned textile mills which the Camacho Admin-
istration considered as being very important to the development of the
Mexican economy. The NPB had originally indicated the two projects would
probably be given priority ratings in September, but that had not been
done, and the mills were in danger of remaining unrated. Messersmith
42Gcorge S. Messersmith to Secretary of State, November 8, 1944,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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felt the work of the Commission could not be considered complete unless
these two projects were rated, lie strongly recommended that the State
Department urge the WPB to grant priority ratines to the textile mills
so the Commission could report to the two Presidents that all 1944 mini-
mum projects had been rated. J On November 19, 1944, in a personal letter
to Acting Secretary of State Stettinius, the Ambassador pleaded for WPB
action on the two remaining projects in the interest of maintaining
America's good relationship with Mexico and in the interest of terminat-
ing the work of the Commission in the near future with good feelings on
44
both sides.
In early December Stettinius requested the Chairman of the WPB to
grant priority ratings for the textile mills. Shortly thereafter the
Department was informed that the WPB would be unable to comply with the
Secretary's request, but would make every effort to see these two pro-
jects were given preferential treatment among unrated orders provided
this did not interfere with the production of defense equipment. The
WPB estimated the material for the mills would be produced in the spring
4 S
or summer of the following year.
In December both Mexico and the United States definitely decided
the work of the Economic Commission should be terminated, and a final
report of its accomplishments made to the two Presidents. This report
would consist of two sections, a general summary for publication and a
detailed project-by-project review for private governmental use. This
Foreign Relati ons of the United States, 1944 , George S. Messersmith
to Secretary of State, November 8, 1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59
44
George S. Messersmith to Acting Secretary of State Stettinius,
November 19, 1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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procedure was agreed to since it was felt Washington would be accused
by the other American Republics of having given preferential treatment to
Mexico if a detailed synopsis of the Committee's activities were published.
^
6
The thirteenth and final meeting of the Mexican-American Commission
for Economic Cooperation was held on January 29, 1945. Its Chairman,
Primo Villa Michel, read a letter addressed to the Commission by Nelson
Rockefeller who had been appointed Assistant Secretary of State and whose
attendance was prevented by preparations for the approaching Chapultepec
Conference. The Committee, Rockefeller stated, had approved a total of
fifty-eight projects, over half of which were already completed or nearing
completion with the balance being considered as rapidly as the war effort
would permit. After approving the final report and hearing statements
of appreciation from both sides, the Commission adjourned sine die .
In its final report to the Presidents the Commission announced it
had approved a total of fifty-eight projects of which the Minimum 1944
Program accounted for twenty, thirty-one were listed as long-term under-
takings and seven as important miscellaneous projects. The greatest
percentage of the material required for these projects had either been
delivered to Mexico or was being produced in the United States at that
time. The Committee acknowledged its primary function had been the
obtaining of priorities and export licenses for equipment required to
complete projects it had approved.
Contained in its report was the Commission's estimate of Mexico's
Thomas Locket t to kelson Rockefeller and Wayne Taylor, December 20,
1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
^7Thomas Lockett to Socretarv of State Stettinius, February 6, 1945,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
^ 8




long- terra capital goods requirements. Based on the thirty-one long-range
projects already approved, as v7ell as others considered necessary for a
well-planned modernization and industrialization program, the represen-
tatives calculated Mexico would be required to import equipment valued
at $94 million through 1947 and $43 million in 1943. The cost of carrying
out the entire program, including the value of materials available in
Mexico was set at $383 million.
Prior to the final meeting of the Joint Commission Presidents
Roosevelt and Camacho exchanged letters expressing their overall satis-
faction with the results of this effort at economic cooperation. In his
note to the Mexican President, Roosevelt stated:
Although in 1943 and 1944 the industry of the United States,
through conversion and expansion, was primarily engaged
in the production of war materials, it was nevertheless
possible to make available and supply to Mexico. . .more
products in those years than during any similar period of
time in the trade between the two countries. I am also
grateful to know that in 1944, a year of tremendous demands
upon the industry and economy of the United States, my
country was able to meet the requirements of Mexico for
materials and equipment for the maintenance and develop-
ment of its economy in amounts greater than it had received
from all world sources in any year preceding the war.-"
The Mexican press received the Commission's report with a great
deal of enthusiasm, praising the United States for its unselfish cooper-
ation in Mexico's industrialization process. One of the nation's leading
newspapers remarked that American assistance was not motivated by a
desire to increase her exports or seize large shares of the world market,
/,9







but rather by a real concern for Mexico and her people. 51
The combination of Mexican hard work and United States collaboration
began to pay dividends very quickly as projects recommended by the
Economic Commission were completed to a limited degree during the war,
and to a much greater extent in the post-war years. The textile industry
was one sector of the Mexican economy where almost immediate improvements
were noted due, in no small way, to the support received from the United
States through the Joint Committee. In 1941 Mexico exported 331 tons
of cotton cloth to eight countries. By 1946 she shipped 14,712 tons of
the same material to twenty-nine markets.
Great increases were also realized in Mexican production of steel
and cement. When comparing the years 1940 and I960 it is noted that
production of steel rose from 149,414 tons to 1,539,537 tons, while in
the case of cement the growth was from 485,000 tons to 3,086,126 tons.
There is little doubt the Economic Commission performed a valuable
service in helping Mexico acquire industrial materials during a period
when they were particularly scarce. It may be considered that this
cooperation was exclusively beneficial to Mexico, and it may be wondered
what Mexico did in the commercial area to assist the United States.
Mexico's most significant contribution to the war effort, her delivery
of vast sums of strategic materials necessary in the manufacturing of so
many implements of war, is the subject of the next chapter.
51
E1 Nacional, editorial, February 1, 1945.
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Foreign Commerce of Mexico 1^41-1948 (Washington: Fan American
Union, September, 1950), p. 24.
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By the sur.rr.er of 1940 France and the Low Countries had been overrun
and Great Britain stood alone against Germany. The United States was
already sending war supplies to Britain and accelerating its own defense
preparations. At that time a decision was made in Uashin^ton at the
highest levels of government to begin stockpiling large quantities of
materials to be used in manufacturing military cauipment for use by the
Allies and, if necessary, by American armed forces. One of the first
steps in this effort was the creation on July 1, 1940, by the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation, itself a subsidiary of the Federal Loan
Agency, of two subordinate corporations , the Rubber P.eserve Company and
the Metals P.eserve Company, with power to acquire and hold strategic
and critical materials needed by the United States to implement its
defense program.
President Roosevelt was troubled during the early 1940' s by the
Latin American Countries' loss, due to the v7ar, of their Furopean markets,
which accounted for about 40 percent of their normal commerce. He
instructed all federal agencies to give "sympathetic consideration" to
Latin American products when purchasing strategic materials. "When
buying in foreign markets for defense needs," the President remarked,
"it is my earnest desire that priority of consideration be given to
rederal Loan Agency Press Release No. 36, July 1, 1940, Accord:-.
of the Department of State, National Archives, Record Grouo 5 ,;>. Here-





Latin American products and I so request."" Roosevelt's action was
motivated by the fear that a drastic reduction in foreign trade could
cause economic and political disturbances in some of the Latin American
Republics, rendering the task of hemispheric defense more difficult and
costly.
During 1940 and early 1941 large quantities of Mexican strategic
materials were sent to Japan, v:here in turn a large percentage of them
were reexported to Germany since direct trade between Mexico and Germany
was impossible due to the British blockade of the European mainland.
Mexico was at that tine delivering to Japan not only domestically
produced goods, but also some metals which had been imported from the
United States. In 1940 well over half of Mexico's 12,000 flask output
of mercury went to Japan which was in addition the second largest
3importer of Mexican zinc. Substantial quantities of lead, antimony,
mica, copper, vanadium, scrap metals, graphite and oil were also leaving
Mexican ports destined for Japan.
The United States was concerned with the large number of commercial
transactions between Latin America and the Axis countries during the
early stages of the war in Europe, but American officials considered
the most serious problem to be the large, sales of Mexican mercury to
Japan. This metallic liquid was extremely important at that time since
fulminate of mercury was used in the percussion caps of all ammunitions
and in all artillery shell fuses. Japan produced very little mercury
President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles,
September 27, 1940, State Department Records, A, 559.
o
Memorandum of Conversation by Adviser on International Economic
Affairs, December 19, 1940, State Department Records, MA, RG59.
'The Mew York r_i] es, January 14, 1941.
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domestically, and her reliance on overseas commerce for this critical
material represented one of her most important strategic weaknesses.
In the pre-war years a seventv-nine pound flask of mercurv cost about
$175 on the world market. In early 1941 Japan offered Mexico $213 per
flask, which induced the latter's monthly mercury production to rise
from 1,000 to 2,100 flasks, all of which was shipped to the Orient. 5
The War Department's Intelligence Division reported Mexico, the world's
second or third leading producer of mercury, was exporting to Japan more
than the entire 1939 United States domestic consumption of that material. 6
In order to combat this dangerous flow of mercury to a potential enemy,
the United States Government embarked on a program of protective or pre-
clusive buying, offering Mexico a price $50 per flask, higher than that
paid to domestic producers.
This endeavor represented only a temporary or stopgap measure until
a more effective and economical control system could be devised. Almost
immediately apparent trial balloons were launched in the American press
in an effort to ascertain Mexico's view to an agreement whereby the
United States would purchase her entire output of strategic materials.
An unofficial reply from Mexico indicated that President Camacho wTould
welcome an accord with the United- States designed to halt the f low of
critical goods to the Axis. The Mexican President was not in favor of
supplying Berlin and Tokyo with vital war materials, but his country's
mining industry was already depressed and he could not, in the interest
Memorandum of Conversation by Adviser on International Economic
-\ffairs, March 17, 1941, State Department Records, N , LG59.
6The New York Times , January 7, 1941.
'Memorandum by Military Intelligence Division, r 'ar Department,
•eneral Staff, Juno 11, 1941, State Department Mecords, MA, RG59.
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of his nation's economy, prohibit the shipment of goods to Japan without
assurances that the output of Mexico's mines v/ould be purchased in another
8
market.
Secretary of State Hull notified Ambassador Josephus Daniels on
March 13, 1941, that the Department was preparing a circular instruction
directing the Chiefs of United States Missions in Latin America to
approach the Governments to which they were accredited with a view to
reaching an agreement on the imposition of export controls by the Ameri-
can Republics. The envisaged controls would regulate all goods received
from the United States which were subject to American export controls and
all strategic materials produced in Latin America. Daniels was requested
to seek the approval of the Camacho Administration to the immediate
application of export controls along those lines pending full consideration
of the regulations suggested in the circular instruction, which was
Q
finally sent out from the State Department on the first of April.
Daniels raised the issue of export controls with Jaime Torres Bodet,
Mexican Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who replied that his country
would be willing to strictly regulate the export of critical goods as
soon as a list of those materials to be controlled was mutually agreed
upon, and the United States guaranteed it would purchase the Mexican
output of the regulated products at the current United States market
10price.
Federal Loan Administrator Jesse Jones announced the agency he
The Washington Post, January 20, 1941.
9Forei r,n Relations of the United States, 1941 , Cordell Hull to
Josephus Daniels, March 13, 1941, Vol. 7, p. 403.
10Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941 , Josephus Daniels
to Cordell Lull, March 26, 1941, Vol. 7, p. 404.
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directed was willing to enter into an agreement with the Mexican Govern-
ment subject to the following stipulations:
1) The Mexican Government would agree to bar shipment of
antimony, arsenic, bismuth, cadmium, cobalt, conDcr,
fluorspar, graphite, her.enuen, lead, manganese, mercury,
mica, molybdenum, tin, tungsten, vanadium and zinc to
countries other than the United States and American
nations imposing similar restrictions.
2) the Federal Loan Agency through its subsidiaries would
purchase the Mexican production of these materials
not sold through normal supply channels in other
American markets.
3) the price would be a matter of negotiation between
the two Governments.^
This proposal was accepted as a basis for negotiations by the
Mexican Government which stated it was willing not only to regulate
those materials on the Federal Loan Agency list, but all goods con-
trolled by the United States which were produced in Mexico. As an indi-
cation of her intention to cooperate in controlling exports, Mexico,
at the request of the United States, prohibited the shipment of all scrap
iron to other than American countries.
Negotiations for the purpose of reaching an agreement on Mexican
imposition of export controls were begun between Luciano Wiechers, the
economic adviser of the Bank of Mexico, and Walter Douglas, special
representative of the Federal Loan Agency and former president of the
Southern Pacific Railroad of Mexico. As the discussions began on June 9,
1941, Foreign Minister Padilla remarked that as the world situation
continued to deteriorate commercial interchange could not "be trusted to
11Cordell Hull to Josephus Daniels, May 10, 1941, State Department
Records, MA, RG59.
12JoscPhus Daniels to Cordell Hull,




chance" and "reciprocal foresight and a mutual plan" were necessary to
IT
insure trade flowed through the desired channels.
Meetings between the two negotiators continued for about a month
before it was announced that a two-part understanding had been reached
which proved acceptable to both Governments. On July 15, a presidential
decree was published in the Diario Oficial forbidding the shipment of
those materials listed in the original Federal Loan Agency proposal to
non-American countries and to any American nations which did not adopt
similar export restrictions. The second part of the agreement consisted
of a letter from Douglas to Wiechers stipulating that, so long as the
provisions of the decree were effectively implemented by the Mexican
Government, the Metals Reserve Company and the Defense Supply Corporation
would for a period of eighteen months purchase at the prevailing market
price Mexico's production of the controlled materials not absorbed in
normal commerce with American countries. ' The letter also stated that
the United States as permitted by war production demands would deliver
to Mexico as much equipment as possible for her industrialization program.
News of the July 15 understanding was well received in Mexico City
except by those elements of Mexican society which harbored pro-Axis
sympathies. The headlines of the capital's German-controlled newspaper
announced: "Mexico has been sold at auction by business with the Yankees."
An article went on to say that traffic in slaves had not yet ceased as
evidenced by the sale of twenty million Mexicans as a result of Avila
Camacho's decree. Many people had served as slaves of more cultured
races, the paper continued, but Mexico had been subjugated by the most
13
Josephus Daniels to Cordell Hull, June 11, 1941, State Department
Records, NA, RG59.
14
Diario Oficial, July 15, 1941.
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foolish of all nations. -*
For many years Japan had supplied Mexico's textile industry with huge
quantities of rayon thread without which the industry would have become
quite depressed. As soon as the effects of Mexico's export controls
began to be felt by the Axis, Japan attempted to exchange large shipments
of rayon for strategic materials covered by the United States-Mexican
agreement. The Mexican Textile Workers Union reported serious consider-
ation was not given to the Japanese offer because "Mexican and hemispheric
I c.
security were more important." Foreign Minister Padilla notified the
Japanese that such an arrangement was not desired and thanked the United
States for its efforts to increase rayon exports to his country.
In the months following the publication of the presidential decree
regulating Mexican exports, a curious change was noted in the figures
indicating the country's mercury output. Prior to July, Mexico's pro-
duction of mercury had varied between 2,0CC and 2,500 flasks per month.
Without warning, the figure dropped to 1,200 flasks for August and even
lower to less than 400 for September. This apparent decrease in produc-
tion worried American as well as Mexican officials who ordered a detailed
investigation be undertaken in cooperation with United States and British
agencies to determine what had happened to cause such a sharp diminution
in reported output.
Within a very short period the investigators discovered why the
figures showed a decrease in mercury production. It was determined that
a producer, after paying the Mexican a_f_qro_ and United States import
tax, cleared $105 per flask when sold in America while a similar sale on
15La Setnana, July 15, 1941.
16Thc Mew York Tines, August 18, 1941.
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the Japanese market brought $179— a difference of $74 per flask! 17 In
early October Mexican authorities seized the Azuna Maru as the vessel
attempted to sail for Japan with 347 drums of "bronze parts." A search
of the ship disclosed that each of the 347 drums actually contained five
18
flasks of mercury. Smuggling activities were quickly controlled, and
by December, 1941, Mexican figures indicated that once again mercury was
being produced at a rate of more than 2,000 flasks per month.
December was also the month in which President Camacho issued
another decree designed to regulate exports. This second proclamation,
described by the Foreign Office as a measure adopted to prevent the re-
exporting of goods imported from the United States, and therefore comple-
mentary to the decree of July 15, controlled the exportation of aluminum,
tin plates in sheets, reinforcing bars, structural iron, steel, scrap
iron, black sheet, galvanized sheet, black and galvanized pipe, hand
tools, calcium carbide, wood, oats, cotton waste, hides, grain seeds,
19
cement, amorphous phosphorus, medicinal products and bones.
In early 1942 the Federal Loan Agency informed the State Department
that Dr. Alan Bateman, a professor of geology at Yale University, was
being sent to Mexico as a special representative of the Metals Reserve
Company to conduct a survey of mineral reserves in Mexico for the purpose
of making recommendations for increasing the production of strategic
20
materials. As part of a distinct program with a similar goal, the
17 Strother Holland Walker, "The Case of the Missing Mexican Mercury,"
Harper's Magazine , Vol. 185 (September, 1942), pp. 387-393.
1 R
War Department Memorandum, October 6, 1941, State Department
Records, NA, RG59.
19Unitcd States Embassy in Mexico to Secretary of State, December 23,
1941, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
200n February 24, 1942, the Federal Loan Agency was abolished and its




United States Geological Survey cooperated throughout the war with the
Instituto de Geologia in studying Mexican mineral deposits, always with
the primary aim of increasing production.
Most of the critical minerals received from Mexico were used in the
United States while a small percentage of them were reexDorted to
America's allies. In February the British Government inquired if the
United States would be willing to modify its agreement with Mexico to
permit the United Kingdom to procure strategic materials directly from
Mexico rather than from Mexico via the United States. Having no objec-
tion to the British proposal, the State Department instructed the American
Embassy in Mexico City to raise the issue with the Foreign Office.
Before approaching the Mexican Government on this subject, Ambassador
"essersmith notified Secretary Hull he was not in favor of allowing the
British to deal directly with the Mexicans. He felt that the United
States should retain some control over such transactions and suggested
instead that British representatives in Washington notify the State
Department when the purchase of critical materials from Mexico was con-
templated. United States officials would then, under the Ambassador's
plan, examine the proposed British requisition, and if found to be
acceptable, the Department would request Mexico to ship the items directly
21
to England.
Messersmith's views were overridden within the Department, and he
was directed to request a modification of the July 15, 1941 accord which
would permit Britain to go directly to Mexico with her orders for strategic
materials provided, in each instance, the United States would be given
the opportunity to state any objections it had to the delivery to England
George S. Messersmith to Secretary of State, March 7, 1942, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
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of the goods requested. The Mexican Government was willing to amend
the purchase agreement with the United States provided the latter would
renew its assurances that the guarantees provided in the Douglas-Wiechcrs
understanding would be strictly applied, i.e. the American Government
would continue to purchase all Mexican controlled materials not absorbed
in normal supply channels. In addition, the Foreign Office was in favor
of applying the modification not only to the United Kingdom, but also to
China and the Soviet Union.
After receiving a United States pledge that the provisions of the
Douglas-Uiechers letter would be meticulously observed, President Camacho
modified his July 15 decree to permit direct shipments of strategic
materials to the British Empire and its mandated territories, the Irish
23
Free State, China and the Soviet Union. Although the path was then
c lear for critical Mexican exports to go directly to several of the
United Nations, in reality the modification which occurred on May 7,
1942, had only a very minimal effect on the increasing flow of strategic
materials from Mexico to the United States.
At the same time the two Governments agreed to a second modification
of the Douglas-Wiechcrs understanding which affected the three metals
imported from Mexico to the United States in the largest quantities and
also froze the domestic taxes and transportation rates charged the
Mexican producers of strategic materials. This second alteration of the
basic accord was negotiated by Finance Minister Eduardo Suarez and Dr.
Man Bateman, the special representative of the Metals Reserve Company.
22George S. Mcsscrsmith to Cordell Hull, March 24, 1942, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
23George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, May 12, 1942, State
department Records, NA, RG59.
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Under the terms of the Bateman-Suarcz Agreement the price of Mexican
lead, zinc and copper, instead of being determined by prevailing prices
on United States markets, was fixed at 5.4 cents, 8.25 cents and 10 cents
per pound respectively, and the maximum annual quantity of these minerals
the United States was obligated to purchase was set at 250,000 tons of
lead, 200,000 tons in the case of zinc, and 75,000 tons for copper. This
understanding did not restrict American purchases to these figures and
in the case of zinc the obligation was exceeded during every year of the
war. In addition it was stipulated that the Mexican Government could not
increase existing taxes or freight rates on minerals and metals or impose
any charges or levies which would affect the net return to the pro-
ducers of the materials regulated by the July 15, 1941 decree. This
provision was included to prevent marginal producers from being forced
out of business. The Bateman-Suarez Agreement was to remain in force for
one year and thereafter until renounced by either Government.'1
Mexico produced great quantities of guayule and other plant rubber,
but only very limited amounts of tree rubber. In an effort to provide
the impetus for expanded production of tree rubber, an agreement was
signed in July, 1942, between Secretary of Agriculture Wickard and
Mexican Minister of Agriculture Marte R. Gomez under which the former
undertook to supply technicians and young trees for the planting of a
demonstration rubber plantation in Mexico designed to teach planting
and propagation skills as well as proper tapping, coagulation and smoking
techniques.
An understanding was reached between the Rubber Reserve Company
Finance Minister Eduardo Suarez to Dr. Alan Bateman, April 29,
1942, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
25Excelsior, July 30, 1942.
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and the Mexican Government in September, 1942, according to which the
United States would make available to Mexico an amount of tree rubber
which when added to Mexico's annual domestic production would equal
4,500 tons. Rubber Reserve also agreed to provide $1.5 million to be
used under its direction for development of the rubber industry in Mexico,
The pact provided that the Mexican Government would sell yearly to the
United States rubber tires and tubes with a rubber content of at least
1,350 tons. In addition, Mexico promised to deliver exclusively to
Rubber Reserve its entire output of plant rubber at a fixed price of 28
cents per pound, which price was subject to adjustment after two years,
and to initiate a rubber conservation program within its borders. More-
over, the Mexican Government agreed, in an attempt to promote production,
not to levy direct taxes on its rubber industry during the life of the
accord which was to remain in effect until December 31, 1946, unless
suspended sooner by mutual consent.
In Ambassador Messersmith 's opinion the rubber pact with Mexico was
the most favorable agreement of this type the United States made during
the war. Basically, Messersmith pointed out, America promised to export
annually to Mexico about 4,500 tons of tree rubber, two-thirds of the
latter 's normal consumption, seventy percent of which could be used for
Mexico's internal use while thirty percent had to be returned to the
United States in the form of tubes and tires. Thus, the Ambassador
argued, in exchange for supplying Mexico with tree rubber amounting to
about fifty percent of her normal domestic consumption, Mexico agreed
to make available to the United States her entire output of guayule and
George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, September 9, 1942, Depart-





Shortly after signing the agreement with the Rubber Reserve Company,
the Mexican Government created a National Rubber Control Commission with
the Secretary of National Economy, F. Javier Gaxiola, as its chairman.
The Commission's responsibilities included the adoption of methods for
increased production and distribution of rubber, preventing its waste,
and working with Rubber Reserve to identify the most productive expendi-
ture of the $1.5 million provided by the United States for development
of the Mexican rubber industry. 28 Commission recommendations for rubber
conservation, later adopted by President Camacho, included restricting
the use of rubber to the manufacture of essential products, which saved
an estimated 16 percent of Mexico's normal rubber consumption, and limit-
ing production of passenger car tires and tubes to 75 percent of the
1941 level. 2Q
In addition to the major understandings with the Metals Reserve
Company and the Rubber Reserve Company, Mexico concluded several agree-
ments of lesser importance with United States Government agencies. The
Defense Supplies Corporation contracted for the entire Mexican output of
henequen, ixtle de palma, sisal, lechuguilla and jaumave, all of which
are cordage fibers used in the manufacture of rope and twine which were
30m great demand during the war. The Foreign Economic Administration
27
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entered into a purchase agreement with the Mexican Government for the
entire exportable amount of various agricultural products, especially
castor seed and oil, peanuts and oil, rapeseed and oil, sesame seed and
oil, sunflower seed and oil, beans, garbanzos, rice and alcohol. 31
The Douglas-Uiechers Agreement of July, 1941, in accordance with
its terms expired on January 14, 1943, eighteen months after it entered
into force. Although they were not under a contractual obligation to do
so, both sides carried out its provisions as long as the Bateman-Suarez
Pact survived. The United States was content with this arrangement
since Government officials felt any attempt to renew the Douglas-
Wiechers Agreement would cause Mexico to press for certain changes which
could result in less favorable conditions from a United States viewpoint. 32
Although it never caused a major problem, the United States was
somewhat concerned that when the direct shipments from Mexico of strategic
materials were added to the minimum allocation from the United States
for the maintenance of their economies, some Latin American countries
were receiving larger quantities of certain critical materials than were
actually needed to maintain their wartime economic standards. At the
direction of the State Department the American Embassy in Mexico City
discussed with the Camacho Administration in January, 1943, the
possibility of Mexico either sending all exportable strategic materials
directly to the United States where shipments to the other American
Republics, Britain, China, and the Soviet Union would be controlled, or
entering into an agreement with the United States which would fix export
^Agreement between Foreign Economic Administrator and Mexican
Government, February 15, 1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
Charge in Mexico to Se
Department Records, MA, RG59
.
cretary of State, February 5, 1943, State
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quotas, not In excess of essential needs, for the Latin American countries
Secretary Gaxiola informed the Embassy that the first alternative was
not practical since Mexico could not permit a foreign government to
control her exports. In his opinion the second proposal would be
acceptable, but it would have to be carefully studied by other agencies
of the Government before a formal agreement could be reached. 33
In late March the Foreign Office notified the American Embassy it
would be unable to accept either of the United States alternatives.
Mexico had made a very careful study of its exports of minerals to
countries other than the United States which showed that only in the
cases of mercury, tungsten and tin did exports of controlled materials
to other markets exceed one percent of the quantities made available to
American buyers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not feel that such
small amounts of minerals would have an appreciable effect on United
States production. When the Douglas-Wiechers Agreement was made, the
Foreign Office continued, Mexico notified its Latin American neighbors
that deliveries of regulated materials would be suspended unless they
devised effective controls. Many countries adopted rigid exoort restric-
tions. If in spite of this, Mexico attempted to limit shipment of
materials to these countries it would be interpreted by many as evidence
of bad faith on Mexico's part. Finally, the Mexican Government declared
it had no intention of increasing trade in strategic materials with any
nation other than the United States and offered to make available to the
State Department all data on its foreign commerce. In making its reply
to the Embassy the Foreign Office supplied the figures listed in Table 7-1
33Charge/ in Mexico to Secretary of State, February 5, 1943, State
Department Records, KA, RG59.
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Lead 298,399,828 1 ,428,467 0.48
Graphite 29,532,067 3,465 0.011
Mercury 1,207,545 42,544 3.5
Zinc 274,945,207 2 ,013,123 0.73
Antimony 16,828,143 157,517 0.94
Arsenic 24,269,607 225,144 0.93
Cadmium 1,463,996
Tin 83,514 43,130 51.64
Tungsten 143,233 2,641 1.84




When he visited Mexico in April, 1943, for consultations with
President Camacho, President Roosevelt noted his complete
satisfaction
with that country's program of supplying ever-increasing
quantities of
strategic materials to the United States and its allies. "The
determination
3*Menorandum, Mexican Foreign Office to United States Embassy,




of the Mexican people and of their leaders," Roosevelt remarked, "has
led to production on an all-out hasis of strategic and vital materials
so necessary to the forging of the weapons destined to compass the final
overthrow of our common foe. In this great city of Monterrey I have been
most impressed with the single-minded purpose with which all the forces
of production are joined together in the war effort."
The Bateman-Sua'rez Agreement was negotiated for a period of one year
and thereafter until terminated by either side. The first year of the
understanding expired on April 23, 1943, and, as was the case with the
Douglas-Wiechers Pact, the United States did not wish to give Mexico
the opportunity to propose any modifications to such a favorable accord,
particularly with regard to the freeze on Mexican taxes and freight rates
as applied to strategic material production. Ambassador Messersmith
was directed by Secretary of State Hull to point out to Foreign Minister
Padilla that the agreement had worked so well for both sides that it
should be "extended" through an exchange of notes for a second year and
thereafter until renounced by either Government upon providing six months
written notice. Messersmith was cautioned not to use the word "renewal"
since it could cause Mexico to offer some modification to the original
37
understanding.
Padilla was in favor of extending the agreement for another year,
but Finance Minister Sua'rez argued for a renewal of the understanding
with certain changes granting Mexico more liberty to regulate taxes in
the mineral industrv. President Camacho, after hearing both of his
36
U. S., Department of State Bulletin , Vol. 8, Mo. 200, April 24,
1943, pp. 348-349.
J/ Cordell Hull to George S. Messersmith, May 5, l n 43, State
Department Fccordr, , NA, P.G59.
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advisers, decided to continue the pact without modification, and instructed
Padilla to so inform the American Embassy. The Mexican Chief Executive
stated that relations between his country and the United States were so
good that the agreement should be continued without change, and he was
sure if as a result of such extension any iniquities or inequalities
developed the United States on its own initiative would correct them.
After hearing from Padilla, Messersmith delivered to the Foreign Office a
note dated May 24, 1943, which proposed that the Bateman-Suarez Agreement
be extended for an additional year.™
In early June Ambassador Messersmith was informed by Eduardo Suarez
that President Camacho had second thoughts about simply extending the
agreement and was considering a modification which would allow the
Mexican Government to increase its revenue by immediately raising freight
rates on mineral shipments, and would commit the two Governments three
months prior to the termination of the year extension to consider
additional freight hikes. The Finance Minister described the proposed
transportation increases as small, but in most cases they would raise the
existing rate by 50-75 percent. Dr. Bateman who had been given a leave of
absence from Yale University in late 1942 to assume the position of Chief
of the Metals and Mineral Division of the Board of Economic Warfare, and
who was in Mexico at the time for the extension of the Bateman-Suarez
Agreement, told Sua'rez such a proposal was not acceptable since it would
force marginal producers out of business and thus reduce the quantities of
39
strategic material shipped to the United States.
38George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, May 24, 1943, State Depart-
ment Records, NA, RG59.
39George S. Messersmith to Secretary of State, June 29, 1943, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
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Suarcz was informed, however, that should Mexico be willing to extend
the present agreement for a period of one year, the United States would
not be opposed to discussing with the Mexican Covernnent, three months
prior to the expiration of the extension, the feasibility of freight
increases to be applied after the one year extension. The Finance Minister
relayed Bateman's counter-proposal to President Camacho who, for the
second time, decided the present agreement should be continued without
alterations. On June 23 Ambassador Messersmith sent a second note to the
Foreign Office, similar to the original of May 24, proposing that the
Bateman-Suarez Agreement be continued until April 29, 1944, with the
stipulation that three months prior to that date consultations would
take place on proposed freight increases which in no case could become
effective prior to the completion of the extension. Foreign Minister
Padilla replied the following week, causing the pact to remain in effect
for another year and thereafter until terminated by either party with
40
six months advance notice.
In December, 1943, Dr. Bateman again traveled to Mexico to inform
Finance Minister Suarez that the United States was approaching a surplus
position with respect to certain minerals which would necessitate a
decrease in American purchase of strategic materials. Bateman said that
if prices for most of these products changed during the coming year, such
change would probably be in a downward direction, and the United States
could not be expected to pay higher prices caused by an increase in tax
rates or freight charges. Sua'rez was told that some thought had been
given in the United States to terminating the mineral purchase agreements,
and that if they were to remain in effect, consideration would have to be
George S. Messersmith to Secretary of State, June 29, 1943, State
Department Records, VA, RG59.
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givcn to modifications which would permit shorter termination notice,
smaller obligated purchases, and perhaps lower prices. Eateman said he
was providing this information to give Mexico the opportunity to adjust
to lower production levels. Suarez replied that an abrupt renunciation
of the purchase agreement could cause a change in Mexico's attitude toward
providing those minerals still needed for defense manufacturing and agreed
to recommend to President Camacho that no increases be made in existing
41freight and tax rates.
Ambassador Messersmith presented a note to Foreign Minister Padilla
in early 1944 which advised Mexico of the United States desire to under-
take negotiations leading to a modification of the Eateman-SuaVez Agree-
ment. The note, delivered on March 2, 1944, stated that if changes
acceptable to both sides could not be formulated, consideration should be
given to renouncing the understanding. The following day the Foreign
Office replied that the Mexican Government was not in favor of terminating
the agreement and would welcome the opportunity to discuss possible
modifications.
With the threat of a renunciation of the Bateman-Suarez Agreement
hanging over its head, the Camacho Administration quickly accepted the
changes proposed by the United States. Motes modifying the Bateman-
Suarez Pact were exchanged on March 27 which provided that the United States
Government could, at anv time after April 29, 1944, the date on which
the agreed one year extension expired, inform the Mexican Government of
its intention to revise the price or quantity to be purchased of any of the
Memorandum of Conversation, Dr. Alan Eateman and Fduardo Surfrcz,
December 10, 1943, State Department Records, NA, EG59.
George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, March 4, 1944, State
Department '.lecords, MA, RG59.
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metals controlled by Mexico in accordance with previous understandings,
such notification to be effective three months following receipt. Mexico
agreed to provide a six month warning before raising existing tax and
freight rates. The requirement for a six month notification of intent to
terminate the understanding remained in effect.
In late May the American Embassy informed the Foreign Office that
three months thereafter the United States Government would cease all
procurement of mercury in Mexico. As was the case with all subsequent
purchase reductions, this notification affected only official transactions
and had no effect on normal commercial dealings.
It will be recalled that under the terms of the Bateman-Sua'rez
Accord the United States agreed to purchase yearly a maximum of 250,000
tons of lead, 200,000 tons of zinc and 75,000 tons of copper. In
December, 1944, the Mexican Government was informed, in accordance with
the recent changes to the agreement, of America's intention to limit her
obligated annual procurement of lead to 150,000 tons, zinc to 100,000
tons and in the case of copper to 25,000 tons. Ambassador Messersmith
stated that in spite of the limits set it was doubtful actual purchases
would decline to these levels. In addition Mexico was notified of the
United States intention to lower the price paid for Mexican zinc from
8.25 cents to 7.25 cents per pound.
Shortly after the Camacho Administration had been notified of United
States procurement reductions, Dr. Bateman met with officials of the
Foreign Office to imnress on them the desire of his Government to assist
A3George S. Messersmith to Cordcll Hull, March 29, 1944, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
!
^Ambassador Messersmith to Foreign Minister Padilla, December 8,
1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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Mexico in the transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy. Bateman
stressed that emergency legislation permitted America to import strategic
materials duty free only until the point was reached when they were no
longer necessary for the war effort. That level had now been reached in
many cases, and the United States had no choice but to cut down on
strategic purchases, while at the same time making every attempt to trans-
fer this trade back to normal markets. In response to a Mexican inquiry,
he stated that in his opinion a large demand for minerals and metals
would not exist in Europe after the war.
Dr. Bateman informed the Foreign Office officials that the United
States would store its strategic material surplus for fifteen months
after the war rather than harm the economies of the producing countries by
putting it on the market at such a critical period. He stated that
through private sources he had arranged for the sale of Mexico's entire
1945 mercury output. Finally, Bateman assured the Mexicans that the
United States would curtail its procurement of minerals and metals in
such a way that Mexico and Canada would be "last and least affected.'"* 6
However, as the war ended the United States had no alternative
other than to limit its imports of critical products. In August, 1945,
obligated purchases of zinc were discontinued under the Bateman-Suarez
Agreement while the yearly quotas for lead and copper were reduced to
120,000 tons and 10,000 tons respectively.
47 On October 9, 1945, Foreign
Minister Castillo Najera was informed that mandatory procurement of
Memorandum of Conversation, Dr. Alan Bateman and Manuel Tello,
December 9, 1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
46Ibid.
47 Secretary of State to George S. Messersmith, August 7, 1945,
State Department Records, MA, RG59.
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copper by the United States under the purchase agreements would be
stopped after three months while the figure for lead was further reduced
to 50,000 tons per annum. At the same time official notification was
also given of United States intention to terminate the Bateman-Suarez
Agreement in six months' time thus ending America's wartime strategic
material program with Mexico.
With one exception Mexico faithfully collaborated during the entire
war period by supplying enormous quantities of vitally needed strategic
minerals to the United States. The only blemish on an otherwise credit-
able record was Mexico's reluctance to fulfill the provisions of her
silver purchase agreement with the United States. In 1936 the two
Governments had reached an understanding whereby Mexico would make avail-
able to the United States five million ounces each month, making Mexico
America's leading supplier of silver. The silver purchase agreement was
suspended by the Roosevelt Administration in 193S in retaliation for
Mexican seizure of American oil properties, but was revived again under
the terms of the comprehensive accord of November 19, 1941. In the summer
of 1942 the United States agreed to increase the price it paid for
Mexican silver from slightly more than thirty-five cents to forty-five
cents per ounce. * The following spring Finance Minister Suarez stated
that all Mexican silver, less the amount needed for internal purposes and
coinage for those countries to which commitments had already been made,
would be sent to the United States.
^Ambassador Ilessersmith to Foreign "inister Castillo Ndjera,
October 9, 1945, State Department Records, NA, 3.G59.
49
U. S., Department of State Bulletin , Vol. 7, No. 165, August 22,
1942, p. 714.
50George S. Messersmith to Cordell Full, April 1, 1943, State
Depart- ient ilecords, NA, 'I.G59.
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During the war years Mexico produced about 80 million ounces of
silver annually of which a maximum of 20 million ounces would normally
be used for coinage. The first warning that silver shipments to the
United States would soon be diminishing was supplied by Ambassador
Messersmith in July, 1943, when he notified the State Department that
the Mexican consumption of silver for other than coinage purposes had
increased from 125,000 ounces per month in September 1942, to 416,000
per month in May 1943. Moreover estimates for 1944 indicated the use of
silver for coinage would soar to 45 million ounces.
The reason for this increased consumption of silver in Mexico,
Messersmith explained, was a greater private demand in the United States
for silver articles which could be sold at a price affording the silver
producers a much larger profit than sales to the American Government.
In fact, the profit was so great that thousands of Mexicans had melted
their silver coins and sold the liquid to industrial firms causing a
shortage of silver money which necessitated a larger coinage allocation.
During 1942 American imports of silver articles from Mexico were valued
at $12,000 per month. Ly July of the following year the monthly figure
had risen to $221,000. 52
Ambassador Messersmith met with Suarez in August, 1943, in an effort
to convince the Finance Minister that his country should restrict sales
of silver to private iiidustry so that large shipments could be sent to
the United States for defense purposes. Suarez agreed to raise the
export tariff on silver articles sent to America and to limit sales of the
51George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, June 23, 1943, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
52George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, August 20, 1943, State
Department Records, NA, R.G59.
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mineral to silversmiths to a quantity mutually acceptable to both
countries. Messersmith suggested 450,000 ounces per month, but the figure
53
was never agreed to by the Mexican Government.
The Bank of Mexico showed little interest in restricting silver
sales to private industry so that by March, 1945, monthly transactions of
this nature accounted for 1,203,231 ounces. As a conseauence Mexican
deliveries of silver to the United States under the purchase agreement
which had been averaging in the excess of 50 million ounces annually
decreased sharply to 19,995,061 ounces in 1944 and to only about
9 million ounces the following year.
Ambassador M.essersmith felt that many Mexicans were just not convinced
of the need for silver in the United States when the latter had stored
vast quantities of the metal underground, and that the Embassy could not
justifiably put pressure on Mexico to sell her silver for only forty-
five cents per ounce when United States defense industries were charged
seventy-one cents per ounce for the stored American silver. In
April, 1945, he reported to the Department that it would be unwise to
insist on compliance with the silver purchase understanding even though
it remained in effect. In Messersmith' s opinion Mexico was "entirely
sound and prudent 11 in developing her silver industry when she realized
56
United States official purchases of silver would soon be declining.
Based on the Ambassador's recommendation, and the fact that the end of
53George S. .Messersmith to Cordell Hull, August 20, 1943, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
-^George S. Messersmith to Secretary of State, April 13, 1945,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
56George S. Messersmith to Division of Mexican Affairs (Carrigan)
,
April 21, 1945, State Department Records, MA, RG59.
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the war was in sight and importation of strategic materials had already
been heavily reduced, no action was taken to insist on Mexican compli-
ance with the silver agreement.
The inconvenience caused by Mexico's failure to maintain throughout
the latter years of the war the previous high levels of silver shipments
to the United States did not seriously detract from her overall colla-
boration in supplying vast quantities of strategic materials for America's
war machinery. Her assistance in this regard was all the more valuable
since maritime transportation, so risky during the war years, was not
needed to deliver Mexican goods to American markets. She was the major
foreign source of graphite, antimony and mercury, three of the twenty-
nine materials considered critical by the Army and Navy Munitions Board.
Next to Cuba and Chile she supplied more material to the United States
during the years from 1940 to 1945 than any of the other Latin American
5°
countries.
As a testimony to Mexico's cooperation Ambassador Messersmith stated
he did not know of a single instance when Mexico attempted to take
advantage of the wartime emergency by demanding higher prices than would
59
normally have been expected for her critical materials. That Mexico
agreed to a freeze in freight rates and domestic taxes on mineral produc-
tion also represented a significant contribution to the war effort.
Table 7-2 illustrates, not only in quantity, but also in degree of
increase over previous production, the magnitude of Mexico's contribution
57
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to the war effort in the form of strategic exports, and also the decreases
in many cases in United States procurement as the war ended.
TABLE 7-2
MEXICAN EXPORTS OF SELECTED STRATEGIC MATERIAL S TO THE UNITED STATES 60
(All Units in Tons)
ITEM '37-'38 '41 '42 'A3 '44 '45 f 46
AV.
Antimony 6,674 24,341 31,536 27,130 28,379 21,714 17,133
Arsenic 9,136 10,376 19,038 16,037 12,765 15,096 10,011
Bismuth * 84 171 183 134 249 175
Cadmium 679 * * 1,034 1,251 1,580 1,157
Copper 44,122 64,961 63,349 53,294 55,927 79,205 67,414
Graphite 10,246 16,923 20,812 20,034 15,393 23,379 22,260
Manganese 117 2,124 25,943 43,610 78,323 39,998 23,343
Mercury 10S 177 1,086 1,393 676 493 284
Molybdenum 874 662 1,140 1,757 1,403 1,364 626
Lead 75,069 123,953 172,327 217,467 169,405 136,641 110,395
Zinc 27,020 249,761 303,977 338,277 355,641 360,027 273,213
Henequen 66,131 76,340 69,609 32,071 83,937 50,394 53,111
Rubber 2,996 5,313 6,705 8,975 7,951 12,075 5,839
-not available
The conditions under which the Mexican workers labored to produce
such large quantities of critical minerals were in many instances quite
dangerous. As one author convincingly writes:
GQ7ore->n Commerce of Mexico 1Q41-1Q4S (Washington: Ran American
Union, 1950)
, pp. 25-32 "and Foreir.n Commerce Yearbook 1948 (Washington:
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 369-370.
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The workers in the Latin American production programs
did yeoman service in the war effort. Most strategic
materials '/ere produced under conditions that tahe the
starch out of the strongest men. ... Disease and accidents
have always taken a high toll in these industries but
under pressure for increased output the toll increased.
The workers who died to produce more tin, cooper, or
rubber were no less heroic—or deserving— than the
soldiers who manned the tanks and planes that blasted
the Axis. 61
There can be little doubt that Mexico's collaboration during the war
years through her expanded strategic materials program was both signifi-
cant and generous. The minerals she sent to the United States helped
that country's industries produce record amounts of military equipment
during this critical period. In speaking of Mexico's contribution to the
war effort Ambassador Messersmith remarked "...if it were confined only
to this furnishing of raw material it would be more important than that
62
of any of the other American Republics."
6l
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CORN AND WHEAT FOR MEXICO
During World War II the average American probably believed that the
Latin American countries derived a great many benefits, while exper-
iencing relatively few inconveniences, from the United States strategic
materials procurement program. The alleged windfall presented the
producing nations with additional government revenues, increased produc-
tion profits, and provided higher wages for their workers. This picture,
however, is incomplete unless some of the resultant disadvantages are
considered. The great effort to increase production caused extensive
dislocation in the economies of many South American Republics as workers
rushed from the farms to the mines where monetary returns were greater,
and land normally planted to corn or other staples was used to raise the
oil bearing seeds urgently needed by the United States for the war
effort. Critical food shortages resulted, and riots occurred in several
areas where inflation and higher costs of living more than absorbed
salary increases, thus preventing people from purchasing even the basic
foodstuffs necessary to sustain themselves.
In this regard Mexico was one of the Latin American countries most
seriously affected. For centuries corn and wheat had been two of the
basic elements in the Mexican diet. Over the years Mexico had been
practically self-sufficient with respect to corn, importing from the
United States only seven tons of that commodity in 1941. About 25 percent
of the wheat consumed in Mexico was usually imported, mainly from the
United States where slightly more than 120,000 tons were purchased in




the United States sent only ninety-five tons to its southern neighbor. 1
In the spring of 1942 the Mexican food situation was better than at any
time during the previous two years and ample supplies of most staples
were readily available. This situation changed drastically as the
effects of the economic disturbances already mentioned were combined with
a meager 1943 agricultural yield caused by a severe drought early in the
year and torrential rains just before the harvest. In 1944 many Mexi-
cans died from malnutrition despite huge increases in food imports from
the United States which in the case of corn and wheat flour rose more
than 200 tines and 5 times respectively above 1941 levels. So widespread
was the domestic unrest caused by the food shortage that the stability
of the country and the Camacho Administration was threatened.
The first indication that the expanded strategic production pro-
grams in Mexico were causing a decrease in agricultural output was
provided by the Mexican Embassy in Washington. In a note of October 15,
1942, the Embassy advised the State Department that Mexico was experienc-
ing a shortage of between 150,000 and 200,000 tons of wheat which it would
be required to import prior to June of the following year. The note
requested the United States to send part of its wheat surplus to Mexico
and to adopt once again the recently suspended wheat export subsidy
program so that the price charged Mexico for the American wheat would be
about one dollar per bushel. If Mexico were unable to import wheat from
^
•Foreign Commerce of Mexico 1941-1943 (Washington: Pan American
Union, 1950).
^Memorandum by Division of American Republics, May 25, 1942, Depart-
ment of State Records, National Archives, Record Group 59. Hereafter
referred to as State Department Records, NA, RG59.




the United States, the Embassy explained, a large amount of land and
labor would have to be diverted from strategic material production to
A
wheat raising.
The Mexican request was forwarded to the Agricultural Department
where Secretary of Agriculture Wickard decided, on the basis of Mexico's
need and her cooperation in the war effort of the United Nations, to
export as much wheat as possible to Mexico and to institute a program
effective December 2, 1942, calling for a $0.20 per bushel subsidy on
wheat shipped to Mexico. The amount actually paid for the wheat would
depend on the market price in the United States at the time of purchase.
The subsidy, later raised to $0.30 per bushel, remained in effect until
December 31, 1943, and applied ultimately not only for deliveries to
Mexico, but also to Cuba, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela and all Central
American areas with the exception of the Canal Zone.
During 1943 and 1944 the United States also experienced low grain
yields, and the limited supply pushed the price of rye, wheat, and corn
to record levels. The cost of wheat on the American market rose to
$1.50 per bushel making United States wheat purchased by the Mexicans,
even with the subsidy, more expensive than Canadian wheat which was
available for $1.00 a bushel. Mexico purchased about 72,000 tons of
wheat from Canada in early 1943 which it planned to move through the
United States by rail; however, the War Production Board and the Office
of Defense Transportation were not able to divert freight cars from
^Mexican Embassy to Secretary of State Hull, October 15, 1942, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
5Forcign Relations of the United States , 1943 , Secretary of State
to Ambassador Castillo Najera, January 25, 1943, Vol. 6, p. 429.
Separtment of Agriculture Press Release, May 5, 1943, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.

-228-
defense associated transportation to the shipment of wheat from Canada
to Mexico. The Office of Defense Information estimated 1,900 cars,
already in critical supply in the United States, would be needed to carry
the entire wheat cargo to Mexico. Ambassador Messersmith strongly
recommended that the necessary rail equipment be made available to trans-
port Canadian wheat, since without the urgently needed grain, bread
prices in Mexico would rise even higher, causing unrest among peasants
and city dwellers which could impede Mexican collaboration with the United
p
States. The War Production Board maintained that neither rail nor sea
transportation was available, but promised to make every effort to supply
Mexico with wheat from Texas and Oklahoma. Mexico had no other choice
than to purchase at a higher price whatever wheat America could make
available and store the Canadian wheat at great expense either in Canada
or the northern United States.
Until the summer of 1943 the only food products in short supply in
Mexico were wheat and to a much lesser degree lard. With regard to most
staples the 1942 harvest had been the best in ten years, and so optimis-
tic was the outlook for 1943 that the American Embassy in Mexico City
on April 22, 1943, reported: "Mexico can take care of her food require-
ments with the exception of wheat and lard. "9 By July the situation had
changed, and the loss of thousands of Mexican farm laborers to mineral
production, coupled with the particularly adverse weather conditions,
began to be reflected in the diminished corn crop.
7Foreinn Relations of the. United States , 1943 , Secretary of State
to Ambassador Castillo Najera, January 25, 1943, Vol. 6, p. 430.
p
George S. Messersmith to Division of American Republics (Bonsai),
May 18, 1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
Memorandum, Division of Mexican Affairs to Office of American Repub-
lics Affairs (Duggan) , May 9, 1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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Mexico which had imported less than 200 tons of American corn in 1942
asked the State Department on July 22, 1943, if the United States could
lend her between 15,000 and 20,000 tons of corn which would be repaid
within one year. Both the Department of Agriculture and the Commodity
Credit Corporation, an agency of the Federal Government, replied that
they did not have in their possession a single kernel of corn to sell or
lend, and they were unable to purchase any corn whatever on the open
market. The United States was also experiencing a corn shortage, and
all available corn was either being used for human consumption or animal
feed, primarily the latter. The Department of Agriculture reported it
had doubts that Mexico could purchase corn anywhere in the United States,
but promised if any corn were to appear on the market every effort would
be made to acquire some for Mexican usage.
In the first eight months of 1943, Mexico had contracted with three
private American firms for the purchase of 100,000 tons of wheat, half
of which had been delivered by the end of August. The remainder was
being stored in the United States and moved in small amounts to Mexico
since adequate rail transportation was not available to accommodate large
shipments. The Mexican Government requested that additional freight
cars be employed during September, October and November to transport not
only wheat purchased in the United States but also the wheat obtained in
Canada which by that time amounted to about 245,000 tons. 11 The American
Government could not comply with the Mexican request since it was
considered imprudent to divert rail facilities from defense transportation
1 Forcion Relations of the United States , 1943 , Secretary of State
to George S. Messersmith, July 26, 1943, Vol. 6, p. 432.
Ambassador Messersmith to Secretary of State, August 30, 1943,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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and there was little support either in the Office of Defense Transporta-
tion or the Interstate Commerce Commission to suspend the ICC order of
January 12, 1943, which prohibited grain shipments by rail through the
1 ?
United States. As an alternative to shipping wheat from Canada to
Mexico, the Mexican Embassy in Washington suggested the Mexican-owned
Canadian wheat, some of which was already in storage in the Great Lakes
area of the United States, be traded for American raised wheat. This
would actually decrease transportation requirements, the Mexicans argued,
since wheat would not have to be sent from Texas, Oklahoma and Kansas
to the northern United States. The Agricultural Department favored this
idea, but it was not until early 1944 that a viable wheat exchange program
was adopted.
By early September, 1943, Ambassador Messersmith reported that
Mexico was experiencing a 65,000 ton corn deficit which he attributed to
increased emphasis on production of oil bearing seeds needed for the war
effort and not producible in the United States, and a generally poor
agricultural year. Messersmith stressed that Mexico was pleased to
collaborate so closely with the United States in the war against the
Axis and did not wish to abruptly cease production of oil bearing seeds,
but President Camacho had to see that his people were fed, and he would
have no other choice if America could not make available to Mexico more
wheat and corn. Messersmith warned that the situation was desperate, and
that if the people were not adequately fed, political unrest would result.
The Ambassador also pointed out that Cuba would have a corn surplus of
about 5,000 tons during the current year, and he recommended this surplus
12 Secretary of Agriculture to Secretary of State, September 29, 1943




be sent to Mexico. Messersmith's estimate proved high, but Commodity
Credit Corporation ultimately purchased about 1,400 tons of Cuban corn
during the remainder of 1943 for shipment to Mexico.
President Camacho took drastic measures in September, not only to
control the supply of corn in Mexico, but also to stimulate increased
production in succeeding years. Wide press coverage was given through-
out the country to two presidential decrees issued on September 21 and 22.
The first order, in an effort to facilitate movement of corn throughout
the country, placed all corn grown in Mexico or imported from abroad
under the exclusive control of Nacional Distribuidora y Reguladora, S. A.,
14
a governmental agency. The second decree made available large amounts
of new land for the raising of corn, and provided that the Federal Govern-
ment would confiscate any crops other than corn grown on the designated
land. 15
On the day following the second decree, Ambassador Messersmith
notified the State Department it had come to his attention that the
light and power companies in Argentina were burning corn, since they
were unable to get coal from Britain and the United States, due to the
pro-Axis position the Argentine Government had adopted during the war.
Messersmith stated that he was aware of the valid reasons which prompted
the United States to suspend coal shipments to Argentina, but he felt
Mexican people could not be allowed to starve while another Latin American
country had such a large surplus of the principal staple item in the
Mexican diet. He recommended consideration be given to the resumption
13George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, September 4, 1943, State









of coal deliveries to the Argentine in exchange for corn not only for
human consumption in Mexico, but also for animal feed in the United
States.
On the same day that he recommended corn be acquired in Argentina,
Ambassador Messersmith sent a personal letter to President Roosevelt in
which he explained in detail the seriousness of the corn scarcity in
Mexico. He charged that corn was unavailable on the American market, not
because of a shortage, but because farmers were dissatisfied with the
corn price ceilings set by the Federal Government. Messersmith said
that the Camacho Administration needed corn to insure internal stability
and was willing to pay whatever price was necessary to get the corn which
it would distribute to the people at a price they could afford. "You
may be sure," the Ambassador wrote, "that I would not bring this matter
to your attention if it were not a matter of primary importance and I
have the deep conviction that it is just as important in some ways for
us as it is for the Mexicans that the economic and political order now
so happily prevailing in Mexico should be maintained. You know what can
happen when people get hungry, and you know that such things can happen
more easily in Mexico than in some other places." Finally, Messer-
smith notified the President that Ambassador-at-large Francisco del Rio
Canedo was being sent by President Camacho to the United States to discuss
with American officials the seriousness of the food problem confronting
Mexico and to attempt to purchase whatever corn or wheat might become
available on the open market.
George S. Messersmith to Division of American Republics (Bonsai),
September 23, 1943, State Department Records, KA, RG59.
17Foreirn Relations of the United States, 1943, George S. Messer-
smith to Franklin D. Roosevelt, September 23, 1943, Vol. 6, pp. 433-435.
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In his reply to Messersmith, President Roosevelt cautioned the
Ambassador that he should not minimize the actual corn shortage existing
in the United States which was not caused simply by dissatisfaction with
federally set price ceilings. Roosevelt stated that while it was true
that corn was not flowing freely to domestic markets due to the "existing
hog-corn price ratio," it was also true that the supply of corn in the
United States was insufficient to meet the demand. The price of corn
on the American market had risen to its highest level in over five and
one-half years. Notwithstanding the shortage in the United States,
President Roosevelt directed the War Production Board on October 1, 1943,
to send 1,500 tons of corn to Mexico. He told the Board's Chairman,
Donald M. Nelson, that arrangements were being made which would permit
the importation of foodstuffs from the Argentine to be used for animal
feed and for replenishing WPB stockpiles.
Such a small shipment as the one President Roosevelt directed the
WPB to send really had little effect in alleviating the widespread
hunger in Mexico. In early October Ambassador Messersmith reported that
Mexico would be required to import large quantities of corn until at
least mid-1944. He said that despite reports to the contrary corn was
not being hoarded in Mexico pending the lifting of price ceilings by the
Mexican Government. The corn situation was particularly critical in the
States of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Aguascalientes , San Luis Potosf, Districto
Federal, Hidalgo and Yucata'n, and Messersmith stated that in some areas
workers had refused to load corn for shipment outside their district since
18Foreien Relations of the United States, 1943, Franklin D. Roose-
velt to George S. Messersmith, September 29, 1943, Vol. 6, p. 436
Memorandum, President Roosevelt to Chairman War Production
(Nelson), October 1, 1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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the supply on which they were dependent was already quite low. 20
Ambassador del Rio Canedo arrived in the United States in early
October for discussions with American officials relative to his country's
serious food shortage. By the middle of the month an arrangement had been
worked out whereby Commodity Credit Corporation, under pressure from
President Roosevelt, agreed to make available to Mexico 5,000 tons of
corn in exchange for a promise from Ambassador del Rio that Mexico would
deliver to the United States a shipment of vegetable meal and oil seed
cake which would be used as livestock feed. It was agreed the Mexican
shipment and the American corn would be of equal value, and that similar
trades in the future would be on a strict dollar-for-dollar basis.
Commodity Credit was particularly anxious to receive a substitute animal
feed for the corn, since without this exchange, dairy and poultry
farmers throughout the United States would have sharply criticized the
Government for exporting scarce feed with no provision for resupply.
Ambassador Messersmith was disappointed that only 5,000 tons of
corn had been released for Mexico, and in a letter to Secretary of State
Hull, he strongly recommended that more corn be made available. He
reminded Hull that corn was urgently needed in Mexico to avert human
starvation while in the United States it was primarily used for animal
feed. Messersmith emphasized that within a few months Mexico would have
large quantities of oil seed meal and cake for delivery to American farmers
but the urgency in Mexico was an immediate one and the United States
could not make corn shipments contingent on parallel meal cake
on
George S. Messersmith to Division of American Republics, October 4,
1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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Marvin Jones, the War Food Administrator, notified President Roose-
velt on October 23, 1943, that through official channels the United
States had released 6,500 tons of corn to Mexico (1,500 tons on October 1,
1943, and 5,000 tons on October 15, 1943). Due to the urgent need for
corn in this country for war essential processing plants, and for animal
feed and human consumption, Jones recommended that no further corn be
sent to Mexico. He said the shortage of dairy and poultry feed in the
eastern states would become more acute when the Great Lakes froze over,
making barley and wheat deliveries from Canada very difficult. If it
should be decided, Jones concluded, that additional shipments of corn are
to be sent to Mexico they should be kept as small as possible and always
with the understanding that Mexico would make equal valued deliveries of
meal and cake to the United States. 3
Acting Secretary of State Edward Stettinius also notified President
Roosevelt of the release of 6,500 tons of corn for Mexico. He said
Mexico probably needed about four times that figure during its present
emergency, although Mexican estimates were much higher. Stettinius
stated that it might be necessary for the State Department to ask the
President "to send the Food Administration a directive indicating the
urgency and importance of assisting our Mexican friends in this emergency."
In addition to its attempts to import corn from the United States,
the Mexican Government was very active in its efforts to increase corn
24
22George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, October 20, 1943, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
23War Food Administration (Jones) to President Roosevelt, October 23,
1943, Official File 146-Box 2, Roosevelt Library.
^Memorandum, Acting Secretary of State Stettinius to President
Roosevelt, October 25, 1943, Official File 146-Box 2, Roosevelt Library.

-236-
production domestically. The Camacho Administration made future
agricultural credits dependent on the willingness of landowners to utilize
a certain percentage of their acreage for corn planting. In addition,
50 percent of the land originally cleared for cultivation of oil bearing
seeds was diverted to corn raising as was all available agricultural
25
machinery. J
The State Department requested Ambassador Messersmith in late
October, 1943, to inform the Mexican Government that future deliveries
of corn to Mexico, whether from Commodity Credit Corporation or from
private sources would depend upon the willingness of American governmental
licensing agencies to permit the corn to leave the country. In either
case, the Department continued, such shipments of corn will depend upon
Mexico's willingness to send substitute feed of equal value to the United
States. Up to that time Dr. del Rio had been unable to supply American
officials with exact data on the availability of vegetable meal and oil
seed cakes, and until such information was forthcoming, the Department
warned, no further Government-owned or controlled corn could be released
f m • 26for Mexico.
The information on substitute feed desired by United States offi-
cials was quickly made available by the Mexican Government. Further
negotiations between Ambassador del Rio and Commodity Credit produced
an agreement whereby the strict dollar-for-dollar basis of exchange was
abolished, and by the beginning of November limited amounts of corn
purchased by del Rio from private sources began to flow to Mexico in
25
Memorandum, Acting Secretary of State Stettinius to President
Roosevelt, October 25, 1943, Official File 146-Box 2, Roosevelt Library.
26
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exchange for approximately equal amounts of vegetable oil meals. 27
In late November, Under Secretary Torres Bodet, informed Ambassador
Messersmith that Mexico would be dependent on corn from the United
States until at least June, 1944, when it was expected that steps to
increase Mexico's corn output would become fully productive. He said
that by the end of the year his country would have purchased between
28,000-30,000 tons of corn in the United States which when mixed with
considerable amounts of wheat would allow Mexico to meet her current
food shortage despite earlier estimates that 60,000 tons of corn would be
28
needed. Of the just under 30,000 tons of corn finally purchased by
Mexico from the United States in 1943, Commodity Credit Corporation made
available 6,500 tons of domestic corn and 1,400 tons of Cuban corn while
the remainder resulted primarily from private transactions negotiated by
/ 29Ambassador del Rxo.
In mid-October, 1943, the price of wheat on the open market had
reached its highest level in fifteen years, and one leading United States
newspaper reported that for the first time in American history the demand
for wheat for feed and industrial purposes was of such magnitude to be a
30
major price-making influence.
By that time Mexico had acquired in the United States and Canada
both from future purchases and spot deliveries about 377,000 tons of the
27
Foreign Relations of the United States , 1943 , Acting Secretary of
State Stettinius to George S. Messersmith, October 26, 1943, Vol. 6,
p. 438.
28
George S. Messersmith to Division of American Republics (Bonsai),
November 28, 1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
oq
^War and Food Administration (Jones) to President Roosevelt,
December 2, 1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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400,000 tons of wheat which she calculated would be needed for domestic
consumption until May of the following year. The requirement for wheat
was so great because large quantities of it were being mixed with corn
in an effort to make the limited amounts of corn last as long as possible,
Despite the fact that Mexico had arranged to acquire almost all the
wheat she would need, it was not really at her disposal since about 70
percent of it was in storage either in Canada or the United States and
could not be delivered to Mexico because of transportation limitations.
On October 15, 1943, the Mexican Embassy requested the State Department
to investigate the feasibility of shipping the Mexican-owned Canadian
wheat to storage facilities in such northern United States cities as
Deluth, Chicago and Buffalo before the Great Lakes froze over making
transportation more difficult. The Mexicans also renewed a former re-
quest that where possible the Canadian wheat be delivered via rail to the
31United States-Mexican border.
Secretary Hull forwarded the Mexican petition to the Department of
Agriculture, asking the latter to utilize x>/hatever transportation was
available to move the Mexican wheat. The Agriculture Department replied
that it would arrange for several ships to transport the wheat from
Canada to the United States until the winter weather made shipping on
the Great Lakes impossible, and recommended that the State Department
undertake to trade the Mexican wheat brought from Canada for American-
owned wheat from a source outside the United States. Secretary Wickard
assured Hull that limited amounts of Texas wheat would be released to
31
Memorandum, Mexican Embassy to Secretary of State, October 15,
1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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Mexico until arrangements could be made for x^heat from another source."* 2
An agreement was made in early 1944 between Ambassador del Rio and
Leon Falk of Commodity Credit under which the United States would exchange
54,000 tons of wheat purchased in Australia for a similar amount of
Mexican-owned Canadian wheat. The understanding simply provided that
Mexico would release a given amount of its wheat in storage in Chicago
or Buffalo when an American ship loaded with an equal amount of wheat
left Australia enroute to Mexico. The arrangement was advantageous to
both countries, since in addition to getting badly needed grain, Mexico
would reduce her storage expenses, and the United States would acquire
wheat without transportation delays and near the northern areas, partic-
33
ularly New England, where it was in short supply.
United States officials made arrangements for six ships to carry
the American-owned wheat from Australia to Manzanillo, Mexico. By the
beginning of April, 1944, four vessels had made the trip, carrying a
total of 35,240 tons of grain to Mexico, thus releasing an equal amount
of Mexican-owned wheat for use in the United States. The remaining two
ships suddenly became unavailable due to higher priority transportation
requirements. Ambassador Messersmith recommended to the State Department
that every effort be made to reschedule these two wheat shipments at the
first possible moment. On May 11 Assistant Secretary of State Dean
Acheson in a letter to Foreign Economic Administrator Crowley stated
that in his opinion the United States Government had a moral obligation
to transport the remaining 18,760 tons of wheat to Mexico. Three weeks
32Memorandum by Division of American Republics, October 20, 1943,
State Department Records, KA, RG59.
"*
.Memorandum of Conversation by Division of American Republic
Affairs (Carrigan) , January 15, 1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.

-240-
later Crowley reluctantly agreed to do so, but he pointed out that recent
increases in the price of Australian wheat would cause the United States
to spend $118,000 more than it had anticipated. He recommended, that
should arrangements of this nature be made in the future, adequate safe-
guards be adopted to prevent similar losses. 3 ^ The remainder of the
Australian wheat was finally delivered to Mexico in September, 1944.
In 1944, the Mexican Government released the figures listed in
Table 8-1 relative to the production and importation of wheat in Mexico.
As has been previously mentioned the amount of wheat consumed during the
later period of the war was greater than in previous years since it was
generously mixed with corn in an attempt to make the limited supply of
the latter grain last longer.
TABLE 8-1
MEXICAN DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND IMPORTATION OF WHEAT35
1940-1945
(All Figures in Tons)
NATIONAL
HARVEST PRODUCTION IMPORTED TOTAL
1940-41 440,004 31,443 471,447
1941-42 393,033 152,585 545,618
1942-43 471,220 123,176 594,396
1943-44 336,292 363,708 700,000
1944-45 (estimate) 300,000 450,000 750,000
The United States Combined Food Board had originally allocated to
Mexico a total of about 171,000 tons of American wheat for 1944 from both
Foreign Economic Administration (Crowley) to Assistant Secretary
of State Acheson, June 2, 1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
35Memorandum by Nacional Distribuidora Y Reguladora, S. A., April 21,
1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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governmental and private sources. By the middle of June of that year
143,000 tons had already been delivered, and the serious food shortage
still persisted. The Board decided that if starvation was to be averted
in Mexico it had no other choice than to increase the 1944 Mexican allo-
cation to 314,000 tons. 36 Final figures on Mexican imports show that
even this total was surpassed. To supplement the diet of its people the
Mexican Government imported from the United States in 1944 almost 55,000
tons of wheat flour, a commodity which most Mexicans in normal times
37
considered undesirable.
The scarcity of corn in Mexico during 1944 presented a far more
serious problem to the Mexican Government than the wheat shortage, not
only because corn was more difficult to acquire abroad, but because it
was the principal staple in the diet of millions of Mexicans. In 1942
Mexico produced 2,356,236 tons of corn, her best crop in over ten years,
while in 1943, the worst year for Mexican agriculture since the turn of
the century, production fell to 1,375,200 tons. In an average year the
entire domestic corn consumption was 2,270,000 tons; however, Mexican
authorities calculated that starvation and widespread unrest could be
averted in 1944 if a total of 1,670,000 tons could be made available.
This meant that 294,800 tons had to be acquired to raise the 1943 production
to the minimum 1944 consumption level. Not all of the additional amount
had to be imported since some corn from the 1944 crop would be harvested
in the fall. The real crisis then would exist only until September or
1£i
State Department to American Embassy in Mexico, June 23, 1944,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
37
Foreign Commerce of Mexico 1941-1948 (Washington: Pan American
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October unless prolonged by unfavorable farming conditions as had been
experienced the previous year.
Ambassador del Rio remained in the United States during the early
months of 1944 to impress on governmental and private officials the
desperate situation of his people. He commissioned W. C. Fox and Company,
a New Orleans grain brokerage, to purchase up to 170,000 tons of American
corn for Mexico. Fox reported he was able to acquire about 30,000 tons
in January alone, and he saw no problem in delivering even larger amounts
39
of corn to Mexico provided shipping facilities could be obtained. The
availability of corn was severely restricted shortly thereafter by a
directive from the War Food Administration which stated that 700,000
tons of corn were needed for industrial use and ordered that all corn from
125 specified counties in the corn belt not used for consumption be
sold to the Federal Government.
In April, 1944, Argentina communicated to the Mexican Government
its interest in sending corn and wheat to Mexico in exchange for oil and
pig iron. Foreign Minister Padilla, in notifying Ambassador Messer-
smith of the Argentine proposition, assured Messersmith that Mexico had
no intention of sending oil to Argentina, but he was not willing to give
the same pledge with regard to pig iron. President Camacho was reluctant
to trade any strategic material with Argentina; therefore, the latter
finally decided to simply sell the grain to Mexico. The Mexican Govern-
ment requested from the Manufacturers' Trust Company of New York a loan
of $7 million for purchasing Argentine grain which was provided after
^Memorandum by Division of Mexican Affairs, February 3, 1944, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
State Department Memorandum for Under Secretary Stettinius, May 24,
1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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Manufacturers 1 Trust had received word from the State Department that
the American Government had no objection to such a transaction.
The corn shortage was particularly acute in the state of Yucatan
where 5,000 tons were urgently needed each month from May through November.
Yucata'n was anxious to receive corn through the port of New Orleans, and
Ambassador Messersmith urged the State Department to intervene on Mexico's
behalf by requesting appropriate governmental agencies to issue export
permits for corn already acquired in the United States. He advised Hull
that Mexico had obtained, with funds borrowed in the United States,
100,000 tons of Argentine corn, and he requested the Secretary's assis-
42
tance in arranging transportation for the grain from Argentina to Mexico.
State Department officials were opposed to moving the grain in Argentine
bottoms since they felt that if Argentine ships entered Mexican ports
they would, without the knowledge of the Mexican Government, return to
their country loaded with zinc, arsenic, pig iron and other strategic
materials. •*
Ambassador Castillo Na'jera called on Under Secretary of State
Stettinius in late May, 1944, to impress on him the seriousness of the
corn shortage in Mexico. He informed Stettinius that food riots were
occurring, and that certain totalitarian groups were calling for the
immediate return of all Mexican laborers in the United States if more
American corn were not made available. Castillo Najera complained that
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between State Department
(Bonsai) and Manufacturers' Trust Company (Johnson), April 3, 1944,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
A2George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, May 6, 1944, State Depart-
ment Records, NA, RG59.




the War Food Administration was exerting an absolute control over the
corn market by compelling producers to sell their corn to certain
Commodity Credit Corporation-approved industrial firms which were using the
corn to manufacture starch and glucose. The Mexican Ambassador reiterated
the seriousness of the situation in his country where corn was urgently
needed for human consumption, and he requested that firms representing
Mexico, such as W. C. Fox and Company, be added to the Commodity Credit
List, and that the War Food Administration supply corn directly to
44
Nacional Reguladora y Distribuidora.
State Department officials informed Stettinius that the War Food
Administration had severely restricted the corn supply at the insistence
of the Army and the War Production Board. In the opinion of these
officials only a request from the highest authority would induce the
War Food Administration to release corn for shipment to Mexico. Repre-
sentations were made to the WFA which agreed to make available for
immediate delivery to Yucatan 4,000 tons of corn from the 125 county
"controlled area.'"^
Two days after his meeting with Castillo Najera, Under Secretary
Stettinius informed the Ambassador of the 4,000 tons of corn being sent
to Yucatan. He also advised the Mexican diplomat that arrangements had
been made to transport 12,000 tons of corn in early July from Argentina
to Mexico in United States vessels. Later in July four additional
American ships would carry about 30,000 tons of Argentine corn to Mexico.
Shipping requirements beyond July were very indefinite, Stettinius
Memorandum of Conversation, E. R. Stettinius and Francisco
Castillo Najera, May 23, 1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
5State Department Memorandum for Under Secretary Stettinius, May 24,
1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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continued, but the State Department hoped that 125,000 tons of corn could
be carried from Argentina before the October harvest in Mexico.
Ambassador Messersmith received a report in late May, 1944, from
Yucatan Governor Ernesto Novelo Torres stating that henequen workers
were abandoning their plantations and migrating to the cities in search of
food. Messersmith reminded the State Department that Yucatan was America's
primary if not sole supplier of henequen which was used in making rope and
binder twine, and that the Defense Supply Corporation had entered into a
contract with Yucatan's henequen producers for the purchase of their
entire exportable output. The Ambassador warned that henequen production
had recently fallen due to the worker migration, and he predicted further
severe production losses, which would seriously affect the war effort,
if the labor exodus was not halted by supplying more corn for Yucatan.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1944 the United States made three or
four small corn shipments to Yucatan of about 4,000 tons each in order
to relieve the food situation there and encourage henequen workers to
remain on the plantations.
In early June Agricultural Minister Gomez informed Ambassador
Messersmith that his country's 1944 corn crop would be larger than
originally anticipated if rainfall was well distributed throughout the
remainder of the growing season, and it was his considered opinion that
Mexico could provide for her own corn needs after mid-November. However,
Gomez stated that an agricultural labor shortage had developed, making it
46
Acting Secretary of State Stettinius to Ambassador Castillo
Najera, May 25, 1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
7George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, May 30, 1944, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
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necessary to employ Mexican army units to harvest the corn.^ This, of
course, gave further ammunition to those opposed to President Camacho's
policy of sending laborers to the United States.
Throughout 1944 both President Roosevelt and Secretary of State
Hull kept themselves well informed on the food shortage experienced in
Mexico. In July, Hull provided the President with an overall summary
of the Mexican food situation as it then existed. According to the
Secretary, scarcities of corn, wheat, lard and sugar had constituted the
principal deficits. He reported that with respect to wheat the United
States would make available at least 315,000 tons during the current
year. In addition more than 54,000 tons would come from Australia, with
a supplemental shipment from that country of about 25,000 tons available
if needed. Mexico had bought some wheat in Argentina, but it was doubt-
ful that ships could be arranged to transport it to Mexico. The Secretary
considered that the wheat shortage no longer presented a major problem
to President Camacho's Government.
"
Hull reported that the United States alone had met Mexico's lard
deficit by delivering in the first half of 1944 almost as much lard as
Mexico indicated she would need for the entire year, and more was still
available in this country if needed. As for sugar, Mexico had stated
she would have to import 70,000 tons during the current year. The
Secretary of State informed Roosevelt that Cuba and Peru had supplied a
total of about 30,000 tons already, and it was generally felt that the
United States and the two countries mentioned above would be in a position
48George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, June 12, 1944, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
^9Cordell Hull to Franklin D. Roosevelt, July 3, 1944, Secretary's
File-Mexico 1943-44, Roosevelt Library.
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to make additional shipments of sugar to Mexico when the size of their
1944 harvests became known.
By the summer of 1944 corn was the only staple whose scarcity still
confronted the Mexican Government with a serious problem. The United
States was making small shipments of corn to Mexico, particularly to the
state of Yucatan, and Mexico had made additional purchases of corn in
Argentina, raising her total amount in storage in that country to
about 168,000 tons. Hull notified Roosevelt that arrangements had been
made to ship about 130,000 tons of corn from Argentina to Mexico in United
States bottoms, and he stated his belief that more American corn would
be delivered to Mexico.
The program for transporting Argentine corn to Mexico originally
made provision for fourteen shipments in United States vessels to pro-
vide corn during the critical period from early July to the beginning
of November when Mexico's crop would begin to be harvested. Two ships
made deliveries in July while three more were planned for August. Due
to more pressing requirements the three ships scheduled for August were
set back until September, and a Government order prohibiting United
States flagships from touching Argentine ports after October 1, 1944,
prevented further corn shipments from Argentina in American vessels
52
after that date. Further shipping complications necessitated the
cancellation of the vessels scheduled for September, so that only two
United States ships actually made the trip from Argentina to Mexico
50Cordell Hull to Franklin D. Roosevelt, July 3, 1944, Secretary's
File-Mexico 1943-44, Roosevelt Library.
Ibid .
52
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delivering a total of only 13,832 tons of corn.
Quite unexpectedly, Finance Minister Suivez notified the American
Embassy on September 22, 1944, that due to a much larger 1944 crop than
had been anticipated, which caused speculators to release corn they had
been hoarding, Mexico did not desire to import any more corn, and he
requested assistance from the United States in disposing of about 145,300
tons of corn still stored in Argentina. Suarez suggested that either
the United States purchase the Argentine corn from Mexico or transport
it, before spoilage occurred, to Mexico where it would be used first,
with the new crop being stored. The Finance Minister was told that the
American corn crop was also plentiful, and therefore, the United States
was not interested in buying the Argentine corn. 3 Moreover, the American
ban against its ships calling in Argentine ports precluded the United
States from transporting the corn to Mexico.
The American Embassy and the State Department were quite surprised
at the decision made by the Mexican Government to cease importing corn.
Two weeks prior to the announcement by Suarez, Ambassador Messersmith
wrote a very strong letter to the State Department recommending that
no effort be spared in locating ships to transport corn to Mexico.
State Department officials were particularly embarrassed since up until
the time of the Mexican notification they had been pressuring Government
agencies in Washington to deliver more corn to Mexico. The day prior to
the announcement of the Mexican Government's decision, members of its
Embassy staff had called at the State Department to request the release
53United States Embassy in Mexico to Division of Mexican Affairs,
September 22, 1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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of more corn for their country.
As a result of the Mexican announcement the State Department informed
Ambassador Messersmith that it had ceased all attempts to locate and
transport corn to Mexico. In reply to a second appeal from Minister
Suarez, the United States again replied that it was unable to purchase
or ship the Mexican corn in Argentina. By October the shortage had ended,
and thereafter Mexico was able to provide its people with food either
imported through normal channels or produced domestically.
Table 8-2 shows total Mexican imports from the United States of
those staples in particularly scarce supply during the war. Shipments
in 1944 of wheat from Australia amounting to 63,066 tons, and corn from
Argentina totaling 13,832 tons which were carried in American ships are
not included in these figures. With the exception of 38,489 tons of
Canadian wheat sent to Mexico by rail in 1945, 6,574 tons of Argentine
corn received in the same year and the items listed above which were
transported from Australia and Argentina in American ships, the data
contained in Table 8-2 pertaining to wheat, corn and wheat flour repre-
sents, by and large, Mexico's entire importation of these commodities
during the war years. It will be noted that 1944 was the peak year for
most items included in the Table.
United States Embassy in Mexico to Division of Mexican Affairs,




MEXICAN IMPORTS OF SELECTED COMMODITIES FROM THE UNITED STATES
55
1941-1945
(All Figures in Tons)
CO>ClODITY 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
Corn 7 199 29,788 144,949 41,389 9,233
Wheat 121,635 144,317 287,094 368,098 273,231 259,649
Wheat Flour 95 96 116 54,309 11,464 42,515
Lard 8,282 6,451 6,395 25,841 5,747 8,084
Sugar 3,753 22 12 3,141 554 1,984
Throughout the duration of the food emergency in Mexico, Ambassador
Messersmith in his reports to the State Department continually stressed
that the delivery of grain and other foodstuffs from America was the
best way to demonstrate support for President Camacho and Foreign Minis-
ter Padilla, and insure the defeat of those advocating an end to the
policy of close collaboration with the United States. During the darkest
days of the food shortage certain pro-Axis elements within the Mexican
society attempted to discredit the United States and the Mexican Govern-
ment's policy of cooperation with its American neighbor by claiming that
the scarcity of food was caused by the United States buying large
quantities of Mexican staples at very high prices to send to its troops
abroad. To hungry and uninformed people this allegation sounded plausible,
causing the frequent demand for the recall of Mexican laborers from the
United States.
Several of Mexico's leading newspapers attempted to counteract the
anti-American attitude cultivated by Fascist sympathizers in the larger




cities during the spring and summer of 1944. A news article from MaTfana
,
a paper usually not friendly towards the United States, stated: "The
United States not only is not taking away from us our articles of prime
necessity but we, in exchange for the indisputable favor of sending
laborers to them, are receiving from them the most indispensable products
for our own subsistence." After listing the food items provided by the
United States, the writer noted that American ships were transporting
grain to Mexico from Argentina and Australia "to the grave prejudice of
these ships' war effort." In the opinion of La Prensa
, one of Mexico's
most respected dailies, "without the shipments from the United States of
corn, wheat and lard, articles which are indispensible for Mexican diet,
the situation of our people, which today is distressing, would be tragic."
There can be little doubt that the United States performed a vital
function in supplying large amounts of food to Mexico, particularly
during the most severe shortages in 1944. Without this assistance the
stability of the Camacho Administration and its policy of close colla-
boration with the American Government, as manifested by the strategic •
materials production program and the migratory worker program, would have
been genuinely endangered. In early 1945 while addressing critics of
Mexican cooperation with the United States in the war effort, Foreign
Minister Padilla spoke of American assistance during his country's food
emergency. "This [criticism] was happening," Padilla pointed out, "at
the very moment when, only to speak of 1944, we were obtaining from the
United States what that nation urgently needed for its soldiers at the
front.... We may state in these grave moments of human history," he
56Maflana
, July 1, 1944.
57 La Prensa, May 19, 1944.
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concluded, "that without the collaboration of this friendly nation—the
United States—which was pursued in an efficient and cordial manner, the
„58
Mexican people would have experienced truly critical moments.




When the great majority of railroads in Mexico were expropriated
by President Lazaro Cardenas on June 23, 1937, the railways' properties
came under the control of the Federal Government which directly admin-
istered them until April, 1938. At that time Cardenas signed a law
turning over the administration of the National Lines to the workers
themselves under whose direction it remained until December 31, 1940,
when Avila Camacho succeeded in having legislation enacted which placed
the control in an Administrative Council consisting of seven members,
four of which were nominated by the Chief Executive and the remaining
three by the Railway Workers Union.
During these changes in the management of the Mexican railroads
their efficiency, reliability and safety dropped to alarmingly low
levels. An editorial in one of Mexico's leading newspapers stated that
the expropriation of the railways had given Governments and individuals
"the opportunity to lower the standards of what had been, and should
continue to be, a commercial enterprise...." Since the nationalization
of the railroads, the writer continued, "politics, prerequisites,
favoritism, red-tape, infiltration and, above all, disorder in the labor
2
administration" have precluded efficient operations.
In early 1942, Major Howard G. Hill, a member of the United States
1Dorothy M. Tercero, "Rehabilitation of the National Railways of










Array Corps of Engineers, was in Mexico in connection with an exchange of
locomotives between the Mexican National Lines and the War Department,
and while there he made a cursory inspection of that country's railroads
which showed that freight cars were badly defective, track was poorly
maintained and, in general, inefficiency reigned. In Hill's opinion
Mexico's railway network would collapse if a wartime load were thrust
upon it, and he considered it quite likely the United States would find
it necessary to assist in a rehabilitation project if large quantities
of strategic materials were required from Mexico for defense manufactur-
ing. 3
Shortly after Hill's report was received in Washington, Under Secre-
tary of State Sumner Welles and Mexican Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla,
who was in the United States for discussions with Government officials,
announced that an immediate survey of the National Lines was desirable
to determine the material and technical assistance required from the United
States to enable the railroads to carry the ever-increasing supply of
Mexican minerals and other critical materials to the American border.
It was agreed that the United States would send a railway specialist to
Mexico to conduct the survey jointly with an expert appointed by the
Camacho Government.
Since he was somewhat familiar with the railway situation in Mexico,
the recently promoted Lieutenant Colonel Hill was designated, under a
special assignment to the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American
Affairs (CIAA) , as the American member of the inspection team. His
3Report by Major Howard G. Hill, "Conditions of National Railways
of Mexico," March 6, 1942, Department of State Records, National Archives,
Record Group 59. Hereafter referred to as State Department Records,
NA, RG59.
The New York Times, news article by Bertram D. Hulen, April 8, 1942.
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arrival in Mexico City on April 6, 1942, marked the beginning of the
United States Railway Mission to Mexico which functioned under the
direction of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs until June, 1946.
As a result of his survey, Hill concluded that the condition of both
the motive power and rolling stock was far below operating standards
due to inadequate maintenance, scarcity of material, and to a large
extent, "carelessness, lack of responsibility and general failure to
follow good railway operating and maintenance practices. 1 He urged
that the corrective recommendations contained in his report be carried
out before the situation deteriorated further.
Ambassador Messersmith was not satisfied with the speed with which
the Washington bureaucracy reacted to Hill's report. On July 10, 1942,
in a letter to President Roosevelt he urged that American assistance be
given Mexico in her attempt to improve the efficiency of the National
Lines. In the Ambassador's opinion the entire United States program of
economic and political cooperation with Mexico was dependent on rail
transportation. He warned Roosevelt that if Mexico's rail system broke
down, her economy and her production of strategic materials would suffer
drastically. The entire issue, Messersmith explained, rested on the
ability of the Mexican Government to insure better management and operation
of the railroads coupled with the willingness of the United States to
provide the necessary locomotive power, freight cars, heavier rail,
maintenance material and repair parts to keep the network operating.
In September, the American Ambassador wrote to Secretary of State
Report by Lieutenant Colonel Hill on Mexican Railways, April 15,
1942, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
George S. Messersmith to Franklin D. Roosevelt, July 10, 1942,
Hull Papers, Container 50, Library of Congress.
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Hull that the rehabilitation of the Mexican railroads was, in his opinion,
more important to the United States than it was to Mexico. He said the
Mexican economy could not bear the cost of the equipment and maintenance
which was badly needed. Messersmith pointed out that the Mexican Govern-
ment could have provided for the repairs necessary to insure peacetime
operations, but the United States was asking the National Lines to trans-
port seven times more minerals and metals in 19A3 than it did in 1941.
Since this request involved operations far beyond those normally antic-
ipated, the Ambassador felt the American Government should bear a sub-
stantial share of the rehabilitation cost. Finally, Messersmith requested
that consideration be given to replacing Colonel Hill with someone who
had more experience in dealing with foreign governments.
Within a week Secretary Hull replied that the United States had
decided to assume a major portion of the financial burden involved in
the rehabilitation program. Hull said that a special allocation would
be secured to carry out the task since lend-lease funds could not be used
for this purpose. He also informed Messersmith that Oliver M. Stevens,
former executive officer of the Missouri Railroad and president of the
American Refrigerator Transit Company, had agreed to relieve Colonel
3
Hill as head of the Railroad Mission.
The functions of the United States Railway Mission were broadened
and formalized by an exchange of notes between Foreign Minister Padilla
and Ambassador Messersmith in Mexico City on November 18, 1942. In his
communication to the American diplomat, Padilla stated that Mexico's
7 George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, September 26, 1942, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
o
Cordell Hull to George S. Messersmith, October 2, 1942, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
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capacity to produce urgently needed strategic and critical materials was
much greater than her ability to ship these goods to the places where they
were exported or consumed. He said that the volume then carried by the
National Lines was far greater than the maximum burden it had ever been
expected to bear in peacetime. In the Foreign Minister's opinion "prompt
and effective action" was needed to carry out the rehabilitation needed
by the Mexican railroads to enable them to effectively handle the increased
load. In this task, he concluded, the cooperation of the Government and
industry of the United States was indispensable.
Ambassador Messersmith replied that his Government was in perfect
agreement with the ideas contained in Padilla's note and was eager to
embark on this added measure of collaboration with Mexico in the war
effort. The United States, Messersmith stated, did not consider it
proper to expect Mexico to single-handedly shoulder the weight of this
huge enterprise, necessitated in part by the large American demand for
defense materials. "
Under the terms of the exchange of notes the United States under-
took to: 1) assume the financial burden for all material and equipment
required for the rehabilitation of mutually agreed upon railroad lines,
2) purchase all rails and fastenings needed for this task which were
produced in Mexico, 3) provide without reimbursement the necessary
American technical assistance to complete the projects, 4) repair in the
United States, free of charge, locomotives and other mutually agreed
upon equipment belonging to the National Lines, and 5) bear the cost of
9
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the additional Mexican road gangs needed to put into operating conditions
the road-beds of the mutually agreed upon railroad lines.
Following consultation between Oliver Stevens and officials of the
Mexican National Lines, it was decided that four principal lines would
be restored in accordance with the November, 1942 executive agreement.
The designated lines included: 1) Laredo-Mexico City via Monterrey,
Saltillo and San Luis Potosi; 2) Torreon-Monterrey via Parado'n; 3)
Cordoba-Suchiate; and A) Chihuahua-Torreon. These lines were selected
to unite Nuevo Laredo on the Texas border with Suchiate on the frontier
with Guatemala, so as to provide a rail route with Central America, and
to facilitate the exportation to the United States via San Luis Potosi,
Torredn, Monterrey and Laredo of strategic minerals found in northern
12
Mexico.
Upon assuming the leadership of the Railway Mission to Mexico, Oliver
Stevens spent four months conducting a detailed inspection of the
country's rail system, the results of which he submitted to Nelson
Rockefeller, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. Contrary to the
opinion expressed by Colonel Hill in his report, Stevens stated that the
National Lines had an abundance of equipment, the problem was locating
it when it was needed. He said locomotives and freight cars were
available in greater numbers than could possibly be used; rail was
generally of good quality but had been neglected, a condition which could
be remedied; machine shops had been horribly neglected, but the tools
they contained were normally more abundant and of a finer quality than
1:L
U. S., Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No. 289,
"Rehabilitation of Certain Mexican National Railways," November 18, 1942,
(Washington, 1943), pp. 3-4.
12




those found in shops in the United States; and spare parts, with noted
exceptions, were more than adequate to carry out any conceivable repair
operation. The quantity of materials in stock was in Stevens' opinion
13
"staggering" and could not possibly be used in the next five years.
In spite of the vast quantities of equipment, Stevens reported that
the Mexican rail network was swiftly moving into a state of "paralysis
and collapse." In his judgment the real problem lay in the human element
where "gross inefficiency, ignorance, and indifferent management and
supervision," could be easily identified. He found the supervisors of
most shop and track work to be totally incompetent. "No lasting improve-
ment can come," Stevens concluded, "without the rehabilitation of the
habits, the methods and the practices of the personnel." He informed
Rockefeller that he would meet with the presidents of several American
railroads in an effort to obtain numerous skilled technicians and super-
visory personnel to come to Mexico to serve as instructors throughout
14
all branches of the Mexican railroads.
President Camacho was in complete agreement with Stevens 1 findings.
He considered the chaotic conditions on the National Lines were the
result of a lack of discipline, and misuse and waste of material by the
workers whom he accused of hindering the work of the United States Railway
Mission. 15
Ambassador Messersmith was also critical of the attitude taken by
the Railway Workers' Syndicate with respect to the Railroad Mission.
In his opinion this union which was one of the most powerful and important
13
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (Rockefeller) to Under




The New York Times, February 3, 1943.
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in Mexico had no desire to collaborate with Stevens or his associates
due to a fear the American technicians would discover that worker
inefficiency was responsible for the many defects on the railroads, which
according to the newspaper Ultimas Noticias had contributed to seventy-
seven accidents in a single day. In addition, the Ambassador charged,
the Syndicate's lack of cooperation stemmed from its fear the Railroad
Mission would cause several of its leaders to lose their jobs by exposing
the fact that the union payroll was larger than necessary. In spite of
their opposition, a measure of success was achieved by the Railroad
Mission which ultimately consisted of more than forty experienced
advisers who had been released by those American railroads that under-
stood the importance of a continuous flow of strategic materials to the
United States.
Although Ambassador Messersmith stated that agencies of the
United States Government were willing to spend as much as $100 million
on the rehabilitation of Mexican railroads, only $7.5 million was ini-
tially allotted for this purpose in May, 1943. Of this total $5 million
came from the President's emergency fund for national defense and $2.5
million was contributed by the CIAA from unused appropriations.
Throughout the remainder of 1943 the Mexican railroads, due in
part to the valuable assistance rendered by the American Railway Mission,
were able to carry an estimated 2.1 million tons of goods to the
United States as compared to 336,092 tons in 1941. There were several
Unpublished Memoirs of George S. Messersmith, Vol. 2, No. 15,
University of Delaware.
17 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, Special Assistant
to the Under Secretary of State (Collado) to the Secretary of State,
January 1, 1944, Vol. 7, p. 1235.

-261-
delays that a more organized and efficient system could have avoided,
but for the most part, the rail network under the watchful eyes of its
American advisers functioned adequately.
Oliver Stevens and his staff spent a significant portion of their
time training Mexican supervisory personel and studying in detail the
operations of the National Lines so as to make recommendations for
improvement. The other facet of the railroad assistance program consisted
in financing specific maintenance and rehabilitation projects. During
1943 the American Mission expended about $2.8 million in repairing and
1 8
maintaining the four designated Mexican lines. The most important
project, and one of the most expensive, consisted in re-ballasting and
re-laying with heavier rail the track between Mexico City and Laredo,
which was the principal artery for shipping strategic materials to the
United States. Locomotive repair shops which were crowded with unser-
viceable engines were reorganized under American supervision and work
hours increased. In spite of this effort many locomotives had to be
sent to the United States, where already overtaxed repair facilities
placed them in operating condition. The amount spent on physical
rehabilitation was much less than originally estimated due to the
efficiency of the United States personnel and the better than expected
material and equipment conditions encountered by the mission, while
expenditures for the many and varied educational and training programs
conducted by the American advisers were greater than anticipated.
By the end of 1943 the Office of the CIAA began to reconsider the
question of future American funding of rehabilitation projects on the
18
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Mexican railroads. Nelson Rockefeller was willing to continue outlays
for training programs and publications, and for any other projects
essential to the smooth movement of critical materials to the United
States, but he was in favor of cutting back on rehabilitation financing
since he felt the Mexican Government had not fulfilled all of its obli-
19gations under the November, 1942 exchange of notes.
Although not specifically stated in the executive agreement which
provided for American assistance in helping Mexico to solve her railroad
problems, the United States and the Camacho Administration had tacitly
agreed that the latter would work toward a revision of the existing
railway labor contracts which both Governments considered a prerequisite
to a smooth functioning system. In addition to preventing any action
being taken against those whose carelessness and inefficiency caused major
accidents, the union contracts precluded the effective use of railroad
personnel. Idle workers could not be transferred from one branch of the
system to another even when urgently needed; wrecking crews could not
lend assistance in another division even if the accident occurred only
a few feet on the other side of the division boundary; and necessary
repairs were often neglected because mechanics could not be shifted
20from one engine shop to another. In spite of efforts by the Mexican
Government the powerful Railway Workers ' Syndicate was successful in
opposing every attempt at meaningful reform of the labor contracts.
This failure on the part of President Camacho provoked charges by certain
American officials that Mexico had not completely carried out her
obligations as required by the railroad agreement.
19
Assistant Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (Douglas) to
George S. Messersmith, December 9, 1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
20
El Universal , October 18, 1943.

-263-
Oliver Stevens and George Messersmith did not share this view, and
in December, 1943, the former urged Nelson Rockefeller that he be per-
mitted to spend a maximum of $500,000 on Mexican rehabilitation projects
during the first quarter of 1944 with significant reductions during the
remaining quarters so that perhaps not more than $1 million would be
spent for this purpose during the entire year. In a letter to the CIAA,
Messersmith also urged that $500,000 be approved for the restoration
program. The Ambassador said he did not feel the Mexican Government had
failed to carry out the terms of the railway agreement, and he considered
continuation of the rehabilitation program was in America's best interest.
In his opinion the Mexican railroads would not have been able to continue
their wartime operations without the aid of the Railway Mission whose
budget for 1943 amounted to less than half of that originally estimated.
In conclusion Messersmith informed Rockefeller that he knew of no other
expenditure "made by our Government in any collaborative program with the
other American Republics, which has meant so much in the way of material
21
benefits" to the United States.
Based on Stevens' and Messersmith 's recommendations, the CIAA
allocated $500,000 for rehabilitation projects for the first quarter of
1944 and lesser amounts for each succeeding quarter. It was Rockefeller's
stated intention to cease all restoration financing by the end of 1944
to permit the Mission to concentrate solely on advisory and educational
programs. This allocation by the American Government of course had no
effect on Mexican expenditures for rehabilitation which in 1944 amounted
to $4 million.
Despite the efforts of the United States Railway Mission, Colonel
21George S. Messersmith to Nelson Rockefeller, December 15, 1943,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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J. M. Johnson, Interstate Commerce Commissioner and Director of the
Office of Defense Transportation, was not satisfied with the performance
of the Mexican National Lines, particularly with regard to what he con-
sidered to be an inordinate accumulation of American and Canadian-owned
freight cars in Mexico. Whether the number of foreign cars in Mexico at
any one time during the war was excessive was a point on which agreement
was never reached between Commissioner Johnson on one hand and Ambassador
Messersmith on the other.
Throughout the war a less than satisfactory situation existed with
regard to the movement of freight cars between the two countries as
embargoes and restrictions on freight movements were applied, lifted and
reapplied as the number of American-owned cars temporarily retained by
the Mexican rail network fluctuated. These American-applied controls
were devised, for the most part, so as to have little effect on the
movement of strategic materials to the United States and food supplies
to Mexico. In all fairness it must be stated that these restraints,
which produced more ill will than beneficial results, were employed due
to the dilatory operation of the National Lines of Mexico.
The first such restriction, applied by the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) in February, 1943, provided that freight cars could
enter Mexico from the United States only after receiving a special govern-
ment permit. It was placed in operation to cut down on the number of
American cars accumulated by Mexican railroads, but in reality it had
little effect since permits were easily acquired. On February 7 of the
following year, a more severe restraint was adopted, limiting the number




cars returned from Mexico during the preceding month. It was stipulated
by Commissioner Johnson that this new system would be managed in such a
way as to permit up to forty-five cars of grain to enter Mexico on a
23daily basis.
On learning of the second restriction applied by the ICC, Ambassador
Messersmith recommended to Secretary of State Hull "in the strongest and
most emphatic form" that all American controls restricting the movement
of freight cars into Mexico be immediately lifted for a ninety-day period.
Messersmith explained that the embargo which had already affected the
industrial structure and economic life of Mexico could produce an economic
disaster in a country whose very life depended so heavily on trade with
the United States. He said that the operation of some plants and mines
producing strategic materials had been hampered by a lack of required
American equipment and by a deficit in the number of freight cars needed
to carry their products to the border. The Mexican people, the Ambassador
reminded Hull, were relying almost exclusively at that time on food
shipments from the United States which would almost certainly be blamed
if unemployment or starvation resulted from the freight car restriction.
Messersmith told the Secretary that an embargo could not possibly
cure the problems existing on the Mexican railroads. In his opinion
only effective measures taken by the Mexican Government in cooperation
with the American Railroad Mission could produce the desired results.
22
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The only consequence of the embargo, the Ambassador related, was the
return of empty freight cars to the United States which violated good
railroad practice, and was done so that, under the provisions of the ICC
restriction, more cars could be received the following month. He said
that if the embargo were lifted he would immediately put pressure on the
Mexican Government to take effective action to control the number of
25foreign freight cars in the country.
Secretary Hull relayed the contents of Messersmith's letter to the
Interstate Commerce Commissioner who announced on February 16, 1944, that
the embargo was being suspended immediately, and would remain so indefinitely
provided an improvement in the car situation was noted within fifteen
days. Johnson pointed out that he had gone further than merely lifting
the restriction for ninety days as the Ambassador had requested and that
he would not reapply it as long as the car balance showed some amelio-
26
ration.
Almost coincidental with the suspension of the freight car control,
President Camacho appointed Andres Ortiz as General Manager of the
National Lines. Ortiz had been studying the operations of the Mexican
railroads for about four months, and on assuming his new position he
presented the President with recommendations for a reorganization of the
railway system. Ambassador Messersmith informed the State Department
that Ortiz would closely monitor the foreign car situation in Mexico, and
if it were necessary to reimpose any restraints Ortiz would so indicate.
Messersmith considered it far more satifactory if the initiative came
25 Foreipn Relations of the United States, 1944 , George S. Messersmith
to Cordell Hull, February 12, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1237-1239.
Voreir.n Relations o_f the United States , 1944 , Memorandum by Divi-
sion of Mexican Affairs (Carrigan) , February 16, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1239-1240.

-267-
from the Mexicans rather than from the ICC. '
President Camacho, using the extraordinary authority granted to him
during the war, issued a decree on March 9, 1944, which amended certain
provisions of the law of December 31, 1940, governing the administration
of the National Railways of Mexico. The proclamation described by the
Mexican National Chambers of Commerce as "another great success" of
Camacho' s Administration, gave the National Lines' General Manager the
power to abrogate those provisions of the workers' collective contracts
that had prevented complete rehabilitation of the network, and allowed
28
for reform in the administration of the nation's railroads.
The Mexican President's action abolished the former seven-member
Administrative Council and placed the entire responsibility for admin-
istration in the hands of the railway's General Manager who would be
assisted by an Advisory Board consisting of nine representatives. The
membership of the Advisory Board included the General Manager, who acted
as its chairman, one nominee each from the Departments of Treasury and
Public Credit, Communications and Public Works, Agriculture and Develop-
ment, and Labor and Social Welfare, the Confederation of National Chambers
of Commerce and Industry, and the Confederation of Industrial Associations
29
of Mexico, and two representatives from the Railway Workers Union.
Despite the make-up of the Board, all decisions on organization, manage-
ment, etc. rested with the General Manager and were final.
A project, not part of the Presidential decree, but closely related
27George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, February 26, 1944, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
28George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, March 28, 1944, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.




to the reform of the railroad system was also begun in early March, 1944.
A sixty-day program was initiated in the Monterrey railway division under
which all management functions in the division were assumed by members
of the American Railroad Mission, and all labor contracts were suspended,
making it possible for several work shifts to operate in round houses,
railway yards, depots and warehouses. Under the existing contracts
30
only one shift per day was permitted. The results were excellent as
trains moved out of Monterrey in record numbers, proving that the Mexican
railroad could be operated as efficiently as any other. Hopes that this
experiment would be extended to other areas were not realized due to
opposition from the workers' unions.
About two weeks after President Camacho's decree had been made
public, but before it had any chance to take effect, Colonel Johnson
notified the State Department that a steady deterioration in the foreign
car balance in Mexico had been noted since the embargo had been lifted.
He said that he was just about "driven to the wall," and were it not for
his high regard for Ambassador Messersmith and the State Department he
would have "clamped the embargo down on them ten days ago." The State
Department requested the Commissioner take no action to control the
movement of freight cars to Mexico, at least until the President's
proclamation had an opportunity to rectify the situation. Oliver Stevens
made a similar plea to the Chairman of the Association of American
Railroads (AAR)
.
Ambassador Messersmith could not understand Johnson's concern over
30
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the accumulation of American cars by the Mexican railroads. He reported
to the State Department that he had contacted several presidents of large
United States railroads who fully understood the reasons for the large
car buildup in Mexico and were not at all alarmed over its impact on
American rail operations. Messersmith notified Department officials that
everything possible was being done to return the cars quickly, and he
cautioned against any drastic action by the ICC or the AAR.
Commissioner Johnson wrote to Secretary Hull on March 21, 1944, to
assure him the ICC would cooperate with the State Department on the Mexi-
can railroad matter to the greatest extent permissible. However, he
informed the Secretary that freight cars were in great demand on American
railroads, making action mandatory on his part if the promised improve-
ment in the car balance did not occur. He said that the upper limit on
the number of freight cars in Mexico should be about 3,500, but the
33figure was then hovering around 5,000, and it threatened to go higher.
Hull replied that the Mexican Government was deeply appreciative of the
action taken by Johnson in lifting the embargo, and that the State
Department believed every assistance should be given President Camacho
in his attempt to reorganize his nation's railroads in accordance with the
recommendations of the American Railway Mission. The Secretary stated
that the Department hoped the ICC would refrain from imposing any
restriction on the flow of rail traffic to Mexico until the presidential
decree had a chance to operate.
32George S. Messersmith to Division of Mexican Affairs (McGurk)
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In late March, on learning the ICC was contemplating the reimposition
of the embargo, Andres Ortiz notified Foreign Minister Padilla of the
disastrous effects such action would have on domestic affairs in Mexico.
He said that the number of American cars temporarily retained in the
country had risen due to the large shipments of wheat arriving from
Australia which had to be delivered quickly from the coast to the centers
of consumption. If controls were applied, Ortiz warned, the movement of
critically needed food as well as shipments of strategic materials to
35
the United States would be restricted.
The Mexican Foreign Minister brought the contents of the memorandum
from Ortiz to the attention of Ambassador Messersmith who relayed to the
State Department the fears expressed by the General Manager of the
National Lines. Based on representations made in Mexico's behalf by the
Department and by the head of the United States Railroad Mission,
Commissioner Johnson notified Ortiz that he would postpone any restric-
tive action until the first of June. If by that date, Johnson warned, a
decrease had not been noted in the quantity of American cars held by the
National Lines, an embargo controlling the number of freight cars entering
Mexico would be applied.
By the middle of May the number of United States railroad cars in
Mexico had swelled to 8,615, making it obvious the improvement Commissioner
Johnson was looking for would not materialize. In a report to Ambassador
Messersmith, Oliver Stevens said Mexico was so lacking in serviceable
Memorandum, Andres Ortiz to Ezequiel Padilla, March 23, 1944,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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cars that she could not even distribute food throughout the country
without using cars belonging to American railroads. This was particularly
true during the critical period when Mexico was receiving wheat from
Australia and corn from Argentina. Stevens reported that of the 2,400
cars normally loaded in Mexico on an average day, less than 100 went to
the United States while the remainder, mainly of American ownership, were
used for internal traffic. He stated that Mexican officials were trying
to improve the situation, and that as long as serious efforts were made
to operate the railroads efficiently he would recommend patience and
assistance from the United States. Even if the accumulation reached




Colonel Johnson informed the State Department in early June, 1944,
that he had made every effort to help the Mexicans, and that he still
would lend assistance whenever possible, but that the number of American-
owned cars in Mexico had continued to rise, leaving him no alternative
other than the adoption of a control system on the movement of freight
from the United States. Since the former embargo had been lifted in
February the United States had lost 4,591 additional cars in Mexico. He
said he would be willing to apply the restriction in the least painful
manner possible, and that he would like the Mexicans to indicate their
o o
desires as to the application of the controls. On June 8, Mexican
officials sent a telegram to Johnson listing nine import categories in
the order of their desired freedom from the restraints.
37
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Without waiting for the Mexican telegram, the Office of Defense
Transportation (ODT) , on June 10, approved an embargo requiring that all
United States freight shipments for Mexico be covered by AAR permits.
In Ambassador Messersmith's opinion the ODT announcement that the
restrictions were applied at the request of Mexican officials was
"gratuitous and somewhat discourteous" since the Mexican Government had
no idea as to the nature of the controls prior to their publication, and
the embargo was formulated without knowledge of the contents of the
39
Mexican telegram despite the fact the ODT knew it had been sent.
Under the terras of the embargo, materials to be used by the National
Lines and aviation gasoline were exempted from the controls. Grain
deliveries were subject to permits, but as a matter of practice permits
were not denied for corn, wheat or flour shipments. Permits were usually
issued in limited numbers in an attempt to force Mexico to return more
cars than were delivered. Ambassador Messersmith reported Mexican
officials were not disturbed as much by the embargo as they were by the
fact that the AAR exercised exclusive control over all rail traffic to
Mexico by determining what priorities were given to each freight shipment.
Messersmith recommended that all restrictions be abolished and that
5,500-6,000 be substituted for 4,000-4,500 as the normal limits for
40Mexican accumulation of American cars.
Colonel Johnson, in his capacity as Director of the ODT, notified
Secretary of State Hull on June 23, 1944, that in the short time the new
restrictions had been in effect the car situation had continued to
George S. Messersmith to Division of Mexican Affairs, (McGurk)
June 14, 1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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deteriorate. He said it would be necessary to further reduce the number
of permits granted for freight shipments to Mexico due to the tremendous
need for cars in the United States.
One week later Johnson again wrote to Secretary Hull about the
accumulation of American cars by Mexican railroads. He reported that
since June 10, the effective date of the current embargo, 289 additional
cars had been lost in Mexico. According to Johnson, not only were the
Mexicans retaining cars in their country, but they were unnecessarily
tying them up at the border. The previous day, he stated, 600 cars
destined for Mexico were at Laredo, of which number 300 were issued
permits and only 80 moved by the National Lines which could furnish only
two engines. On the same day there were tons of American grain lying on
the ground along the Santa Fe Railroad due to a lack of freight cars.
"If the farmers in the Southwest," Johnson warned, "were appraised of the
Mexican car situation and the liberality we have extended, we would have
a justified recurrence of senatorial investigation."
Due to the further restriction on the number of permits issued by
the AAR for freight deliveries to Mexico, Ambassador Messersmith notified
the State Department that he had advised General Manager Ortiz that the
best interest of his country would be served by sending back to the
United States at least two trains of empty cars each day until the car
balance showed some improvement. In the Ambassador's opinion this was
/ 9
the only way to "satisfy Colonel Johnson." Messersmith felt that
Johnson had little idea of how "disruptive and ill considered" his actions
^Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, Director of the
Office of Defense Transportation (Johnson) to Secretary of State, June 30,
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were and how little they appeared to make allowance for "all the factors
which we have to keep in mind. -*
Based on Messersmith's recommendation, division superintendents
along the Mexican railroads were instructed to return to the border all
empty American freight cars which would not be loaded within twenty-four
hours. This was a very uneconomical practice, not only because materials
were waiting to be sent to the United States which could not be loaded
within the allotted time, but also because locomotive power needed to
distribute food throughout the country and to export vital commodities
to the United States was being used to haul empty cars.
The Ambassador firmly believed that Commissioner Johnson simply had
no idea of the tremendous increase in the number of cars needed by the
National Lines since the beginning of the war. This need was accentuated
by the disappearance of most water-borne commerce between Mexico and the
United States which in normal times accounted for a large percentage of
the trade between the two countries. In addition, the delivery of
strategic materials to the border, the receipt of grain from Australia
and Argentina, and the delivery of thousands of Mexican workers to the
United States all contributed significantly to the requirement for addi-
tional cars in Mexico. Messersmith pointed out that Mexico had
attempted to purchase additional locomotives and freight cars in the United
States to permit her railroads to transport the loads they had to carry,
and which the American Government wished them to carry, but due to the
war all orders for the production of railroad equipment could not be
met. Table 9-1 shows the number of engines and cars sold by the United
^George S. Messersmith to Secretary of State, July 7, 1944, State




States to Mexico during the early and mid-forties. Most of the equipment
delivered in 1945 and 1946 was purchased as a result of a $15 million
loan made by the Export-Import Bank to the National Lines in April, 1945.
TABLE 9-1
UNITED STATES LOCOMOTIVE AND FREIGHT CAR SALES TO MEXICO45
1941-1946
ITEM 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
Freight cars 148 323 653 775 1601 1387
Locomotives 20 13 21 13 41 35
Despite the pleas of Ambassador Messersmith, Colonel Johnson felt
compelled to place in effect further restrictions during the early part
of July. On the eighth he announced efforts would be made to limit the
number of cars entering Mexico each day to 110 or half of the number
returned, whichever was smaller. Three days later he notified Secre-
tary Hull that "a hard and fast embargo" had temporarily been adopted
against the loading of any freight cars for Mexico due to the large
accumulation of American cars by the National Lines . Johnson said that
as soon as the situation improved grain and other priority shipments to
Mexico would be resumed. '
By the end of July the practice of returning large numbers of empty
cars produced a reduction in the number of American cars in Mexico and
caused Commissioner Johnson to lift the embargo against the loading of
^Foreign Commerce of Mexico 1941-1948 , (Washington: Pan American
Union, 1950).
Memorandum by Office of American Republic Affairs (Duggan) , July 8,
1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
,7
Colonel J. M. Johnson to Cordell Hull, July 11, 1944, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
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freight for Mexico. During the month of July the Mexican railroads
delivered 4,032 freight cars to the United States, 2,314 of which were
empty, and reduced its holding of American cars by 1,457.
Based on this reduction the State Department again petitioned the
ODT and the AAR for the removal of all controls governing the movement
of freight between Mexico and the United States. Both Colonel Johnson
and C. H. Buford, Vice-President of the AAR, replied that the lifting of
the restrictions would result in the movement of all classes of export
material to the border, causing a great deal of congestion on the Mexican
railway system just as it did when the embargo had been suspended the
previous February. They said, however, that they would permit a gradual
reduction in the ratio of cars returned by Mexico to cars delivered by
the United States. This ratio had been 1.72 during the month of July,
and both officials agreed to allow this figure to decrease as efficiency
49 /increased on the National Lines. Johnson recommended that Andres
Ortiz come to Washington to discuss the car accumulation problem and
possible actions which might be taken to solve the impasse.
Ortiz felt that the seriousness of the railway situation made his
absence from Mexico undesirable; therefore, he sent Benjamin Mendez,
Traffic Manager of the Mexican National Lines, and Raul Compos, the
Assistant Traffic Manager, to confer with Colonel Johnson and other
interested American officials. A meeting was held on August 21, 1944,
between the two Mexicans, Johnson and representatives of the Foreign
Economic Administration (FEA) , the AAR, ICC, CIAA and the State Department
George S. Messersmith to Division of Mexican Affairs, (McGurk)
August 2, 1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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Mendez stated that the number of American cars accumulated on
Mexico's railroads caused a great deal of embarrassment to the National
Lines which was making every effort to return these cars to the United
States. He said this excessive number of cars was actually impeding the
efficiency of the Mexican rail system, and that it was hoped once they
were returned the interchange of cars between the two countries could be
on an equal basis.
Johnson replied that there were about 8,500 American freight cars
in Mexico, a figure which Mendez did not dispute, x^hich was some 3,000
above the recommended accumulation. He said that if the war in Europe
were ended at an early date, a reversal in rail movement patterns toward
the Pacific Coast would be experienced which would require every avail-
able freight car to effectuate.
American officials had decided prior to the arrival of the two
Mexican representatives that it would be necessary to retain the permit
system, at least until the number of cars in Mexico reached an acceptable
level. Johnson and Mendez agreed at the meeting, however, that Mexico
rather than the AAR should stipulate which materials destined for Mexico
should be granted priority loading permits. For this purpose it was
decided that Raul Campos would remain in Washington to advise the AAR of
Mexico's wishes concerning license priorities and loading permits.
Mendez also agreed that the National Lines would make every effort to
reduce Mexico's holding of American freight cars to 6,000 by December 1,
Foreign Relations of the United States , 1944 , Memorandum by Divi-





The Mexican representatives were very optimistic this deadline could
be met since General Manager Ortiz had recently announced that the
National Lines would limit its receipt of American cars to about 100 per
day, the maximum number the system could move with efficiency and dis-
patch. If this order were followed Mexico would have to return 130 cars
daily to decrease her holding of United States freight cars to 6,000 by
December 1. To assist in the rapid movement of cars to the border,
Mexican officials raised the demurrage charge on cars held over forty-
eight hours from 30 pesos to 100 pesos per day. J
For the first few weeks after the meeting between Johnson and Mendez,
it appeared that Mexico would lower her car accumulation to the agreed
number by December 1, but severe rain and flooding in September caused a
great deal of track damage in northern Mexico which interfered with rail
movement for almost a month. The situation was further aggravated by a
completely unnecessary worker strike.
Colonel Johnson notified the State Department in late November, 1944,
that in the preceeding few days there had been a net loss of about 300
cars in Mexico which would prevent the National Lines from reaching its
goal by the beginning of December. Johnson interpreted this failure as
signifying that the Mexicans were not seriously concerned over the car
situation, and he said some action would have to be taken to bring about
the desired car balance. He pointed out that much more leniency had
been exhibited towards Mexico than was normally shown to American railroads
32
Forei",n Relations of the United States , 1944, Memorandum by Divi-
sion of Mexican Affairs (MacLean) , August 21, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1263-1265.
CI
Foreign Relations of the United States , 1944 , Memorandum by
Division of Mexican Affairs (MacLean), August 24, 1944, Vol. 7, p. 1266.
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which were expected to strictly comply with regulatory orders. ^
Two days before the December 1 deadline, Andre's Ortiz requested that
Colonel Johnson take no drastic action to further regulate rail traffic
between the United States and Mexico. Ortiz assured Johnson that car
holdings would be reduced to 6,000 by the end of the year if the latter
would refrain from imposing additional restraints.
Ambassador Messersmith also requested that no immediate action be
taken by the ODT. He said that track damages caused by the September
storms had been repaired by the Mexicans in an extraordinary performance
which would have been impossible only a few years ago. Messersmith urged
the State Department to ask Johnson to abstain from further controls,
which in the Ambassador's opinion would be "unjustified under the cir-
cumstances and would create very unhappy results."
The new Chief of the American Railroad Mission, E. V. Vandercook,
who had replaced Oliver Stevens on September 1, 1944, argued that too
much time had been wasted worrying about the foreign car situation in
Mexico, which, as far as United States railroads were concerned, was
"minor to the point of insignificance." Vandercook pointed out that the
National Lines would exceed its 6,000 car goal by about 1,000, or about
one-tenth of one percent of the total number of cars in the United States
at that time. These same 1,000 cars, he said, represented about five
percent of Mexico's entire total, making them a very important factor on
54Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944 , Division of Mexican
Affairs (Carrigan) , to George S. Messersmith, November 25, 1944, Vol. 7,
pp. 1269-1270.
"^Andre's Ortiz to Colonel J. Monroe Johnson, November 29, 1944,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
56Fo reir.n Re lations of the United .S_tatPg_ t 1944 , George S. Messersmith
to Secretary of State, November 29, 1944, Vol. 7, p. 1271.
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that country's railroads.-* 7
The FEA was also opposed to further pressure being put on the Mexican
rail network to reduce its American car holdings. FEA officials were
disturbed that due to continued requests from Colonel Johnson to expedite
the return of foreign cars, the Mexican railroads were bypassing strategic
materials destined for the United States in favor of moving empty cars to
the border. They reported that as of December 1 there were 1,077 50-ton
carloads of strategic materials stockpiled in Mexico awaiting delivery to
the United States, and they requested that Mexico be urged to discontinue
the practice of returning empty cars even if this resulted in a larger
58
accumulation of American cars in Mexico.
Based on the request from Ortiz and the recommendations of other
Federal agencies, the ODT decided to grant the National Lines an addi-
tional month to reach the 6,000 car limit. On December 27 Colonel Johnson
informed the AAR that approximately 6,400 American and Canadian-owned
freight cars, and 1,100 tanker and refrigerator cars were held by Mexican
railroads. Having made this differentiation, Johnson said that the limit
on accumulation of freight cars would be set at 5,000. Since it was
obvious this figure would not be reached by the end of the month Johnson
directed the AAR to impose a further control, to be effective January 1,
1945, which would limit the number of freight cars entering Mexico in any
given month to 80 percent of the number returned during the previous
month. It was further stipulated that if the National Lines was able to
reduce its holdings of foreign freight cars by 500 in any month, the 80
Chief, U. S. Railway Mission (Vandercook) to George S. Messersmith,
December 5, 1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
58
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1^44 , Foreign Economic
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percent allowance would be increased by 5 percent. This procedure would
be followed until the freight car accumulation had been reduced to 5,000
after which the interchange would be on a 100 percent basis. ^
Throughout 1944 when the Mexican railroads were struggling to decrease
the number of foreign cars in their possession, the United States Railway
Mission continued its rehabilitation work, although to a lesser degree
than in the previous year, and intensified its educational efforts under
the terms of the November, 1942 exchange of notes. Financial and
technical assistance supplied by the Mission in 1944 resulted in recondi-
tioning of locomotives, repairing of miles of track and the removal of
dangerous grades, and the equipping of repair shops with the few critical
materials they had previously lacked. In addition to the training carried
out by American technicians in Mexico, a proposal by the CIAA, readily
accepted by the National Lines, resulted in seventy Mexican workers
going to the United States in April, 1944, for six months of instruction
which could best be given in the modern repair shops of the American
railroads. It was hoped that ultimately about one thousand Mexicans would
participate in this program, and that following this training these men
would return to Mexico to impart their recently acquired knowledge to their
fellow workers.
By the end of July both Ambassador Messersmith and Nelson Rockefeller
had decided that effective December 31, 1944, the United States should
not finance further rehabilitation work on the Mexican railroads. Their
5 Foreign Relations of the United States , 1944 , Office of Defense
Transportation (Johnson) , to American Association of Railroads (Kendall)
,
December 27, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1274-1275.
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decision was based on the material condition of the rail system which was
far better than it had been when the American mission arrived, and on the
assumption that United States purchases of strategic materials would
begin to decrease by the end of the year.
In a memorandum to Foreign Minister Padilla, dated September 21,
1944, Messersmith noted that in the past two years the rehabilitation of
major sections of Mexico's rail system had been carried out by the
National Lines with the collaboration of the United States Railway Mission,
which had also provided a great deal of technical assistance and, after
conducting a survey of the entire network, made several recommendations
for improvements in rail service. The Ambassador stated that the condi-
tions existing when the United States undertook the rehabilitation burden
were no longer present, and noted that the Mexican railroads were now able
to carry normal traffic as well as a wartime load. He therefore proposed
that effective December 31, 1944, the requirement for the American Govern-
ment to assist in rehabilitation work be eliminated, leaving only
technical assistance programs within the Railway Mission's competence.
However, he assured Padilla that on specific rehabilitation projects
already approved by the United States, assistance would continue until the
work was completed. •*
The Foreign Minister replied that his Government was in agreement
with Messersmith's proposal and hoped that all rehabilitation projects
previously approved would be expeditiously completed. By the end of
the year only two restoration commitments were outstanding, one on the
61George S. Messersmith to Ezequiel Padilla, September 21, 1944,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
62Ezquiel Padilla to George S. Messersmith, December 13, 1944,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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Mexico-Queretaro Division amounting to $100,000 and another on the
Southeast Division which totaled $500,000. The United States provided
the funds in 1945 and 1946 to complete this work, but thereafter the
American Railway Mission confined its activities to educational and techni-
cal assistance programs.
The restriction on freight car movement from the United States to
Mexico became effective on January 1, 1945, as directed by Colonel Johnson.
During the month of January the National Lines received 2,311 cars from
the United States and returned 2,522 for a net reduction of 211. By the
beginning of February the AAR had received permit requests for 2,600 cars
for the current month, but under the 80 percent rule 2,017 was the maximum
number that could enter Mexico. Actually only 1,727 freight cars,
many of them carrying grain, crossed the border into Mexico during the
month of February, causing a diminution in normal trade between the two
countries.
In mid-February, the United States Railway Mission reported that
there existed a great need in Mexico for freight cars to distribute food
and other urgently needed supplies throughout the country, and that if
the restrictive measures on the movement of cars continued, it was quite
likely the National Lines would decide to use all available cars for
internal traffic to the detriment of export business. A survey conducted
by the Mission showed that Mexico needed 7,208 foreign cars to handle
all her transportation requirements."
c o
George S. Messersmith to Ezequiel Padilla, December 29, 1944,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
64Division of Mexican Affairs (Carrigan) , to George S. Messersmith,
February 6, 1945, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
Report of United States Railway Mission, February 14, 1945, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
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February was the only month in which the 80 percent rule was
effectively applied. In each successive month until its suspension in
July, 1945, some reason, usually the importation of critically needed
grain or material for an important industrial project, was found to
temporarily suspend its operation. Under this restriction only 1,535
freight cars should have been permitted to enter Mexico in March, but
figures show that 3,026 actually crossed the border and that during the
month American railroads showed a net loss of 551 cars. 66 This loss so
infuriated Colonel Johnson that he began to consider a complete eight day
embargo on the delivery of cars to Mexico.
On learning of the plan contemplated by Colonel Johnson, Ambassador
Messersmith informed the State Department that such action would be
extremely ill-advised and would have disastrous effects on the Mexican
economy. He complained that very little attention seemed to have been
given to the Railway Mission's report which indicated that slightly more
than 7,000 American freight cars were needed in Mexico to meet existing
requirements. At Messersmith 's urging State Department officials warned
the ODT that the embargo they were considering, besides disturbing the
delicate Mexican economy, could seriously affect United States-Mexican
relations and influence Mexico's attitude during the approaching San
Francisco meeting of the United Nations. After listening to the State
Department's argument, Colonel Johnson decided against the eight day
embargo. '
By the beginning of July, 1945, the number of American and Canadian-
66Foreign Economic Administration to George S. Messersmith, April 5,
1945, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
George S. Messersmith to Division of Mexican Affairs (Carrigan)
,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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ovned freight cars in Mexico had decreased to 5,344, which prompted the
ODT to suspend the 80 percent rule and permit interchange on a one-for-
one basis. The Chief of the United States Railway Mission notified the
CIAA that it was reasonable to expect the Mexican accumulation of foreign
cars to rise slightly and fluctuate somewhat between 6,000 and 7,000.
Vandercook said that cars were moving better than at any time since the
arrival of the Mission and that the system was free of any congestion
whatever. He stated that in the last sixty days there had been a truly
remarkable improvement in the efficiency of the National Lines which could
be sustained, provided there was not a recurrence of the labor difficulties
which had plagued the network in the past.
In early September Ambassador Messersmith recommended to the Secre-
tary of State and to Harold D. Smith, Director of the Bureau of the Budget,
that the Railroad Mission continue to function in Mexico until June 30,
1946. He cited some still to be completed rehabilitation work on the
Southeast Division of the National Lines and the need for technical
assistance on a few important projects as the principal factors in support
of his position that the Mission should be maintained. Messersmith
reported that in Vandercook' s opinion expenditures for the first half of
1946 would not exceed $25,000 per month. The United States Government
ultimately approved the Ambassador's recommendation, permitting the
Mission to carry out commitments previously undertaken and to continue
68
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its advisory function until mid-1946.
By the end of October, 1945, a series of strikes and slowdowns on the
Mexican railroads caused the accumulation of foreign cars to exceed
7,200 and prompted the ODT to impose a total embargo on freight movements
to Mexico for a ten-day period. Following the embargo steps were taken
by the AAR to limit the number of permits issued for shipments of food
and railroad material, and the National Lines resumed the undesirable
npractice of returning empty freight cars to the border.
Ambassador Messersmith notified the State Department in December
that the work stoppages had made the operation of Mexico's railroads more
difficult than at any time since his arrival in February, 1942. He said
that President Camacho had ordered the military to fill vacant positions
in an attempt to restore some measure of efficiency to the rail network.
In the Ambassador's opinion the blame for this distressing situation lay
entirely with the leaders of the railway syndicates whose attitude
Messersmith described as "most arbitrary and completely lacking in under-
standing." 72
The American diplomat also reported that the desired results were
not being obtained from the program begun in April of the preceding year
under which Mexican railroad workers came to the United States for train-
ing in American repair shops. It had been hoped that on returning to
Mexico these workers would be placed in positions where they would be
able to impart to their fellow workers the knowledge and experience they
had gained in the United States. This was prevented by the railroad
Memorandum of Conversation, American Association of Railroads
(Arnett) and Division of Mexican Affairs (MacLean) , November 5, 1945,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
72George S. Messersmith to Division of Mexican Affairs (Carrigan),
December 11, 1945, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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unions which insisted that the trainees could only be elevated to instruc-
tional positions on the basis of seniority and not because of knowledge
73
acquired in the United States.
The American Railroad Mission completed all approved rehabilitation
projects and furnished technical assistance during the first half of
1946, but the operation of the National Lines remained in a state of
confusion due to the attitude of the Railway Workers' Syndicate. This
problem was one that could only be solved by the Mexican Government
assuming a strong and uncompromising position with respect to the unions,
something which did not occur during the life of the United States Railway
Mission.
The cooperative railroad program between Mexico and the United
States was officially terminated by a joint governmental memorandum on
July 5, 19A6. The communique noted that during the existence of the
program the National Lines had expended in excess of $40 million for
rehabilitation projects and had contracted for the purchase of new equip-
ment in the United States which would involve another large sum of money.
During the same period the United States had contributed $4,860,037.54
for material, equipment and physical restoration work while making
available $1,875,909.76 for educational and technical assistance projects.
The joint statement reported that the American Railway Mission had
fulfilled "to the entire satisfaction of the parties its functions and
responsibilities in cooperating with the National Railways in carrying
,,74
out the cooperative railroad program....
73George S. Messersmith to Secretary of State, April 25, 1945, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, "Joint Memorandum
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Ambassador Messersmith felt that although the operation of the
Mexican National Lines was never satisfactory, its capabilities were
greatly enhanced by the work of the Railway Mission, lie listed the
Mission's three great contributions as: 1) cooperation in restoring
Mexico's railroads, motive power, tracks, rolling stock and repair
facilities to a condition that they had not enjoyed for many years, 2) the
education of management and some workers in efficient railway operation
and 3) prevention of a complete collapse in Mexico's rail network with
its attendant serious consequences for the Mexican economy and the United
States defense industries which would have been deprived of vast quantities
of strategic materials from Mexico.
In his memoirs George Messersmith wrote:
So far as the United States was concerned, the material
benefit that we received from the work of the Mission was
far in excess of the amount spent on the work which the
Mission did. The minerals and metals and fibers and
other raw material which we secured from Mexico during
the period of the war were not only helpful to us but
they were indispensable in meeting deficiencies. . .in
other countries. The work of the Mission was a very
real contribution to the war effort and the amount spent
was insignificant. .. [in comparison to] the advantages secured
for us alone, not to speak of the advantages secured also
for Mexico. "
The United States sent its railroad experts to Mexico and expended
funds on the rehabilitation of the Mexican National Lines primarily to
insure that Mexican strategic materials would be transported to the Ameri-
can border with a reasonable degree of efficiency. Since this was the
^George S. Messersmith to Oliver Stevens, May 28, 1944, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.




stated objective of the Railway Mission, and since this objective was
realized, the cooperation between Mexico and the United States in this
particular endeavor has been judged a success by Ambassador Messersmith
and many other officials from both Governments. This is probably a fair
evaluation, but the potential existed for far more satisfactory results
than were realized. The attitude of the Railway Workers' Syndicate was
completely uncompromising and served only to hinder the efforts of the
American railway experts to improve the operation of the rail network.
The obstructionist tactics employed by the railroad unions during this
period must be condemned. President Camacho can also be criticized for
his failure to deal more firmly with the syndicate. Had Camacho employed
in an effective way the extraordinary powers he possessed during the war
years, there is little doubt he could have compelled union officials to
cooperate with the Railway Mission, thus assuring much more efficient and
trouble-free operation of the Mexican National Lines.

CHAPTER X
THE RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENT
Following his election to the Mexican Presidency, Avila Camacho
expressed to Ambassador Josephus Daniels the hope that either President
Roosevelt or some other high ranking official of the United States Govern-
ment would find it convenient to come to Mexico for his inauguration in
December, 1940. Roosevelt was unable to free himself from his pressing
Washington duties, but he sent Vice-President-elect Henry A. Wallace to
Mexico City to represent him at the inauguration and the many official
functions and celebrations which traditionally formed a part of the
inaugural festivities.
During his stay in Mexico, Wallace received several Mexican dele-
gations, principally from the nation's northern states, which advocated
the negotiation of a reciprocal trade agreement between their country
and the United States. On his return to Washington he notified Secretary
of State Hull of this sentiment in favor of a trade convention, but
Wallace also informed Hull that in his judgment the conclusion of such an
understanding should form part of a larger arrangement designed to
settle, among other things, the oil expropriation and agrarian claims
issues.
At that time a formal treaty or agreement governing the commercial
relations between the two countries did not exist. However, both the
United States and Mexico extended a most-favored-nation treatment with
1Henry A. Wallace to Cordell Hull, December 16, 1940, Department
of State Records, National Archives, Record Group 59. Hereafter referred




respect to duties on imports from the other, that is, treatment as
favorable as that accorded similar products from any other country, with
the single exception of United States imports from Cuba which were given
2
special consideration.
The terms of the comprehensive understanding which laid to rest
all the major problems that had recently clouded United States-Mexican
relations were made public on November 19, 1941. One of the points on
which agreement was reached was the desirability of negotiating a
reciprocal trade convention as soon as possible. Preliminary discussions
began on December 26, 1941, and on April 4, 1942, Acting Secretary of
State Sumner Welles gave public notice of the intention of the American
Government to negotiate a trade agreement with Mexico.
A similar announcement made by the Camacho Administration was
received with a great deal of satisfaction in Mexico where most press
reports gave favorable coverage to the proposed arrangement. An editorial
comment from one newspaper stated:
We hope then that the treaty will be carried out, not
under the spur of war, but in obedience to a plan of
fullest support, a plan which in a few years will give
the Rio Bravo frontier the same character as has the
frontier between the United States and Canada, which is
no more than an imaginary line, something like a
fence, dividing without separating the garden which
equally serves two houses in which live two brothers.
The State Department sent a memorandum to the Mexican Embassy in
Washington on May 26, 1942, which contained a proposed draft of the
general provisions for a trade agreement. Ambassador Castillo lajera
2Division of Commercial Treaties and Agreements (Hawkins) to William
L. Taylor, May 29, 1941, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
3Ultinas Noticias, editorial, April 9, 1942.
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replied in early July that with a few noted exceptions his Government
was basically willing to accept the American draft provisions. He
notified Secretary Hull that the Mexican technical delegation headed by
Dr. Ramon Beteta had arrived in the United States and was willing at the
first convenient moment to begin discussions on specific concessions to
4
be made by both countries.
The Ambassador went on to say that with respect to a great many
products the major concession his country could make would be to bind
itself not to increase existing duty rates, which he felt would be a
great advantage for the United States. Castillo Na'jera stated that if
the proposed agreement was to be negotiated on the basis "of real, just
and equitable reciprocity" his Government felt the United States would
have to grant substantial tariff reductions, even though Mexico for the
most part would be unable to drastically alter existing rates. He said
that any Mexican decrease in import duties would entail a much greater
5
sacrifice than a similar reduction of the American tariff.
The Mexican diplomat stressed that the point of departure for the
United States in its discussions would be the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of
1930, whose height was unprecedented in American history, while Mexico
would start with a tariff which ranked among the world's lowest. He
pointed out that the two Governments received in absolute figures almost
equal amounts from the duties covering the trade between their two
countries; however, this amount corresponded to 27.1 percent of tariff
revenues collected by Mexico in 1940 while amounting to only 0.5 percent
^Foreign Relations of the United Stat es , 1942 , Memorandum, Ambassador






of the duty receipts of the United States in the same year. The Ambassador
said that his country was attempting to assist in the continental defense
and had, under the comprehensive agreement, taken on new financial obli-
gations, which could not be met if substantial tariff reductions were
granted.
Finally, Castillo N/jera pleaded that as part of the trade convention
the United States agree to permit the importation of an increased amount
of Mexican oil under the American reduced import duty. The United States
Revenue Act of 1932 placed a duty of one-half cent per gallon ($0.21
per barrel) on all foreign petroleum entering the country. In its trade
agreement with Venezuela in 1939, the American Government lowered the
tariff to one-quarter cent per gallon on an amount of oil imported in any
calendar year equal to 5 percent of the total United States domestic
production during the previous year. All imports in excess of this
amount would be subject to the one-half cent rate. In accordance with
the Venezuelan arrangement, the reduced duty quota was set at 61,892,000
barrels in 1940 and was alloted among Venezuela, the Netherlands West
Indies, Colombia, and other countries, principally Mexico. The amount
allocated to other countries, out of which Mexico's share came, accounted
in 1940 for only 3.8 percent of the 5 percent quota. 7 During that
year Mexico exported less than 3 million barrels of oil to the United
States under the lower duty, and in his memorandum to Secretary Hull the
Mexican Ambassador requested that his country's quota under the one-
quarter cent rate be increased to 31 million barrels.
6Forei^n Relations of the United States , 194 2 , Memorandum, Ambassador
Castillo r.'a'jera to Secretary of State Hull, July 6, 1942, Vol. 6, p. 498.
7
U. S., Department of State Bulletin , Vol. 7, No. 183A, (Washington,
December 26, 1942), pp. 1052-1053.
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Even before receiving this correspondence from Castillo Najera, the
Secretary of State and other Department officials had decided that
certain concessions would have to be granted to Mexico with regard to
petroleum imports. On July 4, 1942, two days before hearing from the
Mexican Ambassador, Hull had proposed to the Petroleum Coordinator for
National Defense, Harold L. Ickes, that a reduction in the import duty
from one-half cent to one-quarter cent per gallon be granted on all oil
received from Mexico regardless of the amount delivered by any other
country at the reduced rate.^
The formal opening of the trade agreement negotiations was held in
Washington on July 20, 1942. Since the State Department had not received
a definite reply from Harold Ickes with regard to its proposed tariff
decrease for Mexican petroleum, very little progress was made in reaching
a decision on specific concessions that each country would offer to the
other. The Mexican delegation stated that it would be unable to present
a list of those products on which import duties would be frozen or lowered
Q
until a definite proposition was made on the oil question.
By the end of July still no word had been received from Ickes, whose
delay in responding caused the Mexicans to become quite impatient. Dr.
Beteta called at the State Department to ascertain how much longer he
would have to wait for a decision on the oil issue. He said it was very
difficult to consider United States tariff proposals or encourage his
Government to offer concessions until this matter of such great importance
to his country's economy was decided. Department officials informed
8Cordell Hull to Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense (Ickes),
July 4, 1942, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
^Memorandum by Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements (Smith),
July 20, 1942, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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Beteta they hoped to be able to offer him a specific proposal within the
next few days.
It was not until late August that Ickes, who also held the position
of Secretary of the Interior, expressed his doubts concerning the
petroleum concession recommended by Secretary Hull. Ickes feared that
by allowing Mexico to send to the United States unlimited amounts of oil
at the reduced tariff rate the American Government would incur the wrath
of domestic producers, and be accused by many of undermining its own
petroleum conservation program, in which Mexico was cooperating, by
encouraging wasteful exploitation of that country's oil resources. Harry
C. Hawkins, Chief of the State Department's Division of Commercial Policy
and Agreements, disagreed with Secretary Ickes and informed Under
Secretary Welles that there was no valid reason for not granting the
recommended concession to Mexico. He told Welles that the successful
conclusion of the trade agreement depended on the petroleum import duty
reduction. In Hawkins' opinion, failure to decrease the petroleum tariff
would cause a suspension in negotiations which would be impossible to
resume in the near future with any chance for success.
On September 2, Welles informed Secretary Ickes that negotiations
on the trade convention had been at a standstill for well over a month
because of the State Department's hesitancy, in the absence of any
official word from the Petroleum Coordinator's Office, to make a definite
proposal to Mexico concerning petroleum imports. The Under Secretary
told Ickes that due to the long delay three members of Mexico's commerce
delegation had already left Washington and Dr. Beteta, the chief
negotiator, had indicated he. would be returning to his own country within
10Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements (Hawkins) to Sumner
Welles, August 25, 1942, State Department Records, NA, RG59.

-296-
the next few days. Welles cautioned that a further delay could prevent
the conclusion of the agreement, and he requested that Ickes respond
favorably to the Department's recommended petroleum proposal. 11
Two days following Welles memorandum to Ickes, Dr. Beteta notified
the State Department that he and the remaining members of his delegation
were returning to Mexico as soon as transportation could be arranged.
He insisted that his departure was not intended to signify a suspension
in the negotiations or even discouragement on his part with regard to the
progress that had thus far been made. Beteta simply said that if he
returned to Mexico he felt it would be easier to explain to his Government
the reason for the delay on the petroleum decision, and some of the
tariff concessions desired by the United States. 12 Despite his assurances,
it can in all probability be asserted that had the American Government
been able to make a definite proposal with regard to oil, Avila Camacho
would not have found it necessary to recall Beteta to Mexico City for
consultation.
While Under Secretary of State Welles was awaiting a reply from
Harold Ickes, State Department officials were discussing whether Venezuela
and Colombia, which had previously supplied the United States with the
largest amounts of petroleum under the reduced duty quota, should be
advised of the proposed oil concessions for Mexico. Philip Bonsai of the
Division of American Republics Affairs was of the opinion that Venezuela
and Colombia should not be confronted with a fait accompli . Bonsai urged
Sumner Welles to Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense (Ickes),
September 2, 1942, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
12Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942 , Memorandum of
Conversation by Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements (Fowler)
,
September 4, 1942, Vol. 6, p. 513.
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that if the United States position was sound and did not violate commit-
ments with other countries then it would be well to keep these countries
informed. 13
Harry Hawkins took the position that Venezuela and Colombia should
be told nothing until just prior to the publication of the Mexican agree-
ment. Hawkins argued that notifying these two countries would only serve
to prolong negotiations which had already been seriously delayed. He
said that nothing bound the United States to advise them of the proposal
made by the American Government which, in effect, was designed to correct
an inequality in Mexico's oil quota which had been set very low due to
the expropriation of American petroleum properties in 1938.
^
Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson finally referred the
question to Under Secretary Welles who directed that Venezuela and
Colombia should not be kept informed of discussions between United States
and Mexican officials relative to the trade agreement. Welles said that
the proposed oil concession, to which Secretary Ickes had recently
acquiesced, would probably affect Venezuela's monopoly position and
subject her petroleum Industry to competition, but this was not a condi-
tion which should cause bilateral negotiations to become multilateral.
When the Counselor of the Venezuelan Embassy was finally notified of the
petroleum concession granted to Mexico on the day before the Mexican-
United States agreement was signed, Hawkins reported that he was more
13
Division of American Republics Affairs (Bonsai) to Division of
Commercial Policy and Agreements (Hawkins) , September 16, 1942, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements (Hawkins) , to Division
of American Republics Affairs (Bonsai), September 17, 1942, State Depart-
ment Records, NA, RG59.
Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson to Harry Hawkins, October 6,
1942, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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concerned with revising his country's trade convention then protesting
against the Mexican arrangement.
The State Department delivered to the Mexican Embassy in Washington
in early October, 1942, a complete list of those products on which tariff
concessions were offered and those on which concessions were requested.
With regard to petroleum it was proposed that the import duty on Mexican
oil be lowered to one-quarter cent per gallon "without limitation as to
the quantity which may enter at the reduced rate of tax from Mexico or
any other source."
Since Mexico had refused to consider specific proposals prior to
receiving the American petroleum offer, it took Mexican officials several
weeks to study the detailed product-by-product list supplied by the
State Department. On November 16, 1942, Secretary Hull notified Ambassador
Messersmith that the Department was anxious to conclude the trade
agreement in the not too distant future, and he directed Messersmith to
approach the Foreign Office with the aim of expediting a reply to the
American memorandum of October 8. The Ambassador was instructed to
explain that the United States regretted previous delays, for which it
alone was responsible, and express his Government's hope that Mexico
18
would soon respond favorably to the State Department proposal.
Shortly thereafter Messersmith was advised by Manuel Tello, that
Mexican acceptance of the United States draft was in "a very advanced
16Memorandum of Conversation by Harry Hawkins, December 22, 1942,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942 , Memorandum from
Department of State to Mexican Embassy, October 8, 1942, Vol. 6,
pp. 515-522.
18
Foreign Relations of the United States , 1942 , Cordcll Hull to
George S. Messersmith, November 16, 1942, Vol. 6, p. 522.
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state," with only a few easily adjusted details remaining to be discussed,
He said that the Economic Council of Ministers had decided to send
Ingeniero Carlos Arroyo, Chief of the Treasury's Tariff Division, to
Washington to probe with American officials the remaining issues which
Tello was sure would not hinder final approval of the convention.
Shortly after Arroyo's arrival, the few outstanding points were
fully discussed and, in the opinion of both Governments, satisfactorily
resolved, making it possible to finally conclude the Reciprocal Trade
Agreement which was signed in VJashington on December 23, 1942, by Secre-
tary of State Hull and Ambassador Castillo Najera. In accordance with
its provisions the convention entered into effect on January 30, 1943,
and remained operative for three years, and thereafter until terminated
by either side upon giving the other party six months advance notice of
its intent. In reaching this understanding Mexico became the twenty-
fifth country overall and the fifteenth American Republic to sign a
reciprocal trade pact with the United States under the provisions of the
21
Trade Agreement Act of 1934.
The convention which was designed to facilitate commerce between
the two countries during the war emergency and insure a basis for trade
expansion following the end of hostilities, provided mutual benefits in
the form of tariff reductions and bindings on existing rates with respect
to specific products, as well as guarantees against trade discrimination
in the form of quotas, taxation and exchange controls. The normal
19Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942 , George S. Messersmith
to Cordell Hull, December 5, 1942, Vol. 6, pp. 523-524.
U. S., Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No. 311
(Washington, 1943), p. 19.
21




most-favored-nation treatment was also accorded which insured that
concessions granted by either party to a third country would automatically
be extended to the other party. As was usually the case in agreements
of this sort, an exception to the latter provision was made in the case of
United States commercial relations with Cuba. 22
The convention, in addition to its general provisions, contained
three lists or Schedules. Enumerated in Schedule I were those products
on which Mexico granted concessions to the United States while Schedule II
contained American concessions to Mexico. Schedule III listed those
Mexican products on which the United States agreed to lower the existing
tariff, with the proviso, that the American Government could restore
the pre-convention rate at any time after the termination of the national
emergency declared by President Roosevelt on May 27, 1941, by providing
Mexico with six months written notice of its intention. It was stipulated
however, that the pre-convention rate could not be increased during the
23
existence of the reciprocal understanding.
Concessions granted by Mexico to the United States under the terms
of the agreement covered 203 products raised or manufactured in America.
Tariffs on 76 of these items were lowered while the duty on the remaining
127 particulars, six of which entered Mexico without any import tax
whatever, were bound against any change to the detriment of the United
States. Trade involving these 203 American exports amounted to
$23,413,000 in 1939 or 29.2 percent of the total value of Mexican imports
from the United States in that year. Again using 1939 figures, the items
on which reductions were granted accounted for $11,113,000 in Mexican
22U. S., Department of State Bulletin , Vol. 7, No. 183A, (Washington,
December 26, 1942), pp. 1033-1035.
23Bulletin of the Pan American Union, Vol. 77, pp. 144-148.
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imports or 13.9 percent of the goods shipped to that country from the
United States. American officials considered the tariff bindings to be
particularly important since in recent years the duties on many of those
127 products had increased significantly, and without the trade agreement
there was every indication the trend would continue. 2 ^
American concessions to Mexico amounted to 95 particulars covered
by the Tariff Act of 1930. Tariff reductions were granted for 53 of
these products while bindings of existing rates applied to the remaining
42, of which 29 entered the United States duty-free. In 1939 these 95
items accounted for $35,231,000 or 64.7 percent of the $54,432,000 in
Mexican merchandise delivered to the United States. Those products on
which the duty was lowered amounted to $8,945,000 or 16.4 percent of the
American imports from Mexico in that year while 1939 figures indicate
that bindings were valued at $26,286,000 or 48.3 percent of the import
total. 25
In a report to Secretary of State Hull a few months after the trade
agreement had entered into effect the Department's Division of Commer-
cial Policy and Agreements stated:
The approval of the Mexico-United States Reciprocal
Trade Agreement. . .has occasioned much favorable comment
and roused a spirit of enterprise and optimism through-
out Mexico.... If this remarkable document can be
implemented and administered by both nations in the
same broadly liberal and far seeing manner in which it
was negotiated, it will have far reaching effects on
the social and industrial progress of the Mexican people,
and commensurate benefits for the United States. z




Weekly Report, Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements,
March 13, 1943, Hull Papers, Container 89A, Library of Congress.
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Throughout most of 1943 the terms of the trade convention were
meticulously observed by both parties; however, on December 18, 1943, the
United States Government became very concerned over a decree published
in the Diario Oficial , to become effective on January 13, 1944, which
provided for an upward revision of between 10-50 percent in Mexico's
import duty on about 600 American products. Although none of the items
covered by the decree appeared in Schedule I of the trade agreement, the
United States felt this action to be contrary to the spirit of the
commercial pact with Mexico, and considered it particularly unfortunate
that the Camacho Administration felt compelled to take such a step when
the United Nations were in favor of a reduction in trade barriers.
Secretary Hull summoned Ambassador Castillo Najera to the State Department
to express his concern over the proposed tariff increases and requested
the Ambassador to seek the postponement of the decree for a thirty-day
period to allow consultation to take place between Mexican and United
States officials. Hull believed the decree would cause an undesirable
reaction in the United States which could affect the economic cooperation
28being carried out between the two countries.
Thomas Lockett, the Economic Counselor of the American Embassy in
Mexico City, met with Finance Minister Suarez on January 15, 1944, to
discuss the decree and its potential effects on commerce between their
countries. Suarez said that the proposed tariff increases were designed
to increase Government revenues and formed part of his anti-inflation
program. He stated that this method of taxation had been selected since
27 Forei^n Relations of the United States , 1944 , Department of State
to Mexican Embassy in Washington, January 14, 1944, Vol. 7, p. 1213.
28Memorandum of Conversation between George S. Mcssersmith and Cordell
Hull, January 14, 1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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it was easily enforceable and would take a considerable amount of money
out of circulation. After Lockett explained that if the increases
became effective, the amount of trade between Mexico and the United States
would decrease, Suarez replied that the price situation in Mexico brought
about by inflationary pressures within the economy was causing a great
deal of concern to President Camacho who felt that something had to be
done to slow down price increases. At Lockett' s request the Finance
Minister agreed to recommend a thirty-day postponement of the effective
date of the decree, but he stressed that if the delay were approved the
United States would have to assist Mexico in her battle against inflation
by exporting more American goods to his country in order to draw dollars
29 /
out of circulation. Two days following this meeting Suarez notified
the United States Embassy that in accordance with American requests the
tariff increases would be delayed for a thirty-day period.
Since Ambassador Messersmith was in Washington at that time discussing
with Government officials the allocation of materials for Mexican
industrialization, Secretary Hull instructed Herbert S. Bursley, Charge
of the American Mission in Mexico City, to raise with the Foreign Office
the possibility of permanently suspending the tax-raising decree.
Bursley was directed to say, that with regard to increasing federal
revenues, the United States Government would not presume to tell Mexico
how this could most effectively be done, but it was hoped that a method
other than raising import duties could be found. As for the Finance
Minister's statement that the increases were thought to be anti-infla-
tionary, Bursley was told to "point out discreetly" that his Government
could not support this view; on the contrary, American experts believed




(Bursley) to Secretary of State, January 15, 1944, Vol. 7, p. 1214.
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any action making imported goods more expensive and less easily obtain-
able would contribute to the inflation. In their opinion any step, such
as decreasin g import taxes, that the Mexican Government could take to
place more goods on the market, would absorb excessive amounts of both
foreign and domestic currency. Finally, Bursley was to say that if the
decree were to be postponed for ninety additional days, the United States
would make every effort to assist Mexico in solving her inflationary
problems.
The American Charge relayed Hull's thoughts on the proposed tariff
increases to :ianuel Tello while at the same time Thomas Lockett met with
Finance Minister Suarez for the same purpose. By that time the War
Production Board and the Foreign Economic Administration, under pressure
from President Roosevelt, had decided to grant priority ratings to orders
for materials destined for projects sanctioned by the Mexican-American
Commission for Economic Cooperation, and to deliver this equipment to
Mexico outside the normal wartime allocation for the maintenance of her
economy. (See Chapter 6) This action by the American Government meant
a significant increase in United States exoorts to Mexico x^hich would
help to control that country's inflation. Perhaps due to this action by
the Roosevelt Administration, Suarez informed Lockett that subject to the
approval of President Camacho, which he was sure would be granted, the
tariff decree would be suspended for an additional ninety days and would
be completely forgotten if effective cooperation took place between the
31two countries to curb Mexican inflation.
30Foreign Relations of the United States , 1944 , Secretary of State
to Charge in Mexico (Bursley), February 1, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1215-1216.
31Charge in Mexico (Bursley) to Secretary of State, February 10,
1944, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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Following his return to Mexico, Ambassador Messersnith called on
Foreign Minister Padilla to discuss the tariff problem. Padilla said he
was very disturbed over the possible effects of the decree which had been
approved and published without his knowledge. He explained that in his
opinion the duty increases were not necessary and should be indefinitely
suspended. The Foreign Minister stated that he had so recommended to
President Camacho, who he was sure would completely cancel the decree,
despite the position taken by Suarez, who opposed its total abrogation.
In Messersmith' s opinion if such action were taken it would be due to the
"completely understanding representation" made by Padilla to the Presi-
dent, and he felt the United States should be equally as understanding,
32
especially with respect to the freight car situation in Mexico.
Avila Camacho annulled the duty-raising decree on February 17, but
Ambassador Messersmith warned State Department officials that they had
not heard the last of Mexican import restrictions. Suarez had informed
the Ambassador that many Mexican industries, some developed during the
war years with American assistance, would soon be in need of protection
against competition from abroad, and he x^ould not sit idly by and watch
these "infant industries" suffer and die without taking action to
increase import taxes. Messersmith also believed that Mexico would raise
her tariffs to compensate for lost revenue when the United States began
33
to cut back on its purchases of strategic materials.
The American Ambassador's prediction came true, sooner than even he
expected. An Executive Decree dated April 15, 1944, restricting imports
32
Forei^n Relations of the United States , 1944, George S. Messersmith
to Cordell Hull, February 12, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1218-1219.
33George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, February 19, 1944, State
Department Records, »\'A, RG59.
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to Mexico during the duration of the wartime emergency, was published
in the Diario Oficial on May 12, to become effective as soon as Finance
Minister Suarez, on seeing the need to control the entrance of certain
items, published a list of products to be restricted under the terms of
the decree. Sua'rez informed Thomas Lockett that restraints would be
used to prevent Mexico's foreign exchange reserves from being wasted on
the importation of non-essential and luxury items, and to protect
recently established domestic industries should they become threatened
by "ruthless" competition from abroad. 35
Messersmith pointed out to Secretary Hull that the decree made no
mention of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement nor did it prohibit the inclu-
sion in the lists to be promulgated by the Finance Minister of any of the
products enumerated in Schedule I of the convention. He said that this
action on the part of the Mexican Government seemed to conflict with the
spirit of the agreement, if in fact it did not violate Article 10 which
provided that prior to the imposition of any quantitative restrictions,
consultation should take place between the two parties.
Contrary to normal practice the decree of April 15 had no preamble
or other explanation for its issuance. Messersmith believed this omission
was deliberate, either to avoid revealing the motives of the Government
or to reserve the freedom to choose the most convenient motive when the
time came to publish the first list of restricted products.
Foreign Relations of the United States , 1944 , George S. Messersmith
to Cordell Hull, May 13, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1221-1222.
35George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, May 23, 1944, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
36Foroign Relations of the United .States, 1944 , George S. Messersmith
to Cordell Hull, June 12, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1224-1226.
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Secretary Hull directed the Ambassador to make no representations
to the Foreign Office until more was learned of the reasons for the
publication of the decree and its effects on the commerce convention. In
the opinion of State Department officials, should Mexico press the claim
that the decree was a wartime or national emergency measure then she
could argue that it fell within the meaning of Article 17 of the trade
agreement, which provided that nothing in the understanding could be
interpreted as preventing the adoption of any measure "relating to public
security, or imposed for the protection of the country's essential
interests in time of war or other national emergency."-5 '
In mid-June Hull directed Messersmith to inform the Mexican Govern-
ment that with respect to the statement by Minister Suarez in which he
said the decree was designed to conserve foreign exchange, the United
States viewed exchange controls only as a temporary measure to correct
inequalities in the balance of payments. Since Mexico had accumulated
a large reserve of foreign exchange during the war, Hull continued, it
did not appear a correction in the balance of payments was necessary, and
credence was given to the position that the decree was meant to be a
trade barrier and not an emergency or wartime measure. Finally, the
Secretary requested the Ambassador's opinion as to whether a formal
protest should be made to the Mexican Government over the issuance of the
a 38decree.
Ambassador Messersmith talked with Eduardo Suarez over the possible
application by Mexico of import controls. Suarez again stated that the
37
Foreinn Relations of the United States, 1944 , Cordell Hull to
George S. Messersmith, May 29, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1222-1224.
38Foreign Relations of the United States , 1944 , Cordell Hull to
George S. Messersmith, June 12, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1227-122S.
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restrictions, if imposed, would have as their purpose to prevent dumping
of foreign goods on the Mexican market to the detriment of developing
native industries and to conserve foreign exchange. Messersmith replied
that he was sure such problems could be more easily solved through
consultation than by the application of trade restraints. The Finance
Minister said he was in complete accord with this idea and would not
effectuate the April 15 decree without first informing the American
Embassy so that the two Governments could explore other alternatives.
Ambassador Messersmith informed Hull that even if the decree were
never placed in operation, he was sure Mexico would find it necessary
to take some action to protect her "infant industries." He warned that
the United States would have to grant some concessions in this regard
if American programs designed to assist smaller nations to solve their
industrialization problems were to be successful. In reply to the
Secretary's inquiry concerning a formal protest, Messersmith felt there
was as yet no basis for representations to the Mexican Government since
the decree was still inoperative.
The Presidential Decree of April 15 was finally made effective by
the publication of a list in the Diario Oficial of July 27, 1944, which
named only one item whose importation was to be restricted. The one
product, hog lard, appeared in Schedule I of the trade convention and
represented one of the major concessions obtained by the United States
in that agreement. Secretary of State Hull informed Ambassador Messersmith
39 Foreipn Relations of the United States, 1944 , George S. Messersmith
to Cordell Hull, June 24, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1225-1229.
40Ibid.
41Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944 , George S. Messersmith
to Cordell Hull, June 26, 1944, Vol. 7, p. 1230.
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that the State Department was disturbed by the restraints applied to the
entrance of hog lard into Mexico, but was primarily concerned by the
"intransigent attitude" of Sua'rez and other officials of his Ministry
toward the removal of barriers to international trade. Hull reminded
Messersmith that the Mexican action was not in keeping with her position
as a member of the United Nations and a signatory to the final act of
the Bretton Woods Conference on monetary affairs in which the adherents
undertook to "reduce obstacles to international trade and in other ways
promote mutually advantageous international commercial relations. "^
Now that the decree had been placed in operation, Hull feared that
it would be used by Suarez with little discretion as he attempted to
restrict the importation of more and more products. The Secretary
instructed Messersmith to relay to the Foreign Office, at his discretion,
the disappointment felt by American officials over the Mexican action
which was taken in spite of the efforts of the United States to deliver
large quantities of scarce equipment to Mexico at low prices. The
Ambassador was to warn Mexican officials that if additional items were
controlled it would undoubtedly have an adverse effect on United States
efforts to assist their country with her supply problems.
In late September two additional products, cattle hides and skins,
were restricted under the April 15 decree without the prior consultation
that Suarez had promised. Neither of these particulars were included in
Schedule I of the trade pact since United States exports of these
commodities were insignificant. For this reason the American Embassy in
^ 2Cordell Hull to George S. Messersmith, September 20, 1944, State
Department Records, KA, RG59.
43Foreip,n Relations of the United S tates , 1944 , Cordell Hull to
George S. Messersmith, September 20, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1230-1231.
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Mexico City again counseled against a formal protest to the Camacho
Administration.
Ambassador Messersmith advised the State Department in mid-November
that the issue of import controls would constitute the most serious
economic problem between Mexico and the United States. He said that
Mexico's projected trade balance for 1944 would be unfavorable in the
amount of about 218 million pesos and that exports were continuing to
decrease while imports were rising rapidly. Many industries in Mexico,
faced with unemployment and potential shutdown, were requesting higher
tariffs which Suarez was likely to impose for the added purpose of
increasing Government revenues. Messersmith said he would be less than
honest if he did not express his firm conviction that the application of
additional restraints was inevitable. -)
A heated debate took place in the Mexican Senate on November 25,
1944, over the issue of import controls and the expected flooding of the
Mexican market with products from England, Russia and the United States
after the war had ended. Senator Leon Garcia from San Luis Potosi said
that foreign goods were already being dumped into Mexico, and he advo-
cated higher tariff laws to restrict such movement which seriously
affected the nation's economy. "
The National Chamber of the Manufacturing Industry also favored
such action, pointing out that raw materials were only available in small
George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, October 19, 1944, State
Department Records, KA, RG59.
45Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, George S. Messersmith
to Cordell Hull, November 16, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1231-1234.
A6Ceorge S. Messersmith to Secretary of State, November 28, 1944,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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amounts from the United States while American products containing these
same materials were being shipped to Mexico in large quantities.
The action anticipated by Ambassador Messersmith occurred on
December 22, 1944, when President Camacho signed a decree to become
operative on January 21, 1945, which increased the import duty on twenty-
two items, none of which appeared in Schedule I of the trade agreement.
The measure which was adopted to protect Mexican industries and augment
Government revenue raised the tariff on the affected products as much as
900 percent, with most increases being between 66 and 166 percent.
The second lend-lease agreement signed by Mexico and the United
States on March 18, 1943, provided that the two parties would take action
toward "the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in
international commerce and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade
barriers. " It was agreed that discussions would take place at an early
date to determine the most practical way of implementing these objectives,
On learning of the most recent tariff hikes, Secretary of State Edward
R. Stettinius, Jr., who on November 30, 1944, replaced Cordell Hull due
to the latter's poor health, requested Ambassador Messersmith, at his
discretion, to inquire whether the Mexican Government would be willing
to hold the aforementioned conversations and to relay the strong desire
of the State Department that the latest restriction be delayed prior to
/t7George S. Messersmith to Secretary of State, November 28, 1944,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
A8George S. Messersmith to Secretary of State, January 6, 1945,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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In replying to the Secretary's request Messersmith stated that he,
together with Herbert Bursley and Thomas Lockett, had decided it would
be unwise to petition the Mexican Government to postpone the announced
duty increases for the following reasons: 1) Sua'rez had become very
bitter when the decree of December 18, 1943, which would have raised the
tariff on about 600 products, was completely abrogated by President
Camacho following several requests by the United States that this action
be taken. An attempt to bring about a similar cancellation would produce
a severe crisis within the Mexican Government. Should the President
indefinitely suspend Suarez' most recent plan the Finance Minister would
undoubtedly resign; 2) the Embassy had determined that the latest
increases did not violate the terms of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement
since none of the affected products appeared in Schedule I. The action
was taken to protect Mexico's "infant industries" and was justified, if
any such action can ever be justified. The Mexican public was in favor
of restricting imports making it impossible for Avila Camacho and Padilla
to support the United States position, particularly in a pre-election
year; and 3) the United States would be put in a delicate position since
Mexico was well aware that many American tariffs were designed to protect
certain industries against foreign competition.
With regard to the requested discussions on trade barriers, Messer-
smith reported that Embassy personnel considered it particularly undesir-
able to raise this issue only a few weeks before the Inter-American
5QForeign Relations of the United States, 1945 , Secretary of State
to George S. Messersmith, January 12, 1945, Vol. 9, pp. 1173-1174.
51Foreirn Relations of the United States , 1945 , George S. Messer-
smith to Cordell Hull, February 2, 1945, Vol. 9, pp. 1174-1173.
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Conference on the Problems of War and Peace was to convene in Mexico City
to examine similar economic issues, as well as the whole range of problems
affecting relations between the American Republics. 52
During the period from March to November, 1945, the import tariff
on more than fifty additional products was substantially raised by the
Mexican Finance Ministry in accordance with the terms of the Presidential
Decree of April 15, 1944. Of these items only one, soft plywood, appeared
in Schedule I of the trade agreement. In addition, on September 11,
1945, it was announced that the importation of numerous iron, steel and
rubber products, as well as rayon fiber, had been placed on a control
list and could enter Mexico only upon receipt of a permit from the
Minister of Finance. None of these items appeared in the trade agreement.
The State Department refrained from lodging a formal protest with the
Mexican Government, but Ambassador Messersmith expressed to the Foreign
Office the deep concern of the United States Government with regard to
the "continuing development of the apparent trend towards the creation
of additional barriers to trade. "" The Ambassador's words apparently
had little effect on Mexican officials who continued to impose obstacles
to the free flow of trade between the two countries, and who in mid-1945
requested that a conference be held to consider a revision to the recip-
rocal trade pact. The United States informed Mexico that it was prepared
to take part in discussions for that purpose, but the latter appeared
to lose interest in such a project and did not mention the subject again
until it was raised by Messersmith in December.
52
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As Mexico increased her import duties, the State Department received
many complaints and inquiries from American exporters who were distressed
at the steps taken by the Camacho Administration. In each instance the
Department replied that the Mexican Government considered the basic
decree to be an emergency measure adopted to protect the nation's vital
interests, and that such action was not precluded by Article 17 of the
trade agreement which stipulated that nothing in the convention could
be construed as prohibiting the enforcement of any program "imposed for
the protection of the country's essential interests in the time of war or
other national emergency." The Department went on to say that there
was no legal basis under which the American Government could request
Mexico to reconsider the restrictions as they pertained to items not
included in the trade convention, and that the Article 17 provision
seemed to apply in the case of the two Schedule I products, lard and soft
plywood. The State Department concluded that if a restriction designed
to protect domestic industries rather than to serve as an emergency
wartime measure was applied to items listed in the commercial accord then
a violation of the agreement would occur. 55 Although many American
exporters believed the decree was designed to protect Mexico's "infant
industries," as Finance Minister Sua'rez himself indicated, they were
powerless to take any action without the active support of the United
States Government.
The Mexican Government, issued a circular instruction on December 5,
1945, which added seventy-four items to the import restriction list,
sixteen of which appeared in Schedule I of the trade convention. The
5ADivision of Commercial Policy to Newport Rolling Mill Company,




import tax on these products was not increased, but their importation
was subject to the issuance of permits by the Finance Ministry, which
was in effect given the power to quantitatively control their entrance
into Mexico. The following day Ambassador Messersmith went to the Foreign
Office where he spoke with Manuel Tello who agreed that the circular,
issued without the knowledge or approval of the Foreign Ministry, violated
the Reciprocal Trade Agreement in sixteen instances.
Messersmith returned to the Foreign Office on December 11, for
further discussions with Finance Minister Suarez and Foreign Minister
Castillo Na^ era concerning the effects of the circular instruction on
commerce between the United States and Mexico. Both of the Mexican
officials argued that the circular itself did not constitute a violation
of the commercial accord, which would take place only when the entrance
into Mexico of one of the sixteen products from the trade agreement was
quantitatively restricted. They promised Messersmith that import licenses
covering the restricted items would be readily issued for goods origi-
nating in the United States and assured him that if a particular Mexican
industry became threatened by American imports, quantitative controls
would be applied only after consultation with United States officials
had taken place and all other provisions of the commerce understanding
had been meticulously observed. Mexico, they stated, had no intention
of violating the terms of the trade pact. The Ambassador said that even
if the circular did not violate the agreement it would in his judgment be
impossible to administer the controls so as not to infringe the accord.
The Mexican Ministers reiterated that the understanding would not be
56 Foreipn Relations of the United Statcg_, 1045, George S. Messersmith
to Secretary of State, December 13, 1945, Vol. 9, op. 1178-1187.
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violated and that American exporters would be satisfied with the manner
in which permits were issued.
Ambassador Messersmith inquired whether Mexico was still interested
in carrying out the trade agreement revision she had proposed during the
previous summer. Castillo Najera replied that his Government was very
much in favor of such a step and would address a letter to the American
Embassy to that effect within the next few days. Messersmith stressed to
the Foreign Minister the reciprocal nature of the understanding and
cautioned the Mexicans against formulating a huge list of recommended
revisions. He said that many United States firms were also pressing for
changes to the agreement, but they were being held in check by the
American Government. The Ministers assured Messersmith that Mexico
sought revisions for only a few products, most of which had already
58
appeared in the circular instruction.
Following this meeting with SuaVez and Castillo Najera, Messersmith
informed the State Department there was little doubt that Mexico would
make every effort to grant sufficient protection to allow her industries
to develop and that he was in accord with this policy which the United
States had always followed and which could not be denied to the Mexicans.
He said that Mexico was still at a trade disadvantage vis-^-vis the
United States since American tariffs were still in many instances higher
than Mexican duties and the former, for the most part, were ad valorem
(calculated as a percentage of the value) while the latter were mainly
37Forcign Relations of the United States, 1945 , George S. Messersmith




specific (so much per pound, per yard, etc.)
Ambassador Messersmith notified the State Department in January, 1946,
that import licenses for those goods on the restricted list were not being
granted as readily as Mexican officials had promised they vould be and
that the system as then administered was in effect limiting the entrance
into Mexico of American products, several of which appeared on Schedule I
of the trade agreement. In the Ambassador's opinion the commercial
understanding had already been violated.
During the post-war years, Mexico experienced a very unfavorable
imbalance in her trade with the United States which severely drained her
dollar reserves accumulated during the war and produced strong demands
for more tariff protection to allow "infant industries" to develop and
further industrial development to take place. In 1946 and 1947 Mexican
import duties very substantially increased, and after consulting with
American officials measures were taken to restrict the importation of
"nonessential" items, many of which were covered by the commercial accord.
In April, 1948, negotiations which Mexico had succeeded in postponing
since 1945 were finally undertaken to revise the Reciprocal Trade Agree-
ment. After many months of discussions the representatives of the two
countries decided that a mutually acceptable revision could not be
achieved, and they recommended to their resDective Governments that the
accord be terminated. The State Department announced on June 23, 1950,
that notes had been exchanged with the Mexican Government which would
render the trade agreement inoperative after December 31, 1950. Thereafter,
59![orei^n !eLitions_ of_ the Invited Sjtates, 1945 , George S. Messersmith
to Secretary of State* December 13, 1945, Vol. 9, po. 1178-1187.
6QForeign Relations of the UniMl States , 1946, George S. Messersmith
to Secretary of State, January 18, 1946, Vol. 11, pp. 1039-1041.
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goods going from either country to the other were treated in the same
manner as similar products from third countries under the most-favored-
• i , 61nation principle.
Although the termination of the commercial agreement indicated a
strain in the relationship between Mexico and the United States, it did
not cause a diminution in trade between the two countries. In fact, in
1951 both American exports to and imports from Mexico increased. This
can at least partially be explained by the fact that the United States
had trade agreements with more than twenty other nations, and since
Mexico was afforded most-favored-nation treatment after 1950, the renun-
ciation of the commerce pact did not affect Mexican-United States commer-
cial relations to the degree that might have been anticipated. Table
10-1 shows the value of the trade between the two countries for several
years before and after the termination of the agreement.
TABLE 10-1
UNITED STATES TRADE WITH MEXICO 62
1948-1953
(thousands of dollars)
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
U. S. Exports 521,506 468,195 526,242 730,172 683,237 662,764
U. S. Imports 246,207 243,499 315,412 325,959 410,012 354,523
As Ambassador Messersmith had predicted in November, 1944, Mexico's
attempt to protect her developing industries, and the effects this
61
U. S., Department of State Bulletin , Vol. 23, No. 579, (Washington,
August 7, 1950), p. 215.
62
U. S., Bureau of the Census, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of
the United States , 1964 (Washington: United States Government Printing
Office, 196o), pp. 60, 68.
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attempt had on the operation of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement, produced
one of the most serious problems in the relationship between the United
States and Mexico during the mid and late 1940' s. The commerce convention
functioned well for only about one year before tariff increases and other
proposed restrictions made its life expectancy uncertain. The action
by the two Governments in renouncing the agreement provided the climax to
perhaps the most unsuccessful chapter in the story of United States-
Mexican cooperation during World War II and the immediate post-war period.

CHAPTER XI
CONTROLLING AXIS COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES
While the German war machine was overrunning several European
countries almost at will, Axis economic agents were active in Latin America
and other areas of the world. Their aim was to establish large business
firms outside the Fatherland which could be used to undermine the
economies of the host countries and also serve as centers for Nazi
propaganda and espionage. So great were their initial successes that
worried United States officials felt compelled, in the interest of
hemispheric defense, to control this dangerous economic penetration in
Latin America, and ultimately in several other regions of the globe.
The State Department's Division of World Trade Intelligence, which
was established in July, 1941, and charged with investigating American
trade with aliens whose interests were considered inimical to the United
States, submitted the following analysis of Axis foreign economic policy
in the late 1930' s and earlv 1940 's:
From its inceDtion the Nazi regime in Germany waged
undeclared and total economic warfare throughout the
world. Together with their Fascist and Japanese
partners, they carried out an economic penetration
the ultimate aim of which was not mutually profitable
trade but the subjugation of the national economy of
entire countries to Axis purposes. The thoroughness
of the Nazis in turning their foreign trade into a
weapon of war was typical of their genius for pros-
tituting education, religion, literature, art, the
press, and the radio to their self-aggrandizing aims.
1U. S., Department of State Bulletin , Vol. 10, No. 254, (Washington,




Although it was not articulated in this precise form until 1944, the
same conclusion about German, Italian and Japanese economic activities
in many areas of the world was reached by most agencies of the American
Government before the United States became a formal participant in World
War II. This calculation as to the ultimate goal of Axis overseas
commercial firms prompted President Roosevelt on July 17, 1941, to issue
the Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals, or the Black List as
it was more commonly called, which had as its chief purpose to deny
Inter-American trade to persons who had "hitherto been using large pro-
fits to finance subversive activities, aimed at undermining the peace
and independence of the Western Hemisphere."
The presidential action had the effect of strictly prohibiting the
exportation to persons or firms appearing on the list of any product
included in the Export Control Act of July 2, 1940, and provided that
those named on the list would be treated as though they were German or
Italian nationals within the meaning of Executive Order 8389 of June 14,
3
1941, which froze the assets of Axis citizens in the United States.
The initial list which was the result of extensive investigation by
various federal agencies contained the names of more than 1800 persons
and commercial firms in Latin America, and provided that anyone serving
as a cloak or front for those enumerated would himself be added to the
list. The State Department announced that United States trade which had
previously flowed to those included on the Proclaimed List would be
rechanneled to those citizens of the American Republics who supported
2State Department Press Release, July 29, 1941, Department of
State
Records, National Archives, Record Group 59. Hereafter referred to as
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
3
State Department Press Release No. 347, July 17, 1941,
State Depart-
ment Records, NA, RG59.
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the contribution their respective countries were making to the cause of
hemispheric solidarity. Supplements to the list were issued every three
weeks and complete revisions every three or four months by an inter-
departmental committee under the direction of Assistant Secretary of State
Dean Acheson and consisting of representatives from the Departments of
State, Treasury, Justice, and Commerce, the Export Control Administration
and the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. The State
Department's Division of World Trade Intelligence was charged with
gathering and analyzing data on firms and individuals in Latin America
suspected of action inimical to the security of the Hemisphere and was
directed to advise the interdepartmental committee of its findings.
The entire spectrum of American economic warfare sanctions was
brought to bear against any firm whose name appeared on the list. The
Treasury Department froze all its assets in the United States and pre-
vented the movement of its funds in any of the country's 15,000 banks.
The Foreign Economic Administration refused to issue export permits
covering American goods destined for the proclaimed enterprise, and customs
officials stopped the movement of any shipments for the listed firms that
were still within United States jurisdiction. In addition, the Office of
Censorship monitored all communications in which the particular company
was mentioned.
Of the 1800 persons and commercial establishments appearing on the
original list, 181 were domiciled in Mexico. President Roosevelt's
proclamation brought a loud protest in Mexico City, not only from those
^Department of State to American Diplomatic and Consular Offices
in the American Republics, August 28, 1941, State Department Records, NA,
RG59.
5
State Department Press Release No. 155, May 2, 1944, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
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appearing on the list, but from many American companies located in the
Mexican capital which had substantial business dealings with proclaimed
firms. Hie Americans protested that the President's order was detri-
mental to their interests since sums of money already due them would be
lost if they suddenly suspended all commercial relations with the listed
companies. This argument fell on deaf ears in Washington since the
American firms had been warned in advance of the action contemplated by
the United States Government, in order to give then the opportunity to
terminate business arrangements with pro-Axis companies under favorable
circumstances prior to the publication of the Proclaimed List. 6
The Mexican Government unhesitatingly supported Roosevelt's initiative.
Foreign Minister Padilla issued a statement, given wide press coverage
in Mexico City, in which he said the Black List was an indispensable
defensive measure taken by the United States which had to insure that
her strategic goods were not reexported to those nations against which
she had imposed severe commercial restrictions.
Two weeks after the initial list of proclaimed nations had been
made public, Baron Rudt von Collemberg, German Minister in Mexico,
presented a memorandum to Ezequiel Padilla in which he requested the
Foreign Office to lodge a formal protest against the action taken by the
American Government since many of the Mexican firms on the list were
owned by German nationals who had resided in Mexico for many years. In
his note the German diplomat cautioned that a "resigned acceptance to the
measure in question on the part of the Government of Mexico could not
but influence the attitude of the German Government on the resumption
6Military Intelligence Report by United States Military Attache'
(McCoy), July 28, 1941, State Department Records, NA, RG59.




of commercial relations with Mexico after the war."
This action by the German representative, which Padilla considered
an unsolicited interference in the internal affairs of his country and
an attempt to derogate from the sovereignty of Mexico, so incensed the
Mexican Foreign Minister that he unequivocally rejected Germany's request,
and her warning, on the very day he received von Colleraberg's memorandum.
The Foreign Office considered that the reference to post-war trade
revealed "unacceptable pressure openly in conflict with the spirit and
respect guiding Mexican foreign relations." Padilla assured the German
Minister that Mexico would take whatever action she deemed prudent
"without the necessity of receiving or carrying out insinuations from
other authorities sent through any of the diplomatic missions accredited
in this capital."
Mexican Deputies and Senators unreservedly supported the manner in
which the Camacho Administration replied to the German correspondence.
The legislators thought the note of the Mexican Government was "timely
and honorable" while that of the German Government was felt to be "not
only disrespectful but insolent as well." One Mexican Senator favored
declaring the German Minister persona non grata because of "the uncivil
phrases and the blustering tone employed by him in this official
communication" to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In mid-August the Foreign Office informed the American Embassy in
Mexico City that the Camacho Administration intended to cooperate with
F. H. Rixdt von Collemberg to Ezequiel Padilla, August 1, 1941,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
9Josephus Daniels to Cordell Hull, August 1, 1941, State Department
Records, NA, RG59.
10Excelsior, August 2, 1941.
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the United States to the greatest extent possible in determining those
companies and individuals who should be included on the Proclaimed List,
and requested that no additional Mexican residents be added to the list
until the Mexican Government had an opportunity in each case to conduct
its own investigation and compare its findings with those of American
agencies. Assistant Secretary of State Acheson replied that discussions
with other Governments prior to making additions or deletions to the list
would cause the list to lose its character as an instrument of the United
States Government. He added that prior consultation would take place
only in the case of large firms whose importance to the economic well-
being of the country in question was readily apparent. L ^
During the late summer and early fall of 1941 the United States
took several steps to enhance the effectiveness of the Proclaimed List.
American Missions abroad were directed to maintain close liaison with
their British counterparts and to exchange information with them on
companies thought to be directly or indirectly working for Axis Govern-
ments. The Treasury Department ordered United States banks to direct
their branches throughout Latin America to cease extending credit or
rendering any services to individuals or business firms appearing on the
list. 13 In October the effects of the Black List were extended to include
areas outside the Americas. At its height the list contained over 15,000
persons and establishments in Latin America, the five European countries
^Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to Josephus Daniels, August 13,
1941, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
12Circular Telegram, Secretary of State to Chiefs of Mission in the
Other American Republics, August 8, 1941, State Department Records, NA,
RG59.
13Secretarv of State to all Diplomatic and Consular Offices in the
American Republics, September 22, 1941, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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that in name remained neutral (Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden and
Liechtenstein) and their possessions in Africa and the Middle East, and
Morocco, Turkey, Iran and Iraq.
Ambassador Daniels informed the State Department in November, 1941,
that many American companies were bound by previous contracts to deliver
certain goods to firms domiciled in Mexico which had been proclaimed by
the United States Government, and he inquired as to what action these
American businesses should take in the event of breech of contract
litigation in Mexican courts. The Department replied that United States
concerns, even when under contract, should not under any circumstances
deliver American products to firms appearing on the Proclaimed List, and
since the United States Government forbade such delivery American compa-
nies could plead force majeure should any court action arise. Foreign
Minister Padilla notified the United States Embassy that where German,
Italian and Japanese nationals were involved American concerns would not
be found guilty of breech of contract in Mexican courts, where all such
1 ft
cases would be considered as non fulfillment due to forc e majeure .
Between the initial publication of the Proclaimed List and the
Mexican declaration of war in May, 1942, United States officials were
generally dissatisfied with the efforts made by the Camacho Government
to halt Axis financial and commercial activities in Mexico. Under Secre-
tary Welles informed George Messersmith, the recently appointed American
Ambassador, that the State Department was particularly concerned by the
U. S., Department of State Bulletin Vol. 10, No. 254, (Washington,
May 6, 1944), pp. 405-411.
15Cordell Hull to Josephus Daniels, November 12, 1941, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
16American Charge in Mexico (McGurk) to Secretary of State, December 17,
1941, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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narrow range of transactions and limited number of individuals affected
by Mexican controls. The Foreign Office realized the inadequacies of the
restraints applied by the Mexican Government, but prior to the formal
declaration of war, attempts by the Foreign Minister to tighten the
restrictions were opposed by other federal agencies. As soon as a state
of belligerency existed between Mexico and the Axis powers, the former
became more interested in curbing enemy commercial transactions and
readily accepted an offer by the United States to send State and Treasury
Department officials to Mexico to assist in formulating a more effective
control system.
Less than two weeks after the American advisers arrived in Mexico
City, the "Law Governing Enemy Trade and Property" was published in the
June 13, 1942 issue of the Diario Oficial . This far-reaching legislation
prohibited any trade whatever between persons domiciled or resident in
Mexico and the nationals of any country at war with the United Mexican
States, and it empowered President Camacho to seize property belonging or
thought to belong to an enemy nation or its nationals. Any realty so
seized would be operated by Government-appointed custodians unless its
18
sale to unimpeachable Mexican citizens was deemed advisable.
Together with the new law the Camacho Administration also made
public a list of firms subject to the decree which contained practically
all of the important Mexican concerns included in the American Proclaimed
List. At the start of business on the day the list was published,
temporary Government agents assumed full control of the properties in
question pending the formulation of a permanent custodian arrangement,
17George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, June 2, 1942, State Depart-
ment Records, NA, RG59.
18Diario Oficial, June 13, 1942.
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and local funds of all seized companies were frozen. As soon as the pro-
Axis firms were under Government control President Camacho personally
began to interview prominent Mexicans who had tentatively been selected
to intervene in the management of the seized properties until arrangements
were made for their final disposition. 1^
The June 13 law also provided for the formation of a Committee of
Administration and Vigilance consisting of Luis Cabrera, a well-known
Mexican lawyer, and Eduardo Villasenor, president of the Bank of Mexico,
whose function it was to insure that the legislation was effectively
implemented. So elated were United States officials at the swiftness and
thoroughness of the Mexican action that Secretary of State Hull directed
Ambassador Messersmith to express to the Camacho Administration the
gratitude of the American Government for Mexico's "cooperative spirit
in the preparation of a decree of such broad scope and comprehensive
. . ,,20provisions.
In late July Under Secretary Torres Bodet met with Ambassador Messer-
smith to informally propose that some method be devised for removing from
the United States Proclaimed List those pro-Axis firms which had been
intervened by the Mexican Government. Torres Bodet said that many of
these firms were important to his country's economy and were suffering
because they could not procure merchandise from American exporters since
they were still on the list. He said that Mexican intervention had been
accomplished in a "satisfactory and categoric way" which would unquestion-
ably prevent the companies from carrying out any transactions favorable
19George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, June 13, 1942, State Depart-
ment Records, NA, RG59.
20Cordell Hull to George S. Messersmith, June 8, 1942, State Depart-
ment Records, NA, RG59.
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to the Axis Governments, and that with regard to these firms, collaboration
with the United States was no longer an issue, but rather the issue was
one of Mexican sovereignty and her ability to internally manage her own
affairs. In the opinion of the Foreign Office a decision by the Roosevelt
Administration to prevent American exporters from trading with companies
intervened by the Mexican Government would indicate a lack of faith in
Mexico's ability to enforce her own domestic legislation. In addition,
Torres Bodet requested that small firms, which had been included on the
Proclaimed List because they had commercial dealings with some of the
large intervened companies, also be removed from the list since the
dangerous concerns they had been trading with were under the control of
the Mexican Government. *-
Many State Department officials felt the Camacho Administration
lacked either the ability or the will to effectively supervise and
restrict the operations of the intervened companies. Ambassador Messer-
smith took exactly the opposite position. He reported to Assistant
Secretary of State Acheson that in the six months he had been in Mexico
he had not approached the Foreign Office on a single issue without receiv-
ing the fullest understanding and collaboration from the Mexican Government.
He said that until recently Mexico had been considered an uncooperative
neutral, but in the last year she had developed into an active ally;
however, he warned that if the United States failed to exhibit confidence
in her ability to manage her own affairs and refused to remove seized
companies from the Black List this collaborative friend could become a
21George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, July 22, 1942, State Depart-




On paper it appeared that the Ambassador's views had been accepted
by the State Department which directed Messersmith to inform the Foreign
Office that as soon as Mexican intervention in a particular firm had been
completed, the United States would remove that company from the Proclaimed
List. Under instruction from the Department he delivered a memorandum
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 10, 1942, indicating the
belief of the American Government that concerns located in Mexico and
included on the list should be separated into three distinct categories:
1) the largest and most important firms owned or managed by Axis nationals
whose operation had an important impact on the Mexican economy. When a
"permanent fiduciary administration" had been placed in control of these
businesses, and all personnel considered to be a threat to hemispheric
security had been removed, the United States would delete these companies
from the Proclaimed List; 2) those concerns owned by Mexican citizens
which had been added to the list because they had traded with category
one firms. These companies would be removed as soon as their former
trading partners had been erased from category one; and 3) companies which
had no real effect on the Mexican economy, or which had been acting as
cloaks or fronts for larger concerns, or whose owners had shown sympathy
for the Axis cause. Category three firms would not normally be seized,
but the Mexican Government was expected to prevent its nationals from
entering into any business transactions involving these concerns. This
class also included the names of prominent individuals who had exhibited
pro-Axis tendencies, as well as the names of persons eliminated from
22George S. Messersmith to Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)
,





Included with Messersmith 's memorandum were three lists which
divided companies and individuals into the aforementioned classifications.
The lists contained 57 category one firms, 120 from category two and 346
Japanese individuals, 121 German individuals and 119 firms in category
three. These lists were not complete, and additional names were con-
tinually added by the two Governments.
Both Foreign Minister Padilla and the Committee of Administration
and Vigilance considered the American memorandum to be completely acceptable,
Although further collaboration was not specifically called for in
Messersmith' s communication, Padilla promised that the Foreign Office
would cooperate to the fullest extent possible with the United States
Embassy in gathering and analyzing data on suspected pro-Axis firms in
Mexico. The Committee noted that all but two or three companies listed
in category one had already been intervened and indicated that the
remaining few would be seized within the next few days. In addition, the
Committee was of the opinion that several of the concerns listed in
category three would also require intervention, and its members declared
25their intention to act accordingly. Through both the Foreign Minister
and the Vigilance Committee the Mexican Government expressed its appre-
ciation for this vote of confidence on the part of the United States.
American officials were highly pleased that the terms of the
memorandum were agreeable to the Camacho Government, and they were gratified
23Memorandum of Understanding, Ambassador Messersmith to Mexican
Foreign Office, August 10, 1942, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
24
Ibid.
25George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, August 24, 1942, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
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to receive the promise of continued collaboration from the Foreign Office
in removing pro-Axis elements from Mexican commercial enterprises.
Secretary Hull informed Ambassador Messersraith that in his opinion the
United States would have accomplished a great deal if she could get other
countries to offer as much internal cooperation in restricting Axis
business transactions as had been received from Mexico.
By the beginning of October, 1942, less than four months after
Mexican legislation had given the President the power to seize enemy-
owned or controlled properties, all category one firms and three concerns
listed in category two had been intervened by the Mexican Government.
Moreover, 101 companies not appearing on any United States listing had
also been seized. Ambassador Messersmith reported to the State Department
that the businesses taken over by the Camacho Administration were func-
tioning normally except that in each case the interventor assumed complete
control over all income and bank deposits, and supervised all sales and
purchases, to insure that neither funds nor goods were utilized to benefit
27
the Axis cause. At this tine no formal request was made to the American
Government for removal of these firms from the Proclaimed List since not
all personnel of enemy origin had been discharged.
The United States and Mexico continued to cooperate on all matters
relative to the Black List throughout the remainder of 1942 and early
1943. By the beginning of February, 1943, the Foreign Office formally
recommended that several of the intervened firms be deleted from the
American Proclaimed List to permit them to again take part in hemispheric
26Cordell Hull to George S. Messersmith, September 14, 1942, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
27 George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, October 2, 1942, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
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trade. Manuel Tello said that a committee consisting of Mexican Cabinet
Ministers had studied the operations of the seized companies and was
satisfied that all undesirable elements had been removed, with the
exception of a few highly skilled technicians whose talents were necessary
to keep several of the largest and most important businesses functioning. 28
Although Mexico and the United States had agreed in principle the
previous August that concerns seized by the Mexican Government would
eventually be removed from the Proclaimed List, no procedure had been
formulated to decide when specific firms would be deleted, and as of the
date of Mexico's recommendation, none of the intervened companies had been
taken off the list. This situation placed both Governments in an unsatis-
factory position and derogated from the effectiveness of the Black List
in Mexico.
The Camacho Administration took the view that the intervened companies
were under the full jurisdiction and control of the Federal Government;
therefore, no obstacle should be placed in the path of any transaction
performed by these concerns within Mexican territory. A real problem
arose when these firms, which were still on the United States list, sent
out purchase orders signed by the Government interventor to non-
proclaimed businesses. The non-listed companies faced a real dilemma.
Either they could supply the requested goods at the risk of being added
to the Proclaimed List for having traded with a listed concern, or they
could refuse to provide the requested items on the grounds that the
ordering business was on the list, and thereby run the risk of Government
sanctions for failure to sell to a federally controlled firm. The
predicament became even more complicated when the non-listed concerns
28Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Charge' in Mexico
(Bursley) to Secretary of State, February 8, 1943, Vol. 6, pp. 480-482,
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would ask the American Embassy if they should fill the orders of the
29intervened companies.
Ambassador Messersmith reported to the State Department that the
Mexican Government considered the situation in which it found itself in
this regard so basically unsatisfactory that it was possible a complete
breakdown of collaboration in Proclaimed List matters and a serious
diplomatic controversy would result if the United States was not willing
to agree to the immediate implementation of some procedure whereby inter-
vened firms could be deleted from the list. The Department sent Francis
H. Russell, Chief of the Division of World Trade Intelligence, to Mexico
in late March, 1943, to negotiate an acceptable arrangement with the
Foreign Office.
Prior to reaching an understanding in this delicate area, the United
States inquired as to any legal rights to the seized properties retained
by the former Axis owners under Mexican law. In posing this question
the Roosevelt Administration expressed its concern that the firms in
question might be returned to their former owners either during the war
or after its conclusion. The Foreign Office replied in unequivocal terms
that title to the seized properties rested entirely with the Mexican
Government and that the ex-proprietors had no right to nor connection
with the intervened companies. The original owners were being paid a
very small amount for subsistence each month by the Federal Government,
but such payments would be discontinued if the beneficiaries did not
comport themselves in a proper manner.
Foreign Relations of the United States , 1943, Charge* in Mexico
(Bursley) "to Secretary "of State, February 8, 1943, Vol. 6, pp. 480-482.
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Department Records, NA, RG59.
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Toward the end of April, 1943, a consultative arrangement was
finally agreed to whereby representatives of both Governments would meet
each week to consider additions and deletions to the Proclaimed List.
At these weekly discussions attended by the Economic Counselor and the
Commercial Attache from the United States Embassy, and the Secretary of
the Junta dc- Administracidn v Vit>ilancia and an official from the Foreign
Office, recommendations were formulated which were forwarded to the
State Department and to the American interdepartmental committee for
31final action.
After the first consultative meeting on the Proclaimed List,
Ambassador Messersmith informed the State Department that the American
representatives were highly impressed with the "earnestness and the
thoroughness" with which the Junta Adminis t ra t iya had "cleaned up" the
intervened companies. He said that in those instances where deletion
from the list was recommended the Embassy was completely sure the "purposes
and intent" of the list had been fulfilled, and that failure to remove
the suggested firms would only prevent further collaboration and cause
ill will to permeate the relationship between Mexico and the United
States. 32
Two months after the consultative procedure had been established
more than 100 Mexican firms, among them large chemical laboratories and
textile factories, had been removed from the United States Proclaimed
List, leaving less than ten intervened concerns from category one on the
American schedule. About 600 small businesses managed by Axis nationals
31George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, April 26, 1943, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
32
IPX£iSJi Ml^iiPJls. of the United States , 1943, George S. Messersmith
to Cordell Hull, April 29, 1943, Vol. 6, pp. 491-495.
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were still considered as enemy companies and remained on the list although
any of their assets thought to be of value to the Mexican Government had
been seized by the Vigilance Committee. At this same time the American
list of proclaimed businesses and individuals contained 1500 entries from
Argentina, about 1,000 domiciled in Brazil, almost 1400 in Chile, a
similar number in Portugal, and about 1,000 in Spain. 33
The United States interdepartmental committee and the State Department
were concerned that the Mexican firms deleted from the list would engage
in business transactions with companies still proclaimed. The committee
at its June, 1943 meeting recommended that the American Embassy obtain a
formal undertaking or commitment from the concerns and individuals to be
removed from the list to the effect that they would have no business
dealings whatever with persons or firms remaining on the Proclaimed List.
Ambassador Messersmith was strongly opposed to this proposal since it
would in reality duplicate existing Mexican legislation, and would place
the United States in the embarrassing position of requesting the Mexican
Government to require its citizens to promise in writing to obey domestic
laws. In support of his position, Messersmith forwarded to the Department
a copy of the form letter given by the interventor to the manager of each
concern removed from the list. "You are requested," the letter stated,
"to give the necessary instructions and to maintain a special vigilance
to see to it that in the future the company does not carry out a single
business transaction with houses which still remain on the aforementioned
Proclaimed List, even though they may be intervened. .. .You are to see that
the Junta's recommendations are followed efficiently and strictly."
33
Excelsior, July 2, 19 A3.
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The assurances given by the Ambassador that Mexico was determined to stop
any unlawful transactions seemed to convince the skeptical VInshington
officials who made no further mention of a formal undertaking with respect
to Mexico.
The Mexican press published portions of the Administration and
Vigilance Committee's report for the period from June 15, 1942 to June 15,
1943. During this time the Government seized 258 firms whose total
assets amounted to 106,150,681.83 pesos or about $24 million. Included
in the businesses intervened were 70 coffee plantations, 4 other agricul-
tural plantations, 25 hardware and similar concerns, 11 chemical and
pharmaceutical companies, 16 industrial firms, 46 commercial enterprises,
40 credit and investment houses and 46 miscellaneous type companies. In
only 14 cases was intervention lifted due to a lack of substantial evidence
indicating pro-Axis activities, and it was necessary to completely close
intervened firms in only three instances involving concerns sustained
entirely by imports from Germany. J
Throughout the remainder of 1943 the Camacho Government continued
to move against those companies and individuals suspected of harboring
pro-Axis sympathies. In August it was announced that all Mexican
insurance companies that had insured Italian or German persons or firms
*}6
would be seized by federal authorities.
In late summer of 1943 it came to the State Department's attention
that some United States federal agencies were refusing to act on requests
for export licenses for goods to be delivered to businesses recently
deleted from the Proclaimed List. The Department advised these agencies
35Excelsi or, July 21, 1943.
36Lxcelsior , August 13, 1943.
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that it considered the rer.oved concerns to be satisfactory commercial
contacts for American firms and warned that further sanctions against the
deleted companies would not be consistent with the implications of
deletion and would hinder United States efforts to convince several other
Latin American countries to adopt local controls similar to those
37
employed by Mexico.
During 1944 and 1945 Mexico accounted for fewer additions to the
United States Proclaimed List than any other Latin American country. In
fact, in the great majority of supplements to the list issued by the
American interdepartmental committee, Mexico was not even mentioned in
the additions section which was dominated by Argentina, Chile and Uruguay.
The State Department reported in 1945 that excluding Argentina, satis-
factory cooperation had been achieved in most of the American Republics
on Black List matters. Exceptions included Paraguay, Bolivia and Uruguay
which had not passed the necessary laws to combat pro-Axis influences,
and Colombia which had not taken effective action under its adopted
legislation.
Table 11-1 shows for selected Latin American countries, the maximum
number of their firms and individuals listed on the Proclaimed List as
of June 19, 1942, the number listed as of October 1, 1945, and the
number of hard core pro-Axis sympathizers on the list as of the latter
date. It can be seen that in these categories Mexico fared better than
most. The 455 names listed for Mexico as of October 1 included 350
Japanese nationals who had not at that time been reviewed for removal.
37
State Department's Foreign Funds Control Division to Office of
Economic Warfare, August 27, 1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
38Memorandum by Division of World Trade Intelligence (Oliver),
February 5, 1945, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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of June 19, 1942








. I± : Oct.
Argentina 1,723 1 ,614 223
Brazil 1,002 685 74
Chile 1,562 535 75
Colombia 1,160 883 64
Dominican Republic 38 2
Mexico 932 455 20
Peru 1,134 939 35
Uruguay 457 396 63
American officials had decided in 1944 that it would be necessary to
continue the operation of the Proclaimed List for an undetermined period
following the cessation of hostilities in Europe. On April 28, 1945,
Secretary of State Stettinius informed the United States Chiefs of Mission
throughout Latin America that an understanding had been reached with the
British Government whereby minor offenders would be eliminated from the
list immediately after V-E Day, intermediate offenders about four months
later, with hard-core sympathizers being retained for about one year after
39
George S. Messersmith to Secretary of State, October 24, 1945,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
40
Unitcd States Ambassador to Great Britain (Winant) to Secretary
of State, October 1, 1945, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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the European phase of the war had ended.'* 1
All minor offenders were stricken from the list by June, 1945, and
no further additions were made unless it was intended that the firm or
individual should remain on the list until it was completely dissolved,
i.e., the company or person was a hard-core offender. By the end of
November all but the most ardent Axis supporters had been deleted, and
on June 5, 1946, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes who had succeeded
Stettinius in the summer of 1945 directed that all Latin American Govern-
ments be informed that the United States would totally withdraw the
Proclaimed List on or about June 30.
Mexico's collaboration on all Proclaimed List matters was freely
given throughout the duration of the war despite the serious economic
problems caused by the list in all sections of the Mexican economy. The
situation was particularly critical before the procedure was devised for
deleting many of the intervened firms. Prior to their removal these
companies were unable to import any products from the United States which
was their principal source of merchandise. Of some importance also vere
the internal political problems experienced by President Camacho when he
continued to cooperate with the Roosevelt Administration after several
politically prominent Mexican citizens were included on the list.
From the time of their seizure in the. summer of 1942 the eleven
intervened drug and chemical firms presented the Mexican Government with
a unique set of circumstances and were accorded special attention by
President Camacho and his senior advisers. These companies represented a
Circular Telegram, Secretary of State to American Diplomatic Missions
in the Other American Republics, April 28, 1945, State Department Records,
NA, RG59.
A9
Circular Telegram, Secretary of State to Missions in American
Republics, June 5, 1946, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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very important segment of the Mexican economy, and their continued
operation was considered essential to the country's economic well-being.
They included branches of such renowned German pharmaceutical companies
as I. G. Farbin and Beick-Felix. The former concern, which employed
worldwide about 10,000 chemists among its 300,000 workers, was managed so
as to gather for the Nazi Party the greatest possible influence beyond
German borders and was evaluated by the State Department as being
"unmatched in sheer economic power by any other single industrial enter-
prise in the world. "^
Ambassador Messersmith notified the State Department in September,
1942, that President Camacho and Finance Minister Eduardo Suarez had
commissioned Valentin R. Garfias to develop a method whereby the inter-
vened drug and chemical concerns could be effectively organized into an
efficient Government-owned enterprise. Before the end of the year Garfias
had informally approached the American Cyanamid Company with the proposal
that the latter assume the management of certain intervened chemical,
drug and pharmaceutical firms which would soon be completely expropriated
by the Mexican Government and organized into a federally-operated company.
Colonel Fredrick Pope, the Director of American Cyanamid, informed the
State Department that no definite reply would be made to the Mexican
suggestion until the American Government's attitude to the proposed plan
could be ascertained.
In discussions with United States officials, Garfias stated that
Cyanamid was preparing a tentative study in response to the proposal
^ 3State Department Press Release No. 15,5, May 2, 1944, State Depart-
ment Records, NA, RG59.
^Cordell Hull to George S. Messersmith, December 11, 1942, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
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made by his Government. The purpose of the plan, according to the
Mexican representative, was to build a national chemical industry which
would reduce annual drug and pharmaceutical imports by 50 million pesos
(about $10 million). He said he had stressed to the American company
that it would not be particularly advantageous for Mexico to transfer
from German to American domination of her chemical industry; therefore,
Cyanamid was to devise a plan for decreasing Mexican imports rather than
augmenting United States exports. Garfias advised the State Department
personnel that for the present it was essential to obtain management
services abroad since Mexico simply did not have the domestic resources
from which to draw. He stated that the proposed Government company would
dominate about 50 percent of the Mexican drug market and had no intention
at the moment to engage in foreign commerce.
By the middle of March, 1943, American Cyanamid had formulated a
plan according to which the Mexican Government would expropriate the
intervened drug firms including their patents, copyrights and trademarks,
and would establish a Government-owned company to be known as Quimica v
Farmaceutica, S_. A. in which would be vested the ownership of the confis-
cated properties. Cyanamid would organize a company, T e cn
i
cos Quimi cos,
which would sign a contract with the federal enterprise under which the
former would provide all the management and administrative services
required by the latter. Tccnicos Ouimicos would be wholly owned by
American Cyanamid which would receive 60 percent of the former's earnings
as payment for the use of its patents and trademarks and for making its
*
-^Memorandum of Conversation between V. R. Garfias and State Depart-
ment Officials, January 30, 1943, State Department Records, I.'A, RG5 (>.
^Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943 , George S. Messer-
smith to Cordcll Hull, April 22, 1943, Vol. 6, pp. 489-491.
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personnel available for consultation. The proposed contract which did
not prevent other American firms from taking part in Mexican drug trade,
would run for six years and was thereafter renewable for three vear
periods. When details of the plan became known in Washington, Secretary
of State Hull directed Ambassador Messersmith not to indicate approval
of the Cyanamid proposition until Department officials had ample opportu-
nity to carefully study its terms and recommend possible alterations.
Leo T. Crowley, the Alien Property Custodian (APC) , immediately made
known his opposition to the American Cyanamid proposal. Crowley notified
Secretary Hull that he objected to the plan because: 1) it was contrary
to the principles of the Atlantic Charter; 2) its "monopolistic impli-
cations and possibilities" conflicted with the policy of the United States
Government regarding commercial agreements; 3) it placed Cyanamid in a
favored position vis-a-vis other American firms; 4) the possibility
existed that Axis firms would be able to reenter Mexico after the war by
putting pressure on American Cyanamid in other world markets; and 5) other
United States companies whose assistance was needed in helping Latin ,
American industry to develop would become discouraged and lose interest
48in developmental projects.
The APC felt that there were other American concerns able to make
more beneficial contributions to Mexico than Cyanamid could, and he
favored a plan whereby several firms would jointly assist in the develop-
ment of Mexican industry under his coordination. He told Hull that he
would be willing to formulate an alternate arrangement which would be
^Memorandum by State Department's Foreign Funds Control Division,
May 6, 1943, State Department Records, MA, RG59.
48Alicn Property Custodian (Crowley) to Secretary of State, April 13,
1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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more advantageous to Mexico and would significantly reduce the possibility
that the intervened properties would be returned to their former owners.
The State Department's Foreign Funds Control Division was of the
opinion that the entire matter was basically the concern of the Camacho
Government. The Division thought that the Cyanamid plan would immediately
remove all Axis influence from the Mexican drug industry and recommended,
despite some reservations, that the proposal be approved by the State
Department provided American Cyanamid guaranteed its export business to
those companies making up the Government-owned pharmaceutical enterprise
would not increase proportionately by more than five percent over what
it had been prior to the war, and that it would undertake not to agree
with any foreign interests for a division of world markets nor enter
into any similar non-competitive arrangement. When Division Chief
Bernard Meltzer learned of Crowley's interest in devising a substitute
plan he recommended that the Mexican Government be informed of the
Custodian's intention, but if Mexico did not favor this approach, the
United States should not object to the Cyanamid proposal.
Ambassador Messersnith was of the opinion that no opposition should
be placed in the path of the proposed arrangement under which President
Camacho would move to expropriate the former Axis properties, rather than
simply continue the intervention, since expropriation would render it
all but impossible for the original proprietors to reacquire their
properties. Messersmith said he would not favor a plan whereby the
49Alien Property Custodian (Crowley) to Secretary of State, April 24,
1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
50Hemorandum by Foreign Funds Control Division, April 8, 1943, State
Department Records , NA, RG59.
Memorandum by Foreign Funds Control Division (Meltzer), May 6,
1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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intervened companies would be organized into a private corporation, but
he saw no reason to reject the concept of a Government-controlled enter-
prise. He reported it was generally felt in Mexico that if the inter-
vention was allowed to continue until after the war the former enemy
owners would in many cases be able to regain control of their businesses.
Even if this did not occur, the Ambassador explained, the Mexican drug
companies, unless confiscated by the Government, would look to Germany
after the war for many of their imports. 52
The Director of American Cyanamid notified State Department officials
on May 4, 1943, that the Mexican Government was becoming annoyed over
the United States delay in approving his company's proposal. Colonel
Pope said that if the agreement could not be finalized by May 15 it was
unlikely the Camacho Administration would nationalize the intervened
chemical firms in the foreseeable future. He stated that his proposal
was not an attempt to exclude domestic competition from the Mexican drug
market, and he assured the Department officials that Cyanamid would find
it necessary to purchase materials for its Mexican project from other
Americans firms since United States pharmaceutical manufacturers simply
53did not produce all of the intermediates which they used.
The week following Colonel Pope's visit to the State Department,
Secretary Hull requested Ambassador Messersnith, unless the latter per-
ceived some objection, to inform the Mexican Government of the APC's
belief that an arrangement could be made whereby the former enemy drug
companies under his control, together with other American chemical
52
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943 , George S. Messersmith
to Cordell Hull, April 22", 1943, Vol. 6, pp. 487-491.
53
Memorandum of Conversation, Colonel Fredrick Pope and State
Department Officials, May 4, 1943, State Department Records, NA, IIG59.
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concerns, would provide for Mexico's drug industry the same services
contemplated by the Cyanamid plan. The Ambassador was to assure Mexican
officials that the United States was only interested in assisting in the
development of Mexico's drug industry, and that the transmittal of this
offer did not indicate a rejection of the American Cyanamid proposal
which was still being considered by the State Department and other
agencies of the Government. ^
Messersmith replied on May 12 that he and other Embassy personnel
considered it inadvisable to approach the Mexican Government in the manner
suggested by the Secretary of State since they felt Mexico was not
interested in going into business with the United States Government and
would resent such a proposal. The Ambassador stated there was nothing
monopolistic about the Cyanamid plan which was , in his opinion, the only
sure arrangement for preventing German firms from entering the Mexican
drug and chemical market. He said that American Cyanamid and the Camacho
Administration had been ready to sign the contract, which to the dissatis-
faction of the Mexicans, was prevented by United States interference.
Messersmith strongly recommended that the State Department notify the
American company that it had no objection to the proposed plan.
Leo Crowley and Assistant Attorney General Hugh Cox, met with State
Department officials on May 14, 1943, to discuss the Mexican-Cyanamid
situation. Doth Crowley and Cox spoke of their concern that the suggested
arrangement would work to exclude other American firms from taking part
in Mexican chemical trade. The Department representatives said that it
^Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Cordcll Hull to George
S. Messersmith, May 10," 1943, Vol. 6, p. 498.
55 ForciHn Relations of the United States , 1943 , George S. Messersmith
to Assistant Secretary of State (Achcson) , May 12, 1943, Vol. 6, pp. 499-501
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would be difficult to reject the Cyanamid plan since it did not violate
United States law, and it specifically stated that all American firms
would have free access to the Mexican market. Although this guarantee
might be nothing more than an empty promise, it would be impossible to
base United States disapproval on this hypothesis. The State Department
officers pointed out that from the viewpoint of American economic warfare
objectives and the desire to eliminate I. G. Farben from operating in
this Hemisphere it would be preferable to have the Cyanamid arrangement
than no arrangement at all. Crowley and Cox both supported the latter
statement.
Following this meeting Bernard Meltzer recommended to Secretary Hull
that in view of Ambassador Messersmith's letter of May 12, and the
decision made by Crowley and Cox to support the Cyanamid plan if Mexico
refused further negotiations, the State Department should not attempt to
block the proposed arrangement. Meltzer said that although the plan was
not considered optimum by the Foreign Funds Control Division, and its
acceptance would in all probability be criticized in the American press,
the United States Government did not have a better alternative to offer
except for the somewhat nebulous proposal made by the APC.
The May 15 contract signing deadline purportedly set by the Mexican
Government passed without either approval or disapproval of the Cyanamid
arrangement being given by the State Department. On May 22, 1943,
Laurence Duggan, the Department's Adviser for Political Relations notified
Under Secretarv Welles that after careful study he had concluded the
Memorandum of Conversation, Alien Property Custodian, Assistant
Attorney General and State Department Officials, May 14, 1943, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
Memorandum by Foreign Funds Control Division (Meltzer), May 15,
1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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proposal embodied ''strong monopolistic implications." Duggan advocated
the continuation of efforts to reacli a Government-to-Government under-
standing relative to the management and administration of Mexico's
58
chemical industry.
Since the Washington bureaucracy was unable to reach an agreement
on the Cyanaraid plan, the matter was referred to President Roosevelt
for his decision. On May 26 Attorney General Francis Biddle notified
the President that while the State Department was unwilling at this
advanced stage of the Mexican-Cyanamid negotiations to suggest an alter-
native approach, many other Government agencies feared the monopolistic
implications of the proposed settlement and advocated the presentation
to the Foreign Office of a substitute arrangement. Biddle cautioned
that the plan finally adopted with respect to Mexico would set a precedent
for similar negotiations with the other Latin American countries. He
told Roosevelt that Leo Crowley was prepared to make an offer providing
the same advantages to Mexico as the Cyanamid proposal, but which would
utilize the talent and services of many former German companies under
the control of the APC rather than a single firm as presently suggested.
Biddle favored the latter arrangement since he felt it would prevent
the Mexican drug business from drifting back to Germany after the war and
would permit several American chemical companies to freely enter the
59
Mexican market.
In early June, 1943, Secretary of State Hull presented a compromise
plan to President Roosevelt which had been approved by Vice-President
58Foreign Relations o£_ the United States , 1 C| 43, Memorandum by Adviser
for Political Relations (Duggan), to under Secretary of State and Assistant
Secretary of State (Acheson) , May 22, 1943, Vol. 6, pp. 501-502.
Memorandum, Attorney General Francis Biddle to President Roosevelt,
May 26, 1943, Secretary's File No. 14, Roosevelt Library.
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Wallace, the Attorney General, the APC and the Board of Economic Warfare.
The proposal provided that despite certain objections to the Cyanamid
arrangement the Mexican Government should be notified that the United
States would not place any obstacle in the path of its dealings with the
American concern, while at the same time the American Embassy would
present the APC's offer to the Foreign Office. Hull said that rejection
of the Cyanamid plan could be interpreted by the Mexican Government as
"gringo" interference and could result in a refusal by Mexico to take
prompt and effective action against the intervened properties. The
Secretary conceded that the acceptance of Crowley's proposal would be
very advantageous to the United States since the companies under the
control of the APC could be used as instruments of Government policy and
could wage economic warfare without being influenced by the profit
motive. Hull advised, however, that the "no objection" to the Cyanamid
proposal be given so as to avoid the impression that the United States
was pressuring Mexico to accept Crowley's plan.
While President Roosevelt was considering the recommendation made
by the Secretary of State, the American Cyanamid Company informed the
State Department that it had decided to terminate its negotiations with
Mexico and withdraw its contract offer. The firm indicated this decision
was the result of frequent press reports in which Government officials
were critical of its proposed business arrangement with the Mexican drug
and chemical companies. However, Department officials were of tbe
60Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Memorandum, Secre-
tary of State Hull to President Roosevelt, June 10, 1943, Vol. 6, pp.
505-506.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Memorandum of Tele-
phone Conversation by Foreign Funds Control Division (Meltzer) , June 17,
1943, Vol. 6, pp. 506-508.
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opinion that if the Roosevelt Administration eventually approved its
plan Cyanamid would still be eager to enter into an agreement with the
Camacho Government.
Secretary Hull forwarded a letter to Ambassador Messersmith in late
June, 1943, which President Roosevelt had written to President Avila
Camacho in which the American Chief Executive informed his Mexican
counterpart that the Alien Property Custodian was willing to place at the
disposal of the Mexican Government the services of certain chemical
firms which had formerly belonged to German nationals, but which had
been seized by the Custodian. Roosevelt said that the decision to accept
Crowley's offer rested entirely with the Camacho Administration, but he
emphasized his belief that the companies controlled by the APC could
provide the Mexican drug industry with a very useful service. °2
On the same day he received Roosevelt's letter for delivery to
President Camacho, Ambassador Messersmith telephoned Under Secretary
Welles to request that the following points be brought to the President's
attention before his letter was handed to the Mexican Head of State: 1)
Mexico had indicated a preference for dealing with private firms; 2) the
Camacho Administration did not want to enter into a contract with former
German companies; 3) the members of the Vigilance Committee had stated
they did not favor entering into an agreement with a Government agencv;
4) President Roosevelt's letter would put Camacho in a very embarrassing
position since he could not agree to the APC's offer, but would find it
very difficult to reject a proposal approved by the American President;
and 5) the United States initiative could result in the Mexican Govern-
ment taking no further action with respect to the intervened drug and
62 Foreign Relations of the United States , 1943 , President Roosevelt
to President Avila Camacho, June 24, 1943, Vol. 6, pp. 509-510.
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chemical firms, thereby making it easier for their former owners to
reacquire control of them after the war.
Although the points raised by Messersmith had been thoroughly
considered by the President, V.'elles acceded to the Ambassador's request
and brought then to Roosevelt's attention. The latter again decided that
his letter should be forwarded to President Camacho with the explanation
that the final decision rested entirely with the Mexican Government and
that the United States was "not trying to force anything down their
throats." 64
Messersmith delivered President Roosevelt's letter on July 3, 1943,
and on July 9 President Camacho replied that his Government was always
interested in any arrangement designed to promote mutually beneficial
collaboration between Mexico and the United States. Ke said he was not
able at that moment to make a definite decision on the American proposal,
but he would welcome a visit from Leo Crowley or one of his assistants to
explain in greater detail the provisions of the APC's offer.
On learning of President Camacho' s letter to President Roosevelt,
the Property Custodian began in earnest to formulate a specific plan
which would be acceptable to the Mexican Government. One of the first
proposals called for the Camacho Administration to form a holding
corporation, wholly owned by the Government, in which would be vested
all the stock interests in the former Axis companies, and for the APC to
Forei gn Relations of the United States, 1943 , Memorandum, Under
Secretary of State V.'elles to President Roosevelt, June 28, 1943, Vol. 6,
pp. 510-511.
64Forcirn Relations of the Unite d States, 1943, Cordell Hull to
George S. Messersmith, July 2, 1943, Vol. 6, p. 513.
65Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943 , President Avila
Camacho to President Roosevelt, July 9, 1943, Vol. 6, p. 515
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form a development corporation which would provide the required management
and technical assistance. The development corporation was to be an
instrumentality of the American Government with its Board of Directors
responsible to the State Department, the APC and other federal agencies. 66
Since this plan conflicted in several respects with the views of the
Mexican Government, as reported by Messersmith, it was not seriously
considered by the Camacho Administration.
In early August, Morrison G. Tucker, the Assistant Property Custodian,
traveled to Mexico with a specific proposal for the Mexican Government
which was modified somewhat by Ambassador Messersmith and delivered to
Foreign Minister Padilla on August 14, 1943. The American plan, as
modified, provided that the Mexican Government would form a holding
company which would control the federally-owned pharmaceutical and
chemical companies, and would deal directly with firms held by the APC
or other United States concerns when management or technical assistance
was needed. Although this proposal was acceptable to the Mexicans, the
State Department and the APC were disturbed that Messersmith' s change to
the original arrangement would exclude any participation by the United
States Government and would allow the Mexican holding company to enter
into contracts directly with the firms controlled by Crowley. The
Department notified the Ambassador that it was imperative his note to
Padilla be rephrased so as to permit the APC to "use his good offices to
select that American company best able to render the assistance required
by the Mexican holding company on terms satisfactory to the
66Memorandum by Alien Property Custodian, July 29, 1943, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
67
Foreign Relations of the United States , 194 3 , Memorandum, Georrc




Mexicans." 68 State Department officials were worried, that contrary to
the intent of both the Department and the APC, Messersmith's memorandum
would give the impression that the Custodian had acquired for his firms a
"preemptive position" in an entirely commercial undertaking. 69
In early October Ambassador Messersmith notified Assistant Secretary
of State Acheson that the Foreign Office considered the proposal presented
to Padilla on August 10 was "the finest and most understanding document
presented to the Ministry in many years." The Mexicans were thrilled,
Messersmith reported, that the arrangement did not provide for a major
United States governmental role. Acheson insisted, however, that the
Ambassador make every effort to secure the change desired by the Department
and the APC.
Messersmith notified Secretary Hull on November 9, 1943, that final
arrangements for the development of the Mexican chemical industry,
embodying the modifications requested by American officials, had been
completed with the Camacho Administration. The approved plan provided
that: 1) the Mexican Government would form a holding company in which
would be vested absolute ownership of all seized drug and chemical firms;
however, the autonomy of individual concerns would be maintained so that
each could enter into separate contracts with American businesses; 2) the
Mexican holding company and the APC would each appoint a commissioner to
discuss methods for fully implementing the agreement. The plan called
68Foreinn Relations of the United States , 1943 , Cordell Hull to
George S. Messersmith, September 22, 1943, State Department Records,
NA, RG59.
69Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson to George S. Messersmith,
September 24, 1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
70George S. Messersmith to Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson,
October 5, 1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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for United States firms to render all possible assistance to the Mexican
drug, chemical and pharmaceutical industry. Unless requested otherwise
by the Mexican Government, the management and administration of the
companies in question would remain in Mexican hands; and 3) the Mexican
Government would notify the APC through the American Commissioner of the
need for any assistance. The Custodian would determine which firm under
his control could best provide the required aid. All contracts for such
assistance and supply support would be exclusively between the Mexican
and American companies with no participation by the APC.
Prior to reaching the final settlement Morrison Tucker and Luis
Cabrera, President of the Junta de Administracio'n y_ Vipilancia agreed
that before the terms of the understanding could be implemented it would
be necessary for President Camacho to completely expropriate the inter-
vened drug and chemical companies. VJhen no action had been taken in this
regard by the Mexican Government, Tucker was sent to Mexico in early
March, 1944, to inquire why the confiscation decree had not been issued.
Cabrera apologized for the inordinate delay and promised that the
proclamation would be made in the near future. Enabling legislation was
passed on March 13, 1944, but due to Camacho' s preoccupation with more
pressing matters and the illness of Cabrera, no immediate action was
72
taken to prepare expropriation decrees for individual firms.
The APC notified Cabrera on June 14, 1944, that he stood ready to
fulfill the terms of the November, 1943 agreement, but he said his offer
of assistance could not be extended for an indefinite period pending the
George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, November 9, 1943, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
Memorandum by State Department's Division of Economic Security
Controls, December 4, 1945, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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confiscation of the properties and the formation of a holding company by
the Mexican Government. Crowley stated that he could not continue to
restrain the firms under his control from entering the Mexican drug
market particularly when American competition was already establishing
itself there. Cabrera suggested that a time limit be set for the expro-
priation, after which the Custodian would be relieved of his responsibilities
under the November accord if the Canacho Administration had failed to
move against the intervened concerns. The APC accepted this proposal,
73
and both men agreed to a July 31 deadline.
The time limit passed with no action being taken by the Mexican
Government. In late May, 1945, President Camacho informed the American
Embassy that he had decided to postpone the expropriation of the chemical
firms and all other businesses seized by the Vigilance Committee until
he could ascertain ttfhat action was contemplated by the other American
Republics against former Axis-owned properties. Definite assurances
were given that under no circumstances would the companies in question be
returned to their original proprietors.
Ambassador Messersmith informed the State Department in July of
Finance Minister Suarez's concern that no cooperation had as yet taken
place under the November, 1943 agreement. Suarez cited the letter from
President Roosevelt to President Camacho in which the American Chief
Executive had promised to lend all possible assistance to Mexico in
establishing a national drug and chemical industry, and he expressed his
regret that Mexico had not pressed harder for the acceptance of the
73Mcnorandum by State Department's Division of Economic Security
Controls, December 4, 1945, State Department Records, NA, RG59
.
^United States Embassy in Mexico to State Department, May 31, 1945,




After more than two years of frustrated waiting, the State Department
on January 11, 1946, requested Ambassador Messersmith to notify the
Foreign Office that due to the failure of the Mexican Government to
expropriate the seized drug firms and establish a holding company, which
were agreed prerequisites to the receipt of American assistance in
developing a drug industry, the Alien Property Custodian considered that
he had no outstanding obligation to the Mexican Government. ° There-
after any United States aid in the establishment and development of Mexico's
drug industry was to be on a strictly ad hoc basis. An inquiry to the
American Embassy in Mexico City in 1970 disclosed that the drug and
chemical firms were retained by the Mexican Government and eventually
organized into a single federally-owned company; however, in at least a
few cases some of the other intervened properties were reacquired by the
families which had originally owned them.
It appears quite probable Ambassador Messersmith was correct in the
summer of 1943 when he pointed out, prior to forwarding President
Roosevelt's letter to President Camacho, that Mexico did not want to enter
into a business agreement with a Government agency and that Camacho
could not accede to the proposal of the APC although he would find it
very difficult to reject a plan endorsed by Roosevelt. Perhaps it was
so difficult for the Mexican President to turn down Roosevelt's offer,
that he superficially accepted the American initiative with the idea that
it would never be effectuated. Crowley, Dugcan and Assistant Attorney
73Memorandum by Division of Mexican Affairs, August 17, 1945, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
76Secretary of State to George S. Messersmith, January 11, 1946,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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General Cox were probably justified in their conclusion that American
Cyanaraid would have gained a favored position in the Mexican drug market
had Cyanamid entered into a contract with the Mexican Government. How-
ever, this does not seem as important a consideration as preventing the
intervened firms from reverting to German ownership. It appears that
Messersmith, who was in a position to know, accurately reported the
feelings of the Camacho Government, and that the Roosevelt Administration
should have followed the Ambassador's recommendation if it really wanted
Camacho to expropriate the drug companies during the war. The validity
of this analysis can be questioned, but it can not be disputed that
between November 9, 1943, and January 11, 1946, no serious attempt was
made by the Mexican Government to expropriate the intervened drug and
chemical firms, a prerequisite to the implementation of the agreement.
Regardless of this lack of action by Avila Camacho, it cannot be
argued that he failed to cooperate with the United States in restricting
Axis commercial activities during the war. Mexico's collaboration in
Proclaimed List matters was more effective and far-reaching than that of
any other Latin American nation. Although the expropriation of enemy
properties was not carried out as quickly as the United States would have
liked, the severity of Mexican restraints prevented the Axis countries
from deriving major benefits from their commercial enterprises in Mexico




THE MEXICAN PETROLEUM DEBATE
It will be recalled that in 1938 President LaWo Cardenas expro-
priated all American-owned oil properties in Mexico, causing United
States-Mexican relations, which had experienced several fluctuations
since the overthrow of Porfirio Diaz, to take a decided turn for the
worse. A satisfactory solution to the oil controversy, never possible
during the presidency of Cardenas, was finally negotiated as part of the
comprehensive settlement of November 19, 1941. It was this agreement
which led to the almost total collaboration between these two allies
during World War II. (See Chapters I and II.)
Although not openly admitted by many high-ranking Mexican officials
in the early 1940's, the output and efficiency of their nation's petroleum
industry did not increase substantially following the 1938 exoropriation.
This stagnation in petroleum output bothered members of the Roosevelt
Administration who looked to Mexico as a possible source of crude and
refined oil which was in great demand during trie critical years of the
war. On assuming his post in Mexico City in February, 1942, Ambassador
Messersraith was informed of the American Government's desire to see
Mexico's oil resources explored and developed so that United States
defense industries could acquire her exportable surplus for their own
use. Messersmith was instructed to study the operation of the Government-




Mexican oil reserves to the mutual benefit of both countries. 1
Shortly after the signing of the comprehensive understanding of
1941, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, in a memorandum to
President Roosevelt, suggested that the United States Government might
wish to purchase the confiscated petroleum properties from Mexico. On
February 20, 19A2, Ickes, in his capacity as Petroleum Coordinator for
National Defense, again recommended to Roosevelt that consideration be
given to buying the expropriated oil land. He said that petroleum
reserves were being consumed more rapidly than anticipated and no new
oil discoveries had been made in the last several years. Ickes estimated
that American reserves would be depleted within sixteen years.
President Roosevelt allowed Ickes' initial proposal to go unanswered,
but when it was repeated the President replied that he had over the
years, carefully examined the Mexican oil situation, and based on his
knowledge of the Mexican Constitution, the policies of the Camacho
Administration and the mood of the Mexican people, he was sure that an
offer from a foreign Government to purchase petroleum property in Mexico
would not be seriously considered. Moreover, in Roosevelt's judgment it
would be inappropriate even to make such a suggestion when a decision
had not yet been reached by the Cooke-Zevada Mission which under the terms
of the November 19, 1941 agreement was to determine the value of the
3
expropriated oil land.
Unpublished Memoirs of George S. Messersraith, Vol. 2, No. 17,
University of Delaware.
Harold L. Ickes to President Roosevelt, February 20, 1942,
Official File No. 56, Roosevelt Library.
President Roosevelt to Harold L. Ickes, February 28, 1942, Official
File No. 56, Roosevelt Library.
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Since the President had definitely rejected his recommendation that
the United States attempt to purchase oil property in Mexico, the Interior
Secretary decided that if petroleum were to be acquired from Mexico in
meaningful quantities American businessmen would have to supply financial
and technical assistance. In the summer of 1942, he sent a letter to
Secretary of State Hull in which he attempted to win Hull's support for
a proposal submitted by a group of American oil producers who advocated
the construction of numerous refining and natural gasoline plants in
Mexico. Included among the sponsors of the plan was Edwin W. Pauley,
Treasurer of the Democratic National Committee. Ickes informed Hull
that the proposed projects which had been studied for several weeks by
Interior Department personnel were technically sound and would fit well
into any arrangement for the complete rehabilitation of the Mexican oil
industry which, of necessity, would be more encompassing than the plan
supported by Pauley and his associates. In Ickes' opinion the proposal
represented "a sound and logical first step" and was "definite, well
thought out, and. . .worthy of support."
Despite Ickes 1 enthusiasm for the plan submitted by Edwin Pauley it
was never endorsed by the United States Government. Although the State
Department favored the participation of private American oil companies
on an equitable basis in the expansion of Mexico's oil industry,
Department officials considered Pauley's proposal for the exploration and
development of oil properties was too one-sided and offered little
benefit to Mexico. Secretary Hull advised President Roosevelt that the
recommended arrangement, if concluded, would lead to the exploitation of
Mexican resources and a recurrence of the oil controversy that had
^Harold L. Ickes to Cordell Hull, August 4, 1942, Official File No,
146-Rox 2, Roosevelt Library.
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plagued relations between the United States and Mexico for many years. 5
When the Cooke-Zevada Mission completed its task in April, 1942, the
Roosevelt Administration decided that the United States would collaborate
to the greatest extent possible in the reorganization and rehabilitation
of Mexico's petroleum industry and that only the exigencies of war would
be permitted to deter America from this important task. In July Secretary
Hull requested Ambassador Messersmith to make known to the Foreign Office
the State Department's belief that it would be most beneficial to have a
small group of American petroleum experts undertake a survey of Mexican
oil fields jointly with representatives of Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX).
According to Hull the results of the survey would be used to emphasize
to those agencies of the American Government concerned with material
allocation the urgency and desirability of supplying Mexico with material
requested by PEMEX to expand and develop the national oil industry. In
addition, the field inspection, in Hull's opinion, would provide the
Roosevelt Administration with the factual knowledge on which it could
base its response to requests from the Mexican Government for assistance
in carrying out certain petroleum projects. Even while the idea of a
rapid survey of Mexican oil installations was being considered by both
Governments, the State Department was taking action designed to expedite
the flow of the most critically needed repair and maintenance materials
to the nationalized petroleum industry.
Within a few days after Ambassador Messersmith raised the issue of
a survey of Mexican oil fields, President Camacho replied that he would
Cordell Hull to President Roosevelt, November 27, 1942, Confidential
File: Office of Petroleum Coordinator, Roosevelt Library.
6 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942 , Cordell Hull to George
S. Messersmith, July 25, 1942, Vol. 6, p. 526.
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be very pleased if a small group of about four experts who were fully
conversant with modern production, refining, transportation and engineer-
ing procedures could be sent to his country to study Mexican petroleum
operations jointly with officials from Petroleos Mexicanos. 7 The American
survey team consisting of representatives from the Office of the Petroleum
Coordinator for National Defense, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Office
of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and the War Production Board
arrived in Mexico on August 23, 1942, and together with their Mexican
counterparts completed the assigned mission in less than a month.
In their final report the oil experts concluded that producing
operations required only maintenance and replacement materials to sustain
their current output, but an expansive exploration and drilling program
was needed to improve Mexico's deteriorating reserve position. The
survey indicated that critical conditions existed in most refineries
where both maintenance and expansion materials were required to continue
existing operations and meet future requirements which could arise from
the war emergency. The report recommended that after certain refineries
had been expanded equipment be installed in Mexico for processing daily
about 1,000 barrels of high octane aviation gasoline. It was felt that
most distillation and cracking equipment could be obtained from refiner-
ies in the United States which were no longer in operation, but the
request for high octane manufacturing facilities would have to be
integrated into the overall production program for world-wide gasoline
o
plant construction.
7Foreign Relations of the Uni_ted. States, 1942 , George S. Messersmith
to Cordell Hull, July 28, 1942, Vol. 6, pp. 527-528.
8
Fp_reitm Relations, of the United States , 194 2, Memorandum, Chairman
of the Foreign Petroleum Policy Committee (Thornburg) to Secretary of
State, December 3, 1942, Vol. 6, p. 535.
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After reviewing the report of the petroleum experts, the State
Department advised Ambassador Messersmith that the United States could
not implement all of the recommendations of the oil mission until the
position of the Mexican Government was clarified with respect to the
future participation by private American companies in the Mexican petroleum
industry. The Department said that repair parts would be made available
to maintain existing installations and that the American Government was
willing to enter into discussions leading to the construction of a high
octane gasoline plant in Mexico, but that no other equipment would be
supplied for further expansion until the requested clarification was
supplied by the Camacho Administration.''
As early as January, 1942, the Petroleum Coordinator for National
Defense had informed President Roosevelt that the United States current
production of 100-octane aviation gasoline which amounted to about 150,000
barrels per day would not be sufficient to meet the demand that would
develop as a result of the President's expanded plane construction
program. Ickes recommended that efforts be made to acquire from pre-
viously untapped sources the high octane gasoline required in all high
performance military aircraft.
During his visit to Washington in April, 1942, Mexican Foreign
Minister Ezequiel Padilla together with Under Secretary of State Sumner
Uelles issued a joint statement in which the two officials agreed that a
high octane gasoline plant should be constructed in Mexico as soon as
Q
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between State Department and
Ambassador Messersmith, December 12, 1942, Department of State Records,
National Archives, Record Group 59. Hereafter referred to as State
Department Records, i>IA, RG59.
10
IIarold L. IcRes to President Roosevelt, January 19, 1942, Official
Pile 4435, Roosevelt Library.
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the required equipment and material could be provided by American manu-
facturers. Following Padilla's return to Mexico City, Secretary of State
Hull explained to Ambassador Messersmith for his "strictly confidential
information" that due to the great need for the expansion of petroleum
facilities in the United States to satisfy defense requirements, it would
be "at least one year, probably two years and possibly even longer"
before the necessary equipment could be supplied for the construction of
1
1
an aviation gasoline plant in Mexico.
President Roosevelt considered the high octane project much too
important to permit delays of the magnitude envisaged by Hull. On
November 23, 1942, Roosevelt wrote to the Secretary of State, the Petro-
leum Coordinator and the Secretary of Commerce to express his views on
the necessity of quickly concluding an agreement with Mexico for the
construction of the Dlant. He said that the 100-octane proposal had been
pending for several months and that he wanted to see it disposed of "on
its merits, with the least possible further delay" and without it being
permitted "to become involved in the expropriation or other extraneous
12
matter." The President directed the officials concerned to quickly
report on the current status of the proposed project.
Secretary Ickes replied the same day, saying that he hoped the plan
for a 100-octane plant in Mexico could be rapidly approved and that his
office was ready to do everything it could to that end. Secretary Hull
reported that the technical mission of petroleum experts which had
recently conducted a survey of Mexican oil properties had presented a
Foreign Relations of the United Stat es, 1942 , Cordell Uull to
George S. Messersmith, May 22, 1942, Vol. 6, pp. 525-526.
12President Roosevelt to Secretary of State, Petroleum Coordinator
and Secretary of Commerce, November 23, 1942, Confidential File: Office
of Petroleum Coordinator, Roosevelt Library.
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complete program for the rehabilitation of Mexico's petroleum industry
which called for the construction of new installations and the expansion
of existing facilities before building an aviation gasoline plant. Hull
said that the State Department and the Mexican Government supported this
recommendation. -*
President Roosevelt disagreed with Hull and directed the Secretary
to proceed with arrangements leading to the immediate construction of the
100-octane gasoline plant. In mid-December the Secretary of State
notified Roosevelt that negotiations with Mexico would begin as soon as
a satisfactory proposal covering the planning, construction and operation
of the facility had been formulated by officials from the State and
Commerce Departments and the Office of the Petroleum Coordinator, and the
required export clearances had been obtained for the large amount of
material and equipment required for the project.
In a letter to President Roosevelt dated February 16, 1943, Interior
Secretary Ickes criticized the State Department, primarily Ambassador
Messersmith and Laurence Duggan, for delaying the high octane project.
He said that the State Department felt the United States should not push
forward the proposed gasoline plant until Mexico made known her general
oil policy with respect to the participation of American companies in
the development of the national petroleum industry. While not attacking
this position, Ickes recommended that every effort be made to reach an
understanding with Mexico on her future petroleum policy. He advised
Roosevelt that at the present rate of progress the 100-octane plant '•;ould
13
Cordell Hull to President Roosevelt, November 27, 1942, Confiden-
tial File: Office of Petroleum Coordinator, Roosevelt Library.
Memorandum, Cordell Hull to President Roosevelt, December 14, 1942,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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not be completed prior to the termination of the war. 15
After reading lakes' letter, the President sent a memorandum to
Under Secretary of State Welles in which he demanded to know why the
project had been delayed and requested a "definite action report" within
the next few days. Roosevelt said from a strategic viewpoint he wanted to
"have action and action now."
Under Secretary Welles notified President Roosevelt on March 1 that
negotiations with Mexican officials leading to the construction of a high
octane gasoline plant would begin in the very near future. He said that
the State Department and the Petroleum Coordinator had agreed on a proposal
which envisaged a contract between PEMEX and a reputable American firm
with a demonstrated expertise in designing and operating facilities
similar to the one contemplated. Under the terms of the plan the United
States would extend a construction credit to the Mexican Government which
would presumably agree to give the American Government control over the
exportable surplus of the gasoline produced by the new plant during the
period of the financing.
In late March, 1943, the Director of PEMEX, Efra^n Buenrostro,
arrived in Washington to begin discussions on the proposed high octane
plant. At this time the State Department advised Mexican officials, in
response to a request from the latter, that it would be impossible to
finance the 100-octane facility with lend-lease funds since the project
would be self-liquidating and represented a valuable adjunct to Mexico's
Harold L. Ickes to President Roosevelt, February 16, 1943, Secre-
tary's File, Box 23, Roosevelt Library.
Memorandum, President Roosevelt to Sumner Welles, February 16,
1943, Official Tile 146-Box 2, Roosevelt Library.
17 Foreign Relations of the United States , 1943 , Sumner Welles to
President Roosevelt, March 1, 1943, Vol. 6, pp. 456-457.

-367-
l ftpetroleum industry. The Mexicans were again told that equipment for
proposals other than the aviation gasoline plant would not be supplied
by the United States until an over-all Mexican petroleum policy had been
enunciated.
During the early stage of the negotiations the State Department
suggested a plan, acceptable to Buenrosto, which provided that: 1)
PEMEX would employ a renowned and experienced American consulting firm to
supply advice on all refining operations; 2) the design and construction
of the plant would be completed by a United States company known for its
work in this field; 3) the Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense
would supervise all technical phases of the project; 4) the United States
would finance the construction costs, with repayment being made by the
sale of high octane gasoline to the American Government; and 5) a staff
of skilled American technicians supplied by the consulting firm would
19
operate the plant.
The only objection to the Department's proposal came from Harold
Ickes who said he had been given the impression by President Roosevelt
that the latter perceived the plant as being built and operated by the
United States Government. State Department officials told Ickes that
such an arrangement would never be accepted by the Camacho Administration,
but the Interior Secretary refused to support the Department's plan
despite efforts to convince him that Roosevelt had never envisaged the
American Government owning any part of Mexico's petroleum industry.
Since the bureaucratic impasse showed no signs of being resolved,
18Memorandum by Under Secretary Welles, March 29, 1943, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
Memorandum, State Department Consultant on Petroleum Matters




Secretary Hull, on May 1, 1943, sent a memorandum to President Roosevelt
in which he explained in detail the State Department's proposal. Hull
said that he had already contacted Warren Pierson, president of the
Export-Import Bank, who anticipated no difficulty in arranging a con-
struction loan for Petroleos Mexicanos. Hull's memorandum was returned
by the President who wrote in the margin: "CII OK FDR 5-10-43.
"
20 On
receiving Roosevelt's approval for their plan, Department officials had
little difficulty overcoming Ickes' objections. By the middle of July
an agreement very similar to the original State Department proposal had
been concluded between the Mexican and American Governments, and shortly
thereafter the Export-Import Bank announced it had made a loan of $10 million
to Mexico for the construction of a high octane gasoline plant.
During the entire negotiations for the 100-octane facility, the
United States continued to press the Camacho Administration for a decision
on Mexico's future petroleum policy. Specifically, American officials
wanted some indication as to whether private foreign companies would be
invited to participate in the expansion and development of Mexico's oil
industry. Since the expropriation of American oil properties, very few
repairs had been made and no new exploration or drilling had been
initiated by the Government monopoly which was losing money and could not
afford to undertake operations involving high risks and high capital
outlays. 21 State Department officials felt that only American financing
and technical knowledge would allow PEMEX to operate efficiently and
profitably, and permit the nationally-owned enterprise to export its
20Cordell Hull to President Roosevelt, May 1, 1943, State Department
Records, NA, RG59.
21
George S. Messersmith to Under Secretary of State Welles, January 7,
1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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products to the United States.
Mexican and American officials could not agree whether existing
Mexican lav would permit the participation of foreigners in any operational
capacity in the domestic oil industry. The Ministry of National Economy
interpreted the law as prohibiting foreigners in any capacity from
obtaining contracts for oil exploitation in Mexico. 22 The State Department
understood Mexican legislation as preventing a foreigner from joining a
Mexican firm directly owning subsoil petroleum properties, but allowing
up to 49 percent participation by a foreigner in a Mexican company
23possessing a concession for underground exploitation.
Both President Camacho and Foreign Minister Padilla informed
Ambassador Messersmith in January, 19A3, that as far as they could see
the only role for foreign capital in the Government-owned oil industry at
that time was in the marketing of Mexican products outside of Mexico.
Both leaders stressed that their country's internal markets would remain
closed to foreign interests and Mexico would not alter her position
that subsoil rights were vested in the nation and could never be trans-
ferred. Messersmith informed the President and Padilla that limiting the
role of foreign capital to marketing Mexican petroleum products in overseas
markets was "so narrow and so lacking in advantage" that it would not be
considered by American companies and would be an inadequate basis for
discussing with United States Government officials the possibility of
supplying materials for expansion of the federal monopoly. When Camacho
said that he hoped the Roosevelt Administration would extend a credit to




news article, December 23, 1 (M2.
23State Department to United States Embassy in Mexico, January 20,
1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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financing was out of the question due to the history of the United
States-Mexican oil controversy and because credits for this purpose were
not given to American oil corr.oanies."
Messersnith advised the State Department that President Camacho
found it exceedingly difficult to discuss the reentrance of foreign oil
interests into his country due to the emotion that this subject produced
in Mexico where many people considered the day Lazaro Ca'rdenas expro-
priated American petroleum properties only slightly less important than
Mexico's Independence Day. Although the President and Padilla probably
realized that in order for the national oil industry to develop foreign
capital had to be allotted a substantial role, they feared that such a
decision would cause a vociferous reaction among those influential
Government and PEMEX officials who were backed by labor and who were
unequivocally opposed to any foreign participation in Mexican petroleum
busxness.
The United States drafted a proposed basis on which foreign interests
could participate in the Mexican oil industry. The American plan sub-
mitted to the Mexican Government in March, 1943, provided that: 1) the
Mexican Government would retain all subsoil titles and rights; 2) the
direction and control of PEMEX would remain in Mexican hands; 3) the United
States would make available to Mexico the best possible commercial,
technical and financial assistance in whatever amounts were necessary in
each individual case; and 4) American companies would be protected from
discriminating legislation by fixing in contracts with PEMEX their
2
^George S. Messersmith to Under Secretary of State Welles, January 14,
1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
^Memorandum by Division of American Republics Affairs (McGurk)
,
January 20, 1943, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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obligations and rights. Such contracts would be adjudicated only in
Mexican courts.
Although the Camacho Administration made no direct response to the
American proposal, it appeared that it was being favorably considered
by the Mexican Government. In May Minister of National Economy, F.
Javier Gaxiola, modified his original position when he stated that any
petroleum company legally operating in Mexico could employ foreign
drillers and technicians after it had been established that the foreigners
were not using such employment to conduct oil exploitation for their own
benefit. 27
When the Mexican Government failed to enunciate its petroleum policy
by November, Secretary Hull wrote to Ambassador Messersmith to stress
the importance American officials attached to this proposed declaration.
The Secretary said that the Department did not consider it appropriate
to negotiate a formal agreement with Mexico, but hoped that Avila
Camacho, after considering United States views, would issue a statement
on the development of his country's petroleum resources which would permit
foreign interests to enter Mexico on a contract basis after any change
to domestic legislation required by the policy statement had been enacted.
Hull reminded the Ambassador that the United States was rapidly depleting
its petroleum reserves and would soon be reauired to import large
quantities of oil to support its war effort. In Hull's opinion the
American demand for petroleum together with Mexico's propinquity to the
United States made it even more important that the Mexican Government
26Foreign Relations of the United Sta tes , 194 3 , Cordell Hull to
George S. Messersmith, March 12, 1943, Vol. 6, pp. 457-459.
27United States Embassy in Mexico (Bursley), to State Department
(Duggan), May 21, 194 3, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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quickly adopt a policy which would permit its petroleum industry to
expand and develop rapidly.
In presenting Secretary Hull's views to Foreign Minister Padilla,
Hessersmith said it was the opinion of his Government that without the
introduction of foreign financial and technical assistance, PEMEX, even
under the most favorable conditions, could not adequately develop Mexi-
can oil resources for at least fifty years. Padilla replied that he and
President Camacho agreed, but the Director of PEMEX felt the nationally-
owned enterprise could be maintained and expanded without permitting
foreign capital and technicians to play a major role. Padilla made it
quite clear that Buenrostro would have to be convinced that Mexico's
petroleum industry could not adequately develop on its own before any
decision could be made which would allow foreign oil companies to provide
assistance to PEMEX on a contractual basis.
^
Padilla and Messersmith again met in late December, 1943, to discuss
Mexican petroleum policy. After carefully reviewing each of the four
points suggested by the United States the previous March, the Foreign
Minister stated that he felt they formed a satisfactory basis for a
policy statement by his Government. He said that quite naturally when a
decision had been reached it would take the form of a unilateral
declaration by President Camacho, but he stressed that Mexico was very
happy to exchange views with the United States before resolving this
important question. Padilla reiterated his belief that as far as foreign
capital was concerned America should play the major role in the
28 Fgr-eic;n Relations of the United States , 1943, Cordell Hull to
George S. Messersmith, November 12, 1943, Vol. 6, no. 469-470.
29 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Georpe S. Messer-
smith to Cordell Hull, November 30, 1943, Vol. 6, pp. 470-472.
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developmcnt of Mexico's oil industry, and he told Messersnith that in the
near future he would have some "very pood news." 30 In early January
Messersmith went to Washington to discuss with President Roosevelt the
allocation of material to Mexico for projects approved by the Mexican-
American Commission for Economic Cooperation (See Chapter VI), confident
that on his return he would be informed that a decision on major oil
policy had been reached which was favorable to United States interests.
During Messersmith' s conversations with Roosevelt the Mexican
petroleum issue was raised, and the President requested the Ambassador
to discuss with Secretary Ickes the possibility of building up a strategic
oil reserve in Mexico for emergency defense use. Roosevelt considered
that it would be beneficial for the United States to expend a small sum
in assisting the Mexican Government to explore for new oil deposits.
When a new and adequate supply had been located it would be completely
set aside for military use in connection with the defense of the
Hemisphere. The quantity of petroleum contained in the reserve deposit
would be estimated, and the United States would pay an annual amount to
31
Mexico until the fair value of the oil had been covered. Ickes was
not at all interested in discussing such a narrow project. He said that
he favored either a large United States loan to Mexico which would enable
PEMEX to develop and expand the entire petroleum industry, or an arrange-
ment whereby the American Government would participate on a large scale
in Mexico's oil industry. Ickes had apparently reversed his position
since the plan submitted by Edwin Pauley had been rejected, and he told
30 Foreign Relations of the United States , 1043 , George S. Messersmith
to Cordell Hull, December 20, 1943, Vol. 6, pp. 473-475.
31
Foreien Relations of the United States , 1944 , Memorandum, Presi-




Messersmith that in his opinion domestic oil companies should be kept out
of Mexico. 32
The good news promised by Padilla never came, and by May, 1944, the
petroleum picture had become clouded with the idea that the United States
was prepared to supply PEMEX with a large credit for exploration and
exploitation of the country's oil resources. If this could be arranged
there would be no need for foreign companies to play a major role in
the industry's development and no need for the Mexican Government to make
the important decision on future petroleum policy. After an investi-
gation to determine the origin of the loan idea, Messersmith discovered
that Secretary Ickes had told Mexican Ambassador Castillo Najera that
the United States was prepared to extend a very large credit to PEMEX
which was to be repaid with petroleum and petroleum products. Castillo
Ncfjera relayed the information to former President L/zaro Cardenas who
was at that time Minister of National Defense, and the latter informed
Avila Camacho. J
Ambassador Messersmith advised the State Department that Foreign
Minister Padilla had informally inquired in early June, 1944, about a
loan for widespread oil exploration and development. Messersmith was
sure that Padilla and Camacho both realized that such a loan would not be
granted, but General Cardenas was pressing the issue and the President
had to have an answer before further progress could be made on petroleum
policy. The Ambassador had previously explained to Cardenas that a large
credit for oil exploration was not possible, and he suspected the latter
was raising the loan idea to delay action on oil matters and to prevent
32George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, May 22, 1944, State




the entrance of foreign petroleum companies, which he thoroughly opposed. 34
The State Department was in complete agreement with Ambassador
Messersmith on the inadvisability of granting a large petroleum credit
to the Mexican Government. Several Department officials felt that it
was unlikely that PEMEX would operate more efficiently after receiving
a loan from the United States than it did previously. Of even greater
concern was the effect that such a loan would have on the future partic-
ipation of private companies in the Mexican petroleum industrv and the
reaction that it would produce in other Latin American countries. Should
the United States Government extend a substantial credit to Mexico for
development of her oil industry, the remaining American Republics could
not be blamed for drawing the conclusion that it would be beneficial for
them to nationalize American-owned petroleum properties.
President Roosevelt had established an Executive Committee on
Economic Foreign Policy in April, 1944, for the purpose of making
recommendations in this field to the Executive and to the Secretary of
State. The Committee consisted of representatives from the Departments
of State, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, the United States
Tariff Commission and the Foreign Economic Administration. Authority
was given to the Secretary of State to invite participation from other
35federal agencies when he considered it advisable to do so. It was
agreed that the Committee should meet in June, 1944, to discuss the
issue of a loan to PEMEX, and Assistant Secretary of State Acheson
decided it would be wise to suggest that Harold Ickes or the Deputy
34George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, June 8, 1944, State Depart-
ment Records, NA, RG59.




Petroleum Coordinator, Ralph Davies, attend the meeting with the hope-
that should the Committee reject the idea of a loan for Mexico it might
deter Ickes from encouraging the Mexicans to press for a credit from the
United States.
Deputy Coordinator Davies attended the Executive Committee session
where it was unanimously agreed the Foreign Office should he told that the
United States was not contemplating the extension of a large petroleum
credit to any foreign Government. On June 27, 1944, Secretary Hull
directed Ambassador Messersmith to inform the Foreign Ministry that the
Roosevelt Administration was not considering a loan for petroleum
development either to PEMEX or to the Mexican Government. Messersmith
was ordered to continue his efforts to convince President Canacho that
he should adopt a policy which would insure a role for private capital
and technical assistance in the development of Mexican oil resources. "
This decision by the Economic Foreign Policy Committee had no bear-
ing whatsoever on the $10 million loan already granted to Mexico for the
construction of a high octane gasoline plant at Atzcanotzalco. The
Export-Import Bank credit for the building of a refinery was considered
by American officials to be a far different matter than a loan for
petroleum exploration which by its very nature was a speculative under-
taking. In the summer of 1944 Ambassador Messersmith notified Presi-
dent Roosevelt that certain extremely nationalistic elements in Mexico
led by General Ca'rdenas were making it extremely difficult for President
Camacho to formulate the oil policy that Mexico's floundering economy
36Cordell Hull to George S. Messersmith, June 27, 1944, State
Department Records, NA, RG59.
37




badly needed. In Messersmith's judgment both the President and the
Foreign Minister realized that their country's petroleum law had to be
changed to permit the maximum exploitation of her oil resources through
the participation of foreicn interests on an equitable contract basis
with PEMEX. The attitude of General Ca'rdenas, which the Ambassador
evaluated as being "purely obstinate and altogether unreasonable," had
thus far prevented President Camacho from taking any meaningful action
with respect to the petroleum issue. Messersmith advised Roosevelt that
the United States should continue to exercise patience since he felt
38
that Avila Camacho 's views would ultimately prevail.
Several days before Foreign Minister Padilla was scheduled to arrive
in Washington for a series of talks with American officials on post-war
collaboration, Ambassador Messersmith wrote to Secretary Hull to stress
the importance of convincing Padilla, beyond a doubt, that the United
States would not make a long-term loan to Mexico for petroleum exoloration,
Messersmith said that he had conveyed this impression to members of the
Mexican Government on several occasions, but Ca'rdenas continued to raise
the possibility of a Government-to-Government loan. The Ambassador
hoped President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull would tell Padilla in a
firm, but friendly manner, that there was no possibility the United States
39
would extend such a credit.
Foreign Minister Padilla spent about a week in Uashinjton, and on
July 12, 1944, shortly before his return to Mexico, he called on Secre-
tary Hull to brief him on the results of his visit. Padilla reported he
George S. Messersmith to President Roosevelt, June 29, 1944,
Secretary's File, Box 14, Roosevelt Library.
39Foreign Relati ons qf_ the United State
smith to Cordell Hull, July 1, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1336-1338.
~ o s, 1944, George S. Messer-
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had talked with Interior Secretary Ickes who said that he was very much
in favor of granting a large credit to Mexico for exploration of her
petroleum reserves. Hull replied that to the best of his knowledge the
United States Government was opposed to such a loan. He said that the
authority for making the loan rested primarily with the Treasury Depart-
ment, and to a lesser extent with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
and the Departments of Commerce and State. Hull told Padilla quite
frankly that he did not know who had empowered Secretary Ickes to speak
on this subject. The Foreign Minister informed Hull that President
Roosevelt had encouraged him to seek a long-term petroleum loan from the
American Government and had authorized him to discuss the matter further
with Ickes. The Secretary of State was caught off guard by this apparent
change in policy on the part of the President and could only insure
Padilla that he would attempt to clarify the position of the United States
and notify the Foreign Office when he had done so.
On his return to Mexico, Padilla met with Ambassador Messersmith to
discuss his conversation with President Roosevelt. The Foreign Minister
said that he was talking with the President about the possibility of
private American companies participating in Mexico's oil industry when
Roosevelt interrupted him and stated that private companies should not
become involved. According to Padilla, the President said that petroleum
development could best be achieved by means of a long-tern Government loan
at a low rate of interest. Roosevelt also spoke of his proposal for
setting aside certain oil deposits for continental defense, and he




versation by Secretary of State, July 12, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1338-1339.
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requested that Padilla examine both issues with Secretary Ickes.
The Foreign Minister informed Messersmith that Ickes spoke at great
length of the problems Mexico would experience if private companies were
permitted to play a role in the development of the petroleum industry.
Ickes said that a Government-to-Government loan could lead to rapid,
trouble-free exploration and exploitation of Mexico's subsoil resources.
Padilla stated that his country would consider such a loan only if it
were long-term, at a low interest rate and with no United States inter-
ference in Mexican oil affairs. The Foreign Minister told Messersmith
that if such a credit were offered, Mexico, due to her internal political
situation, would have no choice other than to accept the American
proposal. ^
The Ambassador was thoroughly confused after talking with Padilla
since President Roosevelt had assured him during his visit to Washington
in January that under no circumstances would a loan be made to PEMEX
for widespread petroleum exploration. Messersmith immediately sent a long
dispatch to Secretary Hull in which he emphasized how unwise, misguided
and contrary to United States interests it would be to lend a large sum
to the Mexican oil monopoly and thus, for the foreseeable future, exclude
the participation of private interests in the petroleum industry.
About a week after Padilla had returned to Mexico, President Roosevelt
sent a memorandum to Cordell Hull in which he criticized Ambassador
Messersmith and some State Department officials for not differentiating
between oil intended for civilian use and for military use. With regard
^George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, July 21, 1944, State Depart-





to Mexico, Roosevelt said that the production of petroleum for normal
consumption would have to be accomplished by PEMEX and whatever private
resources were required without financial or other assistance from the
American Government. The President said that he had mentioned to Padilla
the possibility of the United States providing the funds for the exploration
and development of a strategic oil reserve in Mexico to be used only by
military forces for continental defense. Roosevelt stated that the
Foreign Minister was quite receptive to the latter proposal. The Presi-
dent indicated it was never his intention to convey to Padilla the idea
that his Administration was prepared to grant a large loan for the
expansion and maintenance of Mexico's entire petroleum industry.
The Mexican oil issue became more complicated on September 6 when
Foreign Minister Padilla handed a memorandum to Ambassador Messersmith in
which the Mexican Government indicated it was ready to begin negotiations
leading to a Government- to-Government loan for oil exploration. Although
not specifically stated in the memorandum, Padilla said that he was also
prepared to enter into discussions concerning the strategic reserve to
be set aside for defense purposes. Messersmith considered the petroleum
problem so fundamentally important that he decided he would have to
discuss the entire issue with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull so
as to be able to accurately articulate the United States position and
prepare a reply to the Foreign Office memorandum. ^
Although the Ambassador spoke with Hull in early October, it was
not until December 19, 1944, that he was able to meet with President
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, Memorandum, Presi-
dent Roosevelt to Secretary of State, July 19, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1346-1347.
Foreign Rel ations of th_e United States, 1944, Georqe S. Messer-
smith to CordelY Hull," September" 11, 1Q44, Vol. 7, pp. 1348-1351.
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Roosevelt concerning the Mexican oil problem. Roosevelt said there had
been a very definite misunderstanding in his conversation with Padilla
if the Foreign Minister had concluded that the United States was willing
to lend a large sum of money to PEMEX. He stated that he had mentioned
an expenditure of about $4 million for a special reserve for military use
which Padilla seemed to favor. Finally, Roosevelt signed a brief note
prepared by Messersmith which said that a large Government loan to
Mexico for petroleum development would not be made, and he instructed the
Ambassador to continue his efforts to gain permission for private
interests to participate in the Mexican oil industry.
^
In formulating the Embassy's response to the Foreign Office memorandum
of September 6, Secretary of State Stettinius directed Ambassador
Messersmith on December 18, 1944, to include the following points: 1)
the United States Government believed that any arrangement for the
development of Mexico's petroleum industry should be between PEMEX and
private foreign companies; 2) the Roosevelt Administration regretted its
inability to provide a loan to the Mexican Government for oil exploration;
and 3) the American Government was "deeply interested" in the develop-
ment of a petroleum reserve for continental security and would be willing
to supply the capital for that purpose. "
Ambassador Messersmith informed President Roosevelt in early January,
1945, that President Canacho and Foreign Minister Padilla completely
understood why the United States could not make a loan for commercial
oil exploration, and that both men agreed to consider the American
-*Forei"n Relations of the United States, 1944, Memorandum of Conver-
sation by George S. Messersmith, December 19, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 1356-1358.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, Secretary of State
to George S. Messersmith," December 28, 1Q 44, Vol. 7, pp. 1358-1359.
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proposal for setting aside a strategic oil reserve in Mexico and to
continue discussions toward the entrance of private American companies
into the Mexican petroleum industry on an equitable contract basis with
PEMEX. However, Messersmith warned that 1945 would be a very difficult
year in Mexico and that a great deal of progress on the oil issue should
not be expected. A premature political campaign aimed at the 1946
presidential election had already begun, and President Camacho and his
Foreign Minister were being openly attacked in the press by those
Mexicans who opposed their policy of close collaboration with the United
States.
The January 12, 1945 issue of Ultimas Noticias contained an interview
with the Director of PEMEX in which Buenrostro stated that about seventy
new oil wells would be drilled during the current year. Messersmith
reported that although the Mexican public believed this, he felt sure
there was not sufficient capital available for an undertaking of this
magnitude. The Ambassador said that statements such as that made by
Buenrostro rendered it even more difficult for President Camacho to enact
a responsible petroleum policy, especially in a pre-election year when
the oil issue was so volatile.
By the middle of March Messersmith notified the State Department that
the number of verbal attacks against Avila Camacho and Padilla had
substantially increased, and he concluded that the political situation
in Mexico was such that meaningful discussions of future petroleum policy
could not be continued. In late June, 1945, the Ambassador reported that
George S. Messersmith to President Roosevelt, January 8, 1945,
State Department Records, N'A, RG59.
George S. Messersmith to Division of Mexican Affairs (Carrigan)
,
January 12, 1945, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
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there was no hope of achieving any progress on the oil problem until
after the Mexican presidential election in July of the following year, and
that it would, in his opinion, be most unwise to press the issue before
49
that time.
In response to rumors circulating in Mexico City to the effect that
President Camacho was prepared to allow foreign companies to participate
in the oil industry, the Secretariat of National Economy stated that in
accordance with Article X of the Petroleum Law "contracts for exploitation
and exploration may be signed with Mexican citizens or with companies
formed exclusively by Mexicans. .. .There is no plan to reform the Petroleum
Law to make the modifications to Article X that would be necessary before
foreign companies could obtain contracts for oil exploration and
exploitation." 50
The State Department notified Messersmith that it concurred with his
recommendation concerning the temporary suspension of discussions on
Mexican oil policy. However, Secretary of State Byrnes advised the
Ambassador that the American Government had altered its position with
respect to the strategic oil reserve in Mexico, and that when a meaning-
ful dialogue was resumed he should refrain from taking the initiative in
discussing this subject. Messersmith was also cautioned that his nego-
tiations with the Mexicans should not be limited only to the possibility
of American companies playing a role in the development of the oil
industry. Byrnes feared that United States holdings in other countries
might be discriminated against if only American interests were permitted
49George S. Messersmith to Division of Mexican Affairs (Carrigan)
,
June 28, 1945, State Department Records, NA, RG59.
The New York Times, August 3, 1945.
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to enter Mexico. ^*
Throughout the late 1940 's and 1950 's little substantive progress
was made in the petroleum discussions between the United States and Mexico,
With the cessation of hostilities the urgency that had motivated American
efforts to influence Mexican policy no longer existed. A 1970 inquiry
to the United States Embassy in Mexico City indicated that in the 1960 's
a few private American oil companies had worked under contract for PEMEX,
but in the last few years these contracts have all been terminated by
cash settlements.
In May, 1946, when he was leaving Mexico to become the American
Ambassador to Argentina, George Messersnith stated that the greatest
disappointment he experienced in Mexico was the inability of the Mexican
Government to adopt a rational petroleum policy. In his memoirs Messer-
smith noted that during his tenure as Ambassador to Mexico (February 1942-
May 1946) the Export-Import Bank made loans to the Mexican Government in
the amount of about $97 million for well-planned, constructive projects.
It was his opinion that if the Mexican Government had taken the positive
action to permit private American firms to participate with PEMEX in the
development of Mexico's oil industry, the revenue from petroleum exports
would very rapidly have made it unnecessary to carry out domestic programs
52
with foreign financing.
51Foreign Relations of the United States , .1945., Secretary of State
to George S. Messersnith, November 8, 1945, Vol. 9, pp. 1161-1162.





There can be little doubt that, with a few noted exceptions, Mexican-
United States collaboration during World War II was superb and provided
a magnificent example for the other American Republics and the rest of
the world. With this statement the author does not intend to convey the
impression that without the active cooperation of Mexico, America and
her European allies would not have won the war. Nothing could be further
from the truth; however, this should not detract from the fact that
President Camacho and his country contributed to the war effort much
more than even the most optimistic American statesman could have antici-
pated.
Prior to 19A1 there was no reason to expect that Mexico's conduct
during the global conflict would differ appreciably from what it had been
during the First World War. In fact, had the Roosevelt Administration
attempted to use force in 1938 and 1939 to settle the petroleum contro-
versy it is quite probable that Mexico would have reverted to her 1917
role as an unfriendly neutral during the struggle against the Axis.
Over the years relations between the two neighbors had experienced
periods of extreme crisis, and many people in both countries believed that
the oil expropriation would precipitate another era of bad feeling. In
December, 1942, American Ambassador to Mexico George Messersmith wrote:
If there is one country among the American Republics which
would have a real reason for not collaborating fully
with us in the war, or at least understandable reasons,
it is Mexico. And yet the fact remains that Mexico, the




whom we have declared war, has declared v?ar on the
Axis, is our ally, and is loyally trying to do what
she can.l
Throughout the presidency of Lazaro Cardenas there was little
indication that Mexico was prepared to support the United States should
the European war involve the American continent. Soon after the
inauguration of Avila Camacho, new attempts were nade by both Governments
to solve the many problems which had marred their relationship. These
efforts culminated in the signing of the comprehensive agreement of
November, 1941, which settled most of the issues pending between the two
countries and made possible the wartime collaboration which ultimately
took place.
The idea of cooperating closely with the United States was foreign
to a great many Mexicans who had never felt any antagonism towards the
Germans, the Italians or the Japanese, but who had been imbued since
childhood with the idea that a certain animosity towards their North
American neighbor was a healthy experience for the normal Mexican. To
pinpoint the exact moment when the average Mexican began to feel that his
country must join with the United States in the defeat of the Axis is
as difficult as it is to fix the instant when the outgoing tide has run
clear and begins to come in again. However, by the fall of 1942, after
German submarine activity had caused President Camacho to declare war on
the Axis, most Mexicans were willing to support their President and his
policy of close alignment with the United States.
\7hy did Mexico and the United States finally decide in 1941 that the
time had come to settle their differences and embark on a program of
George S. Messersmith to Vice-Admiral Alfred W. Johnson, December 27,




military, political and economic collaboration? The answer to this
question is relatively simple. The leaders of both countries felt,
without question, that each nation had a great deal to gain by following
such a course. An American newspaper editorial in 1942 declared: "With
practically all of her foreign business gone except that with her big
neighbor to the north and with that big neighbor in need of many of the
things Mexico can supnly, the situation is one that produces a spirit of
cooperation based on practical grounds to which idealistic grounds may
2
well be a complement."
In each specific area where collaboration took place it was mutually
beneficial. President Camacho allowed Mexican laborers to go to the
United States because American farmers and railroads were experiencing
manpower shortages and because Mexico was suffering through a period of
high unemployment. The poor material condition of the Mexican railroads
and the United States need for strategic materials which had to be
transported by these railroads prompted the Roosevelt Administration to
dispatch the Railway Mission to Mexico. The strategic minerals purchase
agreements provided American defense industries with raw materials and
the Mexican Treasury with badly needed foreign exchange. Each cooperative
effort can be explained in this manner.
James W. Gerard, United States Ambassador to Germany prior to the
outbreak of hostilities in Europe, in testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on January 30, 1941, predicted that should Britain
fall, Germany would seize Mexico. President Camacho knew that if
either Germany or Japan attempted an invasion of his country American
2The New York Times, editorial by Edwin L. James, April 26, 1942.
3The New York Times , January 31, 1941.
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troops would be rushed into Mexico to defend the Hemisphere. The movement
of foreign troops across the border would infringe upon Mexican sovereignty
and independence, but Mexico could not and would not want to prevent
American armed forces from repelling the invasion. The Mexican President,
who really gave no thought to cooperating with the Axis , decided it
would be in Mexico's interest to begin a program of military collaboration
with the United States as soon as possible, and before any foreign power
attempted to seize his country. Thus, if a real crisis did occur, the
average Mexican would view the entrance of American troops as a demon-
stration of military assistance from one ally to another rather than the
occupation of a neutral neighbor. Mexico therefore authorized American
use of designated air and naval facilities, but it was not until after
German submarines had sunk two Mexican tankers in the spring of 1942 that
her leaders seriously considered committing a military force to engage
the enemy.
It is interesting to consider the question of whether such close
collaboration would have taken place without the impetus supplied by
World War II. Although the opposing position can be defended, it is felt
that a significant amount of cooperation, although probably not as much
as actually occurred, would have characterized United States-Mexican
relations in the early 1940' s even had a global conflict not been waged.
It is important to note that in early 1941 Government officials on both
sides were sincerely interested in ameliorating the often stormy relation-
ship that had existed between their countries at least since 1910. This
is an important consideration since the international situation in 1917
^Uarry I. Stegmaier, Jr., "From Confrontation to Cooperation: The
United States and Mexico 1938-1945," an unpublished dissertation presented
at the University of Michigan in 1970, pp. 195-196.
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and 1918, although equally as dangerous to the security of the Hemisphere,
did not draw the two neighbors together because the Mexican Government
was not interested in collaboration with the United States.
It was most fortunate that the men directing the international
affairs of Mexico and the United States during the war years were dedi-
cated to initiating and maintaining a special friendship between their
respective countries. Without the fortuitous circumstances that provided
such determined statesmen devoted to a policy of reconciliation and
cooperation, such close collaboration would not have taken place.
Manuel Avila Camacho succeeded La'zaro Cifrdenas as President of
Mexico in December, 1940, and from the moment he took the oath of office
he considered his primary international goal was to lay to rest the many
problems that had plagued the relationship between his country and the
United States. He was primarily concerned with settling the petroleum
and agrarian claims issues. His initiatives produced immediate results,
and by the spring of 1942, Dr. Diogenes Escalante, Chairman of the
Governing Board of the Pan American Union, in welcoming Mexican Foreign
Minister Padilla to the organization's headquarters, stated that as a
result of the efforts of President Camacho, relations between Mexico and
the United States were more cordial than at any time in history.
Ambassador Messersmith wrote to Secretary Hull in 1942 about several
conversations he had had with Camacho. "I want even more particularly to
tell you," Messersmith wrote, "that the President here is for us, and
for Mexico and for the Americas, a Rock of Gibraltar. He is very sound,
serene, and considered. He has made up his mind some time since that the
future of Mexico lies in close cooperation with us in every field. He is




firmly convinced that the victory of the Axis would mean the loss of
everything to Mexico.'
Over the years Messersmith' s opinion of President Camacho did not
change. Almost two years after his letter to Hull he relayed his
impression of the Mexican Chief Executive to President Roosevelt. The
Ambassador wrote:
There is an old saving that comparisons are invidious,
but I do believe, from the knowledge which I have, that
there is no Chief of State in the other American Republics
who is a sounder and firmer and more convinced friend
of our country than President Avila Camacho. .. .Presi-
dent Avila Camacho has often said to me that one of the
principal things he wants to accomplish during his term
of office is to consolidate friendly relationships with
the United States and collaborate with us in the politi-
cal and economic field and to do it in such a way that
any successor of his will be practically certain to
follow in that path.
7
Camacho chose as his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ezeauiel Padilla,
whom Messersmith evaluated as "the most enlightened statesman in the
o
chancery of any Latin American country at the time." One American author
stated that Padilla did more than any other individual to gain acceptance
in Mexico and throughout Latin America for the policy of collaboration
with the United States. He wrote that it was impossible "to exaggerate
this man's contribution to the security of the western Hemisphere and,
in particular, to that of the United States."
6George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, June 25, 1942, Hull Papers,
Container 50, Library of Congress.
George S. Messersmith to President Roosevelt, June 29, 1944, Secre-
tary's File, Box 14, Roosevelt Library.
Q
Unpublished Memoirs of George S. Messersmith, Vol. 2, No. 17,
University of Delaware.
9Daniel James, Mexico and the Americas (New York: Frederic!; A.
Praeger, 1963), p. 351.
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Padilla was particularly concerned with the principle of hemispheric
solidarity. His remarks delivered at the Third Meeting of Consultation
of American Foreign Ministers held in Rio de Janeiro in January, 1942,
shocked many of his Latin American neighbors. "Japan's attack upon the
United States," he stated, "was not only an attack upon one American
nation, it was an attack by the totalitarian powers upon the democracies
of the world. The men who have fallen gloriously on Wake Island and in the
Philippines have not fallen to defend the honor of the United States
alone; they have fallen also to defend human liberty and the free destiny
of the Americas." The audience was stunned. Never before had a
Mexican official so eloquently praised American fighting men. Many
things had changed since the United States-Mexican War and the American
occupation of Veracruz.
A few days later Padilla again rose to speak before the Conference.
"We have come here not to argue with words of peace but to speak in
terms of continental security. .. .This is no time to defend national
wealth, it is a time for sacrifice. It would be ignoble to pretend that
others should defend the heritage of justice, the unity of America that
we so loudly advocate, while we shelter ourselves in selfishness and
false security. We are all of us in the same boat. Time will save none
of us alone. All of us on this continent shall be crushed together or
all of us saved beneath the banner of American unity."
Padilla 's remarks not only clearly indicated the path the Mexican
Government intended to follow, but served to influence the policy
decisions of several other Latin American countries during the critical






years of the war. In July, 1944, Secretary of State Hull gave a dinner
in Honor of the Mexican Foreign Minister while the latter was in
Washington for discussions with United States officials. In speaking of
his guest Hull stated: "I am delighted to say that the great country
from which you come has met every hope and every expectation of a good
neighbor in peace and in war. You, sir, have been one of the great
leaders. .. .As we moved into this crisis your country was on the alert at
the outset. .. .You awakened not only your country but Central America and
the countries to the South by your speech which rang out at Rio de
Janiero." 12
Padilla ardently supported the policy of close collaboration with the
United States until his resignation in July, 1945. Ostensibly he left
the Foreign Ministry to free himself to campaign for the presidency, but
actually he resigned because of the harsh criticism he received from the
Mexican public for cooperating with Secretary of State Stettinius in his
successful attempt to have Argentina invited to attend the United
Nations Conference in San Francisco. Public denunciation of his assis-
tance in the Argentine affair plus a heavy attack from the Left for
allegedly subserviating his Ministry to the State Department convinced
both Padilla and Avila Camacho that the former's resignation was required
if the President's policies were to receive popular support.
United States leaders in the 1930 's and early 1940 's also made
special efforts to promote Inter-American solidarity, and these efforts
undoubtedly contributed to the close wartime relations between their
country and Mexico. At Inter-American Conferences in Montevideo in 1933
and Buenos Aires in 1936 President Roosevelt renounced what previous
1 2
Statement of Cordell Hull at dinner in honor of Ezequiel Padilla,
July 8, 1944, Hull Papers, Container 96, Library of Congress.
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administrations had considered their right to intervene in the affairs
of other American countries, and he adopted a policy which came to be
known as the Good Neighbor Policy. When the Roosevelt Government refused
to use force in settling the petroleum controversy in 1938, Mexico and the
republics of Central and South America became convinced that the
President was seriously attempting to change United States policy through-
out the Hemisphere.
Shortly after Mexico had declared war on the Axis countries, Foreign
Minister Padilla, in a note to Ambassador Messersmith, wrote: "To the
factors which have contributed to a closer understanding between our
countries. .. it is only just to add and to give snecial mention to the
attitude of President Roosevelt who, in advocating and putting into
practice the Good Neighbor Policy, has achieved the unification of the
Republics of our Hemisphere....' Avila Camacho was perhaps Roosevelt's
greatest admirer and in his conversations with Messersmith he continually
referred to the 1943 Monterrey meeting with his American counterpart.
Shortly after Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, the Mexican President
expressed to President Truman his belief that the United States and the
world "had lost the greatest statesman it had ever produced."
Within the walls of the State Department there were many distinguished
officials who worked very hard to improve United States relations with
Latin America and promote a feeling of harmony within the Hemisphere.
Cordell Hull led the American contingent to the 1933 Montevideo Confer-
ence. At such meetings the head of the United States delegation normally
Ezequiel Padilla to George S. Messersmith, June 9, 1942, Messer-
smith Papers, Box III, Correspondence Folder B, University of Delaware,
^George S. Messersmith to Secretary of State, April 21, 1945,




sat back and waited for the Latin Americans to pay courtesy calls, but
Hull, shortly after his arrival in the Uruguayan capital, personally
visited the senior representative from each of the American Republics in
attendance. This gesture, however small, won for Hull the respect and
admiration of his Latin colleagues. Sumner Welles, possessor of a keen
intellect and sound judgment, was considered by many to be the real
architect of the Good Neighbor Policy. Others like Laurence Duggan,
Philip Bonsai and Herbert Bursley also contributed to the successful
collaboration that took place between Mexico and the United States during
the war years.
George Strausser Messersmith was perhaps the best American friend
that Mexico ever had, and he was surely, among United States officials,
the greatest supporter of unlimited cooperation between the two countries
during World War II. During his more than four years in Mexico he developed
a deep respect and admiration for President Camacho and Foreign Minister
Padilla, and he dedicated his every effort to press for the adoption of
policies by both Governments that would lead to continually increasing
degrees of collaboration between their countries.
Messersmith 's contribution to the "era of good feeling" between
the United States and Mexico in the early and mid-1940 's has been over-
looked by many historians, but in 1944 one writer convincingly stated:
Before the war, the Embassy and affiliated units
employed about 40 people, including the Ambassador.
Now, including the economic unit, the Embassy employs
850. Virtually all of them are professionals. George
Messersmith is not down here because he contributed
25 or 50 thousand dollars to someone's campaign fund,
but because lie has grown grey and broken his health
representing the United States in Latin America.
One of the first things he did after coming down
here was to insist that everyone connected with the
Embassy speak Spanish. ... He knows and respects the
Latin Americans and has become extraordinarily well-
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likcd in his short time there because of his frankness
and because he doesn't try to kid anyone. It is solely
through his pood offices and those of some of his assis-
tants that if in the future Texas and California planters
need Mexican labor they will get it. Texas will get
Mexican farm hands not because of Governor Stevenson's
good-will trip but because of Mexico's liking and re-
spect for George Messersmith and his people of the Embassy.
Let there be no doubt about it. 15
President Roosevelt did not underestimate the contribution made by
his Ambassador to the success of American policy in Mexico. In late
1943 he wrote to Messersmith: "I discern between the lines of the
reports that reach me that to you is due considerable credit for the
improvement in relations between Mexico and the United States during the
last two years. Keep up the good work!'
Gordon Connell-Smith in his book on the Inter-American system has
argued that the Good Neighbor Policy was a casualty of World War II.
Although this is not a completely accurate statement, it does contain a
certain amount of fact as it pertains to Mexico. By the end of the war
President Roosevelt had died, and Cordell Hull, Sumner Welles, and
Laurence Duggan had left the State Department. Ezequiel Padilla resigned
as Minister of Foreign Affairs effective July 12, 1945, and was replaced
by former Ambassador to the United States Castillo Najera who, while not
anti-American, was more closely allied with L^zaro Cardenas than Presi-
dent Camacho. George Messersmith departed from Mexico in May, 1946, to
become Ambassador to Argentina, and in December of that year Miguel
Aleman became. President of Mexico. Thus, during the period from late
1944 to late 1946 those officials who were primarily responsible for the
•^Harrv Sylvester, "Mexico and the War," Commonweal , Vol. 40
(June 30, 1944), pp. 246-250.
^President Roosevelt to George S. Messersmith, October 15, 1943,
Secretary's File, Box 14, Roosevelt Library.
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unsurpassed wartime cooperation between Mexico and the United States
vacated their positions and were no longer able to influence to any
degree the relations between their countries.
It was normal to expect that as the great global struggle drew to a
close many collaborative programs which owed their existence to the war
would be abandoned. This occurred, but a deterioration in the overall
relationship between the two countries was allowed to take place by
leaders, primarily in the United States, but also in Mexico, who did not
place as great an emphasis on close cooperation as had their predecessors.
Mexico, as well as the other Latin American countries, was annoyed when
her views were neither sought nor heeded by the United States and other
Big Powers at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco in the spring
of 1945.
Although the commitment of the 201 Air Squadron had a less than
negligible effect on the outcome of the war, most Mexicans were extremely
proud that their country was one of the two Latin American Republics to
actually engage the enemy during the war. When the unit returned to the
United States, plans were made for a grand celebration in Laredo, Texas
where the Mexican heroes would cross the border to their own country.
Several high-ranking Mexican Government officials met the unit as it
arrived in Laredo. William Prescott Allen, publisher of The Laredo Times
,
proposed that President Truman place a three-minute telephone call to
Laredo to congratulate the Mexican Squadron Commander on the performance
of his unit. Truman replied that he was too busy to make such a call,
and American officials refused to provide a train to carry the returning
squadron from the west coast of the United States to Mexico City. The
train took the fliers only as far as Laredo where they were forced to
carry their equipment across the border and rcboard a Mexican train for

-397-
the remainder of their journey. In all probability this would not have
occurred if President Roosevelt had lived, nor is it likely that in 1950
Avila Camacho and Roosevelt would have allowed the Reciprocal Trade
Agreement to be terminated had they been in office.
This does not mean that relations between the United States and
Mexico were permitted to deteriorate to their pre-war level. On the
contrary, the two countries have over the years cooperated in many areas,
but from the early 1950' s to the present, Mexico has been noted for her
independent foreign policy. Despite pressure from the United States,
Mexico was the only Latin American country that refused to sever diplo-
matic relations with Cuba in 1964.
Regardless of post-war events, Mexico and the United States
collaborated magnificently during the years of conflict. In July, 1944,
the State Department advised President Roosevelt: "Aside from the
efforts put forth by this Government, the success of our foreign policy
in support of the war effort among the American Republics has been
largely due to the support of Mexico and Brazil." One American author
described Mexico's assistance in this way:
Few North Americans realize the total contribution which
Mexico made during World War II. Its role was usually
undranatic and unpublicized , but on important economic,
military, and political fronts, Mexico's cooperation was
superb and its contributions were substantial.
It can truly be said that an "era of good feeling" existed between
State Department Memorandum to President Roosevelt, July 21, 1944,
State Department Records, NA, RG59.
Howard F. Cline, The United State s and Mexico (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1953), p. 271.
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Mexico and the United States during World War II and exerted a trenendous
influence on the conduct of foreign policy by these two neighbors during
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